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 The objective of this study is to provide a framework that allows for a holistic and 
integrated analysis of what will become, if they are not already, the two most significant 
determinants of foreign policy – the need for a fundamental change in the global energy 
system and the nature of major power competition within the international system. It 
specifically rejects the eco-modernist framing of the required energy transition as simply 
a technocratic challenge, and instead accepts the large-scale nature of the social, political 
and economic changes and disruptions that will be required. By framing these changes 
within the dynamic of great power competition, this study can provide unique insights 
into the possible dynamics of, and the nature of resistance to, such an energy transition.  
The requirement for a transition of the global economy toward low carbon energy 
sources has been evident since the first assessment report of the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN IPCC) in 1990. Thirty years later, and 
with anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) over 60% higher than in 1990, the 
prospects for such a transition are still open to question due to the ongoing inability of the 
leading nations to address the issue in a timely manner and with an adequate scale and 
scope of action. In the same timeframe, the international system has been fundamentally 
changed, firstly by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and then by the rise of China, and in 
recent years by the return of great power conflict. This study argues that the energy 
transition and the configuration of the international system are interdependent, with both 
negative and positive possible interactions that must be analyzed in an integrated fashion.  
 Cox’s historical materialist methodology provides a framework for understanding 
the processes of such large-scale change over time to the world order, and within 
 v 
individual nation states. The effect of the resulting international and domestic 
configurations upon state foreign policy processes can be captured within the neoclassical 
realism of such researchers as Christensen, Lobell, Ripsman, Schweller, Taliaferro and 
Toje. The selection of the long-term domestic variables of strategic culture and Cox’s 
state/society complex (viewing the state and society as an integrated complex rather than 
as separate social realms) provides this study with a longer-term view than many of the 
tactically oriented neoclassical realist analyses.  
 The eco-modernist assumptions that underlay much of the social science literature 
on the possibility of an energy transition, together with assumptions of unbroken 
exponential economic growth, are problematized given the fundamental framing effect 
that they have upon academic and policy discussions. 
 Three nation-state case studies are utilized, China, the USA and Russia, to 
analyze the possible alignment and misalignment of the international system, and 
individual nation-states, with the transition to a low carbon economy within the 
timeframes proposed by the UN IPCC. The core question raised is the possible 
irreconcilability between continued economic growth combined with great power 
competition and embedded fossil fuel interests, and the international cooperation and the 
limited growth required for an energy transition within a timeframe compatible with 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Climate Change and the Need for an Energy Transition 
 
 The First World Climate Conference of 1979 was the pivotal event for the start of 
global climate research and governance, with the next decade constituting a period of 
framing the problem in scientific and policy terms (Gupta 2010). Bodansky, Brunnee & 
Rajamani (2017) see the latter half of this period as being one of policy agenda setting 
(1985-1988) followed by pre-negotiation (1988 to 1990), including the publication of 
Our Common Future (WCED 1987) and the testimony of James Hansen to the U.S. 
Congress in 1988 (Shabecoff 1988). In 1992 the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UN FCCC) was adopted and opened for ratification. This was to provide the 
framework under which international climate agreements would be negotiated. The 
general objective of the UN FCCC as stated in article 2 was the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, with article 4.2., providing a non-
binding commitment to return anthropogenic emissions of GHGs to 1990 levels (UN 
1992). 
 Nearly three decades after the adoption of the UN FCCC, anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions are more than 60% higher (Global Carbon Project 2019). In 
1979 the atmospheric concentration of GHGs was the equivalent of 382 parts per million 
of carbon dioxide (ppm CO2e), in 2019 it was 500 ppm CO2e (NOAA 2020); the rate of 
change is now higher than in the 1980’s (3.6ppm per year vs. 3.2ppm per year). With the 
US having rejected the 2015 Paris Agreement (the new Biden administration started the 
process of rejoining in early 2021), most other nations not implementing policies that 
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would match their Paris Agreement voluntary commitments (Climate Action Tracker 
2019), and China and India only committed to peaking emissions prior to 2030 (China’s 
recent commitment to “carbon neutrality” by 2060 does not alter this), the probability of 
extremely disruptive climatic changes are becoming increasingly likely. The longer that 
the international community delays substantive actions, the greater and more difficult 
policy actions will become, and the more difficult it will become for the international 
community to act together for the greater good. Such a dynamic could produce 
dysfunctional and conflict-ridden reactions within and between nations which may 
significantly undermine the international community’s ability to act effectively in the 
face of a possible existential crisis. 
 With fossil fuels providing the energetic basis of society, and many nations 
heavily dependent upon fossil fuel rents, the replacement of fossil fuels may have 
significant ramifications both within the domestic arena and for the international system.  
Such complexities will tend to be exacerbated if the window for action is reduced due to 
the ongoing lack of substantive actions by the international community. The sheer scale 
and complexity, in technical, economic and sociological terms of the global energy 
system has been well documented by authors such as Smil (2010, 2017, 2017a), Hall and 
Klitgaard (2012) and Yergin (2011, 2020). 
The next section discusses the nature of the international system within which any 
energy transition will be implemented. 
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1.2. The Nature of the International System 
1.2.1. From Great Power Politics to Unipolar Moment to Great Power Politics 
 
 In 1991, just a year before the adoption of the UN FCCC, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed, resulting in a fundamental reorientation of the 
international system. Over the next decades the East European states of the Warsaw Pact, 
together with Albania and the new Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, were 
integrated into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Yugoslavia was also dismembered into separate states, with some of them also 
joining the EU and NATO. The USSR itself split into a number of successor states, with 
Russia pushed far away from Europe with the creation of the independent Baltic states, 
Belarus and the Ukraine. It was also separated from central Asia and the Middle East by 
the new states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Russia possessed only half the population of the USSR, 
and during the last decade of the twentieth century its economy was halved in size. 
Extensive deindustrialization produced an economy heavily dependent upon the 
production of fossil fuels, minerals and foodstuffs. The Soviet bloc as a threat, and 
counter example to, Western capitalism for over four decades simply faded away from 
the international scene. 
 Three years prior to the adoption of the UN FCCC, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) had weathered the Tiananmen Square crisis and was about to oversee two decades 
of economic growth that averaged over 10% per annum (doubling every seven years), 
transforming a country that had been poorer on a per capita basis than sub-Saharan Africa 
in 1978 into a middle income nation. With a population of 1.4 billion, such per capita 
income also brought its economy within reach of parity with that of the US. Growth of 
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over 7% per annum during the next decade then doubled the size of the Chinese 
economy, making it larger than the US on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.  
 With the collapse of the USSR, the US was faced with the “unipolar moment” and 
the assumed End of History (Fukuyama 1992) with capitalist liberal democracy assumed 
to have triumphed over all other ideologies. The First Iraq War and the US interventions 
in Yugoslavia were the first major foreign US interventions since the Vietnam debacle. 
After the 9/11 attack, US foreign policy took on an even more militaristic tone with the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, together with a “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) that 
resulted in a massive increase in covert operations and the establishment of an extensive 
drone warfare program. The next decade brought the regime change operation in Libya 
and the transference of the Ukraine into the Western camp. With a rising China 
increasingly allied with a somewhat resurgent and independent Russia, and the US unable 
to force its will upon the Middle East, the unipolar moment may have now come to an 
end. 
 The unilateral retreat of the Soviet Union from the international scene, the rapid 
ascension of China within the international system, and the actions of the United States 
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc point to the need for theoretical structures that 
integrate both the international and the domestic. The three decades from 1990 to 2020 
may be seen as an interregnum between periods of great power politics. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union intensified the intellectual reassessment of the concept of security that 
had arisen during the 1970s and 1980s in response to “the intense narrowing of the field 
of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War” 
(Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, p. 2). This involved both a widening and a deepening 
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“in favour of deepening the referent object beyond the state, widening the concept of 
security to include other sectors than the military, giving equal emphasis to domestic and 
trans-border threats, and allowing for a transformation of the Realist, conflictual logic of 
international security” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p. 188). 
 Prior to this period the international system was dominated by the bipolar conflict 
between the US-bloc and the Soviet-bloc, after this period a new bipolar conflict between 
the less cohesive blocs centered on the US (e.g. the US, EU/NATO, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan) and China (with Russia, Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran) may 
become dominant. This study returns to the focus on the competition between great 
powers, while accepting that the international system is significantly more pluralistic than 
during the Cold War, reflecting the current ontological reality of the international system. 
1.2.2. The Nature of the State in the International System 
 
 Within the discipline of International Relations, realists view the referent object 
of security to be that of the nation state, with state-to-state relations representing the 
ontological core of any analysis. Such interactions are assumed to be of a generally 
utilitarian nature within a Hobbesian anarchic international system (or “world order” as 
preferred by Cox) with “every state for themselves”. The classical realism of such 
thinkers as Carr, Niebuhr and Morgenthau (and earlier thinkers such as Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Clausewitz), while differing “greatly from one another in assumptions, 
objectives and methodologies” (Gideon, p. 153), tended to stress the “objective laws that 
have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, p. 4), a nature that is inherently 
flawed and causes conflict through the non-congruence between the quests for power of 
competing nations. This was generally superseded by the neorealist approach in the 
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1970s, which stressed the dominance of the structure of the international system over the 
agency of the individual nation; the actions of individual “unitary, national states 
motivated by a desire for security” (Gideon 1998, p. 149) responding to the structure of 
the international system and their relative objective power positions. This was at the 
height of systems theory within the academy and borrowed heavily from a mainstream 
economics that viewed the individual as a rational unitary being motivated by a desire for 
utility. Neorealism can be either offensive (Mearsheimer 2003) – assuming that states 
seek security through the maximization of relative advantage, or defensive (Waltz 1979) 
– seeing the international system as somewhat less Hobbesian and more open to 
balancing security alliances. In the latter case, disruptive factors such as new military 
technologies and “rogue states that misread or ignore the true security-related incentives 
offered by their environment” (Rose 1998, p. 150) may interrupt the relatively benign 
international system. 
 Although neorealism is a parsimonious theoretical structure that can provide 
insights into possible state behavior within a given international systemic configuration, it 
has provided limited value with respect to explaining actual historical state behaviors. 
Neoclassical realists, while still making “relative [state] power their chief independent 
variable” and assuming “that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy 
by seeking to control and shape their external environment” (Ibid., p. 152), accept that 
states may not act as expected by neorealists due to intervening variables such as the 
subjective perceptions of their external environment and national political considerations:  
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 Proponents of neoclassical realism draw upon the rigor and theoretical 
 insights of … neorealism … without sacrificing the practical insights about 
 foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in … classical realism … 
 [it] assumes that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for 
 material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive 
 uncertainty. (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009, p.4) 
 
 States are not seen as like-objects but varying internally in ways that directly 
affect foreign policy decisions. They also acknowledge that foreign policy is made by 
actual human beings that are affected by personal and group-level biases, which may 
result in non-rational and inaccurate perceptions of geopolitical realities and the efficacy 
of different strategies (Christensen 1997). Such misperceptions may partly stem from an 
inability to adjust to changed circumstances, and flawed beliefs stemming from personal 
socialization and bureaucratic inertia. The former may be especially impactful during 
periods of significant international system reorganization – due to such things as new 
rising powers (e.g. the US at the start of the twentieth century and China at the start of the 
current century), the rapid deterioration of a systemically important one (e.g. the USSR at 
the end of the last century), and the recovery of a previously declining one (e.g. Russia in 
the past decade or so). The acceptance of internal political considerations also allows for 
the integration of the international and the domestic. The relative power and legitimacy 
of the state with respect to society is also an important intervening variable, as this will 
affect the ability of the state to utilize and direct national resources toward its objectives 
(Christensen 1997). Some of the more recent neoclassical realist work has moved away 
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from seeing the international system as the primary variable driving state behavior, 
proposing that the nature of the international system may exist on a spectrum between 
permissive (low level of imminent danger) and restrictive (high level of imminent 
danger), with the former allowing for a much greater impact from domestic factors. For 
example, the United States faced a more permissive environment in the 1950’s before the 
Soviet Union was able to build a significant intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal, and 
between the fall of the Soviet Union and the present day. That permissiveness may be 
rapidly declining with a growing China and a reinvigorated independent Russia. 
 While providing a nuanced and multi-perspective process for analyzing foreign 
policy decisions and options, neoclassical realists have been criticized for a non-
consistent choice of intervening variables, using different variables from one analysis to 
another. This may of course be seen as a reflection of the empirical “messiness” of social 
reality, which inhibits the usefulness of generalizable theories that purport to be 
applicable across nations and time. Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) organize the 
domestic intervening variables into four clusters: leader images, strategic culture, state-
society relations, and domestic institutions and extend the temporal range over which 
these variables can operate. The relative importance of these variables may change with 
each new nationally and temporally specific case; the particularity of the circumstances 
of a given nation at a given time is accepted within their analytical structuring. 
 This analysis utilizes the broader notion of strategic culture as “entrenched 
beliefs, worldviews, and shared expectations” (Ibid., p. 81) that “shape the strategic 
understanding of political leaders, societal elites, and even the general public” (Ibid., p. 
83). In addition, Cox’s concept of state/society complex (Cox 1981; Cox & Sinclair 
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1996) that subsumes state-society relations and domestic institutions will be used as an 
intervening variable.  Cox rejects the “distinction between state and civil society” which 
may have 
  
made practical sense in the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries when it 
corresponded to more or less distinctive spheres of human activity or practice … 
Today, however, state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts 
have become almost purely analytical … and are only vaguely and imprecisely 
indicative of distinct spheres of activity. (Cox 1981, pp. 126-127)  
 
This conceptualization supports the assumptions of the heterogeneity of states 
within the international system, with the possibility of a myriad of configurations of the 
state/society complex. It also supports the possibility that a given state/society complex 
may create a state interest that is very different to the national interest, as proposed by 
van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016) in their study of the integration of US grand strategy 
and corporate elite networks. In the more collective decision-making structures of most 
modern nations, such as the US and China, leader images may be subsumed under the 
strategic culture category; a specific leader may create tactical, but not long-term 
strategic, changes in foreign policy. The exception, reflecting the caution with which any 
analytical framework needs to be utilized, may be that of Russia – specifically Vladimir 
Putin. This possibility will be reviewed in detail in the relevant chapter. 
 What is also required is a theory of longer-term change with respect to both the 
global system and within individual nations. The historical materialism utilized by Cox 
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envisages state/society and global system configurations as being historical structures, a 
“particular combination of thought patterns, material conditions, and human institutions 
which has a certain coherence among the elements” that “constitute the context of habits, 
pressures, expectations, and constraints within which action takes place” (Cox 1981, p. 
135) and are “limited in their applicability to time and space” (Ibid., p. 137). The 
currently fluid conditions, both between the dominant and rising powers, and in the 
energetic basis of the economy, produce a “condition of uncertainty in power relations” 
that “beckons to critical theory” (Ibid., p. 130) that “does not take institutions and social 
and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with 
their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Ibid., p. 
129). Historical materialism provides such critical theory that views the world through a 
political economy lens, examining “the connections between power in production, power 
in the state, and power in international relations” (Ibid., p. 135). Strategic culture can be 
seen as a product of a nation’s historical and present state/society complex 
configurations, with a specific focus on elites with respect to foreign policy decisions and 
orientations; elites that may be as much focused on their own interest as the national 
interest: 
 
those actors who benefit from a change in the social system and who gain power 
to effect such change will seek to alter the system in ways that favour their own 
interests. (Gilpin 1981, p. 9) 
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 The strategic culture focus on elite strategy makers also provides a balance with 
Cox’s focus on larger political economic forces. The specificity and contingency inherent 
in such elite groups, and even an individual such as Vladimir Putin, can have significant 
impacts not foreseen by a purely historical materialist approach. The historical examples 
of Stalin and Mao bear this out. 
 The next section covers the way in which fossil fuel energy and assumptions of 
continued economic growth are central to the economic, social and political realities of 
modern societies. 
1.3. Fueling the Economic Growth Imperative 
1.3.1. Economic Growth Required For State Legitimacy and Social Stability 
  
 In the post-WW2 period economic growth has become a sine qua non of state 
legitimacy, even more so from the last decade of the twentieth century as the ideological 
supports of communism and socialism were removed from the Soviet-bloc, China and 
India. With the rejection of the ‘License Raj” in India in the early 1990s, the post-
Tiananmen Square Chinese state compact of growth without political liberalization, and 
the recovery of Russia from the disastrous 1990s, approximately half of humanity has 
been added to the growth equals state legitimacy fold; as long as personal incomes 
continue to rise, the state can claim its right to govern. Added to this dynamic is the 
pressure of an international system full of growing economies. To not grow is to rapidly 
fall behind in economic scale and the resultant relative power; the dynamics of great 
power competition only add to the intensity of this pressure for continued growth. 
 In the past few decades, industrialized societies have also become increasingly 
dependent upon continued economic growth for social, economic and political stability as 
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financial markets, property values, retirement plans, corporate incentives, insurance 
policies and long-term state budgets have become structurally dependent upon 
assumptions of unbroken future economic growth (Boyd 2014). The rapid growth of 
financial markets in relation to the economy in the United States and United Kingdom 
and many other nations, together with extensive deregulation and globalization, has 
created a global financial system that has been repeatedly shown to be prone to abrupt 
non-linear behavior. As a complex social system, the global financial system displays the 
same bounded resilience that many complex ecological systems display (May, Levin & 
Sugihara 2008; Boyd 2014). Within certain limits of variability the system can maintain 
its integrity, utilizing negative feedback and adaptability mechanisms to regulate toward 
equilibrium, but when those limits are broken positive feedback loops can rapidly move 
the system to a very different state (Sornette 2002, 2003); such events in the financial 
markets are referred to as “crashes”. The progressive integration and increasing 
complexity of global financial markets, together with increases in market concentration, 
has increased the risk of such cascading systemic collapses (Goldin, Mariathasan, Georg 
and Vogel 2014). Even just the prospect of a contraction in the economy can have a large 
negative impact upon the financial markets, possibly creating a positive feedback loop 
between the financial system and the economy. This is the ledge that state policy makers 
looked over in 2008 before launching their global multi-trillion-dollar bailout. States will 
carry out previously unthought of interventions in the economy to forestall the positive 
feedback loop between falling asset prices and economic contraction; as seen once again 
during the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. With both markets and eco-systems displaying non-
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linear behavior, and the former existing within the latter, there is also the possibility for 
the compounding effects of coupled non-linear behavior at different scales. 
 Social welfare may cease to grow above a given level of GDP per capita, after 
which other factors such as social inequality become central (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). 
Unfortunately, the structure and dynamics of political, economic and financial systems at 
national, regional and global scales, together with inter-state competition, preclude an 
unforced movement away from the growth paradigm. 
1.3.2. Energy and Economic Growth: Eco-Modernism to the Discursive Rescue 
 
 The scale of energy use accelerated rapidly with industrialization, utilizing the 
fossil fuels of first coal and then oil and natural gas (Huber 2009; Yergin 2011; Hall & 
Klitgaard 2012; McNeill and Engelke 2014; Angus 2016; Smil 2017). Their utilization 
freed humanity from the constraints of the ongoing flow of solar energy, through the 
geological and geochemical processes that had converted millions of years of solar 
energy into concentrated reservoirs of coal, oil and natural gas. The availability of this 
concentrated energy also facilitated the building of other energy sources, such as 
hydroelectric dams and nuclear power stations, but these non-fossil fuel sources have 
always been an adjunct to the vast majority of energy supplied by fossil fuels (Smil 
2017a). Even with the installation of increasing amounts of renewable energy sources in 
the past decade, fossil fuel use has continued to increase (IEA 2020). As the burning of 
fossil fuels is the predominant source of anthropogenic GHG emissions, those emissions 
have also continued to grow (UNEP 2020). In addition, the provision of fertilizers 
through the fossil fuel fed Haber-Bosch process has resulted in large increases in 
agricultural emissions and deforestation. 
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 If economic growth is assumed to be a constant and such growth requires 
increasing amounts of fossil fuel derived energy how can anthropogenic GHG emissions 
be reduced? How can the circle be squared? A fundamental belief in the ability of applied 
human ingenuity, technology, to fix any problem is the ruling discourse that allows for a 
belief in continued economic growth combined with reductions in anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. At the core of this belief is the theory of eco-modernism, which proposes that 
a process of ecological modernization inherent to a reflexive market economy (Beck 
1992; Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994; Beck, Bonss & Lau 2003; Beck 2007; Mol, 
Sonnenfeld & Spaargaren 2009) will proactively respond to such ecological challenges – 
in this case decoupling energy (and generally material) use from economic growth. A 
relative decoupling, with energy use increasing at a lower rate than economic growth has 
been observed, but not an absolute decoupling. With energy use continuing to increase, 
installations of renewable energy have been unable to even offset the annual increases in 
energy use, let alone reduce the use of fossil fuels. Unless absolute decoupling can be 
attained, significant reductions in fossil fuel usage in the timeframes envisaged by the UN 
IPCC scenarios may not be reconcilable with continued global economic growth. The 
technocratic basis of eco-modernist approaches also tends to ignore the large-scale social 
and political challenges inherent to the destruction of the majority of the current energy 
system and related social, economic and political structures. 
 The 2014 UN IPCC report utilized speculative eco-modernist assumptions of 
massive levels of GHG emission capture and storage, with no basis in the reality of 
current technological capabilities, to reconcile continued economic growth and falling net 
GHG emissions. With the continuing growth in the levels of atmospheric GHGs and 
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anthropogenic emission levels, the scale of the eco-modernist assumptions upon future 
speculative technologies must increase to square the circle. If such technologies fail to 
materialize on the scale necessary, the next eco-modernist move may be towards the 
direct geo-engineering of the climate system through global-scale Solar Radiation 
Management (SRM) technologies.  
 The theory that a decoupling of economic growth and energy usage can be 
attained at the global level has no empirical basis (see the section The False Promise of 
Absolute Decoupling of Growth and Fossil Fuels). Proposed technologies to either 
remove and store GHGs or reduce the level of solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface 
are highly speculative and the subject of many possible technical shortcomings and 
negative side effects. The maintenance of the belief in the efficacy of such answers to the 
predicament of reconciling continued economic growth with reductions in the level of 
atmospheric GHGs is an extremely risky one that may lead into a period of climate policy 
crisis that may drive extreme and highly disruptive policy outcomes. In the meantime the 
belief in eco-modernist answers allows policy makers to place the energy transition well 
behind many more “urgent” issues. 
 Given the scale of the current predominantly fossil-fuel based energy system, 
without which the material base of modern societies would not be possible, together with 
the extensive embedded dependencies throughout the industrialized nations, a low-carbon 
energy transition will have large-scale economic and political impacts; impacts that 
technocratic approaches such as eco-modernism tend to substantially underestimate. 
Historical materialism assumes a linkage between changes in the organization of 
production and changes in social forces which then affect the structure of states and 
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consequentially the international system (or “world order” as preferred by Cox). For 
example, Anievas (2014) identifies the uneven rates of industrialization between states 
prior to World War One as creating significant changes in the relative power positions of 
the major European states. Given the extreme dependence of many states upon fossil fuel 
export revenues, and the myriad of industries that will be affected by a low-carbon 
energy transition, the impacts upon individual states and the international system as a 
whole may be significant. 
1.4. Significance of This Study 
 
 The objective of this study is to provide a framework that allows for a holistic and 
integrated analysis of what may become, if they are not already, the two most significant 
determinants of foreign policy – the need for a fundamental change in the global energy 
system and the nature of major power competition within the international system. It 
specifically rejects the eco-modernist framing of the required energy transition as simply 
a technocratic challenge, and instead accepts the large-scale nature of the social, political 
and economic changes and disruptions that will be required. By framing these changes 
within the dynamic of great power competition, this study can provide unique insights 
into the possible dynamics, and the nature of resistance, to such an energy transition. It 
also explicitly explores the applicability of strategic culture and historical materialist 
state/society constructs with respect to both energy and foreign policies, with exceptions 
identified. 
1.5. Research Question and Case Study Selection 
 
 The assumption of this study is that the challenges of a geopolitical system 
undergoing fundamental change in the balance of states and an energy system requiring a 
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comprehensive restructuring are not independent and will interconnect in a complex and 
bi-directional fashion that will act to complicate the reactions of the global community to 
both. To address this assumption, I construct an integrated framework and test that 
framework utilizing three case studies: 
 
• China: The rising power that challenges the US dominance of the international 
system. The largest emitter of GHGs, as well as the largest producer and 
consumer of coal, the sixth largest producer of fossil fuels, and the biggest oil and 
natural gas importer. The leading nation in the production and utilization of low 
carbon technologies. 
• United States of America: The dominant power within the international system, 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The second largest emitter of 
GHGs and the largest producer of fossil fuels. 
• Russia: A significant regional power and increasingly allied with China in 
opposition to the US. Possesses a nuclear arsenal only second to that of the US. 
The fifth largest emitter of GHGs (after China, US, EU28 and India), and also the 
second largest producer and the largest exporter of fossil fuels. 
  
 Together, these three nations are the dominant powers with respect to nuclear 
arsenals and military might. In addition, they represent nearly half of global GHG 
emissions and are the first, second and sixth biggest producers of fossil fuels. Russia is 
the largest exporter of fossil fuels, and China the largest importer of oil and natural gas. 
China and the US are also the largest economies. China is the largest producer and 
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consumer of low carbon technologies, with the US in a somewhat less advantaged 
position, and Russia a significant laggard. This combination of economic and military 
power, fossil fuel production and use, contrasting positions with respect to fossil fuel 
import and export dependency, and differing positions with respect to the production and 
use of low carbon technologies, together with the competitive relationship between the 
US and China plus Russia, provides a good set of cases with which to test the 
applicability of the proposed framework and therefore validity of the research question. 
 The European Union is not seen as possessing an independent foreign policy 
orientation, especially with the majority of its members being part of a US-dominated 
NATO. Japan also falls within the US security umbrella and has a significant US military 
presence on its territory. India has a population on the scale of China, but has not been 
able to develop the social and political institutions to drive the required constant 
upgrading of capabilities that China has been able to maintain. The recent turn to a 
fascistic religious-nationalism and the dominance of oligarchic power (Andersen & 
Damle 2019; Chatterji, Hansen & Jaffrelot 2019; Roy 2020) does not bode well for the 
development of such capabilities. Given these concerns, and the diversity of attributes of 
the selected three nations, a case study on India is not seen as necessary for the testing of 
the proposed framework. 
1.6. Chapter Outlines 
 
 The Conceptual Framework chapter (chapter 2) utilizes previous research in the 
areas of Climate Change, Eco-modernism, and Security Studies to construct the 
conceptual framework that will be utilized for the case studies.  
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This is followed by the three Case Study Chapters (chapters 3, 4 and 5) that utilize 
the framework to study the specific cases of China, the US, and Russia respectively. 
China is intentionally placed first to reflect the historical length and scale of its 
civilizational project that significantly overshadows that of Western civilization (of which 
the US is the vanguard). This reverses the euro-centric and liberal-centric 
conceptualizations of Western civilization as the universal standard to which others 
should aspire, as well as accepting that multiple conceptualizations of modernity may 
exist. Western civilization is provincialized as specific rather than universal. 
The final Conclusion chapter (chapter 6) provides a review of the applicability of 
the proposed framework, possible areas for future research and lessons learnt with respect 
to the joint energy and geopolitical transition. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework  
2.1. The False Promise of an Absolute Decoupling of Growth and Fossil Fuels 
 
The scale and complexity of any organism, whether it is an individual or a 
combination of many organisms (e.g. a bacteria, an ant hill or a human society), is 
dependent upon the supply of energy to that organism; increases in scale and complexity 
tend to require increases in energy inputs (Tainter 1988; Zotin & Pokrovskii 2018; Smil 
2019). Following from this, economic growth and development require that energy and 
other resources be extracted from the environment to manufacture goods, provide 
services, and create capital; “The central role of energy is substantiated by both theory 
and data” (Brown et. al 2011, p. 19). Prior to the industrial revolution, and the 
exploitation of fossil fuels, human societies were limited by their ability to harness the 
energy of the sun through photosynthesis for food and animal feed, conversion of that 
energy to heat through fire, and to a much lesser extent watermills and windmills (Hall & 
Klitgaard 2012; Smil 2017). The history of human civilization prior to the eighteenth 
century is one of repeated developments of complex societies, followed by repeated 
collapses of those societies. Morris (2011) developed an index of social development and 
noted that only three civilizations could be identified as reaching the low 40s on his 
index: those of the Roman Empire, the Song Dynasty, and modern civilization. About six 
hundred years separate the first two, and five hundred years the latter two. Morris notes:  
 
If someone from Rome or Song China had been transplanted to eighteenth century 
London or Beijing he or she would certainly have had many surprises ... Yet 
more, in fact much more would have seemed familiar ... Most important of all, 
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though, the visitors from the past would have noticed that although social 
development was moving higher than ever, the ways people were pushing it up 
hardly differed from how Romans and Song Chinese had pushed it up. (Ibid., p. 
482). 
 
This quickly changed with the exploitation of coal from the late eighteenth-
century, “A long-term perspective shows virtually no growth of major economies before 
1750, and accelerated growth in the frontier (that is the richest Western) economies, in 
the UK after 1750 and the US a century later” (Smil 2019, sources of economic growth 
para. 13). By “about 1870 [humans] used more fossil fuel energy each year than the 
annual global production from all photosynthesis” (McNeill & Engelke 2014, p. 9). In the 
twentieth century human energy use increased by a factor of eight and has continued to 
increase in the twenty-first century. Oil, and then natural gas, was increasingly added to 
coal usage as the twentieth century progressed. These fossil fuels represent the 
cumulative energy produced by hundreds of millions of years of photosynthesis, 
removing the energy constraint that had limited the scale and complexity of human 
civilizations; “growth since the industrial revolution has been driven largely by the 
increased stock of capital and the adequate supply of useful energy due to the discovery 
and exploitation of relatively inexpensive fossil fuels” (Ayres & Voudouris 2014, p. 27). 
The resultant phenomenal scale, and historically atypical nature, of energy usage in 
modern societies is a little-discussed fact within the dominant social discourses. Instead, 
it tends to be an assumed part of a common sense that is not questioned or problematized 
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within such areas as mainstream economics and sociology, together with society in 
general.  
When looking at the determinants of economic growth, mainstream economists 
see such growth as a function of labor, capital and technology, as with the widely used 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Little or no role is given to natural resources, 
including energy, with technology being assumed as being responsible for the majority of 
economic growth that cannot be accounted for by labor and capital. When reviewing the 
economic literature for the explanation of the residual economic growth once the inputs 
of labor and capital had been removed, Ayres & Warr (2009, p. 159) note “The 
unexplained residual is usually attributed to a homogeneous stock of technological 
‘knowledge’ that grows (by assumption) smoothly and automatically, due to factors 
outside the economy”.  Such assumptions are repeated through many highly influential 
economic texts. Although Denison (1968, p.5), “tries to give explicit consideration to the 
largest possible number of factors affecting growth” no reference to energy can be found 
in the book index. In the extremely brief chapter on “Land and Natural Resources” (Ibid., 
pp. 180-186), fossil fuel energy is included with all other minerals production (e.g. iron 
ore, copper etc.) and counted in US$ rather than in units of energy. Solow (2000, p. xii). 
states that, “the permanent rate of growth of output per unit of labor … depends entirely 
on the rate of technological progress in the broadest sense”. Samuelson and Scott (1966, 
p. 780) can note “inventions which helped to drain swamps or to grow more food on the 
same acres of land” without taking any account of the increases in energy usage required 
by those inventions (and the availability of natural gas for the production of cheap and 
plentiful nitrogen fertilizers). They then surmise that “facts suggest the hypothesis that 
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capital accumulation is second to technical change in explaining rising productivity” 
(Ibid., p. 791); again, no mention of the increased usage of energy required to utilize that 
technical change. This fits within what Dunlap and Catton referred to as the “Human 
Exemptionalist Paradigm” (HEP), that views humanity as exempt from environmental 
limits due to the unlimited possibilities of human technology (Dunlap & Catton 1994). 
The position of mainstream economics with respect to energy has not changed 
substantially in over half a century, with even the work in the sub-field of Resource 
Economics not altering the assumptions held across the discipline, as Stern (2011, p. 26) 
notes “Resource economists have developed models that incorporate the role of 
resources, including energy, in the growth process, but these ideas remain isolated in the 
resource economics field”; a position supported by other researchers such as Ayres & 
Warr (2009). Mainstream economists continue to assume “that there are only two 
important ‘factors of production’ and that energy and other natural resource inputs 
contribute very little to the economy” (Ayres & Voudouris 2014, p. 16). This viewpoint 
has become widely embedded within popular culture with authors such as Simon (1981, 
1996) and Naam (2013) popularizing the ability of human technology to drive economic 
growth irrespective of exogenous factors such as the availability of energy. Smil has 
pointed out that although “civilization is the product of incessant large-scale combustion 
of coals, oils, and natural gases … for many decades, the fundamental link between the 
rising use of energies and the growing complexity and greater affluence of human 
societies was overlooked by both the public and the policymakers” (Smil 2010, 
introduction para. 1).  
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The empirical research of Ayres and Voudouris (2014) contradicts the dominant 
discoursal common sense that assumes infinite growth independent of energy and 
material limits, pointing to a fundamental and irrevocable causal relationship between 
energy, especially cheap fossil fuel energy, and economic growth since the industrial 
revolution. This conclusion is supported by the work of Hall & Klitgaard (2012), Ayres 
& Warr (2009), Ayres et. al. (2013) and Smil (2010, 2017, 2017a). “In contrast to the 
neoclassical economic model … The real economic system can be viewed as a complex 
process that converts raw materials (and energy) into useful materials and final services. 
Evidently materials and energy do play a central role in this model of economic growth” 
(Ayres & Warr 2009, p. xviii). In addition, reductions in energy costs are seen as having 
offset the increased energy required for the extraction of rapidly declining mineral ore 
grades due to depletion (Bardi 2014), “By using larger and larger amounts of available 
energy we can sift copper out from poorer and poorer ores … But the energy cost of 
mining low-content ores increases very fast” (Georgescu-Roegen 2011, p. 67). Greater 
energy usage is therefore linked directly to greater social welfare and general notions of 
progress (Hall & Klitgaard 2012; Smil 2017); supported by the exponential growth in 
energy usage in the post-WW2 period as the global economy entered a still continuing 
phase of exponential growth (McNeill & Engelke 2014).  
A significant proportion of the advances in human technology can be seen as both 
dependent upon concentrated energy availability (e.g. coal to heat water into a gas within 
an atmospheric engine) and facilitating increased usage of that energy (atmospheric 
engine water pumps used in coal mines) in a synergistic fashion. The later usage of diesel 
(derived from oil) and electric (using electricity from coal-fired electricity generating 
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stations) engines in coal mining were later refinements. Technology becomes not simply 
a substitute for energy usage, but both dependent upon greater energy availability and a 
facilitator of greater energy usage. The internal combustion engine was dependent upon 
the availability of an energy-dense liquid fuel (oil) and facilitated an exponential increase 
in the use of that fuel; “while the worldwide car sales were less then 100,000 vehicles in 
1908, they were more than 73 million in 2017, roughly a 700-fold increase” (Smil 2019, 
figures of merit para. 12), with significant possibilities for future growth outside the 
richer nations. The technology and capital investments that brought the provision of 
electricity were also dependent upon the availability of fossil fuels (coal and then natural 
gas) and produced an exponential growth in the usage of those fuels. Such social and 
economic phenomena fit with the Jevons Paradox or rebound effect (Jevons 1865; 
Polimeni et. al. 2008) that states that technological change that increases the efficiency 
with which a resource is used leads to an increase in consumption of that resource. 
This is seen at the global level, with reductions in energy use per unit of gross 
domestic product (GDP) of 1.6% per year since 2000 (Enerdata 2019) being offset by a 
GDP growth rate of over 3%, resulting in continued increases in energy usage. Even with 
gains in energy efficiency (a relative decoupling of energy usage and GDP growth), trend 
economic growth rates are still dependent upon increasing energy supplies. The same 
trend is seen for the U.S. economy from 1950 to 2005, during which “the energy 
efficiency of the economy nearly doubled … which had the effect of increasing the 
aggregate consumption of commercial energy in the US by almost three times!” 
(Polimeni et. al., p. 84). These findings parallel the findings of Ayres et. al. (2013) who 
propose that there is a high output elasticity with respect to energy in modern 
 26 
industrialized economies; i.e. significant reductions/increases in energy throughput will 
produce significant reductions/increases in economic output. With the rate of energy 
system decarbonization being negligible since 2000 (Enerdata 2019a), as the growth in 
renewable energy was more than offset by the growth in overall energy consumption, 
economic growth has been predominantly facilitated through an increased consumption 
of fossil fuels. Smil (2010 & 2017) has detailed how decarbonization of the energy 
supply may not be the “frictionless” process assumed in policy models and may be 
limited by complex social, economic and technical considerations. This is echoed by 
climate scientist Steffen, who considers that it will take at least 30 years and more likely 
40-60 years, to attain a net zero emissions global energy system (Moses 2020). 
Given the linkage between relative economic size and geopolitical power detailed 
by scholars (Anievas 2014; Kennedy 1987), the possibility of differing nation-specific 
GDP growth “speed limits” beyond which GHG emissions grow may take on geopolitical 
dimensions. Nyman (2018) has identified the possible conflict between the need for 
growth-supportive levels of energy provision in the short term and the need to 
decarbonize that energy provision for longer-term climate security. Short-term energy 
security is attained at the cost of longer-term climate insecurity. 
European environmental sociology that fits within the contemporary post-WW2 
modernist and functionalist sociological mainstream (e.g. Giddens, Latour and Urry) 
proposes the probability of a decoupling of economic growth and general resource usage 
through an ecological modernization inherent to a reflexive market economy (Beck 1992; 
Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994; Beck, Bonss & Lau 2003; Beck 2007; Mol, Sonnenfeld & 
Spaargaren 2009). As Foster notes “Looking at today’s ecological modernization theory, 
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it would be hard to miss the close family resemblance to earlier post–Second World War 
modernization theory” (Foster 2012, p. 216). As noted previously no such decoupling has 
been observed at the global level, nor for the US from 1950 to 2005. With respect to 
individual nations, a positive correlation between resource usage and economic growth 
has been observed across 186 countries when including the embedded resource utilization 
of net imports (Wiedman et. al., 2015). Research identifying absolute decoupling in some 
advanced industrial nations tends to utilize national production measures that ignore the 
effects of net imports. With the general globalization of supply chains, and therefore the 
possible off shoring of energy and other resource-intensive activities from richer to 
poorer nations, such exclusion undermines the validity of these reports. In essence: 
 
absolute decoupling measured by DMC [a production based indicator of resource 
usage], at the individual country level, may not indicate that resource use is 
actually decreasing with increasing income. It may just indicate that more 
material extraction has been off-shored. Developed nations experience an increase 
in imports of semifinished and finished products and a change in economic 
structure toward service economies, which add high value to the GDP. These 
trends make developed countries look more resource-efficient, but they actually 
remain deeply anchored to a material foundation underneath. (Ibid., p. 6275) 
 
 The sheer scale of the offshoring of resource extraction activities is shown by the 
estimation that “41% (29 Gt) of total global resource extraction was associated with 
international trade flows in 2008” (Ibid., p. 6275); rendering domestic production-based 
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measures of resource usage, including energy, as unreliable indicators. Going further, 
Ward et. al. (2016), conclude on the basis of simple modeling that “decoupling of GDP 
growth from resource use, whether relative or absolute, is at best only temporary. 
Permanent decoupling (absolute or relative) is impossible for essential, non-substitutable 
resources because the efficiency gains are ultimately governed by physical limits … 
growth in GDP ultimately cannot plausibly be decoupled from growth in material and 
energy use” (Ibid., p. 10). 
The measurement issues noted above can be seen in specific national energy 
usage statistics, with observed slight reductions in absolute energy usage in the richer 
nations of North America and Japan since 2000 (a trend reversed in the USA in 2018), 
and the EU28 since 2010, being the result of errors of omission inherent in the 
production-based measures utilized to arrive at these findings; Japan, the EU28 and the 
USA display the greatest differences between energy production and energy consumption 
measures (Kan, Chen & Chen 2019). Significant amounts of energy intensive activities, 
especially manufacturing, have been offshored to other nations such as China and 
Mexico. For example, in “Switzerland the energy embodied in imports has increased by 
80% between 2001 and 2011” (Moreau & Vuille 2018). With respect to the United 
States, Smil (2013) details the wholesale transplantation of significant energy-intensive 
industries, through both foreign competition and corporate offshoring, from the 1970’s 
onwards. The role of China as a major net exporter of embedded energy is detailed by Xu 
et. al. (2016), who state that “China’s net embodied energy exports reached the highest 
level with a volume of 652 MTOE in 2013, which accounts for nearly 30% of China’s 
total coal and oil consumption. And 91% of China’s total net embodied energy exports 
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are from manufacturing sectors. If net embodied coal & oil exports are considered, China 
is still an energy exporter” (Ibid., p. 1303). Such empirical issues are missed in “many 
forms of ecological modernization [that] suffer from an inability to grasp how affluent 
countries in the core zone are able to improve their environmental conditions through 
outsourcing the impacts of material extraction and disposal to the periphery” (White, 
Gareau & Rudy 2017, p. 29). In recent years, the rate of relative energy decoupling has 
been on an undulating plateau, with the energy intensity of global GDP declining by 
1.8% in 2016, 1.2% in 2017, 1.5% in 2018, and 2.1% in 2019; in the latter year 80% of 
the primary energy mix was still fossil fuels (Enerdata 2020).  
The ecological modernization hypothesis is somewhat akin to the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Stern 2004; Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang & Wheeler 2002) that 
proposes a decoupling of environmental impacts and economic growth at higher income 
levels. Both the ecological modernization and the EKC theories are seriously undermined 
by the analysis of both energy usage and CO2 emissions for the period 1971-2015 by 
Luzzati, Orsini and Gucciardi (2018, p. 619), who state “for the period 1971 -2001, there 
was some weak evidence of EKC” but “such a piece of evidence does not hold for the 
whole period 1971-2015, which includes the new wave of globalization”. Csereklyei and 
Stern (2015, p. 641) also find that “the most robust driver of growth in energy usage has 
been economic growth” and that “there is no sign of decoupling of economic growth and 
the growth of energy use at higher income levels”. Such findings also contradict the 
propositions put forward by some ecological economists (Daly 1996 & 2014) that 
qualitative development and quantitative growth can be separated once basic material 
needs have been met. Historically “all the most important processes of structural 
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transformation that the economic system has experienced, from the creation of a labor 
market … to the concentration of production in large factories … from colonial 
exploitation to postwar development policies … ending with consumerism and the 
financialization of the economy … have been supported and shaped by economic 
growth” (Bonaiuti 2011, p. 46); growth acts as a lubricant for change within society as 
the old is devalued and the new developed. 
Eco-modernist scholars have identified localized and limited examples of 
reflexive behavior, but have provided no evidence of such behavior leading to reductions 
in material and energy throughput at the global or national levels to support their theories, 
“empirical results from the cases studied are implicitly taken to have a general validity, 
but the research strategies applied are actually not able to support such claims” (Seippel 
2012, p. 299). In addition, European environmental sociology “draws heavily on the 
sociology of science and science and technology studies” with the result that “natural 
science arguments are rarely used authoritatively in European environmental sociology” 
(Lidskog, Mol & Oosterveer 2015, p. 347); empirical analysis is not accepted as an 
objective measure of theory. Instead of viewing human society and economy as a subset 
of nature, eco-modernists argue for the incorporation of nature within the economy (Mol 
1995 & 1996); human culture and technology being assumed to trump ecology. 
This is in contrast to a US environmental sociology founded in the 
environmentalist heyday of the 1970’s (Catton & Dunlap 1978 & 1978a) that calls for the 
inclusion of “biophysical variables in sociological analysis” and “is ‘dependent on’ 
natural science laws, calculations and materialities” (Lidskog, Mol & Oosterveer 2015, p. 
346). This is evident in the writings of Catton and Dunlap who state that “Neglect of the 
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ecosystem-dependence of human society has been evident in sociological literature on 
economic development … which has simply not recognized biogeochemical limits to 
material progress” and is in the “habit of neglecting laws of other sciences (such as the 
Principle of Entropy and the Law of Conservation of Energy) – as if human actions were 
unaffected by them” (Catton & Dunlap 1978, p. 43); a statement that could be directed at 
eco-modernist scholars four decades later. 
The approach in this text integrates both social and natural empirical study 
utilizing an approach of scientific realism “it is the task of philosophy to create ontologies 
of society, but in a society with extensive social research such ontologies should be made 
conditional on the results of the empirical study of society” and whenever “theory and 
empirical … research run into conflict, it is the metatheory … that needs to be changed” 
(Heiskala 2011, pp. 15-16). It is accepted that empirical study can be used to validate, or 
invalidate, social theory; the alternative is the “danger of replacing empirical social 
research with [ungrounded] metatheory” (Ibid., p.16). Therefore, it is assumed that eco-
modernism is an unproven theory that may require changes to match the results of 
empirical study. Although energy usage and carbon emissions relative to the size of the 
global economy have been reduced, and there are specific local case studies of absolute 
reductions, there is no proof of absolute reductions at the national or global levels.  It has 
not been proven that energy and fossil fuel usage can be significantly reduced in the 
context of a global economy growing at the rates experienced in this century. Such a 
finding is at odds with the common sense assumptions of continued exponential growth 
independent of energy supply and pollution limitations. Relative decoupling will be taken 
as a likely future reality, while absolute decoupling will be treated as an unlikely one. 
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Eco-modernism, and the related theories of Green/Natural/Ecological Capitalism 
(Hawken, Lovins & Lovins 1999; Lovins & Rocky Mountain Institute 2011; Berghof & 
Rome 2017) and the concept of Sustainable Development still hold a leading position 
within the societal discourse on growth and ecology, one that is not supported by 
empirical research. The belief that economic growth can be delinked from environmental 
degradation and resource usage was implicitly accepted by the United Nations with its 
concept of Sustainable Development (WCED 1987), and has also been popularized by the 
World Bank which stated that “The view that greater economic activity inevitably hurts 
the environment is based upon static assumptions about technology, tastes and 
environmental investments” (IBRD 1992). The dominant United Nations climate change 
discourse also assumes that ecological modernization will take place to decouple 
economic growth and energy usage and/or carbon emissions; energy systems will 
transition from fossil fuels to low carbon alternatives, new technologies will capture and 
sequestrate carbon, and a greater relative, or even an absolute, decoupling of energy 
usage and economic growth achieved (UN IPCC 2018). 
The staying power of such concepts, surviving lack of empirical support for more 
than three decades (and even longer in the case of mainstream economics), may be 
significantly due to their placement within a much longer utopian discourse of progress 
and modernism (Harlow, Golub & Allenby 2013). They reflect the political 
modernization theory that became dominant in the West in the post-WW2 period and that 
proposed “that a meliorist, rationalizing, benevolent, technocratic state was capable of 
solving all social and especially economic ills” (Gilman 2003, p. 56). Neoliberalism also 
seems to have been integrated into these concepts, as Foster notes (2012, p. 220), “the 
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emphasis of ecological modernization theory … seems to be shifting somewhat in recent 
years from public regulation by government to private authority in the governance of 
ecological flows” within which “the privatization of formerly public authority is seen as 
entirely consistent with ecological reform or regulation, since corporations, along with 
transnational authorities, such as the WTO, are said to be increasingly disposed toward 
private self-governance and self-regulation of environmental flows through voluntary 
measures in line with ecological rationality”. Beliefs that a combination of unfettered free 
markets and human ingenuity are capable of resolving fundamental social issues and 
limits, a utopian liberalism, emerged toward the end of the 18th century (Polanyi 2001). 
This utopian liberalism is reflected in the words of Beck (2010, p. 73), who states that, 
“Under a regime of ‘green capitalism’ composed of transnationally structured ecological 
enforced markets, ecology no longer represents a hindrance to the economy. Rather, the 
opposite holds: ecology and climate protection could soon represent a direct route to 
profits”. As with liberalism, communism is a modernist child of the Enlightenment and 
shares the belief in the unlimited capabilities of human organization and ingenuity. This 
is reflected in the major ecological problems created by the practice of communism in 
both Russia (Powell 1971; Kramer 1974) and in a China with a previous history of 
extensive ecological degradation (Shapiro 2001; Economy 2004; Elvin 2004). The 
discourse of progress and modernity is not just one of capitalism but a “greater problem 
of industrial civilization” (Polanyi 1968, p. 76), a paradigm that “is still a powerful 
device in civic debate” (Heiskala 2011, p. 15). To reject it is to reject the two major 
ideological discourses of the modern industrialized era.  
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In addition, the theories of Green/Natural/Ecological Capitalism and the concept 
of Sustainable Development are conceptually flexible enough to be ontologically defined 
by beholders with many differing utopian ideals. These theories can also be seen as a 
mainstream response (including from leading mainstream economists) to the anti-utopian 
messages arising in the 1970’s from such texts as Limits to Growth (Meadows et. al. 
1972) and The Population Bomb (Ehrlich 1968) and US environmental sociology, as well 
as a general increase in environmental awareness and the identification of the negative 
impacts of industrial civilization. The comment of Solow is telling “having, like everyone 
else, been suckered into the reading of Limits to Growth” and is representative of the 
approach of many mainstream economists and sociologists to what was seen as the overly 
pessimistic and anti-modernistic environmental discourses of the 1970’s that challenged 
some of the common sense assumptions of modern growth-oriented societies (Foster 
2012; Parenti 2012). Eco-modernism (and the various strands of sustainable capitalism 
and development), as with modernism, “is an expression of conformity to dominant 
institutions, which are seen as the very epitome of modern” (Foster 2012, p. 217) and 
thus serves as a theoretical and discoursal protection of the status quo against threatening 
theories and discourses. “It should hardly surprise us that there is very little difference 
between the language and emphases of today’s ecological modernization theorists, and 
the earlier stances adopted by post–Second War modernization theorists such as Bell, 
Lipset, and Nisbet, when entering the limits of growth debate” (Ibid., p. 219). 
With a new wave of development in nations such as India and Indonesia that are 
at an energy-intensive stage of development the possibility for any absolute global 
energy/GDP decoupling, or even acceleration in relative decoupling, may not be possible 
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for decades. The extremely high correlation between increased energy usage and 
increased social welfare in such low energy usage per capita nations will provide intense 
pressure toward increases in energy consumption. At the same time, there appears to be 
little appetite within the industrialized nations for offsetting reductions in energy usage. 
The still dominant modernist and eco-modernist discourses of human exemptionalism 
reinforce and support these trends. They also support a predominantly technocratic 
approach to issues of energy security and environmental pollution that fits well with the 
rationalist and technocratic approaches of neo-realist and liberal internationalist 
international relations traditions. 
As noted above, this research will assume that there may be a continued relative 
decoupling of economic growth and energy usage, but will reject absolute decoupling as 
an unreliable hypothesis. If global economic growth is to continue at the over 3% rate 
achieved in this century the result will tend toward increased energy (and quite possibly 
fossil fuel) consumption. As societies get wealthier, they may reduce the amount of 
energy (and other material) required per unit of GDP, but no absolute reduction in usage 
is achieved: 
 
Whilst the strength of the proportionality between consumption and impact 
decreases slightly towards higher incomes (measured by so-called elasticities), 
consumption was found to be a consistently positive driver. In other words, the 
impact intensity of consumption decreases, but absolute impacts increase towards 
higher consumption. Absolute decoupling, let alone  an inverted-U-type Kuznets 
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relationship, does not occur from a consumption-based accounting perspective. 
(Wiedman, Lenzen, Keysser & Steinberger 2020) 
 
This assumption is supported by the International Energy Outlook produced by 
the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), that forecasts an increase of 
nearly 50% in world energy consumption between 2018 and 2050 in its reference case, 
“with almost all of the increase occurring in non-OECD countries” (EIA 2019, p. 24); 
non-OECD countries include China, India, Indonesia and South East Asia. In the EIA’s 
forecasts, the growth in renewables is unable to offset the growth in energy usage, 
resulting in continued increases in fossil fuel consumption. The International Energy 
Administration (IEA) also forecasts increasing fossil fuel use, in this case to 2040. In the 
New Policies scenario that includes all new policies and targets announced by 
governments (an optimistic scenario given the mismatch between announcements and 
actions by many governments [Wilkes, Warren & Parkin 2018; Climate Action Tracker 
2019]), the growth in renewables cannot fully offset a growth in global energy usage of 
over a quarter by 2040 (IEA 2018).  
In the IEA’s eco-modernist Sustainable Development Scenario (IEA 2018) an 
approximate doubling in the rate of energy efficiency improvement offsets economic 
growth (i.e. zero energy consumption growth with over 3% global economic growth) and 
increases in electrification and renewables reduce fossil fuel use. It is notable that even in 
this scenario large-scale implementation of carbon capture, usage and storage 
technologies is required to meet GHG emission goals. Its assumption of a doubling in 
energy efficiency is also seriously undercut by the findings of the IEA 2020 report on 
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energy efficiency that found that “Since 2015, global improvements in energy efficiency 
… have been declining”, which is “especially worrying because energy efficiency 
delivers more than 40% of the reduction in energy-related greenhouse gas emissions over 
the next 20 years in the IEA’s Sustainable Development Scenario” (IEA 2020, p. 10). 
As discussed above, the probability of such an eco-modernist scenario will not be 
taken as a probable one; the assumptions in this research align significantly with the EIA 
reference case and IEA New Policies scenario. They also align with short-term (5-year) 
renewable energy industry association forecasts which see a slow growth of 2.7% per 
annum in net new global wind energy capacity (GWEC 2019) and a rapid deceleration in 
the annual growth of net new solar capacity from 12% in 2020 to 6% in 2023 
(SolarPower Europe 2019); the latter compares to approximately 25% as recently as 
2019. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 
2020 (UNEP 2020) has found that even consumption-based measures of GHG emissions, 
which include embedded-energy imports, have exhibited small reductions for the richer 
nations since the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). A major reason for this 
though has been the significantly reduced rates of growth in the EU28, US and Japan 
after the GFC. Even these reduced rates of growth may have been significantly over-
stated for a US that has aggressively utilized statistical changes to reduce the inflation 
rate (deflator) used to convert nominal into real GDP (therefore inflating its real GDP 
growth numbers [Williams 2013]), and included its large and growing fee-based financial 
sector as an economic output rather than as the intermediate cost that it had been 
previously considered to be (Assa 2017). In addition, there are significant concerns that 
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the positive GHG emissions effects of coal to natural gas switching in the electricity-
generation sector in many rich nations have been substantially over-estimated due to the 
under-counting of fugitive methane emissions related to natural gas extraction and 
distribution (McKibben 2016; Howarth 2019; Schneising et al 2020; Wheeler 2021). 
Given the above, the only avenue available to reduce GHG emissions at the 
required rate proposed by the UN IPCC would be a significant if not total reduction in 
global positive GDP growth combined with global-scale war-like efforts to transition to 
low carbon energy sources and increase energy efficiency. This would require an 
extremely high level of trust and coordination at the international level, including the 
possibility of richer nations making a greater contribution (e.g. wealth and technology 
transfers, negative growth) to make space for poorer nations to improve their populace’s 
living conditions. There would also need to be sanctions available against any “free-
riding” nations or non-state actors.  
The following section interrogates the international system with respect to the 
possibility of such cooperation. 
2.2. The Nature of the International System 
2.2.1. Neoclassical Realism, Strategic Culture and Coxian Historical Materialism  
 
 Neolassical realism came into being as a response to the shortcomings of 
neorealism (or structural realism) and the repeated occurrences of states acting in ways 
contradictory to what would be expected from a neorealist perspective. With neorealism 
Waltz placed the focus upon his third image, the anarchic international system with states 
as the most significant actors; the referent object with respect to the attainment of 
security. States are seen as being forced to act in a rational way to the balance of power 
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within the international system that they inhabit, with no recourse to a higher power. 
Those states not acting rationally in their own interest will either be socialized by the 
negative consequences of their actions or removed from the system altogether by those 
consequences. The other two images, the nature of the individual humans and social 
groups involved, and the internal configuration of each state, fall into the background. 
These are assumed to be “like objects” with little or no variation between human policy 
making groups or states. To maintain their security, states must act with respect to the 
nature of the international system as otherwise they will either lose relative position or 
even perish; “the international system socializes states over time to balance against rising 
great powers and to emulate the successful security behavior of their peers” (Ripsman, 
Taliaferro & Lobell 2016, p. 17). This systemic and rational theoretical perspective was 
first put forward by Waltz in the 1970s, at the height of the influence of systems theory 
within the academy. It also borrowed heavily from a microeconomics that viewed 
individuals as reacting rationally for their own utilitarian interests with respect to an 
external market system. 
 The assumption of generic rational individuals and social groups who perceive the 
world accurately and can adequately process all of the information available severely 
limits the applicability of structural realism. Robert Jervis (1976, 2017) and others (Booth 
1979; Katzenstein 1996; Krause & Latham 1997) have argued that the actual human 
beings that conduct foreign policy frequently make perceptual and cognitive mistakes 
across a whole range of variables, such as the possible options available and the relative 
balance of power. This can be due to a combination of cognitive and cultural biases, the 
sheer complexity and possible contradictory nature of information flowing from the 
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international system, and the possible lack of clarity of such information. A state that has 
never been invaded may view the international system in a very different way to one that 
has been repeatedly invaded, leaders may have very different temperaments, other states 
may work hard to conceal their own motives, and the probabilistic and complex nature of 
planning may produce stasis rather than insight. The first image may have significant 
impacts upon actual outcomes, with the Strategic Culture (Glenn, Howlett & Poore 2004) 
specific to given national strategy making groups impacting national decision making 
over decadal timeframes. 
 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) treat strategic culture as one of their four 
clusters of intervening variables (the others being leader images and perceptions, state-
society relations, and domestic institutions) and extend the temporal range over which 
such variables can operate. This facilitates the usage of neoclassical realism as a theory of 
international relations in itself, rather than as a device to tactically deal with outcomes at 
variance to neorealist expectations. The relative importance of strategic culture may 
change, as with the other variables, with each new nationally and temporally specific 
case; the particularity of the circumstances of a given nation at a given time is accepted 
within their analytical structuring. In some cases, leader images and perceptions may be 
subsumed within the strategic culture – especially with a regular turnover of leaders. A 
term-limited democratically elected leader from outside the political establishment, such 
as a Jimmy Carter or a Donald Trump may show significant presentational differences, 
but variances to the general continuity of foreign policy making are much less evident. 
This may not be the case for leaders in more autocratic systems who may retain 
leadership for a decade or more – such as a Vladimir Putin; they may have the mixture of 
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tenure and political strength to bend the strategic culture somewhat to their will, while 
acting with some independence. Even medieval absolute monarchs though had to take the 
views of their elites into account, with a ready successor always seemingly available to 
cast them aside. 
 The study of strategic culture began during the Cold War, as academics studied 
the cultural bases for the relations between the US and the Soviet Union. As Snyder 
(1977, p. v) stated “Neither Soviet or American strategists are culture-free, 
preconception-free game theorists … It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to 
strategic thinking as a unique ‘strategic culture’. Individuals are socialized into a 
distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a 
set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns … had achieved a state of 
semipermanence that places them on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere ‘policy’ … 
new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual 
lens provided by the strategic culture.” This challenges the “ahistorical, non-cultural 
neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choices” (Johnston 1995, p. 35). A second 
generation of strategic culture research in the mid-1980s “started from the premise that 
there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper 
motives for what in fact they do” (Ibid., p. 39) – the symbolic discourse may not 
represent the underlying decision making processes. This left an ambiguous 
instrumentality that could not be solved within the second-generation theoretical 
approaches. Approaches emerged in the 1990s that are “explicitly committed to 
competitive theory testing” (Ibid., p. 42) to validate the applicability of strategic culture 
in comparison to other approaches.  
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 As noted previously, this analysis will utilize the broader notion of strategic 
culture as “entrenched beliefs, worldviews, and shared expectations” (Ripsman, 
Taliaferro and Lobell 2016, p. 81) that “shape the strategic understanding of political 
leaders, societal elites, and even the general public” (Ibid., p. 83). From the later strategic 
culture research, it will be seen as a variable that “either presents decision-makers with 
limited range of options or … acts as a lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of 
different choices” (Johnston 1995, p. 42). It will be assumed that such culture will reflect 
the interlinked material, ideational and institutional context within which strategy making 
elites have developed within and currently reside, aligning with the approach taken by 
van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) that has highlighted significant 
differences between US and Chinese strategic decision makers. These decision makers do 
not independently “float above” the national milieu that they represent, focusing 
independently and rationally on the raison d’etat, but are imperfect actors, with their own 
interests as well as those of the state, that are molded by, and reside within that milieu – 
especially the elite networks from which they tend to be drawn from. With respect to the 
US, Layne (2017) makes the case for a strategic culture, stemming from a “foreign policy 
establishment”, that has displayed a significant amount of continuity from the 1890s to 
the present day; supporting the case for strategic culture as a long-term determinant of 
foreign policy. “The foreign policy establishment has had two incarnations. The ‘old’ 
foreign policy establishment’s heyday was from the late 1890s to the late 1960s, the era 
where the East Coast elite was clearly ascendant in the US foreign policy making process 
… Since the 1960s, the foreign policy establishment has become less white, less male, 
less Protestant, less East Coast centric, and its ranks leavened significantly with women, 
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people of color, Catholics, and Jews [but] the foreign policy establishment successfully 
co-opted, assimilated, and socialized the members recruited from non-traditional 
backgrounds” (Layne 2017, pp. 263-264). The current US elite may look somewhat 
different to those of the late 1890s or 1950s, but there may be relatively few differences 
in their strategic culture – “the foreign policy establishment’s world view … has 
remained fundamentally unchanged since the early 1940s” (Ibid., p. 267). 
 With structural realism treating states as “like-objects”, possible variances in such 
things as the state/society complex configuration, domestic institutions and political 
considerations, and the ability to mobilize internal resources with respect to external 
challenges are not considered. This ignores the real possibility that states may 
compromise their position within the international community to prioritize internal 
economic, political and social needs. Barnett (1972, 1986) argues that the drive of the 
post-WW2 Labour government to meet the clamor of the population for greater social 
welfare after the sacrifices of two world wars redirected resources that were required to 
limit its relative decline with respect to other nations. The social and political culture of a 
nation may also greatly affect its ability to make full use of the resources available. For 
example, the cultural norms that delayed the mobilization of women as an industrial 
workforce by the Nazi German leadership placed Germany at a disadvantage with respect 
to a Britain that had no such resistance. The “Vietnam Syndrome” can also be seen as 
restricting US foreign policy options even into the current period, with a foreign policy 
executive and military branch highly averse to the domestic political risks of taking major 
casualties or instituting a draft. 
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 Neoclassical realism “retains the primacy of the international system that 
structural realists emphasize, while relaxing the constraints of external determinism” 
(Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell 2016, p. 25) to allow the inclusion of factors internal to 
the individual nation-state, providing for both the structural and unit-level causes that 
Waltz accepts are required to explain actual behaviors and outcomes. One use has been a 
relatively tactical one of explaining empirical variances to what would have been 
expected from a neorealist perspective. This assumes that states tend to act in a way 
conformant to neorealist theory, with only occasional variances. Another has been to 
explain more than just anomalies, providing insights into “a broader range of foreign 
policy choices and grand strategic adjustment” (Ibid., p. 29) – a general theory of foreign 
policy. The referent object of both approaches is still the state within an anarchic system, 
but states that may not be “like objects”. This aligns with the possibility of state 
differentiation proposed by Buzan & Schouenborg (2018, p. 23) that “suggests that ‘like-
units’ might be quite radically different from each other”, for example in the nature of 
their state/society complexes. 
 Cox’s concept of the state/society complex subsumes the state-society relations 
and domestic institutions intervening variable clusters and sees them as co-creational 
elements of a larger structure rather than as independent intervening variables. Cox 
provides a way of analyzing the structure, and the interaction of the parts, through the 
concept of the state/society complex defined by the interaction of ideas, institutions and 
material capabilities. As with neoclassical realism, Cox integrates insights that could be 
construed to be constructivist, but such a view would “fail to appreciate the deep 
connection Cox maintains between intersubjectivity and the material conditions of 
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existence, which is informed by a particular reading of historical structures that comes 
through an engagement with the work of Carr and Braudel” (Germain 2016, p. 537). 
Carr’s work was “centrally concerned with how the future is evolving out of the 
contemporary social, political, and economic arrangements” (Ibid.), with the historical 
method being essential to all social sciences. Cox’s work shares much with the classical 
realists, while rejecting fixed concepts of “human nature” and providing a more 
structured approach to the process of historical change. 
 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) expand on Waltz’s understanding of 
system structure, including Buzan’s concept of “interaction capacity” factors that are 
systemic without being part of the system – such as “technological capabilities and 
shared international norms and organization” (Ibid., p. 39), referring to them as 
“structural modifiers”. Here, Cox’s concept of material capabilities, ideas and institutions 
interacting in a reciprocal fashion as a historical global structure provides a more holistic, 
integrated and temporally conditioned view of such systemic, but not structural, factors. 
They are not part of the structure, but may alter that structure and the interactions within 
the system in fundamental ways. Anievas’ analysis (2006) of the ways in which the 
process of industrialization and modernization unbalanced the international system prior 
to World War 1 is indicative of the insights that can be gained from such a historical 
materialist approach that does not assume a simplistic material determinacy. 
 Cox’s view of a given configuration of structural modifiers, a “particular 
combination of thought patterns, material conditions, and human institutions which has a 
certain coherence among the elements” that “constitute the context of habits, pressures, 
expectations, and constraints within which action takes place” (Cox 1981, p. 138) as 
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temporally and geographically specific provides a way of understanding the “present” as 
a specific point in a fluid space/time. Differing scales and timeframes can be 
accommodated, with the rejection of ahistorical and universal social concepts such as The 
Thucydides Trap and liberalism.  
 The assumption of an ongoing struggle between different interests and ideas 
facilitates the understanding of change, at the systemic and unit levels. There may be 
periods of relative stability, such as the post-WW2 Cold War, that lend themselves to 
static problem-solving theories. The post-Cold War period, continuing up to the present 
time, has been one of major change and instability. Critical theory, such as Cox’s 
historical materialism, that problematizes and historicizes conditions at a given moment 
in time, is advantaged over problem solving theoretical approaches that generally assume 
only incremental change, during such times. 
 Cox also introduced the Gramscian concept of hegemony to International 
Relations, with a hegemonic state serving to mitigate the anarchical nature of the 
international system, “If a social class becomes hegemonic within a state, then it may 
expand its naturally consolidated hegemony abroad. In doing so, it forges an international 
historic bloc … The formation of an international historic bloc serves to mitigate 
systemic anarchy” (Green 2014, p. 288). This is proposed as the case for the Pax 
Britannica (1845-75) and the later Pax Americana, “Cox proposes that the major 
consequences of the liberal era [Pax Britannica] were that it permitted both a 
transformation of state structures, centered upon convergence toward the liberal form, 
and the expansion of the world economy in relatively peaceful circumstances” (Ibid., p. 
289). This convergence toward a liberal form was in many cases mediated and combined 
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with nation-specific political economies. In the case of German industrialization liberal 
forms were grafted onto an in-place set of economic and social relations, with the 
aristocratic Prussian Junker class remaining dominant, producing hybrid rather than 
purely liberal structures. The same hybridity can be seen in the present, especially in the 
case of China. Instead of producing convergence, hegemonic periods of globalization can 
produce heterogeneous outcomes as each newly developing nation grafts liberal elements 
onto already existing social structures and institutions in a revolution from above aimed 
at driving rapid development. Referring to Japan, Cox & Sinclair (1996, p. 262) note that 
“a substructure of classes objectively differentiated by evolving relations of production is 
overlaid by the persistence of stande (status groups) characterized by specific styles of 
life and conceptions of honor”. This aligns with Trotsky’s concept of Uneven & 
Combined Development (Hobson 2011), which sees industrialization as spreading 
unevenly across the globe, and liberal elements being combined with differing social and 
cultural traditions. These hybridizing processes have created much of the heterogeneity of 
states within the current international system; “unevenness posits multiplicity and 
differentiation as a general ontological condition of social existence. Second, unevenness 
ipso facto conditions and is reconditioned by processes of change within and across 
interacting societies. This interactive process ontologically blurs the analytical distinction 
between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’, and by extension the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, as 
it necessarily generates particular ‘combinations’ of its own component parts, 
continuously generating new iterations and dynamics of unevenness” (Anievas & Matin 
2016, p. 7). 
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 Strategic culture, by incorporating the specific beliefs and cognitive biases of the 
humans, and groups of humans that inhabit strategic planning groups, overcomes the 
possible blindness of historical materialist approaches (and other systemic approaches) to 
the importance of contingency. Specific individuals and groups, through their actions and 
beliefs, may have significant impacts upon geopolitics; the importance of a Stalin or 
Hitler, or the US “north eastern protestant elite” comes to mind. Cox understood the 
importance of contingency when he noted that, “There is no iron determinacy or 
historical inevitability at work in the process of structural transformation of the world 
system. There is rather a balance of constraints inherent in the existing order, with 
opportunity inherent in the process of change itself” (Cox & Sinclair 1996, p. 251). 
 Neoclassical realism is limited in its use to those nations that maintain a 
significant degree of sovereignty, such as Western Europe, the white settler colonies 
(Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand), Japan, Russia, India and China. As the 
level of sovereignty declines the impact of outside interests upon state policy making 
becomes more prevalent, such as more powerful states, supranational organizations, non-
governmental organizations and transnational corporations. 
2.2.2. The Interregnum Between Great Power Conflicts 
 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union intensified the intellectual reassessment of the 
concept of security that had arisen during the 1970s and 1980s in response to “the intense 
narrowing of the field of Security Studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions 
of the Cold War” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, p. 2). This involved both a widening 
and a deepening “in favour of deepening the referent object beyond the state, widening 
the concept of security to include other sectors than the military, giving equal emphasis to 
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domestic and trans-border threats, and allowing for a transformation of the Realist, 
conflictual logic of international security” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p. 188). The process 
of globalization also reinforced this process, as it was perceived by many as reducing the 
power of the state and introducing new actors such as transnational corporations, 
international non-governmental organizations, and city networks together with the 
general facilitation of cross-border horizontal connections independent of the state 
(Robinson 2004; Scholte 2005; Sassen 2007; Castells 2009; Sassen 2012; Taylor 2013; 
Sprague 2015; Curtis 2016; Pingeot 2016). In addition, with the “unipolar moment” 
removing major power confrontation as a significant security issue, in the post-9/11 
period terrorist organizations became a privileged threat. 
The overwhelming power and transformative orientation of the United States 
during the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union was captured well by 
Zakaria “U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen 
since the Roman Empire” (Zakari 2019), Mearsheimer “My basic argument is that the 
United States was so powerful in the aftermath of the Cold War that it could adopt a 
profoundly liberal foreign policy, commonly referred to as ‘liberal hegemony’ … the 
United States has sought to remake the world in its own image” (Mearsheimer 2018, 
preface para. 1) and Huntington “The very phrase ‘the world community’ has become the 
euphemistic collective noun … to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests 
of the United States and other Western powers” (Huntington 1993, p. 39).  
Starrs (2013) typified globalization as not reducing the power of the US 
state/society complex, but rather representing a change in the way that power was 
projected and maintained, “As a consequence of sustained acquisitions by American 
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firms in key markets around the world over the past couple decades, perhaps it is not 
surprising that by 2012 American firms combined own 46% of all publicly listed shares 
of the top 500 corporations in the world” (Ibid., p. 824). In addition, the US state’s 
domination of international bodies such as the IMF and World Bank together with the 
liberalization of trade and capital flows allowed the US state and US transnational capital 
to more directly affect the internal structures and processes of other states. US capital, 
allied with the US state, had increased its global dominance “beginning with US-led 
globalization in the 1960s and US led liberalization in the 1980s, coupled with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the great opening and rise of China, among others, by 
the twenty-first century American structural power straddles the globe like never before” 
(Ibid., p. 828). This view of a tight integration of US economic elites and US state policy 
making institutions is supported by the work of van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016) in 
analyzing “the social context in which grand-strategy makers are embedded” (Ibid., p. 
237) and Layne (2006 & 2017). A context of predominant overlap between state and US 
transnational corporate sector actors “which obviously serves the interests of U.S. 
transnational corporations … not because U.S. grand-strategy makers are agents 
representing the corporate elite, but because in fact they are often part of the corporate 
elite themselves, or at least of broader corporate elite networks” (van Apeldoorn & de 
Graaff, p. 238).  
From this perspective globalization can be seen significantly as a consciously 
shaped process that increased the power of the US state/capital combination (and to a 
lesser extent that of other Western ones with respect to non-Western ones) while reducing 
the ability of other states to resist through the liberalization of trade and capital flows and 
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the deregulation and privatization of major economic sectors. Taylor’s work (2013) 
provides support for such a view, with the global corporate command and control 
functions becoming increasingly centralized within the leading “global cities” that 
predominantly reside within the US and other Western nations. State sovereignty is seen 
as being a critical determinant of whether or not a nation would be able to produce global 
cities with all their economic and political benefits as against simply cities of slums. 
China is identified as one of the few non-Western nations that maintained sovereignty, 
and therefore has been able to develop leading global cities such as Shanghai.  
The predominant Western view in the last decade of the twentieth century was 
that as nations interacted with the liberal West they would be integrated into the US-led 
liberal hegemony. As Europe had become in the post-WW2 era, “European capitalists 
formed ties with American capitalists both within Europe and within the US, which 
actually reinforced the material foundation of American imperial hegemony. European 
capitalists no longer constituted ‘national bourgeoises’ inclined toward anti-American 
sentiments … by the early 1970s, [they] were becoming ‘Canadianized’” (Gindin & 
Panitch 2012, p. 115). The whole world would inevitably embrace liberalism, as captured 
by the concept of The End of History (Fukuyama 1992) or the view that the world was 
“Flat” (Friedman 2005); all nations would naturally converge, or would be “helped” to 
converge, toward a liberal capitalist state. Ideological conflict would be made irrelevant 
through a truly global liberal international order (LIO) overseen and safeguarded by the 
“enlightened” and “benevolent” leadership of the “indispensable nation” of the US acting 
as the “global policeman”. “Looking at the world at the end of the twentieth century, one 
could be excused for thinking that history was moving in a progressive and liberal 
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internationalist direction” (Ikenberry 2018, p. 7). Ikenberry captures the liberal 
internationalist belief in the universalism and inevitable global triumph of liberalism 
when he asserts:  
 
This is not a story about the rise and spread of Western liberalism. It is a story of 
modernity and the global search for universal principles of politics  and 
economics. No region or people own this story. It is a story that is written on a 
world scale – and it is one of breakthroughs, crises, triumphs and transformations. 
The liberal international order is in crisis. But after liberalism there will be more, 
well, liberalism. (Ikenberry 2010, p. 521) 
 
By replacing the words “liberalism” with “Christianity”, “politics and economics” 
with “religion”, and “liberal” with “Christian” the parallels with the Western Christian 
civilizing burden of a previous time are apparent. The world would become civilized and 
enlightened through the adoption of US capitalist democracy. A dissident alternative 
view was provided by Huntington (1993), who saw a global system rent by a “Clash of 
Civilizations” along cultural lines. In both cases major nation-state power rivalry was not 
seen as a significant part of the security agenda, although Huntington did quote Lucian 
Pye in seeing China as “a civilization pretending to be a state” (Ibid., p. 24). The events 
of 9/11 and the resulting “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) provided some support to 
Huntington’s thesis, while significantly re-orienting security concerns toward non-state 
actors in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
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As Mearsheimer notes, between WW2 and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc the US 
headed a “Cold War order” that was “neither liberal nor international” (Mearsheimer 
2019, p. 8). The construction of this Cold War order was the result of the overwhelming 
economic and military power of the US post-WW2; the Axis powers of Germany, Italy 
and Japan had been defeated, devastated and occupied, the rest of Europe, Russia and 
China suffered overwhelming economic and social losses, and the United Kingdom was 
financially ruined (Barnett 1986) - “America’s first unipolar moment” (Layne 2017, p. 
261). To refer to it as a “liberal international order” is both mistaken and Eurocentric 
given its composition. It had liberal features, but the logic was predominantly one of 
realism by the US state/society complex, “quarantining” those states that it could not 
dominate, while maintaining a hierarchical hegemony over those that it could. At the core 
of this hierarchy was a “West” consisting of Western Europe, and the white settler 
nations that shared a cultural and ideological history of Western colonial supremacy and 
liberal ideological constructs such as capitalist democracy (in differing forms, such as the 
German ordoliberalism [Biebricher & Vogelmann 2017] and the French dirigisme 
[Schmidt 1996]); “the liberal order is a club of the West” (Acharya 2018, p. 3). Japan was 
only added after Western institutional constructs were forcibly imposed upon it during 
the post-WW2 occupation period (an occupation that still continues for the people of 
Okinawa and those around the many other US military bases in Japan [Vine 2017]); 
“Japan was forced to adopt (and then adapt to) political and economic institutions that 
were literally imposed on them from abroad” (Steinmo 2010, p. 89). The order was 
“rules-based inasmuch as it is solidified in liberal global institutions established by and 
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centered on US power, but also crucially underpinned by a preponderant military with a 
global reach” (De Graaff & Van Apeldoorn 2018, p. 113).  
 Layne (1997) identified a security/interdependence nexus at the base of past-
WW2 US policies. The imposition of liberal democratic structures in West Germany, its 
integration within the US-dominated North American Treaty Organization and the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the major deployment of US troops to the country, 
and a US-led reconstruction, remade the nation as a non-threatening member of a 
peaceful Western Europe. Within such an environment, economic interdependence could 
flourish. Japan was placed in the same position, with the occupying force driving through 
extensive land redistribution and liberal democratic structures, an imposed constitution 
that renounced the right to war, a “Red Scare” to crush socialist elements, and a security 
alliance with the US. After the end of the occupation the CIA “spent millions of dollars to 
support the conservative party that dominated Japan's politics for a generation” (Weiner 
1994). The two major Axis powers were internally reconstructed, and integrated within 
security and economic alliances, that made them safe for democratic capitalism and 
extensive economic interdependence. The lesser member of Italy was also restructured, 
and internally manipulated well into the post-war years.  
 Overall, a peaceful liberal core was constructed whereby “the plutocracy that 
dominates the system is centered in the United States, but has powerful allied branches in 
Western Europe and Japan especially” (Shoup 2015, preface, para. 2). This structure 
facilitated the post-WW2 economic “miracle” that came to a halt in the 1970s, a 
hegemonic order that provided extensive benefits to its core nations and their populations 
through an enforced mixture of US-provided security, liberal democracy and economic 
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integration. It also fully supported the Open-Door policies that facilitated the 
international growth of the globally dominant US international corporations. This 
“security/interdependence nexus” (Layne 1997, p. 86) required a strategy of 
preponderance. The “creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on 
preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and on American values; 
maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence 
of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic 
interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest” (Ibid., p.88); the US as the sovereign of 
its world order. This was based upon “a historically rooted belief that to be secure, the 
United States must extend abroad both its power and its political and economic 
institutions and values” (Ibid.). This concept of preponderance integrates the Offensive 
Realist view of the need for a maximization of relative power and the Defensive Realist 
view that “The spread of democracy, economic interdependence, and the development of 
international institutions can help accomplish” (Ibid., p. 93) security; the latter being 
somewhat consistent with liberal internationalism.  
The vast majority of humanity existed outside this bounded sphere, with many of 
the non-Soviet bloc nations existing within economic and political “lesser than” spheres 
of influence dominated by the sovereign or one of the senior members – such as Central 
and Southern America (the US) and the West African CFA franc nations (France) – that 
were maintained through economic, political, cultural and if necessary military, power. In 
many cases formal colonialism was replaced with the economically more efficient, and 




Gabon was an African country, geographically shaped by the French, 
 colonized by the French, forested by the French, led by a francophone 
 assimilated elite who spoke French, read French writing, received French 
 education, practiced French law, worked for French businesses, and who 
 adopted a French system of government that was additionally dominated by 
 France through a system called ‘cooperation’ (a term coined by the French in 
 a series of military, economic, and diplomatic accords). (Yates 2012, p. 28) 
 
Others became proxy battlegrounds between the two competing blocs, such as the 
Koreas, Vietnam, the Middle East, Somalia and Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Cuba. “The 
order often operated more through coercion than consent. It was hardly ‘orderly’ for the 
Third World, where local conflicts were magnified by capricious great power 
intervention, including the United States and its Western allies” (Acharya 2018, p. 4).  
The neoliberal revolution was first implemented under the direction of the Milton 
Friedman led “Chicago School” by the Chilean Pinochet dictatorship of 1973-1990 
(brought into power by a US-supported military coup) and then by the US-supported 
Argentinian military dictatorship of 1976-1983 (Gandin 2006; Undurraga 2015); the 
latter only fully taking “root a decade later with President Menem’s (1989-1998) 
implementation of the ‘convertibility plan’. During the 1990s” (Ibid., p. 11). In the late 
1970s and early 1980s it became established in both the US and UK (Harvey 2005; 
Mitchell & Fazi 2017). With respect to the former, the New York fiscal crisis of the mid 
1970s served as somewhat of a “dry run” for the national imposition of neoliberal 
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policies and the reassertion of elite interests (Phillips-Fein 2017). Neoliberalism differed 
from classic liberal theory (as against the actual reality of pre-WW2 “liberal” capitalism 
[Polanyi 2001]), and the post-WW2 embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982), through the 
explicit role of the state in engineering markets (in contrast to laissez faire) and the 
extensive state privatization, removal of state social services, and deregulation (in 
contrast to embedded liberalism) respectively. In 1983 the French government of 
Francois Mitterand “faced with a choice between abandoning major elements of its 
dirigiste policies or the European Community, decided in favor of the latter and, 
therefore, of liberalism” (Schmidt 1996, p. 378) turning away from its attempts to “revive 
and extend the post-war dirigiste model” (Mitchell & Fazi 2017, p. 78) and embraced a 
more neoliberal and austerity-focused orientation “in what became known as the tournant 
de la riguer (‘turn to austerity’)” (Ibid., p. 80) and later dismantled “the core institutions 
of the post-war dirigiste model” (Ibid., p. 81).  
Aided by the reinvention of global economic governance organizations such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) along the neoliberal lines of the 
“Washington consensus” (Kentikelents & Babb 2019), together with the 1980s Third-
World debt crisis (created by the combination of high oil prices and greatly increased US 
interest rates due to the “Volcker shock”), peripheral nations could also be forcibly 
“structurally adjusted” along neoliberal lines. “From the 1970s onwards, a similar therapy 
[to that implemented in Chile] was imposed – through financial blackmail, coercion, 
violence and even outright military intervention – on several countries, from Latin 
America to Asia to Eastern Europe to the Middle East” (Mitchell & Fazi, p. 102). With 
respect to Brazil “an alliance of agro-mineral and finance capital, involving both foreign 
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and local capitalists” supported the election of President Cardoso in 1994, which “led to a 
decisive break with the national statist policies of the previous 60 years” (Petras 2013, p. 
471); a process started by Collor, the first elected President after the end of the military 
dictatorship. This neoliberal regime was “sustained and deepened by the Lula regime” of 
2003 to 2010 (Ibid., p. 472). 
Such direct intervention into national economic and social structures by global 
governance organizations, together with Western powers and TNCs, represented a 
significant reduction in sovereignty for the peripheral nations. A new neoliberal order 
was being imposed upon the Western bloc and its areas of influence. The illegal guerrilla 
“contra” war against Nicaragua in the 1980s, and the invasion of Panama in 1989 also 
demonstrated that the US was the sovereign, unconstrained by the rules or norms of the 
order that it led (Karabell 1999). A position underlined by its response to a 1986 
International Court of Justice ruling against it with respect to its aggression toward 
Nicaragua; it refused to recognize the court’s jurisdiction and used its UN Security 
Council veto to reject a resolution calling for full compliance to the court’s ruling 
(Gandin 2006, p. 118; Highet 1987).  
It was in this context that the West received the dividends of the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc and Chinese market liberalization. With no offsetting international grouping, 
the Western powers seemed to be free to impose a true (neo)LIO, “The sudden and 
unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union inflated America’s ambition for its role in the 
world, as reflected in Washington’s strenuous efforts in the post-Cold War era to create a 
unipolar world and expand the liberal hegemonic order to the rest of the globe” (Wu 
2018, p. 1000). An ambition reflected in the side-stepping of the United Nations to carry 
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out an illegal (under international law) invasion of Iraq, followed by the occupying 
forces’ illegal imposition of a fundamental neoliberal restructuring of the Iraqi 
constitution, law and institutions without the consent of the Iraqi people (Whyte 2007; 
Baker 2014).  
With the collapse of the Soviet-bloc and the entry of China into the global market 
place, it was assumed that the US would remain as the sovereign of its now fully global 
order, setting the rules of that order with some consent from its constituents (including 
the new ones such as Russia and China) but reserving the right to be above those rules 
when it deemed such an exception to be required; acting as the “policeman” who is also 
the judge and jury. Those that did not acceptably accede to the sovereign’s authority 
would continue to be identified as threats to be co-opted (China after its break with the 
Soviet bloc), subdued (Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Argentina 1955 & 1976, Bolivia 
1964, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Uruguay 1973 [Gandin 2006; Dehghan & Norton-Taylor 
2013])), or contained (the Soviet Bloc, China before its break with the Soviet bloc, North 
Korea, Cuba, post-Shah Iran, Chavez and Maduro-led Venezuela). The contingent nature 
of the commitment to democracy (as against capitalism) is shown by the US recognition 
and ongoing support for extremely illiberal regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Central/South American and African dictatorships; especially when such elites are of a 
subservient comprador type. This has been repeatedly underlined through such things as 
the post-WW2 CIA interventions into Italian politics to make sure that the populace 
voted the “right” way (Blum 2014), and Levin’s identification of 81 cases of US 
intervention in the democratic processes of other nations between 1946 and 2000 (Levin 
2019). Democracy seemed to be only an option if it was within a capitalist system, while 
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capitalism seemed to be an option with or without democracy; a position taken by the 
highly influential economist Hayek during a visit to totalitarian Chile “my personal 
preference leans toward a liberal dictatorship rather than a democratic government devoid 
of liberalism” (as cited in Gandin 2006, p. 172).  
The Western nations would continue to represent the senior members of this 
order, akin to feudal Nobles, able to maintain lesser spheres of influence while being 
subservient to the sovereign. Individual Western nations may be allowed limited 
independence, as with France’s decision not to maintain a full membership of NATO in 
1966 (reversed in 2009), but such independence was limited - as shown by the punitive 
actions of the US toward the UK and France during the Suez Crisis. 
The self-perceived superiority of the US (and other Western nations), and the 
ideological need for them to impose its (their) rules and norms upon others, was further 
buttressed by Democratic Peace Theory and the concept of Human Security 
operationalized through the paradigm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Menon 2016). 
Nations that did not align with Western norms and values (e.g. capitalist democracy) 
could be defined as the “ontological Other” (Zhang 2016, p. 805) that were not 
“civilized” enough to deserve the full protection of Westphalian sovereignty; “with a 
liberal zone of law constituted by liberal states practicing a higher degree of legal 
civilization, to which other states will be admitted only when they met the requisite 
standards” (Kingsbury 1999, p. 90). This “discourse of ‘democracy as civilization’” 
(Zhang 2016, p. 805) supported a dominant Western position that “In the name of 
democracy, violence and war as well as regime change can be and indeed have often been 
justified as necessary evils in the course of either establishing or defending a ‘superior’ 
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liberal political and legal order and punishing or disciplining ‘rogue states’, ‘pariahs’ and 
‘outlaws’” (Ibid., p. 806). The rhetorical support for liberal interventionism continued as 
before to be at odds with the reality of US foreign policy actions. In 1993 Russia 
President Yeltsin “won enthusiastic support from both the Clinton administration and 
virtually all of the U.S. media” (Cohen 2001, p. 126) when he carried out a violent coup 
against the democratically elected Russian Parliament. In 2009 the Honduran coup-
leaders who overthrew a democratically elected president were supported by the US and 
Canada (Shipley 2017) – support repeated after 2016 elections that the Organization of 
American States (OAS) judged to be marred by “irregularities, mistakes and systemic 
problems” (HRW 2017). Noting the reality of geopolitical considerations over supposed 
humanitarian ones, Menon asked “Would the Saudis ever face a Security Council - R2P 
resolution? Would the United States, Britain or France vote for an R2P resolution 
condemning Israel’s use of force … in the West Bank or Gaza?” (Menon 2016, p. 98). 
Such an interventionist stance can also be seen as violating the basic liberal international 
tenets of state sovereignty and pluralism that are embedded in the United Nations charter. 
From this perspective, the current positions of the Western powers and that of Russia and 
China may be seen as differing selections from the liberal international values pallet, 
rather than one being liberal and the other illiberal.  
 US policy elites expected that Russia, China, the Eastern European and Baltic 
nations, together with Yugoslavia would accept the necessity of US dominance and 
security, and their place within its now fully global order. For the successor states of 
Yugoslavia, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe this assumption generally became 
reality, with integration for many within both NATO and the European Union. It has been 
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argued that US policies forestalled the integration of Russia (Cohen 2001), while the 
sheer scale, independent stance and the specific state/society complex of China ruled out 
a compliant acceptance of a subservient position within a US-led global order. 
 
2.2.3. Failure To Integrate And The Return Of Great Power Politics 
 
 The recovery of Russia from the disastrous decade of extreme Western-sponsored 
structural adjustment “shock therapy” at the end of the twentieth century (Cohen 2001), 
together with its reassertion of an independent role in international affairs, brought major 
power competition back onto the security agenda. As Cohen so presciently noted: 
 
what will be the reaction of our own opinion shapers and policymakers when 
Russian realities explode the prevailing myths about America's post-Communist 
friend and partner, as they soon will? If missionary dogmas persist, the American 
backlash is easy to foresee - at best, cynicism and indifference to Russia's plight; 
at worst, a sense of betrayal and a revival of  reflexive Cold War attitudes . . . 
Russia can find its own way only within the limits of its own traditions and 
possibilities, not ours. Such a reformation does not need our political tutelage. If 
the United States cannot accept this first principle of post-Communism 
everywhere, the sequel to the Cold War is likely to be a very cold peace. (Ibid., 
pp. 111-112)  
 
 The decisive move away from the shock therapy neoliberal experiment of the 
1990’s by the Putin government, toward a more dominant state and nationalist position 
(which included financial and legal measures against economic elites/oligarchs deemed to 
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be non-compliant), placed Russia outside the neoliberal capitalist democratic orientation 
acceptable to the Western powers. This is most evident in the fossil fuel sector, where 
after a period of privatization in the 1990’s the Russian state has worked to reassert 
control, with state backing becoming “a vital factor determining the success of [fossil 
fuel] players in Russia’s state managed capitalism” (Kretzschmar et, al 2013., p. 778). 
The result has been state management but not necessarily nationalization, “even state 
behemoths such as Rosneft and Gazprom are organized like private companies, geared 
primarily to pay dividends to shareholders – of which the state is simply the largest” 
(Wood 2018, p. 171). 
 After the accession of Putin to the Russian presidency, the Russian state had 
continued to have good relations with the US and had provided extensive support to the 
US invasion of Afghanistan (as did Iran). Putin had been lauded in the Western press, 
with The Economist as late as September 2003 describing the Bush-Putin relationship as 
“warm and fuzzy” and Putin as “one of his [Bush’s] few real remaining friends on the 
world stage” (The Economist 2003, p. 49). The very next month the Russian oligarch 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, purported to be the richest man in Russia, was arrested on 
charges of fraud and tax evasion. The Yukos oil and gas company that he had gained 
control of through the infamous “Loans for Shares” privatization process in the 1990s 
was broken up with substantial parts being taken over by the government controlled 
Rosneft. By acting against the most powerful private actor in Russia, Putin asserted and 
solidified the power of the Russian state apparatus and rebalanced the relationship 
between the state and the remaining oligarchs. The arrest of Khodorkovsky may also 
have been precipitated by the possibility of a sale of a major stake in Yukos to Exxon 
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(Jack & Hoyos 1993), which would have placed a strategic Russian fossil fuel asset under 
US influence. Putin’s actions both rebalanced the power of the Russian state with respect 
to capital, and blocked US corporate access to a strategic asset. Given the orientation of 
the US state, as noted above, it would be expected that responses to such actions would 
be extremely negative. This became very apparent in US mainstream press coverage, 
with Kristof (2014) asserting, “the West has been suckered by Mr. Putin. He is not a 
sober version of Boris Yeltsin. Rather, he's a Russified Pinochet or Franco. And he is not 
guiding Russia toward free-market democracy, but into fascism”. 
 Relations were also damaged by Russian resistance to Western influence in 
Ukraine, a former member of the USSR with an extensive border with Russia and the 
host of the Russian naval base at Sevastopol. Any attempt by Russia to establish its own 
sphere of influence to maintain its security was not acceptable to the US. Cohen quotes 
Elisabeth Bumiller of the New York Times as stating that US “Russia specialists say 
[Putin’s] involvement in Ukraine is his most serious offense yet in American eyes” 
(Cohen 2005). The deterioration continued with the 2008 Russia-Georgia war (with the 
US providing support to Georgia) and the continuing Russian opposition to the eastward 
march of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) 
toward the Russian border. Tensions between Russia and the US escalated further after 
the NATO regime change intervention in Libya in 2011, which was seen as a misuse of 
the UN mandate by both Russia and China: 
 
Russia and China learned their lessons in Libya. Neither country opposed Security 
Council Resolution 1973, which, in 2011, authorized military action, undertaken 
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by a coalition of NATO and Arab states, to protect Libyan civilians; but they 
complained bitterly, well before the mission had ended, that ‘regime change’ was 
afoot and had never been part of the mandate. They became determined not to 
allow a repeat performance in Syria and have acted accordingly. (Menon 2016, p. 
9) 
 
 This was followed by the Ukraine crisis of 2014, which resulted in the Ukrainian 
civil war, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the resultant escalating Western 
economic sanctions. Russian intervention in Syria in 2015, couched in terms of Syrian 
state sovereignty and self-determination, then underlined a newfound independence in 
Russian foreign policy that stood in opposition to the US-led discourse of universalist 
capitalist democracy, humanitarian intervention and regime change. This opposition was 
enunciated clearly by the Russian President in 2019 in a speech at the 16th meeting of the 
Valdai Discussion Club: 
 
 since all nations are obviously different, uniformity and universalisation are 
impossible by default. A system is required whereby different values, ideas 
and traditions can co-exist … in the 19th century they used to refer to a “Concert 
of Powers.” The time has come to talk in terms of a global “concert” 
of development models, interests, cultures and traditions where the sound of each 
instrument is crucial, inextricable and valuable, and for the music to be played 
harmoniously rather than performed with discordant notes, a cacophony. It is 
crucial to consider the opinions and interests of all the participants in international 
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life. Let me reiterate: truly mutually respectful, pragmatic and consequently solid 
relations can only be built between independent and sovereign states. (Putin 2019) 
 
 Such a position fundamentally challenges the US role as the sovereign of the 
global international community; placing it as one among a number of equal great powers 
(each with their own accepted sphere of influence) with no single power empowered to 
take unilateral action. Russia’s increasingly independent stance is reflected in significant 
differences between the Russian National Security Strategy (NSS) documents of 2009 
(Russian Federation President 2009) and 2015 (Russian Federation President 2015). The 
latter portrays “the EU, along with NATO and the US negatively” (Raik et al., 2018) and 
uses much more explicit language to identify the source of major state threats, such as 
“the Russian Federation’s implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy 
is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain 
their dominance in world affairs” (Russian Federation President 2015, Article 12). 
Russia’s position is captured well in Putin’s interviews with Oliver Stone (Stone 2017), 
and summarized succinctly by the Brookings Institute, a leading US foreign policy think 
tank: 
 
Putin’s vision of international order is fundamentally at odds with the interests of 
the United States. Putin believes that the existing order is a façade. It is shrouded 
in the language of universal values and global institutions but the order is actually 
designed to promote American dominance of the international system. 
Consequently, Putin has made it his mission to weaken this order and replace it 
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with something much more conducive to Russia’s interests … Putin believes that 
America’s penchant for intervention in the Middle East destabilized the region 
and empowered Islamist forces that threaten Russia. Globally, in his view, the 
United States has weaponized the international financial system to unilaterally 
impose sanctions on countries that it disagrees with, including on Russia over the 
annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. (Chollet et. al. 2017, pp. 18-
19) 
 
 The relationship between Russia and the US and its allies has only deteriorated 
further with the Skripal incident and the continuing clash of interests in Syria. The most 
recent Western media coverage of the Russiagate allegations of Russian tampering in the 
democratic processes of the USA and its allies is highly reminiscent of the Red Scare at 
the beginning of the Cold War during the early post-WW2 years. The extremely negative 
and demeaning discourse is reflected in the US foreign policy establishment, through 
such documents as the US National Security Strategies (see below) and reports from 
highly influential think thanks. A case of the latter is the identification of Russia as a 
“Rogue, Not a Peer” (Dobbins, Shatz & Wyne 2018, p. 1) by a RAND Corporation report 
that goes on to state that “Russia is not a peer or near-peer competitor but rather a well-
armed rogue state that seeks to subvert an international order it can never hope to 
dominate” (Ibid., p. 2). This explicitly “Others” Russia and places it among the non-
civilized “rogue states” that should not enjoy the status and protections of the higher level 
of legal civilization. 
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Four decades of exponential growth have transformed China from a backward 
nation with per capita wealth on the same level as many African countries into a still fast 
growing upper middle-income nation with an economy larger than the United States on a 
purchasing power parity basis. It had been assumed by many that after its ascension to the 
World Trade Organization, China would increasingly converge with the liberal capitalist 
nations and take its place within the US-led (neo)LIO, rather than act as a “revisionist” 
state. This was reinforced by the Chinese stance of Keeping A Low Profile, under which 
“China passively adapted itself to changes in the international environment” (Yan 2014, 
p. 166) while it focused on national economic development. In 2010, Buzan could note 
that “China’s rise over the past 30 years certainly looks peaceful compared to that of 
most other recent great power arrivistes [Germany, Japan and the USSR]” and that “over 
the past 30 years, China has done a pretty good job of pursuing peaceful rise” (Buzan 
2010, p. 15). 
Buzan typified China as a “reformist revisionist” power that “accepts some of the 
institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons. 
But it resists, and wants to reform, others, and possibly also wants to change its status” 
(Buzan 2010, p. 18) and presciently observed that the “danger is that as China rises it will 
become less dependent on the United States, and more opposed to its leadership, and the 
United States will feel more threatened by its increasing power and revisionism” (Ibid., p. 
22). The new stance under the leadership of Xi Jinping of Striving for Achievement and 
his promotion of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has been seen in the West 
as threatening an increasingly assertive foreign policy that will “’shape’ the international 
system to a higher degree”, expect “to be treated on an equal footing” and that “China 
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will never compromise on China’s sovereignty and core interests “ (Sorensen 2015, p. 
65). This new stance can be seen in China’s increasing opposition to the United States in 
the UN Security Council, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its actions to claim 
sovereignty within the South China Sea; “China’s foreign policy is transformed from 
weak-state diplomacy to strong-power diplomacy” (Yan 2014, p. 168). As well as 
providing demand for Chinese goods and services, the BRI (and the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank [AIIB]) “reflect Beijing’s efforts to promote the reform of the existing 
international economic system dominated by the USA so as to allow China to play a 
more important role” reform that “can hardly be echoed and supported by status-quo 
powers, the USA in particular” (Cai 2018, p. 838). 
It is interesting that in later work Buzan and Schouenborg (2018) note that China 
aligns with the classical Westphalian Global International Society (GIS) institutions of 
sovereignty, non-intervention, territoriality, balance of power and great power 
management, together with the newer ones of nationalism, human equality and 
development together with conditional acceptance of markets; “From the CCP’s [Chinese 
Communist Party’s] perspective, it is the liberal West that is aggressively revisionist, 
seeking to impose its liberal values [of democracy and human rights]  on the rest of the 
world” (Ibid., p. 462). This statement helps problematize a Western-centric viewpoint 
that may be blind to the Western neoliberal interventionist (e.g. R2P and World 
Bank/IMF conditionality) revisionism that gained force in the post-Cold War period and 
the possible role of China in wanting to return to Westphalian principles. 
China’s rapidly expanding economy, the ‘S-curve’ trajectories of Chinese R&D 
expenditures and patent applications in recent years (Li 2018), and increasing Chinese 
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military capabilities (even with military expenditure capped at 2% of GDP) may in of 
themselves have triggered a more conflictual response from the United States; “By the 
early 2010s … the rise of Chinese power, its military power in particular, had become all 
the more evident and real, which inevitably made the status-quo powers and neighboring 
states increasingly concerned” (Cai 2018, p. 839). Chinese state-supported technology 
development, together with the continued state ownership/control of the “commanding 
heights” of the Chinese economy, blocks US/Western corporate ownership and the 
integration of Chinese capital into the (neo)LIO, while at the same time threatening the 
dominant position of US/Western corporations within the leading technological sectors. 
Starrs questions whether an independent capitalist class even exists within China “the 
liberal concept of the ‘private sector’ itself does not exist in China, as there is no strict 
separation between public and private spheres … this throws serious doubt on whether 
there is any basis for the existence of an independent capitalist class in China that can 
challenge the state – and by extension, their integration with a global TCC [transnational 
capitalist class] against the policies of the state” (Starrs 2017, p. 647).  
This parallels So and Chu’s (2016) typification of predominant Chinese state 
economic policies as ones of state neoliberalism, with deregulation, privatization and 
marketization being used to maintain the power of the state and CCP rather than reduce 
it. The successful co-option of the corporate and upper middle class (Feng, Johannsen & 
Zhang 2015) helps maintain the ascendancy of the Party over what could otherwise 
develop into an independent private sector and civil society. As van Apeldoorn and de 
Graaff (2018, p. 122) note “in the case of China the lack of state ownership does not 
imply lack of state control or state direction … Chinese private enterprizes above a 
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certain size always have a party secretary and a party commission included in the 
organizational structure of the company”. In this context, the relatively sudden 
emergence of Huawei as the global leader in computer networking can be seen as a 
challenge to both US technological dominance and its specific state/society complex. The 
more assertive Chinese foreign policy and government statements, together with official 
state plans to leapfrog the US in critical high technologies (Morrison 2019), could only 
add to the sense of threat within US policy making and corporate circles.  
In response the US state began to treat China more as a competitor than one 
accepting its leadership role within the (neo)LIO. This was seen first with the “pivot to 
Asia” under President Obama at the beginning of the last decade and the more recent 
aggressive stance of the Trump administration. The major US concern is about China’s 
ability to establish its own sphere of influence in the Western Pacific, as the US did in the 
Americas before extending its reach globally after World War 2: 
 
Beijing believes that it can create a new Sino-centric status quo in the Western 
Pacific that the United States will be unable or unwilling to stop, that Washington 
will have little option but to accept it once established, and that U.S.-China 
relations will, in this context, become predominantly cooperative … If China 
succeeds, it will transform the regional order into one with a weaker U.S. role, 
Chinese control over vital sea-lanes (which will remain open but only with their 
consent), and a Sino-centric institutional order. This could have the effect of 
reshaping the international order as a whole. A spheres of influence order in East 
Asia … would weaken the U.S. position globally. (Chollet et. al. 2017, p. 23) 
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As with its actions toward Russia, the US stance is one of resisting the emergence 
of any regional competitors to the US-led (neo)LIO, a position reflecting that of the 1992 
Wolfowitz Doctrine “The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a 
region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the 
reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies. These regions 
include Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America” (National 
Security Council 1992, p. 2). This stance has been reflected in the wording of a US 
National Security Strategy that explicitly identifies both Russia and China as state 
competitors (see below). There is also, as Buzan notes “a quite strong constituency in the 
United States that almost wants to cast China in the role of ‘peer competitor’ in order to 
resolve the clarity of purpose to US foreign policy which has been hard to find since the 
end of the Cold War” (Buzan 2010, p. 23). In an academic disciplinary and policy 
complex sense, a “Cold War 2.0.” would also significantly benefit many of those pushing 
the “China as threat” discourse at the expense of the wideners and deepeners. 
 The result has been a significant reordering of security discourses back toward a 
state-specific orientation, with both military and geo-economic competition being seen as 
major concerns by the US administration; leading to attempts at forcing a more neoliberal 
model upon the Chinese state-managed economy through tariffs. At the same time, the 
global governance of conflict has been significantly attenuated as the United Nations 
Security Council has also been rendered dysfunctional due to the differing agendas of the 
US, China and Russia; all of which possess veto power. This underlines the move away 
from liberal internationalist and GWOT conceptions of security and a return to a more 
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state-centric and realist-oriented security paradigm. The competing interventions within 
the Ukraine and Syria, and more recently Venezuela and Iran, are symptoms of this new 
international environment. The rapid growth of India since the economic reforms of the 
early 1990’s has also added at the least an additional major regional power to the 
international system. I propose that the last decade of the twentieth century and the first 
of the new century may come to be seen as an interregnum between two periods of major 
power rivalry, with both global governance institutions and globalization becoming 
significantly attenuated. US foreign policy and national security elites seem to have 
reoriented themselves toward major power rivalry during the current decade, with a more 
forthright stance adopted during the Trump administration. 
 The 2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “there should be no 
doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security” (The 
White House 2010, p. 1); implicitly assuming that the US has the authority to define what 
is a threat to global security and will not accept a challenge to that authority – a redrafting 
of the blunter deliveries of the same message by the previous Bush administration. Russia 
and China had not yet been identified as serious threats to that authority. The USA will 
work “to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of 
influence—including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations 
such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—so that we can cooperate on issues of 
bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, 
is no longer a zero sum game (Ibid., p. 3)”. In the section entitled “Security”, emphasis is 
given to the need to “Strengthen Security and Resilience at Home” and to “Disrupt, 
Dismantle, and Defeat Al-Qa’ida and its Violent Extremist Affiliates in Afghanistan, 
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Pakistan, and Around the World” as well as reversing “the Spread of Nuclear and 
Biological Weapons and Secure Nuclear Materials”. No mention of major power rivalry 
as a major security threat. The 2015 NSS, written after the Obama administrations pivot 
to Asia notes, “India’s potential, China’s rise, and Russia’s aggression all significantly 
impact the future of major power relations” (The White House 2015, p. 4). Apart from 
widening the security issues to be dealt with to include climate change, health and 
“Access to Shared Spaces” (Ibid., p. 12) such as space, the high seas and the internet, the 
document does though maintain the same general security focus as the previous one; 
great power rivalry is not listed as a security issue. Later in the document mention of the 
dependence of Europe upon Russian energy supplies is made, and that the USA “will 
closely monitor China’s military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while 
seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation” (Ibid., p. 24). 
 Very early on in the 2017 US NSS, a very different emphasis is taken “China and 
Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American 
security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to 
grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and 
expand their influence.” (The White House 2017, p. 2) and require “the United States to 
rethink the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that 
engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global 
commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most 
part, this premise turned out to be false” (Ibid., p. 3). In a major section entitled “Promote 
American Prosperity”, which states that “Economic security is national security” it is 
noted, “American prosperity and security are challenged by an economic competition 
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playing out in a broader strategic context. The United States helped expand the liberal 
economic trading system to countries that did not share our values, in the hopes that these 
states would liberalize their economic and political practices and provide commensurate 
benefits to the United States. Experience shows that these countries distorted and 
undermined key economic institutions without undertaking significant reform of their 
economies or politics. They espouse free trade rhetoric and exploit its benefits, but only 
adhere selectively to the rules and agreements” (Ibid., p. 17). In a sub-section entitled 
“Promote and Protect the U.S. National Security Innovation Base” it states “Every year, 
competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions 
of dollars” and that “Losing our innovation and technological edge would have far-
reaching negative implications for American prosperity and power” (Ibid., p. 21); 
explicitly securitizing intellectual property and innovation. Reference is also made to the 
increasing role of the USA as a fossil fuel exporter and that “As a growing supplier of 
energy resources, technologies, and services around the world, the United States will help 
our allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce” 
(Ibid., p. 23). 
 The “revisionist powers of China and Russia” that “want to shape a world 
antithetical to U.S. values and interests” (Ibid., p. 25) are identified as challengers to US 
power. “Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the 
sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads 
features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is 
building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its 
nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and 
 76 
economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including 
America’s world-class universities” (Ibid., p. 25) and “Russia aims to weaken U.S. 
influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners. Russia views the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as threats. Russia is 
investing in new military capabilities, including nuclear systems that remain the most 
significant existential threat to the United States, and in destabilizing cyber capabilities.” 
(Ibid., p. 25-26). The threat from China is seen as encompassing many areas of 
competition on a global basis, while that of Russia is seen on more regional basis and 
limited to military and energy competition. Overall, the “2017 NSS takes a bleak view of 
global realities. The struggle for power is on. Multilateral efforts to cope with global 
challenges are out. Multilateralism is viewed as competitive at best” (Raik et al. 2018, p. 
21). With the Wolfowitz Doctrine still seeming to be in place, the US is not accepting of a 
rebalancing of the global system toward a pluralism that will constrain its actions and 
place geographically specific limitations upon the reach of US, and other Western, capital 
and transnational corporations. This reorientation of the international system, as 
perceived by the leading power of the (neo)LIO, supports the assumption of the state as 
the referent object of security. 
 The recent US actions to sideline such core global institutions as the United 
Nations and World Trade Organization through bilateral trade sanctions and tariffs, the 
‘weaponization’ of the international payments system (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications: SWIFT) to reinforce sanctions regimes (Farrell & 
Newman 2019), and intellectual property rights to curb the development of Chinese 
technology corporations such as Huawei and ZTE, point to a US state focused on relative 
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gains and a “win-lose” foreign policy orientation. Such actions fit very well within 
Zhou’s proposed version of power transition theory in which: 
 
before a rising power overtakes it, the hegemonic power will take action to avoid 
losses, and that in response the rising power will passively take action to avoid its 
own losses [with the] inhibitive influence of nuclear deterrence, strategic 
competition between the hegemonic power and the rising power is limited to 
peaceful measures including diplomatic means. (Zhou 2019, p. 1)  
 
The possibility of an escalating cycle is also possible, “Beijing cries foul, 
bemoans alleged U.S. efforts to ‘contain its peaceful rise’—a popular meme in Chinese 
commentary on U.S. strategic intentions toward Asia—further ramps up its military 
spending and bolsters its warfighting capabilities. A vicious, unavoidable, and tragic 
action-reaction cycle is born” (Liff & Ikenberry 2014, p. 53). A report from the RAND 
Corporation, one of the predominant US foreign policy institutes, using the following 
words, “War between the United States and China could be so ruinous for both countries, 
for East Asia, and for the world that it might seem unthinkable. Yet it is not [my italics]: 
China and the United States are at loggerheads over several regional disputes that could 
lead to military confrontation or even violence between them” (Gompert, Cavallos & 
Garafola 2016, p. iii) can also be seen as a warning of future aggression. The report goes 
further to identify a time window of 2015 to 2025 for successful US military action 
against China that is reminiscent of Germany’s concerns about the rapid industrialization 
of Russia prior to WW1: 
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Note that China’s enhanced A2AD [Anti Access/Area Denial] in 2025 will reduce 
the gap between its losses and U.S. losses at T1. Because it could be less clear 
which side is losing at T1, a severe war might be more likely to be prolonged in 
2025 than in 2015, despite mounting costs (Gompert, Cavallos & Garafola 2016, 
p. 22)  
 
As historians convincingly demonstrate, there was a relatively short window of 
opportunity, as perceived by German state managers (approximately 1912-17), for 
launching a preemptive strike against Russia before it completed its strategic 
railway lines, making German tactical war plans obsolete. (Anievas 2014, p. 27)  
 
Such analyses support the proposition that the two states are in a period of relative 
power transition, and reinforce notions of a closing window for US action to curtail 
Chinese growth and/or force it into acceptance of US hegemony within the neo(LIO). 
With an economy still growing at over twice the rate of the US, and a defense budget of 
only 2% of GDP, China is capable of increasing military expenditures at a much faster 
rate than the US without significantly impacting its economy; the very position that the 
US enjoyed with respect to the USSR in the 1980s.  
The very public attacks upon China by senior government officials are 
reminiscent of the official US discourses used against Russia during the Cold War (Perlez 
2018), as is the increasingly Red Scare like US discourse with respect to Russia. To 
critical researchers such as Michael Hudson, such attacks are simply propaganda 
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designed to obfuscate the real objective of obtaining Chinese and Russian subservience 
within a US and Western capitalist dominated (neo)LIO. He considers that the Chinese 
response is predictable: 
 
There is no way that China will dismantle its mixed economy and turn it over to 
U.S. and other global investors. It is no secret that the United States achieved 
world industrial supremacy in the late 19th and early 20th century by heavy public-
sector subsidy of education, roads, communication and other basic infrastructure 
… The U.S. idea of a ‘win-win’ agreement is one in which China will be 
‘permitted’ to grow as long as it agrees to become a U.S. financial and trade 
satellite, not an independent competitor. (Hudson 2019).  
 
This has many parallels with the US approach taken toward what was seen as the 
Japanese industrial and technological (specifically in semiconductors) challenge to US 
hegemony in the 1980’s. The result was “voluntary” restrictions on Japanese exports to 
the US, an agreed upon major upward revaluation of the Yen against the dollar, and 
domestic financial deregulation that helped trigger the Japanese financial crash in the 
following decade. The rhetoric of “unfair” competition and the need for significant 
structural changes (Fallows 1989) echoes the current US rhetoric toward China; it would 
seem that only if China becomes a “bigger version of Japan” will it be seen as an 





 In chapter 1.3., the dependency of modern industrialized (and financialized) 
societies upon ongoing growth for both state legitimacy and social stability was noted. 
For the lesser-developed nations, the extremely high correlation between economic 
growth and increasing societal welfare also produces an ongoing pressure for economic 
growth. The benchmark that will be taken within this paper is that the trend global GDP 
growth rate of approximately 3% will continue. Chapter 2.1. shows that the promise of an 
absolute decoupling between trend GDP growth inherent in such theories as eco-
modernism is not backed up by empirical evidence. Increases in global energy efficiency 
have been declining since 2015 (IEA 2019); for the purposes of this paper a rate of 1.5% 
per annum will be assumed, with a limited possibility for increase (in 2019 a coalition of 
countries agreed an aspirational target of a 3% reduction in energy intensity per annum, 
but this did not include the US or China [Kosolapova 2019]). With significant friction 
within economic, financial, social, and political systems with respect to energy system 
decarbonization (reductions in GHG emissions per unit of energy), only slow progress 
will be assumed in this area, consistent with historical trends and industry, IEA and EIA 
forecasts referenced in chapter 2.1. Steffen (Moses 2020) considers that such a transition 
to a global low-carbon energy system will take at least 30 years at best, and more likely 
40-60 years. 
 The next section will utilize analyses of the two major powers (China and the US) 
together with a Russia that is allied with China in opposition to the US, to assess whether 
the dynamics of the international system and the internal dynamics of those specific 
nations, are consistent with a reconciliation of the need for an energy transition and great 
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power politics. US government policy and strategy statements have displayed an 
unwillingness to accede to the rise of China within the international system. Given the 
ongoing pressure of a differential economic growth rate that advantages China (with the 
Chinese economy already 25% larger than the US on a PPP basis and the gap becoming 
greater each year), and a more assertive China, there is a probability of escalating conflict 
within the international system. The aggressive stance of the US with respect to Russia 
adds to the possibility of conflict. The most recent examples of this are the US-China 
trade war and the increasingly negative US discourse toward Russia with respect to 
alleged US election interference and toward China in relation to the COVID-19 
pandemic. A global clean energy transition is seen as a system level variable that may 
alter the nature of the international system, possibly changing the balance between the 
great powers and their allies. At the same time, the competition between the powers will 
provide a feedback into the nature and success of any such energy transition, reflecting 
the bi-directional co-dependent nature of these two global processes. 
 From the discussion in 2.2., the appropriate method of analysis for the individual 
states is deemed to be the utilization of the neoclassical realism proposed by Ripsman, 
Taliafero and Lobell (2016), with strategic culture and Cox’s state/society complex as the 
two long-term internal state variables. The process of change over time will be 
conceptualized using Cox’s historical materialism, a conceptualization that’s allows for 
the co-creational development, continuity and change of material interests, institutions 
and ideas. The latter will include the national “myths” that underpin national identities 
and culture. 
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2.4 Application of the Conceptual Framework 
 
The neoclassical realism of Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell allows for the insights 
into the dynamics of the international system provided by neorealism to be utilized. The 
relative position of a given state within that system to other states, current and possible 
alliances between states, and the rational reactions of a state to the system configuration 
that it faces, can be addressed. The inclusion of longer-term international system-level 
variables, such as industrialization or new weaponry, also provides for some forces of 
historical change to the international system. At the same time, the inclusion of longer-
term domestic intervening variables (strategic culture, leader image and perceptions, 
state-society relations and domestic institutions) brings into play the internal dynamics of 
each state. Such dynamics may drive policy decisions that are different to those that 
would be expected from a purely neorealist lens. Significantly adding to these differences 
is the acceptance of subjectivity, with the rejection of a purely rational actor basis of 
human decision-making. In addition, the incorporation of the possibility of contingency, 
such as a natural disaster or specific individuals, better reflects national and international 
reality. 
The resulting analytic is then a combination of the external policy drivers (the 
international system), internal policy drivers (the internal dynamics of the individual 
state), and the consideration of any system-level variables (e.g. the continuing impact of 
industrialization on the relative power of individual states) – an integration of all these 
factors will be required in the analysis of individual states and possible future policy 
paths. 
• What are imperatives of the international system upon a specific state? 
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• What impact will international system level variables have upon the relative 
position of states? 
• What is the strategic culture of each state and how will it affect the response to 
those imperatives? 
• Do individual leaders have a significant impact upon policy decisions, and if so 
how will they affect the response to those imperatives? 
• How will the nature of state-society relations (e.g. the ability of the state to muster 
societal resources) affect the response to those imperatives? 
• How will domestic institutions affect the response to those initiatives? 
• How sensitive is the state to different contingencies, does it have the resources 
and social structures necessary to deal with contingencies effectively? 
 
Although providing greater levels of insight and analytical flexibility compared to a 
neorealist approach, such an analysis would still be significantly lacking. 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of system level variables, the lens is still a predominantly 
static one; it lacks a theory of change over time. A given point in time is part of a 
somewhat path dependent continuum that progresses from the past into the future. Cox’s 
dialectical materialist approach to change rejects enlightenment notions of an ongoing 
process of societal perfection, together with liberal notions of capitalist democracy 
naturally providing for the general good. Instead, it sees change as the outcome of a 
struggle for power between competing interests and ideas. In addition, the liberal 
separation of the state from society (including domestic institutions) is rejected as out of 
date – replacing this separation with an integrated state/society complex. I have chosen 
not to subsume strategic culture into this state/society complex as it provides insights into 
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how groups of specific individuals can affect both short and long-term outcomes; an 
analytical lens missing in Cox’s work. Generally, leader image and perceptions can be 
subsumed within strategic culture, but there will be cases where specific individuals may 
have importance. The questions above become somewhat altered: 
 
• What are the current imperatives of competition between state/society complexes 
within the world order, seen as a point in time within a partially path-dependent 
historical continuum driven by a dialectical process of change between competing 
interests and ideas? 
• What are the world order level variables, such as industrialization, that may affect 
the relative position of an individual state/society complex over time?  
• What is the current nature and effectiveness of those complexes, seen as a point in 
the historical continuum? 
• What is the current strategic culture, seen as point in the same historical 
continuum? 
• How sensitive is a given state/society complex to different contingencies, and 
does it have the resources and social structures necessary to deal with 
contingencies effectively? 
 
To gain an understanding of the present state of the world system, an individual 
state/society complex, or strategic culture, the historical analysis will be guided by Cox’s 
forces, which can be applied to each one of these areas of analysis. 
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Material capabilities, ideas and institutions are seen as interactively co-creative, 
with no unidirectional causal processes. For example, material capabilities and 
institutions may give birth to some ideas, but those ideas can change both of the other 
forces and exist well past the material capabilities and institutions that birthed them. Cox 
also sees these forces as being applied to what he terms “social forces” stemming from 
the organization of production. These equate to the system level variables, such as 
industrialization or an energy system transition, that are not part of the system but may 
fundamentally affect it over time – through such things as changing relative national 
material capabilities (e.g. the UK as the first industrializing nation), or the creation of 
new economic and social actors such as a concentrated industrial work force. 
The concept of strategic culture brings into perspective the position of at least part 
of the societal elite, but the framework is still lacking an effective representation of elites: 
both within a given nation and across nations. This is where the insights of the 
Amsterdam School, as well as concepts of comprador and quisling elites become 
pertinent. At the national level it is assumed that an elite, made up of one or more social 
class fractions (Jessop & Overbeek 2019) that may compete but also coalesce when 






state/society complex. At the same time, it is accepted that cross-national coalitions of 
elites may exist in differing structures of equality and hierarchy. A given national 
state/society complex and/or elite may significantly prescribe the actions of another. The 
processes through which the US exerts such control over the Brazilian and other South 
American elites and state/society complexes are well documented (Barbosa dos Santos 
2019; Black 1977, 1986). Cross-national elite networks may also be based on shared 
cultures, and their relationships may change significantly over time; as with that between 
the US and UK elites. National elites may also have explicit historical hatreds, as with the 
hatred generated by the Soviet massacre of the flower of the Polish elite in Katyn Forest 
in 1940. The figure below provides a diagrammatic representation of the structure of 
analysis: 
 
• Strategic cultures, state/society complexes, countries, and the world/international 
system are all historical entities that change over time in a somewhat path 
dependent way. 
• Strategic culture is separated from Cox’s state/society complex, as it provides for 
an analysis of policy-maker belief systems that is not a focus of Cox’s 
methodology. 
• The societal elite is conceptualized as encompassing strategic culture and also 









The questions above become somewhat altered: 
 
• What are the current imperatives of competition between state/society complexes 
within the world order, seen as a point in time within a partially path-dependent 
historical continuum driven by a dialectical process of change between competing 
interests and ideas? 
• What are the world order level variables, such as industrialization, that may affect 
the relative position of an individual state/society complex over time?  
• What is the current nature and effectiveness of those complexes, seen as a point in 


























• What is the current strategic culture, seen as point in the same historical 
continuum, and how is that culture affected by elite socialization, power and 
wealth? 
• What are the interconnecting structures between different state/society complexes 
and/or elites? How much sovereignty does an individual country possess? 
• How sensitive is a given state/society complex to different contingencies, and 
does it have the resources and social structures necessary to deal with 
contingencies effectively? 
 
Through this set of questions, and the analytical tools provided by the differing 
theoretical approaches utilized, we can arrive at a holistic understanding of the dynamics 
of the world order. This understanding can then provide a base of understanding from 
which to assess the possible future policy paths of individual countries, and groups of 
countries; as I will show in the three case studies contained within this work. 
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Chapter 3: China Case Study 
 
“Smash The Four Olds” 
(Slogan used during the Cultural Revolution, referring to Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old 
Customs) 
 
“A Chinese Dream” 
(Slogan used by Xi Jinping) 
 
“The China Virus” 
(Donald Trump September 22nd 2020, speech to the United Nations) 
 
“The China Nightmare” 
(Title of a 2020 book by Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute) 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will firstly carry out a historical analysis to ascertain the political 
economy of China, specifically the nature of its state/society complex and the power 
dynamics within it, and the long-term determinants of the strategic culture of the policy-
making elites. I will then utilize these insights to assess current energy-related policies in 
the context of major power competition. In the final piece of the chapter I will summarize 
the current characteristics of China with respect to the international community and 
possible policy paths. Mao may have instigated social chaos to smash the impact of 
China’s history upon its present, but Xi’s envisaged Chinese dream still very much builds 
on select parts of the “Olds”; a dream which may produce nightmares in a West still 
asserting its ideological superiority and claim upon a single universalist conception of 




3.1. Historical Positioning 
3.1.1. Periodic consolidation and collapse, Mongol invasion, Empire, Imperial Zenith 
(~1600 BC to 1839 AD) 
 
 
 China has been the site of a major civilization, centered on the Yellow River 
valley, from at least the time of the Shang Dynasty that was established around 1600 BC 
(the existence of the prior Xia Dynasty from 2070 to 1600 BC is still open to academic 
debate, although there is evidence of royal palaces and bronze vessels from that period 
[Trigger 2003, p. 107]). The Shang territorial state at its maximum may have controlled 
320,000 km of rich farmland, an area only slightly smaller than modern Germany, with a 
population of approximately 10 million. It was a centralized monarchy (as was its 
successor) with access to economic surpluses on the scale required to produce large 
palaces and support “highly skilled and specialized artisans [that] crafted magnificent 
luxury goods and symbols of authority” (Trigger 2003, p. 111). The Shang dynasty lasted 
until 1046 BC, paralleling the existence of the Egyptian New Kingdom, with a population 
around twice that of Egypt. Its successor, the Zhou dynasty, lasted until 221 BC; a 
combined period of over thirteen centuries. In the Zhou dynasty, during the Spring and 
Autumn period (772-481 BC) which generally paralleled the period of the pre-republic 
Roman Kingdom, centralized control broke down and power became much more 
decentralized. This disintegration led to the Warring States period from 475 to 221 BC. 
The population of China during the Warring States period was at least 30 million, and the 
wars lasted for two and a half centuries. Each of the seven warring states (Qin, Chu, 
Zhao, Wei, Han, Yan, Qi) exhibited large economic, social, political and military 
structures, with complex strategic planning and diplomatic strategies. The enforced 
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competitiveness drove innovation across many areas, especially in military organization 
and technology, and state administration. Within the Qin, the political leader Shang Yang 
implemented reforms that greatly increased its efficiency and effectiveness, facilitating 
its eventual victory and the establishment of the Qin Dynasty (the first dynasty of 
Imperial China).   
 The philosophy behind these reforms was that of Chinese Legalism, and the Book 
of Lord Shang is seen as a foundational text of this school of philosophy. It is a 
philosophy of centralized autocracy, state efficiency and the use of power that has been 
likened to the work of Machiavelli in The Prince. A fundamental belief is the need for a 
strong central state to maintain political stability and protect against the chaos and 
destruction of disintegration that periodically enveloped China. A competing philosophy 
was provided by Confucius (551-479 BC), which emphasized the gaining of the right to 
rule a hierarchic social structure through elite benevolence, justice, virtue, and morality. 
Confucianism somewhat aligns to the Mandate of Heaven concept that was first used by 
the Zhou to legitimize their overthrow of the Shang. Unlike the European Divine Right of 
Kings the Mandate was not unconditional, but provided a right of rebellion against those 
seen as ruling unjustly or incompetently. Major natural disasters and droughts could be 
seen as heaven removing its mandate, legitimizing rebellion. As covered later in this 
chapter, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized the Mandate of Heaven in the 
current form of the concept of Performance Legitimacy. The CCP has also utilized a 
combination of Legalism and Confucianism to represent itself as a strong centralized 
force that rules in a benevolent fashion. The third major Chinese school of philosophy, 
Daoism, also originated during this period. This was based on a belief in the need for 
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human harmony with nature, humility in leadership and restrained statecraft. Its belief in 
limited government has had some contemporary scholars liken Daoism to Libertarianism. 
 This Warring States period overlaps with the time of Thucydides (460 – 400 BC), 
who’s History of the Peloponnesian Wars has been seen as the first political realist text. 
The contemporaneous Athenian experiment with democracy provides an ancient basis for 
the Western philosophy of Liberal Democracy. An important point is that the 
Peloponnesian Wars involved a population of only about one million over sixty years, 
while the Warring States period involved thirty times the population and four times the 
number of years. The applicability of lessons learnt from the Warring States period may 
thus be seen to be more applicable to the present than the Peloponnesian War, as well as 
other significantly smaller and simpler events of Western history. A core part of the 
chronicles of the Warring States period is the usage of deceit, strategic withdrawal, 
alliance building and general statecraft to offset the military advantages of opponents and 
if possible, win without the need for battle. As Sun Tzu, who lived during the Zhang 
dynasty, noted: the best general is the one that can win a war without fighting any battles 
(Gagliardi 2014). 
 The individual Chinese states could amass armies of at least 100,000, with the 
larger states possibly amassing armies as big as one million men. At a single battle, that 
of Changping in 260 BC, hundreds of thousands of men died (a figure of over 450,000 
was estimated during the later Han dynasty). Western warfare did not reach this scale 
until the beginning of the nineteenth century with Napoleon’s Grand Armee on the eve of 
the invasion of Russia (1812 AD), a scale not to be repeated until World War 1; famous 
battles such as Agincourt (1415 AD), Waterloo (1815 AD) and Gettysburg (1863) pale in 
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comparison. The “total war” nature of the societal destruction of the Warring States 
period could be compared to that of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648 AD), Napoleon’s 
invasion of Russia and the two World Wars. The level of chaos and destruction of the 
Warring States period has been seen as a warning of what can happen if the “center does 
not hold”; a parallel with the later Three Kingdoms period (220-280 AD), Sixteen 
Kingdoms period (304-439 AD), the Mongol Conquest (1205-1272 AD), the Century of 
Humiliation (1839-1949 AD), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976 AD). The Chinese 
population tended to grow during the peace provided by a strong center, only to 
significantly decrease during times of internal strife and invasion. 
 The Warring States period ended with the victory of the Qin and the start of the 
Imperial Period. The Qin dynasty was rapidly replaced by the Han dynasty that lasted for 
over four centuries (206 BC to 220 AD). The Han dynasty was a tortuous transitional 
period with respect to political-economic thought, “from ‘contention of a hundred schools 
of thought’ to a ‘grand unification’” (Cheng & Zhang 2019, para. 5) that was a synthesis 
of aspects of Legalism, Daoism and Confucianism combined with insights from the 
merchant class. This new orthodoxy displayed guiding principles which emphasized the 
collective over the individual, benevolence and righteousness outweighing 
instrumentality, the relative importance of agriculture over manufacturing and commerce, 
frugality, and reducing inequality. It also became a privileged paradigm of thought that 
“became a barrier to the development of new economic thought” and “it was not until the 
late Qing Dynasty … that the conditions were created for revolutionary changes in the 
subject area” (Cheng & Zhang 2019, final para.). After being defeated by the Xiongnu 
nomadic tribes to the north in 200 BC, and forced into a vassal status, it took a century 
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for the Han to reverse roles with the Xiongnu. The dynasty was later undermined by 
increasingly complex and violent court politics, together with peasant rebellions led by 
Daoists, as with the Daoist Yellow Turban Rebellion (184-205 AD) and the rebellion of 
the The Celestial Masters in 184 AD. Following the death of Emperor Ling in 189 AD 
the palace eunuchs were massacred and the empire became divided between different 
warlords. At approximately the same time, the Roman Empire was attaining its peak. 
The chaos and destruction of the resulting Three Kingdoms (Wei, Shu & Wu) 
Period was ended with reunification under the Jin dynasty (266-420 AD), but that started 
to disintegrate within a few decades resulting in extensive internal conflict; including the 
War of the Eight Princes (291-306) and the Uprising of the Five Barbarians (304-316). 
Its final denouement was followed by the chaos and extreme political volatility of the 
period of the Sixteen Kingdoms (304-439), paralleling the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire in Europe. These kingdoms were slowly consolidated into the Northern and 
Southern dynasties (386-589), which were then combined to form the short-lived Sui 
dynasty (581-618). It was from this period that the state bureaucratic system, staffed from 
those that could pass the rigorous entrance exams rather than just those from noble 
families, was established. This greatly improved the quality of the administration and lent 
it legitimacy as lowborn individuals reached senior positions. Another of the 
accomplishments of this dynasty was the building of the Grand Canal with up to 5 
million laborers; this greatly improved transportation between the northern and southern 
parts of the Empire. The economic strain of such large projects together with a series of 
costly wars helped destabilize the Empire, leading to the establishment of the Tang 
dynasty (618 – 907). This dynasty is seen as the heyday of Chinese civilization, with the 
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population increasing to 80 million. This was succeeded by another unstable period, that 
of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907-979). Much of China was then reunited 
under the Song dynasty (960-1279), which coexisted with the smaller Western Xia and 
Liao dynasties. The latter was overthrown by the Jin dynasty, which then successfully 
waged war with the Song, taking the northern part of their territory before stalemate set 
in. During this period, the Chinese population is estimated to have grown to 
approximately 90 million, in comparison to a European population that had grown from 
about 50 million in 1000 to a high of around 75 million (approximately the same size as 
the Roman Empire at its peak nearly a millennia before). 
 The Mongols conquered both the Western Xia and Jin lands in the period 1229-
1241, and after a long war defeated the Song in 1279. The Mongol leader Kublai Khan 
formed the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) to rule China. The dominance of Mongol and 
Semu (various Central Asian groups allied with the Mongols) in the higher reaches of the 
government, together with their cultural and legal special privileges, underlined the 
colonial nature of the dynasty. There does seem to have been a major level of 
depopulation during the latter part of this period (up to 50%), as well as a general decline 
of the state, although some scholars point to the establishment of serfdom as removing 
many people from the official population rolls. In later years the Mongol leaders took less 
interest in good governance, and this lack of effective government policy when combined 
with a series of natural disasters undermined the leadership’s legitimacy. In 1351 the Red 
Turban Revolt turned into a nationwide rebellion, with the Ming coming to dominate the 
rebel forces after the Battle of Lake Poyang, which reportedly involved 850,000 men. The 
Ming dynasty was established in 1368 and ended in 1662, a period during which the 
 96 
Chinese population grew to about 160 million; approximately double that of Europe. In 
parallel, the Ottoman Empire arose in Western Asia, destroyed the Byzantine Empire 
(also known as the Eastern Roman Empire) and expanded into North Africa and the 
Balkans. The collapse of the Yuan Dynasty led to the retreat of the Mongols to what later 
became the state of Mongolia and the autonomous Chinese region of Inner Mongolia. 
 It was during the Ming dynasty that the Tribute system was formalized, reflecting 
much of the philosophy of Confucianism. China was seen as the benevolent head of a 
hierarchy of states, with the lesser states such as Vietnam and Korea displaying their 
respect through ostentatiously obsequious displays and actions that generally aligned with 
China’s interests. After exchanges of gifts and the investiture of the foreign leader by the 
Chinese, trade relations would be allowed. The lesser states remained independent of 
China, and were not required to change their economic, social or political structures to 
align with those of China. Such an approach can be seen with the current Belt and Road 
Initiative (and many other dimensions of current Chinese foreign policy), with Chinese 
investment and trading relations not being dependent upon changes to a state’s internal 
composition. This is very much in contrast to the universalist liberal internationalism of 
the Western nations, which does not allow for such diversity and has relied heavily upon 
territorial expansion and forced societal change. Between 1405 and 1433, seven huge 
ocean-going expeditions were carried out by the Chinese navy, stretching as far as the 
East African coast. These consisted of hundreds of ships, some of them over 400 feet 
long and 160 feet wide; the ships used by Columbus to “discover” North America in 
1492 were tiny in comparison and such a scale of fleet would not exist again until World 
War 1. Due to increasing challenges at home such as the newly reunited Mongols, and 
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court politics between expansionist elements and more frugal Confucian elements, a navy 
that had consisted of 3,500 vessels was eventually scrapped. At no time during these 
voyages did the Chinese display a need to conquer and subjugate foreign territory, unlike 
the future European vessels that would enter the Indian Ocean. 
 From the 16th century onwards European trade increasingly affected China, both 
through the introduction of new crops (the Columbian Exchange) and increasing demand 
for Chinese goods. A combination of agricultural collapse stemming from the Little Ice 
Age and the effects of reduced trade upon a silver-dependent economy led to a successful 
rebellion against the Ming that was defeated by the Manchus. The latter then established 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) after a bloody conquest that resulted in the deaths of over 
25 million people (approximately 1 in 6 of the population). Although the Manchus made 
extensive efforts to integrate Han into elite positions and integrated much of Han culture, 
setting them apart from the Mongols, the Qing dynasty was seen as not being a legitimate 
heir of the Middle Kingdom by surrounding nations such as Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. 
Fang (2019) identifies this period as the end of any East Asian cultural community that 
might have existed, with the latter nations identifying themselves as more legitimate heirs 
to the civilization of the Middle Kingdom. The Qing dynasty peaked in the late 18th 
century, at which point there was little variation in wealth and income between Europe, 
the USA and China (Davis 2001; Bayly 2004).  
 
 For many centuries, the high cultures of Asia were held in respect, even awe, 
 in many parts of Europe (Darwin 2007:117). India and China were dominant 
 in manufacturing and many areas of technology. As such, the West interacted 
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 with Asian powers sometimes as political equals and, at other times, as 
 supplicants. (Buzan & Lawson 2013, p. 624) 
 
 Adam Smith noted the greater sophistication of Chinese markets of the time when 
compared to European ones (Jacques 2012, p. 30), and “saw China as an exemplar of 
market-based development, [observing] in 1776 that ‘China is a much richer country than 
any part of Europe’” (quoted in Jacques 2012, p. 93). In 1820 China’s economy 
accounted for nearly 40% of the global economy and was seven times the size of that of 
both the United Kingdom (UK) and France (India was three times the size of the latter 
two). The US economy was less than one twentieth the size of that of China (Maddison 
1995, p. 30). The Chinese population was approximately 381 million, more than four 
times that of France, Britain, Spain, Austria and Prussia combined, 38 times that of the 
US, and one third of the global population. Its economy had enjoyed centuries of 
“vigorous economic growth and reasonable prosperity” (Jacques, p. 92).  
 Without the ability to overcome the biophysical limits of its intensively utilized 
agricultural sector China was at a disadvantage to a Britain that could access firstly Irish 
lands (even at the cost of local famine [Thomas 1982]) and then the colonies of North 
America; the latter including the cheap slave-produced cotton that helped propel the 
British textile industry. In addition, the UK was able to amass capital from the profits of 
the slave trade and the naval plundering of Spanish precious metal shipments, and later 
the massive profits provided by the colonization of India. Britain’s separation by water 
from its enemies also protected against invasion (unlike the position of China with 
respect to the Mongols) and it possessed large-scale accessible coal deposits within its 
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small landmass. As Jacques (2012) states, it may have been at least as much these one-off 
factors than any longer-term socio-economic ones that produced the British industrial 
revolution that took off in the early nineteenth century. Such a position is supported by 
the ability of a very different socio-economic model, that of China, to so rapidly and 
successfully industrialize; rendering liberal capitalism as a specific rather than a universal 
route to modernity. 
 For this modernity to take shape though, the shackles of the hegemonic culture 
and political economy established during the Han dynasty had to be broken to allow for 
the import of new ideas and a reconceptualization process; one that the Japanese 
successfully performed after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The Qing dynasty saw itself 
as the center of global civilization, surrounded by lesser civilizations, or even barbarians. 
Mirroring today’s universalist liberalism, the only path to being truly civilized was seen 
as being that of integration into Chinese culture. This arrogance, allied with a lack of 
inquisitiveness about other civilizations and even basic geography, exposed the Qing to 
the possibility of a catastrophic denouement at the hands of the Western powers: 
 
After the Kangxi Emperor (1645-1722) banned the spread of Catholicism, the 
Chinese people suffered a major setback in their geographic knowledge. Worse 
still, the erroneous view that China was at the center of the world, surrounded by 
some insignificant barbarian countries, again became a platitude commonly heard 
of in Chinese society. The Yongzheng Emperor and his son, the Qianlomg 
Emperor, declared even stricter bans on Catholicism, thus severing all ties with 
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Western civilization, which was making tremendous progress at the time. China, 
by contrast, became increasingly ill-informed and backward. (Fang 2019, p. 3). 
 
3.1.2. Century of Humiliation (1839 to 1949) 
 Following the peak of the Qing dynasty came the Century of Humiliation from 
1839 to 1949 during which China was reduced to a mere supplicant of other powers. The 
first half of this period encompassed the First and Second Opium Wars (to force China to 
legalize the British opium trade that recycled the silver paid for Chinese exports), the 
Taipeng rebellion (1850-1864) and Dungan revolt (1862-1877) that led to the deaths and 
displacement of tens of millions, the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 resulting in huge 
reparation payments and the loss of the tributary Korea, and the Boxer rebellion (1899-
1901) that led to the outright invasion of China by the Western powers. “By the turn of 
the century, China’s sovereignty had been severely curtailed by the growing presence of 
Britain, France, Japan, Germany, the United States, Belgium and Russia on Chinese 
territory” (Jacques 2012, p. 102). By 1900 the richest parts of Europe had a GDP per 
capita of over ten times that of China (Bayly 2004), and China’s share of global GDP was 
less than a third of that of Europe (Davis 2001). The US economy had overtaken that of 
China by 1890, and by 1930 was nearly three times the size, with the UK and Germany 
roughly equal in size to China (Cox 2015).  
 The Qing dynasty finally collapsed and was overthrown in 1911, ending the last 
imperial dynasty of China. The new Republic of China with Sun Yat-sen as its first 
president was highly unstable and included the interregnum of the dictatorship of Yuan 
Shikai (1912-1916), together with the chaos of the Warlord Era (1916-1928). As Fang 
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notes (2019, p. 48), during the period of chaotic change from 1849 onwards, “especially 
amidst forced Sino-Western contact, an unprecedentedly great value shift concerning the 
question of how to view ‘civilization’ occurred in China, reaching a climax with the May 
Fourth Movement”. As with Japan, this did not result in the replacement of local culture 
and thought by those of the West, but rather the use of the latter to serve the rejuvenation 
and extension of the former. Greater stability came with the establishment of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government under Chang Kai-Shek in 1927, but then 
civil war resulted from the split of the KMT with the CCP (including the massacre of 
communists in Shanghai); the CCP and KMT had been in alliance from 1923-1927. The 
next decade brought the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931-1932). The Long March 
of the CCP (1934-1935) also took place during this period, with Mao becoming leader of 
the CCP in 1935. Within two years the Japanese mounted their larger invasion of China 
(1937-1945). The Rape of Nanjing (1937) is only one example of the scale of destruction 
and violations of basic human rights during the Japanese invasion and occupation. From 
1940 onwards the CCP and KMT were allied once more in a national government 
focused on fighting the Japanese invaders. As soon as the war ended in 1945, civil war 
broke out between the CCP and KMT, lasting until 1949.  
 This period of over a century of extensive subjugation to foreign powers and 
internal disintegration ended the more than five-century period of national development 
under the Ming and Qing dynasties, and a nearly four millennia stretch of a Chinese 
civilization that was dominant in the Asian continent and a major global power. A 
civilization that had seen itself as the Middle Kingdom sitting above all others was 
defeated, subjugated and devastated; the only full parallel being that of the Mongol 
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invasion and occupation six centuries earlier (the Manchus took great care to integrate 
with, rather than dominate, the Han). “China’s plight during this period is illustrated by 
the fact that in 1820 its per capita GDP was $600, in 1850 it was still $600, by 1870 it 
had fallen to $530, in 1890 was $540, rising very slightly to $552 in 1913 – still well 
below its level in 1820, almost a century earlier. By 1950 it had fallen to a mere $439, 
just over 73 per cent of its 1820 level.” (Jacques 2012, p. 114). This Century of 
Humiliation remains today in the collective Chinese consciousness, and within the history 
books, with a latent will to recover the status and pride lost with the demise of the Middle 
Kingdom; a potent source of nationalist and anti-foreign sentiment, and legitimation for 
the CCP (Kaufman 2010; Weatherley & Rosen 2013). It also serves as “a source of 
beliefs about how the world works” (Kaufman 2010, p. 4) for elite policy makers, 
embedding a deep mistrust of the Western powers and a fear of the chaos and destruction 
of the period. The horrendous record of Japan during its invasion of China is also well 
remembered, and a lingering source of anti-Japan sentiment that can rise to the surface; 
the Rape of Nanjing is still a highly contentious issue between the two countries. 
3.1.3. Communism (1949 to 1978) 
 After the end of the Second World War, the socialist and nationalist crisis ridden 
and corrupt KMT rule that had been established in 1927 was swept away by the 
communist revolution that established the modern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949, led by Mao. The PRC was unable to subdue the island of Taiwan, where the 
defeated nationalist government re-established itself. As with the Century of Humiliation, 
this is seen as a historic wrong that should be righted – providing a long-term non-
negotiable foreign policy objective. A fully communist system (i.e. without capitalist 
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productive relations) was not established until later in the 1950s; during this first period 
of rule the CCP oversaw a rapid growth and recovery from the destruction of the 
Japanese invasion and the civil war. This was helped by extensive technical aid from the 
USSR. What followed was the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-1960). 
 At first output had leapt during the Great Leap Forward due to the over-intensive 
use of resources at the behest of Mao (machinery, people and natural resources), but this 
was unsustainable and produced vast amounts of waste. An example was the melting 
down of household and farming implements in “backyard furnaces” to produce metal that 
was generally useless for manufacturing purposes; a process that destroyed capital goods 
in return for a short-term jump in unusable industrial output. Another was the Smash 
Sparrows Campaign that resulted in severe ecological imbalances due to the mass 
killings of sparrows; the sparrows were seen as pests that ate grain seeds, but they also 
served to keep insect numbers under control. These imbalances, together with disruptive 
changes in agricultural organization, excess procurements of grain, and the redirection of 
labor from agriculture to industrial uses, exacerbated adverse weather patterns that would 
have by themselves reduced crop yields. The result was the Great Chinese Famine (1959-
1961) that resulted in the death of approximately 20-30 million from starvation. Some of 
this death toll was due to local Party officials’ resistance to accepting the reality of 
reduced yields and to reporting that reality to Mao (O’Grada 2009). As with the 1930s 
USSR famine, the study of this famine has become enmeshed within ideological 
discourses with a recent example being that of Dikkoter (2010). In his highly critical 








The failures of this period led to a restriction of Mao’s powers, and a limited 
agricultural de-collectivization was carried out that produced a significant recovery in the 
next few years (1961-1965). This recovery was hampered by the removal of Soviet 
assistance after the Sino-Soviet split of 1962. In 1966, Mao re-established his pre-
eminence, while creating widespread cultural and social destruction, through a political 
terror campaign that undermined basic societal institutions and the state bureaucracy. 
After only two years of the Cultural Revolution the chaos and instability were so great 
that Mao had to call in the military to re-establish basic social order in the cities. The 
chaos was concentrated in the cities, and there was a much lesser impact upon 
agricultural output than on industrial production. The 1971 death in an air crash in 
Mongolia of the Vice-Chairman of the CCP Lin Biao, in still highly debated 
circumstances, has been seen by some as moving Mao away from the extremes of the 
Cultural Revolution and toward the reinstatement of many purged and disgraced officials. 
Mao had shown himself to be better at destruction than creation, removing the previous 
economic and social order but also producing over a decade of lost growth. With the 
reduction in the intensity of the Cultural Revolution, which would continue under Mao 
and then the Gang of Four until 1976, economic growth resumed. The purging of many 
competent officials during this period, and the educational deficits caused by the closure 
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of the universities, provided significant headwinds for longer-term economic 
development. One of the disgraced officials that were reinstated was Deng Xiaoping, who 
was rehabilitated in the mid-1970s. Following the death of Mao and the arrest of the 
Gang of Four in 1976, he established himself as the leader of the CCP late in 1978.  
 In 1951 Tibet was reintegrated into China under the Seventeen Point Agreement, 
with its internal structure remaining unchanged; a medieval theocracy with the vast 
majority of land organized into religious and secular manorial estates worked by serfs 
(Parenti 2003). The region had been a protectorate under the Qing dynasty from 1720 to 
1912. The succeeding Republic of China had claimed it as part of China, as the current 
Taiwanese government still does. The British had invaded Tibet in 1904, and once the 
Qing dynasty collapsed Tibet became a British protectorate. This was de facto 
independence, but Tibet did not receive de jure recognition by the international 
community. After the Tibetan uprising of 1959, supported by Taiwan and the CIA 
(Conboy & Morrison 2002), both sides (the PRC and the Dalai Lama) repudiated the 
Seventeen Point Agreement and the PRC revoked Tibetan local autonomy. From a CCP 
point of view, the reintegration of Tibet can be seen as part of the process of regaining 
sovereignty over Chinese lands from the Western powers; in the same vein as the return 
of Macao and Hong Kong, and the still unresolved issue of Taiwan. 
 Immediately after the establishment of the PRC, Mao allied the nation with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which provided extensive economic, 
technical and military aid. In 1950, only a year after the establishment of the PRC, the 
Chinese army was used to repulse the UN troops that had crossed the 38th parallel and 
had approached the Chinese border at the Yalu River. Although the successful defense of 
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North Korea increased the CCP’s reputation and legitimacy, the cost of the war 
significantly impacted domestic development policies. After the death of Stalin in 1953 
and his denunciation by Khrushchev, the two nations started to diverge on communist 
doctrinal and geopolitical issues. This culminated in the breaking of relations with the 
USSR by China in 1962 and border conflicts in the late 1960s. China was heavily 
involved in supplying support staff and material to the North Vietnamese during its wars 
with the French, and then the US (Qiang Zhai 2000); support that was critical to North 
Vietnam’s final victory. In the 1970s China became more pragmatic with respect to 
foreign relations and opened up communications with the US from 1972 onwards. 
3.1.4. Communism In Name Only (1978 to Present Day) 
 At the start of this period the Chinese GDP per capita was lower than that of sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank 2019a & 2019b), and its economy represented only 2.19% 
of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms (PPP) (The Guardian 2016). By 2018 
Chinese GDP per capita was at the level of Brazil and Mexico in US$ terms and only one 
third less than Greece and Portugal in PPP terms (World Bank 2019c & 2019d). This had 
been facilitated by the move away from communist dogma and toward a more pragmatic 
approach instigated by Deng: 
 
Only if we emancipate our minds, seek the truth from facts, proceed from reality 
in everything and integrate theory with practice, can we carry out our socialist 
modernization programme smoothly … Seeking truth from facts is the basis of the 




The richer conurbations such as Shanghai currently house tens of millions who 
enjoy a Northern European standard of living. In 2016, the Chinese economy was 18% of 
the global economy. These facts remind me of a conversation I had in the late 1990s with 
a Singaporean colleague when I was complaining about the authoritarian nature of the 
city-state’s government and its leader. I was quickly silenced when told that only a few 
decades earlier the city state had been “as poor as Africa” and the freedom of her children 
from hunger, disease and a lack of education were much more important than liberal 
notions of democracy. When discussing human rights, it is important to remember the 
more basic ones and the relative hierarchy of needs; the selective utilization of such rights 
can be seen as an act of politicization and propaganda. Compared to the experiences of 
the Mao era, or even of the last two decades of the twentieth century, the current China 
can be seen as being an incredible achievement. An achievement extremely obvious to 
any Chinese person over the age of thirty; the human rights of the average Chinese 
citizen have been massively improved. 
 From the start of Deng Xiaoping’s liberalizing reforms at the end of the 1970’s 
until 1993 China was self-sufficient in fossil fuels. After this period, domestic oil 
production was unable to keep up with increasing domestic consumption, resulting in a 
widening trade deficit in oil and oil derivatives (EIA 2015). In parallel, China began its 
integration into the neoLIO supported by successive US administrations that took a view 
that increasing trade and development would push China toward “economic liberalism, 
multiparty democracy, and a rejection of hegemonic designs” (Salam 2018). China 
conditionally obtained US “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) trading status in 1980, 
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renewable on a yearly basis (under the 1974 US Trade Act). Repeatedly, US 
administrations resisted Congressional and other domestic pressures to revoke MFN 
status, even after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.  
 In the late 1980s the CCP was split between those that supported political 
liberalization and those that supported the combination of authoritarian politics and 
liberalizing economics. This dispute culminated in the subjugation of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests, the removal of the leaders supporting political reformism 
such as Zhao Ziyang, and the reinstatement of the authoritarian development state. The 
center was strengthened to remove the possibility of the chaos that had afflicted China so 
many times during its history, a chaos personally experienced by a leadership that had 
lived through the Japanese invasion, the Chinese civil war and/or the Cultural Revolution 
(Jiang 1997; Brown 2014; Vogel 2015). Deng himself had been purged from the elite 
during the Cultural Revolution to reside in the countryside as a manual worker and had 
seen a son become a paraplegic after either jumping, or being pushed, out of a window 
while being imprisoned by the Red Guards (Vogel 2011). Xi Jinping, the current head of 
the CCP, saw his senior Party member father denounced and jailed, one of his two sisters 
commit suicide after the ransacking of their house by student militias, and was sent to the 
provinces where he resided in a cave house before being assigned to a work camp to dig 
ditches (Buckley & Tatlow 2015). The collapse of the USSR can only have reinforced an 
elite consensus toward a strong central state, and resistance to any signs of domestic 
revolt, backed by both Chinese history and visceral personal experience. In referring to 
Xi, MacFarquhar notes “The combination of that domestic trauma, experienced as a 
young person, and the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union, those two traumas, one 
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domestic and one foreign, have really shaped him … He has seen what happens if you 
allow too much criticism of the party and the establishment” (quoted in Denyer 2015). 
 Far-reaching economic reforms were made in the next decade, but political 
stability was maintained, foreign capital kept at arms-length within the Special Economic 
Zones, and the economic “commanding heights” kept within state ownership. In contrast 
to the USSR and its successor states, the period from the late 1980s to the turn of the 
century was not one of economic collapse, but rather of rapid economic growth. This was 
aided by a much shorter history of collectivist communist rule (including the partial de-
collectivization of agriculture in the wake of the Great Leap Forward), a previous multi-
decadal capitalist period immediately prior to the communist revolution (unlike in pre-
revolutionary Russia), extensive markets under the Ming & Qing dynasties, and access to 
a large market-savvy and capital owning Chinese diaspora – including those in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. The reinstatement of competitive exams for entrance to the state 
bureaucracy also produced a highly capable technocratic state bureaucracy. 
 At this point China had become “communist in name only” and the CCP could 
not rely upon ideology for its legitimacy. The CCP became dependent upon its ability to 
successfully meet its citizens needs for its legitimacy. The most significant way of 
providing for its citizens needs was through the economic growth that has facilitated 
rising living standards. “Top officials in China all know that economic development is 
now most crucial for maintaining the state’s power. They not only strongly promote 
market-oriented reforms but also try hard to prevent economic overheating and high 
inflation” (Zhao 2009, p. 425). Such performance legitimacy is akin to the ancient 
Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven that had come to the fore with the Western 
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Zhou dynasty (1045-771 BC). This created a state (and Emperor) legitimacy based upon 
the state’s ability to competently serve the general good: 
 
One of the key components of the Mandate of Heaven concept is that although a 
ruler cannot entirely determine his own destiny, he is able to influence Heaven’s 
will by good and moral conduct … in general, a good emperor needed to act 
according to moral principles prescribed in the Confucian teachings, maintain the 
functioning of the government administration and public order, lead the defense 
of the state in time of foreign attacks, and take responsibilities for the people’s 
welfare and associated public works, including but not limited to flood control 
and irrigation projects, road construction, and famine relief during natural 
disasters. (Ibid., p. 421).  
 
 As Zhao notes, the concept allowed for the de-legitimization of the ruler (i.e. the 
Emperor) based upon performance, a situation that supported rebellion against a ruler 
seen to be unfit, “the idea of rising to rebel against an unfit ruler had a legitimate position 
in Chinese political culture” (Ibid., p. 421). As with the Emperors, the CCP has no 
electorally based legitimacy to fall back upon during difficult times, and therefore must 
rely upon ideology, nationalism and/or performance for its legitimacy. Through the 
market reforms of Deng, together with a more open dialogue about the shortcomings of 
post-1949 Chinese state socialism, “By the mid-1980s, most urban Chinese no longer 
believed in communism” (Ibid., p. 423). After the forcible subjugation of the pro-
democracy movement in 1989, which was significantly triggered by the economic and 
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social disruptions of the prior decade, the CCP “employed all three major forms of 
performance legitimacy available to stabilize its rule (Zhao 2001): moral performance, 
economic performance, and the defense of national interest (calls to patriotism and 
nationalism)” (Ibid., p. 425). The focus of the CCP upon performance-based legitimacy 
since that period was underlined by the concept of the three representatives put forward 
by Jiang Zemin in 2001: 
 
Jiang argued that in order to be accepted by the people “The CCP must always 
represent the development of China’s advanced forces of production, the 
orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people” [and] the CCP-controlled [sic] 
media … argued that the three representatives are “the foundation of the Party, the 
basis of government legitimacy and the sources of state authority”. (Ibid., p. 426).  
 
 In 2000, the United States provided China with “Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations” (after significant political maneuvering within the US), and supported China’s 
ascension to the WTO in 2001. These latter changes greatly facilitated the movement of 
western manufacturing to China, as they provided a promise of future stability in trade 
relations that corporations could rely upon. This helped accelerate the Chinese economic 
growth rate in the first decade of the new century, producing a five-fold increase in the 
size of the economy. The Chinese economy then nearly doubled during the following 
five- year period. This period of explosive growth has its historical parallel in that of the 
global emergence of the United States at the end of the nineteenth century; although 
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China’s economy grew at twice the rate that the US had experienced during its industrial 
takeoff. 
 The movement of the ex-Soviet Bloc countries toward the liberal model of 
capitalist democracy in the 1990s supported the idea that the inclusion of China within 
the neoLIO would lead it down the same inevitable liberalizing path. Western hubristic 
assumptions of the “End of History” (Fukuyama 1992) and the triumph of liberal 
capitalist democracy, provided support to such a benign view of China’s rise, “The West 
… chose to look at China through political rose-colored glasses over the decades, despite 
the dramatic wake-up call that was Tiananmen” (Rudd 2019, p. 39-40). China’s own 
focus on economic development “pushed the country away from its earlier revolutionist 
attitude towards international society, and towards a more status quo position” (Buzan 
2010, p. 13) with respect to the neoLIO; a position exemplified by the diplomatic strategy 
of “keeping a low profile and hiding brightness”. As Buzan noted, “over the past 30 years 
[1980 to 2010], China has done a pretty good job of pursuing peaceful rise” (Buzan 2010, 
p. 15). There were some scholars and policy makers who questioned such a benign view. 
For example, Brzezinski (1997, p. 54) questioned “how large a Chinese sphere of 
influence, and where, should America be prepared to accept as part of a policy of 
successfully coopting China into world affairs? What areas now outside of China’s 
political radius might have to be conceded to the realm of the reemerging Celestial 
Empire”. With the US focus on the “Global War on Terror” post 9/11, China could 
continue to gain strength while enjoying the security and stability provided by the 
neoLIO; a situation that continued through the first decade of the 21st century. Internally, 
the CCP continued to liberalize the economy but within a framework of Party dominance.  
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 Although China regarded the world energy market “as an unfair and unsafe arena 
for latecomers” (Shaofeng 2008, p. 96) its growing import needs forced it to rely upon 
the global oil markets. These concerns were ameliorated somewhat by a diversification of 
supplying nations and fossil fuel related foreign direct investment by Chinese national oil 
companies (NOCs). Its acceptance within the neoLIO provided China with a relatively 
secure and reliable international fossil fuel trading environment at a low cost. 
 In 2007, China became the third, and then in 2010 the second, largest economy in 
US$ terms; overtaking Germany and then Japan (IMF 2019a). IMF projections indicate 
that China may overtake the United States in the late 2020s if it continues to grow at the 
same rate (Ibid.); there is already a precedent for this on a PPP basis since 2013 (IMF 
2019b). China’s rapid economic growth has not turned the country into a liberal capitalist 
democracy, instead, the CCP remains the dominant political force and large swathes of 
the economy remain state-owned or subject to state direction (So & Chu 2016; Starrs 
2017). Xi underlined the non-negotiable nature of this arrangement in a speech in 2015: 
 
We must consolidate and develop the public sector with firm commitment, and 
devote equal commitment to encouraging, supporting, and guiding the 
development of the non-public sector, ensuring that ownership of all forms can 
reinforce each other and develop together. At the same time, we must be 
extremely clear that our nation’s basic economic system is a pillar of the Chinese 
socialist system and the basis of the socialist market economy, and therefore the 
dominant role of public ownership and the leading role of the state sector must not 
change. (Xi 2015) 
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In the current decade, Chinese foreign policy has taken on a less subservient 
stance, with Xi Jinping’s new strategic direction of “Striving for Achievement” (SFA) 
indicating, “that China will take initiatives to shape its external environment in a 
favorable direction” (Yan 2014, p. 166); as noted in chapter 2.  
 Buzan typifies China as a “reformist revisionist” state that “accepts some of the 
institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons. 
But it resists, and wants to reform, others, and possibly also wants to change its status” 
(Buzan 2010, p. 18). It will want to “’shape’ the international system to a higher degree”, 
expect “to be treated on an equal footing” and “will never compromise on China’s 
sovereignty and core interests” (Sorenson 2015, p. 65). Buzan (2018) notes that China 
aligns with the classical Westphalian Global International Society (GIS) institutions of 
sovereignty, non-intervention, territoriality, balance of power and great power 
management, together with the newer ones of nationalism, human equality and 
development together with a conditional acceptance of markets. “From the CCP’s 
perspective, it is the liberal West that is aggressively revisionist, seeking to impose liberal 
values [of market dominance, democracy and selective human rights] on the rest of the 
world” (Ibid., p. 462). This statement helps place China’s position with respect to the 
neoLIO, with it being seen as supportive of many of its aspects while wanting to revise 
its relative position within that order and resisting what it sees as a Western revisionism 
that especially violates concepts of state sovereignty. Given its historical interactions with 
the West, especially during the Century of Humiliation, such a focus is understandable. 
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 Initiatives such as BRI that serve to expand China’s sphere of influence while 
supporting political and economic diversity (and restricts the interventionism of the 
Washington Consensus institutions), and the “Made in China 2025”, together with a 
“Chinese dream” that envisions a China at odds with basic tenets of Western 
neoliberalism, can be seen as direct challenges to America’s global leadership and the 
neoLIO as it currently stands. At a deeper level, the universalism of Western modernity is 
being challenged as the only true version of modernity. Instead, multiple possible 
versions of modernity are seen as possible, with the Chinese model as one of them 
(Jacques 2012). This creates significant ideological differences between China and the 
West, not as great as those between communism and capitalism, but still significant; 
especially in such areas as the balance between individual (and property) rights and the 
collective and the need for Western-style democracy. 
 China has also taken a more active stance against the US within the UN Security 
Council after encountering what it saw as the misuse of a UN-mandate by NATO to 
overthrow the Libyan state in 2011. In addition, China’s military capabilities have 
expanded. Although Chinese defense expenditures have remained at around 2% of GDP, 
they have paralleled the exponential growth of the economy. In US$ terms, the Chinese 
defense budget overtook that of Japan in 2001, became the second-largest globally in 
2002, and in 2018 was equal to over one third of the US defense budget while being 
nearly four times larger than the third-placed country (SIPRI 2019); calculated on a PPP 
basis China’s defense spending would be approximately half that of the US. 
 The combination of the above factors has led to a reassessment of China by the 
United States, starting with the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” in 2011. US 
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policymakers have changed their positioning vis-à-vis China significantly as indicated by 
national security documents, together with many academic books and articles, identifying 
China as a strategic revisionist competitor (US DoD 2018) and assessing the viability of 
oil blockades and military conflict (Allison 2017, Collins 2018, Gompert et. al. 2016). 
The current trade war that includes demands for fundamental changes to the ways in 
which the Chinese economy operates can be seen as a continuation of this escalating 
trend. As Buzan noted in 2010 “The danger is that as China rises it will become less 
dependent on the United States, and more opposed to its leadership, and the United States 
will feel more threatened by its increasing power and revisionism” (Buzan 2010, p. 22). 
A fundamental issue is that the Chinese population is about four times that of the US, and 
therefore if it is able to escape the “middle income trap” and its GDP per capita becomes 
closer to that of the US it will naturally become the dominant world power. From a realist 
viewpoint it would be advantageous for the US to keep China within that middle-income 
trap, a possibility undermined by the continual upgrading planned for the Chinese 
economy through such initiatives as Made in China 2025. Moak (2020) states the US 
view bluntly, “China was a ‘good guy’ when it was producing labor-intensive or low-
technology products such as garments. It only became the ‘greatest threat’ when it was 
able to produce high-technology goods that were competitive with those produced in the 
US.” 
 In parallel to this changing geopolitical environment, Chinese oil imports have 
continued to increase rapidly; imports now provide approximately two thirds of domestic 
consumption and China has become the largest global importer of oil and its derivatives. 
With limited prospects for increases in domestic oil production and the rapid growth in 
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the number of personal and commercial vehicles, the import share of oil is set to increase 
further. Although imports of coal increased substantially after 2011, they still represent 
less than 6% of domestic consumption. With domestic production of coal increasing in 
the past few years, and consumption growth moderating, it is possible that China will 
return to a position of coal self-sufficiency on a net basis (some imports of coking coal 
may still be required). Natural gas consumption has also increased rapidly in China over 
the past few years, leading the country to become a net importer after 2007. Since then 
imports of natural gas have increased further, and with the Chinese state targeting a 
doubling of the natural gas share of primary energy consumption to 10%, the level of 
imports is set to substantially increase in the next decade. The increase in imports is 
associated with a lack of progress in the development of domestic shale gas deposits 
combined with repeated reductions in forecasts of future production (Forbes 2019). 
3.1.5. Current Domestic Energy Consumption 
 Overall, fossil fuels provided 85.4% of primary energy consumption in 2018 
(compared to 92.2% ten years earlier). China’s energy intensity (energy usage per unit of 
GDP) fell by 2.2% in 2018, a rate well below the 10-year trend of 4% annual reductions 
(BP 2019). Although coal use as a percentage of overall energy consumption has fallen, 
its use in absolute terms has remained stable over the past few years. Oil consumption 
has been rising at a steady rate of 5% per year, while natural gas consumption has been 
rising at a rapid rate of 15% per year. Nuclear power has been growing rapidly, but from 
a small base. The growth rate in hydroelectricity has been falling year over year. The new 
renewables have been growing rapidly, but from a low base and the growth rate has 
decelerated significantly over the past few years. Overall, the growth in nuclear, 
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hydroelectricity and the new renewables has been unable to offset the growth in primary 
energy use, resulting in a continued increase in the use of fossil fuels. 
Table 3 1: Chinese Primary Energy Consumption 
       Total Energy            Growth Rate        Share of 
       Mill. Tons Oil Equiv.          2010-17    2018         Total 
Primary Energy 
Consumption 
3,273 3.9% 4.3% 100% 
- Coal 1,907 1.8% 0.9% 58% 
- Oil 641 4.9% 5% 20% 
- Natural Gas 243 15% 18% 7.4% 
- Hydro 272 9.2% 3.2% 8.3% 
- Nuclear 67 15% 19% 2% 
- Wind, Solar, Biomass, Geo 144 41% 29% 4.4% 
Data from BP 2020 Statistical Review and IRENA Renewable Energy Statistics 2019. 
 
3.2. Current Strategic Culture & International Political Economy 
 Today in China the CCP with a membership of over 90 million, and the CCP-
controlled state, are the dominant social, political and economic institutions. This CCP-
state, or Party-State (PS) complex aligns with the Legalist school of Chinese philosophy 
that has been likened to the western realist school. State appointments are controlled by 
the CCP, including for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), removing the possibility of an 
independent state civil service. An independent civil society, independent media 
(including the Internet) and independent property-owning bourgeoisie are to all intents 
and purposes non-existent within China. PS control is maintained over the commanding 
heights of the economy, including the financial system. This control is extended through 
investment and lending relationships, informal networks, and the CCP committees that 
exist in all corporations. At the same time private property does not have the same level 
of protection as in the West, the owner can be unencumbered of such property and face 
criminal charges if deemed necessary. The Party-state-society complex (PSSC) is 
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integrated to a much higher degree than in liberal democratic societies, with a right-wing 
capitalist equivalent being the very different fascist state of Mussolini; the latter 
considered to be a highly amenable option by many Western elites during the 1930s. 
 The market is a disciplining factor for corporations, including the SOEs, but it is 
an embedded market designed to serve the aims of the PSSC. When the vicissitudes of 
the market threaten a strategic industry, such as the solar photovoltaic (PV) industry in 
the early 2010s, the PSSC will be at hand to support the industry during rough times. 
Individual corporate winners will not be chosen, rather the industry as a whole is 
protected. Aside from the market, the dangers of over centralization are mitigated by the 
sheer size of and competition between Chinese provinces, many equal to sizeable nation 
states; aided by the state decentralization initiated by Deng in the 1980s until its reversal 
in the mid-1990s. This allows for a diversity of practices and localized flexibility, with 
the best practices becoming good examples for other provinces while the failures are only 
locally impactful. 
 The PS is seen as the center that must hold. It would be expected that any direct 
threat to it would be dealt with swiftly and effectively. Actions taken against Falun Gong, 
the Uyghur community, specific dissidents, and the Hong Kong protests fall within this 
expectation. Soon after Xi Jinping gained the leadership of the CCP he started an anti-
corruption drive to improve a Party reputation that had been tarnished by significant 
levels of corruption. This can be seen as fitting within the Confucian tradition; the center 
must not only be strong but also seen as legitimate through its actions and its ethics. The 
drive also facilitated a removal of many of Xi’s opponents within the Party, consolidating 
his power. He has been very successful in having his own acolytes promoted to the 
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Politburo of the CCP (Thomas 2020). A number of commentators now see Xi as the most 
powerful CCP leader since Mao, exceeding the power position that Deng enjoyed.  
 The alignment with the Mandate of Heaven and Confucian benevolent good 
governance is apparent in the response to the increasing politicization of local 
environmental issues – especially air pollution within the larger cities. Tighter emission 
standards have been placed upon coal-fired electricity generating systems, some plants 
moved away from urban areas, and a greater role given to natural gas and low-carbon 
generation. The CCP leadership has also taken multiple actions, such as heavy investment 
in rural and lagging areas, together with increased social services in such areas and 
increases in the minimum wage, to mitigate increases in income inequality. Together with 
rural areas possibly reaching the Lewis Turning Point at which rural migration to cities 
tightens up rural labor markets, Chinese income inequality has fallen significantly after 
peaking around 2010 (Li 2016; Kanbur, Wang & Zhang 2017; World Bank 2020). The 
focus on the equitable sharing of the benefits of growth was one of the key elements of 
Hu Jintao’s harmonious society strategy; PS benevolence experienced by all citizens. The 
BRI also serves to help develop many underdeveloped inland regions, as they become 
hubs for international transport networks. After a stumbling start, the effective and 
efficient response to the COVID-19 pandemic can also be seen in the same Confucian 
light.  
 In recent years, the CCP has also started to increasingly use nationalism as a tool 
of legitimation, utilizing the need to overcome the Century of Humiliation and re-
establish the Middle Kingdom in Asia for purposes of both legitimation and social 
unification. This nationalist orientation, combined with performance legitimacy, orients 
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the CCP (and hence the state) toward a focus on traditional concepts of the national 
interest. The lack of a truly independent bourgeois sector (Starrs 2017), together with the 
lack of integration and subjugation of Chinese elites into transnational networks (de 
Graaff & van Apeldoorn 2018), also supports the view of the Chinese elite as focused 
predominantly on the Chinese national interest, the raison d’etat. This argues for a realist 
(within the Chinese Legalist philosophy) strategic culture perspective, imbued with 
Confucianist and tributary elements that do not call for the geographical, military or 
philosophical dominance of other nations as long as those nations do not threaten China; 
a strategic orientation that also combines a strong defense to deter aggression with a 
preference for victory without the need for battle. This shares much with defensive 
realism. 
 
Strategy is less about winning battles than it is about winning without a battle. 
Good strategists seek positions that are so powerful that no one challenges them. 
Fighting opponents openly is usually the failure of strategy  … The goal is to 
create positions that others cannot attack and that ideally they want to join. Sun 
Tzu teaches that a general who fights a hundred battles and wins a hundred battles 
is not a good general. A good general is one who finds a way to win without 
fighting a single battle. Strategy teaches that you win by building the right 
positions and advancing those positions while avoiding conflict. (Gagliardi 2014) 
 
 The nationalist orientation, together with China’s continued strong economic 
growth, places China in the position of the rising power attempting to establish its own 
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sphere of influence; very much as the US did with respect to the Western Hemisphere. 
Unlike the British though, the US is highly unlikely to acquiesce to the establishment of a 
Chinese sphere of influence. This is underlined by a US (and Western) position that 
seems to be, “[the] United States and other Western powers … [are] eager to bring China 
… on board to share responsibilities … but … not willing to give up their much larger 
share of the decisionmaking power” (Li 2011, p. 347). China is also surrounded by strong 
powers (Russia, India and Japan) that restrict its room for geopolitical maneuver. The 
Chinese elite nationalist orientation also places it at odds with the US TNC elite, as it 
represents a barrier to the latter’s ability to fully profit from the Chinese market. In 
addition, the CCP’s fostering of globally competitive Chinese firms creates strong 
competitors to US (and other Western) TNCs. 
 With the Chinese economy continuing to grow significantly faster that the US and 
Europe, time is on the Chinese side. From a defensive realist stance, and one of power 
transition theory, it would be best for China to not trigger a military conflict and deter 
one through a strong defensive position. China has increased the size of its military in 
line with economic growth to deter aggression from other powers, an objective enhanced 
by the increasingly close relationship with Russia. Its military has also been reoriented 
toward deterring an aggressive US move through the denial of a safe operating space to 
the US navy in the Western Pacific and South China Sea through such things as long 
range anti-ship missiles and submarines. Expansion has been carried out through 
financial, economic and diplomatic means, the BRI being the prime example, which 
should not trigger open conflict. With forecasts that show the Chinese economy on a PPP 
basis more than twice as large as the US and bigger than the US and Europe combined by 
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2030, it may be only a decade before China once again becomes the Middle Kingdom. 
This places a strong imperative on continued economic growth within the Chinese 
strategy. 
 As I will argue in the chapter on the US, China faces a main opponent that is not 
fully aligned around an agreed raison d’etat, with significant contention within the elite. 
US corporations have reaped extremely large profits from both the location of production 
within China, and their ability to sell into the large and expanding Chinese market. An 
excellent example is that of the Apple global value chain (GVC) that allows for that 
corporation to capture over 50% of the value of the iPhone (Phillips 2017). This creates a 
tension within the US elite with respect to steps that may benefit the relative US strategic 
position but directly, or indirectly through Chinese counteractions, damage TNC 
profitability and market positions. Another possibility is that actions to limit the use of 
US corporate intellectual property (IP) by Chinese firms may accelerate a drive to replace 
that IP. Given that the control of GVCs is heavily dependent on IP (Phillips 2017), such 
moves are a direct threat to the US and Western TNCs that currently dominate most 
global GVCs. Such considerations may significantly delay substantive US action and 
facilitate a “playing for time” Chinese strategy. The recent opening of a Tesla factory in 
China, aided by funding from the Chinese state, can be seen as the creation of a useful 




3.3. The Drivers of Current Energy Policy  
 
 Chinese energy policies can be seen as being directed by the intersection of 
geopolitics (the risk of the interdiction of the increasing levels of oil and gas imports), the 
domestic politicization of local air pollution, and an industrial policy targeted at new 
“green” industries.  
3.3.1. Geopolitics and Energy Security 
 The increasing dependence upon imported oil and natural gas, with the former 
predominantly provided through surface shipping from the Middle East and Africa, when 
combined with an increasingly conflictual geopolitical environment threatens Chinese 
energy security. The resulting policy changes would be expected to focus on the safety of 
the supply of fossil fuels, and the ability to resist any form of energy embargo. This fits 
into an overall policy framework driven by the level of net imports and the level of 
conflict within the geopolitical environment: 
 




































 Since 1993, China has moved from the upper left quadrant (characterized by 
energy self-sufficiency and low potential for conflict), to the lower left (a stage of energy 
import dependence within a low conflict environment), and then from 2011 increasingly 
into the lower right quadrant (with high risk of conflict and high dependence on external 
energy sources). 
 The state maintains an implicit policy that coal imports, which were 251.94 
million tonnes in 2018 (6% of total consumption), will remain flat in volume terms from 
year to year (Singh, Xu & Schmollinger 2019). It does appear that the policy with respect 
to coal imports is to maintain some flexibility and competition for domestic producers 
while reserving the ability to be self-sufficient if required. The drive to increase the usage 
of domestic low carbon energy sources such as hydroelectricity, nuclear, wind, and solar 
can be seen as fitting within an energy security paradigm. Their increased usage offsets 
some of the growth-driven need for increases in imported energy and thus reduces the 
risks associated with an interdiction of supplies or political issues within one or more 
supplier nations. The main areas of concern from an energy security perspective are the 
increasing levels of natural gas and oil imports. 
 China has significant domestic gas production and has very recently been able to 
overcome its inability to grow that production through unconventional sources – 
especially coal bed methane. Even with this, consumption continues to outstrip domestic 
production with the probability of import dependency rising to over 50% by 2025 (Angus 
Media 2019, EIA 2019). China has developed significant supplies of natural gas that are 
sourced from “friendly” nations (Russia, Central Asia) delivered through land-based 
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pipelines and has plans to significantly increase those levels of secure supplies (Wu 2014; 
Zhao & Chen 2014; Jamali 2018). The most important new project is the Power of 
Siberia gas pipeline, which will have a full capacity of 38 Bcm/year in 2022-23, 
approximately 9.5% of consumption in 2022 (Liang, Abrue & Fan 2019). The in place 
Central Asia – China gas pipeline has a capacity of 55 Bcm/year and is forecast to be 
running at peak capacity by 2019 (Putz 2018). The state has also merged the gas pipelines 
of the three national oil companies to improve efficiency and effectiveness. With further 
gas pipelines and expanded liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries from Russia, China 
has the potential to replace all other supplies – including those from Australia (a member 
of the Five Eyes with the US), Qatar (the site of a major US military base) and the Middle 
East in general.  
 Domestic oil production has grown at a rate of only 0.3% per year in the past 
decade, well behind an annual increase of 4.9% in consumption, with the result being an 
increasing level of imports – with an import dependency of 72% in 2018 (BP 2019). The 
Chinese state has a goal of increasing domestic oil production by 50% (2 million barrels 
per day [Mb/d]) through expanded development spending over the next 5 years, from 
conventional fields (Forbes 2019). There are limited prospects for China to repeat the US 
shale oil revolution of the past decade due to geographical, geophysical and ecological 
differences. Even if domestic production is increased by 2 Mb/d over the next five years, 
this compares to an annual increase in consumption of 0.5 Mb/d over the past decade and 
0.7 Mb/d in 2018 (BP 2019); unless oil consumption growth is reduced, this domestic 
production increase will at best stabilize the level of oil imports up to 2023.  
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 China has established a strategic oil reserve and it “has around 80 days of oil in 
storage, including those in its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), oil storage at oil firms 
and commercial stocks” (Daly 2019) which equates to about 788 Mb. With the fall in oil 
prices due to COVID-19 China has taken the opportunity to significantly add to its 
petroleum reserves. Coal to Liquids (CTL) plants to replace oil as a carbon feedstock 
have been estimated to cost $67-$82 per barrel of oil equivalent (Hydrocarbons 
Technology 2019), and increased state pollution and water use regulations may further 
hinder large-scale adoption (Guo & Xu 2018). China’s usage of methanol as a 
transportation fuel has risen rapidly in the current decade and was over 500,000 b/d in 
2016 (EIA 2017), making up 8% of liquid fuel use in 2015 (Ingham 2017). Chinese 
methanol is predominantly derived from coal, so its increasing usage as a transportation 
fuel would leverage the nation’s large coal reserves to reduce imported oil consumption. 
 China’s oil refinery capacity is greater than that required for domestic demand, 
with the result that in 2019 it is estimated that approximately 10% (1 Mb/d) of China’s 
crude oil imports will be re-exported as oil products (Zhuo, Xu & Yep 2019). Current oil 
pipelines from Russia and Central Asia have the ability to deliver 1.2 Mb/d of oil (Collins 
2018).  Taking into account the pipeline-delivered oil, together with the ability to shut 
down the excess refining capacity, a very sizeable exposure to seaborne oil deliveries still 
exists. If we assume that the combination of transport electrification (see below) and 
increased domestic oil production serves to stabilize oil imports at 10 Mb/d significant 
measures would be required if an oil embargo were instituted against China. The analysis 




Table 3 3: Cumulative Effects of Actions to Counter an Energy Blockade 
 
 Actions       Change       Seaborne Oil Imports 
Stop Petroleum Product Exports -1 Mb/d 9 Mb/d 
Current Overland Pipelines -1.2Mb/d 7.8 Mb/d 
Rail and Truck Capacity  -0.6 Mb/d 7.2 Mb/d 
Methanol & other fuel extenders -0.6 Mb/d 6.6 Mb/d 
35% reduction in oil demand (per 
US in WW2) 
-4.9 Mb/d 1.7 Mb/d 
 
Increased military oil usage +0.5 Mb/d 2.2 Mb/d 
Additional 5% oil demand 
reduction (air travel and EV) 
0.5 Mb/d 1.7 Mb/d 
 
 With the 2019 level of strategic petroleum reserve, together with other crude 
stocks, estimated at 788 Mb (Daly 2019), China would be able to withstand a seaborne 
energy blockade for approximately 15 months. This could be extended to 20 months 
through the emergency addition of a new oil pipeline from Russia transporting 0.6 Mb/d. 
China’s latest increases in its strategic oil reserves could extend a possible holdout period 
to significantly beyond 2 years. During such an extended period, further pipelines could 
be completed, and structural changes would also reduce oil demand. An important point 
is the importance of Russia and the Central Asian states to the energy security of China 
during a possible seaborne energy blockade for at least the next decade, if not longer. 
Only when the need for imported oil and gas has been reduced to minimal levels will this 
dependency be fully removed. 
 It is extremely doubtful that the US could impose a seaborne energy blockade 
upon China for over two years, given the scale of the global economic and political 
fallout. The price crash resulting from the removal of Chinese demand from global oil 
markets would severely impact many oil exporting nations, many of which may worry 
about being displaced as unreliable suppliers after the blockade; there would also be the 
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additional risk of an accelerated Chinese move toward the electrification of transport. 
Another big question is whether the US would risk antagonizing Russia by interfering 
with Russian tankers delivering oil to China through the Sea of Japan and the Yellow 
Sea. Given this, China may be said to have already substantially desecuritized its energy 
supply, removing it as a possible geo-economic vulnerability to be used against it. Post 
2025, as greater and greater numbers of electric vehicles (EVs) enter the Chinese 
personal and commercial fleets, together with the scrapping of older less efficient internal 
combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) etc., the ease with which China could withstand an 
energy blockade would rapidly increase. As with the window for successful US military 
action against China in the South China Sea and environs passing by 2025, any 
possibility of a successful energy blockade may also have passed by then – if not already. 
3.3.2. Domestic Politicization of Local Air Pollution  
 The Party-state has reacted vigorously to the domestic politicization of local air 
pollution, working to both show its responsiveness and co-opt citizen actions within Party 
controlled processes. In doing this, the interaction between the PS and the citizenry is 
kept within “normal” politics, removing the possibility of a politicization of the issue of 
local air pollution in a manner threatening to the legitimacy and domestic dominance of 
the Party-state.  
 Stringent particulate matter regulations have been imposed upon the coal-fired 
electricity fleet, requiring “scrubbers” to be installed, and actions taken to move many 
electricity-generating plants away from concentrated urban areas. At the same time, the 
use of natural gas and low-carbon electricity generation has been increased, and natural 
gas increasingly targeted to reduce the role of coal for space heating purposes. What is 
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considered “one of the world’s strictest rules on automobile pollutants” (Xinhua 2019) 
has also been put in place and the use of EV’s within urban areas incentivized.  
 China has been upgrading its coal-fired electricity generating fleet to supercritical 
and ultra-supercritical high-efficiency power generation units that both reduce coal usage, 
and as a side effect of that extra efficiency, particulate matter and carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of electricity (Wang, Xu & Ren 2018). Super and ultra-supercritical 
high efficiency units provide approximately half of Chinese coal-fired electricity 
generating capacity (Hart, Basset & Johnson 2017). The Chinese state is already 
tightening regulations with respect to acceptable plant efficiency levels to obsolete the 
least efficient plants “By 2020, every existing coal-fired power unit in China must meet 
an efficiency standard of 310 gce per kilowatt-hour; any units that do not meet that 
standard by 2020 will be retired. In contrast, none of the current top 100 most efficient 
U.S. coal-fired power units would meet that same efficiency standard today [my italics]” 
(Hart, Basset & Johnson 2017). With the average ultra-supercritical plants in Southeast 
Asia being 22% more efficient in transforming coal into electricity than subcritical ones 
(World Coal Association 2016), and the best plants 41% more efficient than the average 
SE Asia subcritical plant (Power Technology 2019), there is a large scope for China to 
significantly increase the electricity output of its coal-fired fleet without increasing the 
amount of coal consumed. This ongoing ability to increase the amount of electricity 
generated for a given amount of coal allows for a level of domestic coal consumption 
“projected to broadly plateau over the next 20 years” (Wang, Xu & Ren 2018, p. 161) 
while supporting the need for the increases in electricity production required for 
continued economic growth. 
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3.3.3. Industrial Policy  
 The Party-state has driven a consolidation of the coal mining industry into larger 
automated mines (Wang, Xu & Ren 2018) to increase the efficiency of the overall 
industry. This produced a temporary fall in coal production in mid-decade as smaller 
mines were closed but production rebounded in 2017 and 2018 (BP 2019). Approval was 
given to “40 new ‘modernized’ domestic coalmines, with a total capacity of 196 million 
tonnes, in the first three quarters of 2018” (Singh, Xu & Schmollinger 2019).  
 The low carbon energy sector has been targeted as a growth area in which China 
can provide technology leadership, and as a source of new job opportunities. The 
installation of significant levels of solar and wind energy in China has aided the 
development of the related domestic industries. State support for the solar industry during 
the over-capacity crisis of the early 2010s allowed the industry to survive that crisis and 
then become the globally dominant supplier of solar panels that it currently is. Support 
for the nuclear industry has also been provided by the expansion of capacity within 
China, with the industry now in a position to bid for foreign plant installations.  
 Within the renewable electricity generation sector China has rapidly moved from 
being a laggard to the position of a leader, both as an implementer of renewable 
technologies and as a manufacturer of such technologies. The table below details the 




Table 3 4: Chinese Low Carbon Energy Sources 
     Mtoe       2007-17    2018                2018 Cap. 
         Mill. Tons Oil Equiv.   Growth   Growth    Share         Growth        
Low Carbon Energy 483 n/a n/a 14.7% 11% 
- Hydro 272 9.2% 3.2% 8.3% 2.5% 
- Wind 83 49% 24% 2.5% 12% 
- Nuclear 67 15% 19% 2.0% 2.0% 
- Solar 40 100% 51% 1.2% 33% 
- Biomass, Geothermal 21 28% 14% 0.6% 0.6% 
Data from BP 2020 Statistical Review and IRENA Renewable Energy Statistics 2019 
 
 The electrification of transport is also a key area of development for China. The 
massive implementation of subways, trams and trains (including a high-speed train 
network larger than the rest of the world combined) has facilitated the growth of highly 
competitive industries within these sectors. In parallel, EV manufacturing has been 
supported though both producer subsidies and consumer incentives. China leads the 
world in the production and usage of electric buses, a fleet with a high utilization rate 
with respect to personal vehicles. Roughly 99% of the 385,000 electric buses worldwide 
operate in China, 17% of the overall Chinese bus fleet (Poon 2018), with estimates that 
for every 1,000 electric buses 500 barrels of diesel are displaced per day. The city of 
Shenzen has already moved to a 100% electric bus fleet (Keegan 2018). Some local 
governments have also been targeting taxi fleets, which have much higher than average 
utilization rates, for electrification. Local government has direct control over the 
composition of taxi fleets, through the regulation of the types of vehicles allowed and the 
provision of charging points. These powers have been used by a number of Chinese cities 
to replace gasoline-powered taxis with EV’s (Chun 2018; Keegan 2018). This focus on 
high-utilization transport may significantly increase the reduction in oil usage from the 
adoption of EVs.  
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 From only a 0.9% market share in 2015, Chinese EV sales have grown at a 
compound annual rate of 69% to reach a market share of 3.9% in 2018, with 75% of EV 
sales being pure battery electric vehicles (as against hybrid models) in 2018 (Hertake et al 
2019). Sales fell in the second half of 2019 due to reductions in EV state subsidies, but 
this can be seen as a strategic step to shake out the less efficient among a plethora of 
Chinese suppliers and to reduce the rapidly increasing fiscal impact of such subsidies. 
With the removal of restrictions on foreign-owned EV production, those subsidies may 
have also increasingly gone to foreign car manufacturers. Due to the previous state 
regulations that only allowed EV manufacturing by locally owned and joint-venture 
entities and steered manufacturers toward domestic battery manufacturers (Huang 2019), 
the domestic market has been predominantly supplied by domestic manufacturers. The 
state’s development plans call for the production of 2 million EV’s in China by 2020; 
actual production was 250,000 in 2015, 410,000 in 2016, 660,000 in 2017 and 1.2 million 
in 2018 (Qiao & Lee 2018; EEI 2019). The state has targeted a market share of 20% for 
new energy vehicles (NEVs) in 2025, which may include fuel cell and other technologies 
(Hernandez 2018). Given that the vast majority of cars sold in China are net new 
additions to the fleet (Collins 2019) this level of EV market share may bend the upward 
curve of oil usage growth but will not result in any shrinkage of the ICEV fleet. 
 Chinese manufacturers had struggled to produce competitive internal combustion 
engine cars, resulting in a heavy foreign presence within the Chinese market. For 
example, 40% of Volkswagen and 50% of BMW global sales are in China (Hanley 
2018). This provides significant leverage for China with respect to European car 
manufacturers who are also being pushed to develop EVs by new EU28 emission 
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regulations. The foreign manufacturers will be forced to sell an increasing number of EVs 
within China just to defend market share against domestic competitors. The pressure 
from China, combined with that from recent EU28 regulations, may spur the sales of EVs 
within the EU28 where the majority of car sales replace current fleet vehicles resulting in 
a reduction in European oil demand. The result would be a greater reliance upon the 
Chinese market for oil exporting nations, and possible significant disruption for a US car 
industry that significantly lags with respect to EVs (excepting Tesla). 
 A report on the geopolitics of a low carbon energy transition (GCGET 2019, p. 
40) states that “leaders in technological innovation are positioned to gain the most from 
the global energy transformation” to renewables, and that “No country has put itself in a 
better position to become the world’s renewable energy superpower than China. In 
aggregate, it is now the world’s largest producer, exporter and installer of solar panels, 
wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles, placing it at the forefront of the global 
energy transition.” Such a position offers “its industry the opportunity to overtake US and 
European companies, which have been dominant in sectors such as cars and energy 
machinery”.  The report also notes that in 2016 China had a 29% cumulative share of 
renewable energy patents, compared to 18% for the US, 14% each for the European 
Union and Japan (Ibid., p. 41). An analysis of renewable energy patents in 2017 gave 
China a 76% share, with the US only having a 10% share (PEi 2018).  
3.4. Summary 
 The predominant orientation of China is toward the removal of possible military 
conflict through strong defensive measures and the removal or nullification of possible 
conflict-inducing factors (e.g. its seaborne oil imports). This allows for a continued 
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peaceful rise of China, with its economy forecast to become twice the size of the US 
within a decade in PPP terms. At the same time China is establishing an increasing web 
of economic, social and political connections with other nations through such policies as 
the BRI. Through the BRI and other initiatives China is economically integrating much of 
South East Asia with its own economy, and extending this to Central Asia, parts of the 
Middle East, and Africa. Economic growth and an increasing position of China within the 
international community are central to the continued domestic legitimacy of the CS. 
 China’s deepening partnership with Russia benefits its security, economic and 
political objectives in multiple ways. Firstly, it removes the “threat from the north” that 
has dominated Chinese security concerns for centuries. Russia also provides a nuclear 
umbrella second only to that of the US, advanced military technologies and tactical 
knowledge, and a geographic expanse that links China to Europe and Central Asia. With 
respect to energy, Russia would be a core element in any Chinese response to an energy 
embargo. This myriad of factors leads to the need for China to carefully consider the 
impact upon Russia of its policies. 
 Such considerations may act as a drag upon any Chinese move to a low-carbon 
economy, given the high dependence of Russia upon fossil fuel exports – both oil and 
natural gas. The high price elasticity to demand for oil could lead to a significant drop in 
world oil prices were China to cut its oil imports; especially when such a cut was seen as 
part of a long-term incremental reduction that could drive oil exporters to maximize 
current production to monetize oil reserves before their value falls further. China could 
reorient its oil imports toward Russia, as it has somewhat during the pandemic-induced 
oil price drop in 2020, but this may only offset part of the loss in Russian oil revenues. 
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Any extremely aggressive eco-modernist moves away from oil, perhaps through a 
deadline beyond which ICEVs will no longer be sold, will need to be balanced with 
measures to support the stability of the Russian economy. Such policies could include 
increasing non-fossil fuel Russian imports such as food and directing investments to aid 
the Russian economy in moving away from fossil fuel dependency. The latter policy 
avenue may become more viable later in the 2020s as Chinese US$ GDP per capita 
overtakes that of Russia (in 2019 the latter was still about 10% more than the former), 
making the well-educated Russian workforce more competitive; continued Western 
sanctions against Russia would also tend to improve China’s bargaining position with 
respect to investments in its ally. 
 Nowhere in the above has climate change been mentioned, reflecting the marginal 
impact that climate change considerations have upon Chinese policies. China’s 
commitment at the Paris climate conference in 2015 was to peak GHG emissions by 
2030, a commitment that it has not changed since (including at the 2019 Madrid COP 
meeting). This provides no real limitations upon China’s energy policies until the date at 
which it is forecast to have an economy that will be over twice the size of the US. 
 If there is no climate change constraint upon China’s energy policies within the 
next decade are there any other factors that could create a much more aggressive move 
toward a low carbon economy? One possibility is an accelerated industrial policy focused 
on dominating the green economy, especially in EVs and related technologies. The main 
policy drivers for this would be increases in the state-mandated Chinese market share of 
EVs above current targets, and possibly a date by which ICEVs would no longer be 
allowed to be sold. The problem with such an acceleration, as stated above, is that it 
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could cause significant problems for its ally Russia and it could trigger an aggressive 
response from the US (paralleling the response to the Made in China 2025 plan to 
dominate leading technology sectors). Instead, such a policy change may be carried out in 
reaction to greater conflict with the US, or to some form of global climate emergency. 
 The greater efficiency of EVs versus ICEVs does mean that there would be some 
reduction in GHG emissions through the substitution of electricity from China’s coal 
heavy generating mix for oil; projections “show that electric passenger cars using China’s 
national electricity mix in 2015 will result in a 50% reduction in life cycle fossil energy 
use and a 35% reduction in life cycle GHG emissions compared to gasoline cars” (Ou, 
Xiaoyu & Zhang 2010). Such reductions would be mitigated by the fact that the majority 
of new Chinese car sales are additions to the car fleet rather than being replacements of 
current ICEVs. Much more significant policy changes would be required to escape the 
Energy Security Paradox noted by Nyman (2018) where immediate energy security is 
increased through a move to more secure fossil fuel sources, while longer-term insecurity 
is increased through the continuing usage of those fossil fuels.  
 With both domestic and geopolitical considerations forestalling any reductions in 
economic growth, it is hard to identify a path that would reduce Chinese GHG emissions 
over at least the next decade. With no constraints provided by its Paris agreement 
commitments, and seemingly little policy urgency with respect to climate change, there 
appears very little possibility of significant policy moves to reduce GHG emissions. Short 
of a climate emergency (e.g. a very high intensification of the local effects of climate 
change that threatens significant geographic and industrial assets), a CCP generally 
committed to the raison d’etat (and its own existence) will remain focused on 
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maintaining the economic and geopolitical rise that will return China to the position a 
prosperous Middle Kingdom. 
 A Middle Kingdom that will not require territorial control nor ideological and 
cultural homogeneity if the CCP reverts to earlier foreign policy practices. The nature of 
the PSSC will provide a very different civilizational modernity to that of Western 
liberalism, and its rise will return the international system to the civilizational plurality 
that existed prior to the nineteenth century; a change that will provide a new reality very 
hard for Western elites to accept after their centuries of global pre-eminence. 
3.5. Framework Insights In The China Study 
The current dynamic of the international system (what Cox refers to as the world 
order), places China as a rising contender to the dominance of the United States; with a 
rational focus on increasing its own power and/or that of its coalition with respect to the 
US and its coalition. The neoclassical realism of Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, adds an 
analysis of the internal dynamics of China – a strong central authoritarian bureaucratic 
Party-state that dominates, even subsumes, Chinese society; a Party-state that also enjoys 
high levels of societal legitimacy. In addition, a strategic culture focused on the raison 
d’état (also the raison du parti as synonymous with the raison d’état) and the recovery of 
China’s “rightful” place within the international system, staffed with individuals groomed 
over decades within the Party and state bureaucracies. This is reinforced by a leader 
whose father was a senior figure in the revolutionary movement, and that leader’s 
experiences during the Cultural Revolution. Such an analytical picture does provide a 
relatively nuanced view of the present, and provides some insights into future state policy 
making, but does not provide a vision of the historical processes that created the current 
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China, nor their possible impact going forward. It also takes the present as a given, 
without problematizing its elements; how and why the present came into being may have 
significant exculpatory value with respect to how the future may progress. 
A significant surprise among many Western scholars and policy makers has been 
the lack of movement toward a society with liberal institutions, such as political 
democracy, a free press, and independent non-governmental organizations; why is this 
and will it continue? To answer such a question Cox’s historical materialist approach can 
be utilized. The Chinese state/society complex has swung between that of an effective 
central state that dominates society, and disintegration, for over two millennia – a 
continuous process of dialectical change rather than any smooth route to societal 
perfection. Even within dynasties there were dialectical processes present, as shown with 
the Discourses of Salt & Iron during the Han period, in which competing groups debated 
how much the state should intervene in the market for basic necessities that affect the 
cost of living of the general population. This historical discussion was an important part 
of the debates about the pace of liberalization of the Chinese economy in the 1980s, a 
period when a “big bang” economic and social liberalization was a significant option 
(Weber 2021); an example of Cox’s notion that ideas can be extremely long-lived, even 
when the material and institutional conditions that helped create them are well in the past. 
Over the two millennia, there were also popular uprisings and other challenges that had to 
be dealt with and new ideas integrated into an updated societal common sense as a result 
of these dialectical processes. The Century of Humiliation can be seen as the period 
during which this common sense was reconceptualized, after remaining relatively stable 
for over a millennium, to align with the modern world and the challenge of the West.  
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This resulting common sense includes the societal acceptance of a scale and scope 
of state activities that differs greatly from Western liberal conceptualizations. This stems 
from the association of social stability and the growth of material capabilities with a 
strong competent state, and social chaos and collapse in its absence. The interaction over 
time of the philosophy of Legalism that was the ideational base for the first imperial 
dynasties (the short-lived Qin and then the four century Han) with the repeated successes 
of states that utilized it drove a positive feedback between Cox’s forces of material 
capabilities, institutions and ideas. Confucianism added the need for the state to rule 
benevolently, for the benefit of the nation as a whole, benefitting from the same positive 
feedback between the forces. As noted above this process was not smooth, as shown by 
the repeated collapses and reconstructions of the Chinese state/society complex – each of 
which brought new derivations of the same basic formula; for example, competitive 
exams for state bureaucratic positions. The combination of Legalist and Confucianist 
concepts also aligned with the communist conceptions of central planning and the role of 
the state in fostering the good of the working people and limiting their exploitation. The 
lack of a bourgeois revolution, either organically or from above, also meant that markets 
were not seen as a separate realm better left independent of the state. The ease of the 
combination of aspects of different philosophical schools points to a level of ideational 
pragmatism in state building, far predating Deng’s famous statement that “It doesn't 
matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice”.  
The victory of the communists in 1949 put paid to the development of a capitalist 
economy and the dominance of the state by capital. Instead, the communist Party-state 
very much followed the historical practice of a strong, and socially dominant, central 
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state. Even after the extensive reforms started by Deng, there is still not a truly 
independent bourgeoisie, instead the Party-state remains as the dominant elite grouping, 
“In the Chinese state–society complex, primacy rests not with an autonomous capitalist 
class but ultimately with the state and a state class organized around the Communist 
Party, which is still the dominant source of power in society” (de Graaff & van 
Apeldoorn 2018, p. 116). A Party-state dependent upon a performance legitimacy that 
very much aligns with the historical concept of the Mandate of Heaven, and has been 
burnished by the incredible growth in material capabilities that it has overseen in the past 
decades. 
In this context, Xi’s focus on routing out corruption, asserting the power of the 
Party-state with respect to the wealthy and their corporate vehicles, and the need to 
reduce income inequality, can be seen as a logical rebalancing after the excesses created 
by the breakneck and less controlled growth of the first decade of this century. All things 
that previous emperors and their administrations would have been at home with as they 
worked to maintain the strong central state’s efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. In 
at least the medium term, the strong Party-state will remain as the dominant social, 
economic and political institution and the creation of an independent bourgeois class will 
continue to be stymied. 
The work of the Amsterdam School adds to these insights through its focus on the 
background and relationship networks of the societal elite. The Party-state elite is seen as 
independent of other national and cross-national elite groupings, an independence 
supported by the Party control of the “commanding heights” of the economy (e.g. 
finance, energy and media) as well as the bureaucratic recruitment and advancement 
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processes. China’s independence is not just supported by its material capabilities, 
institutions and ideas, but also through the career paths leading to membership of the 
policy-making elite. Xi’s extensive focus against corruption within the Party-state, as 
well as the recent reassertion of state dominance over economic elites, will serve to 
bolster that independence.  
It is this Party-state elite that provides the Chinese strategic culture, imbued with 
the historical beliefs and learnings of China; the fundamental belief in the efficacy of a 
strong central state (and Party) populated with highly educated and experienced 
bureaucrats, dependent upon the people for its legitimacy and with a strategic vision of a 
reinvigorated Middle Kingdom. The multi-decade process through which a leader rises 
through the Party hierarchy, during which they experience increasingly senior and diverse 
assignments, will tend to reinforce group cohesion and identification with the Party. This 
long process of advancement within the Party, together with the long tenure of paramount 
leaders (14 years for Deng, 10 years for Jiang, 10 years for Hu, 9 years so for far for Xi) 
and other senior officials, supports a long-term orientation to strategic planning and 
decision-making; in contrast to the US political cycles that regularly place individuals 
with no previous state executive experience in senior positions, including that of the 
President. Such a strategic culture can support the multi-decadal commitments required 
for such things as the Belt & Road Initiative and a move beyond the middle-income trap; 
it also mirrors the leadership stability during the rapid economic growth of Japan (the 
LDP), Korea (Park Chung-hee), Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew), and Taiwan (the 
Kuomintang). 
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The personal experiences of Xi and many of his colleagues during the Cultural 
Revolution also serve to reinforce the perceived efficacy of a strong central state, as well 
as the need to limit the impact of a rogue individual (such as Mao). Xi may now have 
gained as much power as Deng, but the strategic culture will provide much resistance to 
him ever becoming a Mao; somewhat mirroring the focus on collective leadership within 
the Soviet Union after the time of Stalin. The strategic culture is also affected by the 
material capabilities of China versus the Western powers, hence Deng’s foreign policy 
orientation of keeping a low profile to allow for the unimpeded focus on economic 
growth. China’s multi-decade exponential growth has now placed it into a position to 
start to challenge the West’s dominance of the world order, and these new circumstances 
have been reflected in a more assertive foreign policy. The strategic culture is also 
informed by the historical way in which China has dealt with foreign powers, which 
differs greatly from that of the US. The Tribute system did not require the invasion nor 
cultural dominance and homogenization of other nations, instead it focused on the 
benefits of trade while accepting heterogeneity and independence as long as the leading 
position of China was acknowledged and not challenged. These ideas can be seen in the 
material capabilities and institutions of the Belt & Road Initiative, and provide a 
fundamental ideational, as well as material and institutional, challenge to the way in 
which the West has operated.  
The Coxian concepts of competing state/society complexes and the co-creational 
combination of material capabilities, institutions and ideas allows for a full appreciation 
of the scale and scope of the challenge of China to the US, and the West in general. The 
fundamentally differing backgrounds of the competing societal elites, with very different 
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worldviews and relatively few connections between them, also underline this challenge 
and the great difficulties that the US elites will have in attempting to co-opt Chinese 
elites. In addition, the historical legitimacy of the state, together with that developed by 
the Party-state in recent decades, does not augur well for any attempt to separate the latter 
from “the Chinese people” as imagined by the then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
(2020). The still relatively low level of GDP per capita underlines the opportunity for the 
Chinese state/society complex to outgrow the scope and scale of its US counterpart; 
empowering an elite centered on the Party and state rather the capitalist class as in 
Western nations. The differing material and institutional capabilities with respect to 
domestic fossil fuel production and the technologies required for a low-carbon energy 
transition only deepen the challenge, as China seems positioned to gain significant 
advantage with respect to the US during any such a transition. The continued success and 
growth of China becomes a direct challenge to the interests of the Western capitalist 
classes and their ability to dominate both the international system and their own domestic 
citizenry. 
The Chinese state/society system does not have an internal fossil fuel capitalist 
group that may resist an energy transition, as the energy sector is owned by the Party-
state – i.e. the nature of the elite and political economy removes significant barriers to 
such a transition. An industrial policy that has favoured green technologies as part of a 
policy of continuous economic upgrading and growth (central to the continuing 
legitimacy of the Party-state), together with the position of China as a major oil importer, 
will result in significant benefits from the move to low carbon technologies. In addition, a 
focus on the electrification of transport will benefit domestic energy production and 
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reduce the dependence upon foreign oil. A limitation upon the speed of such a transition 
will be a strategic culture that values social stability, and a need to support Russia and 
Central Asia that are important allies that secure its borders, support its energy security in 
the short and medium term, and provide military and geopolitical support in the case of 
Russia. The result may be a transition that is faster than that in the US, but not too fast to 
threaten internal and external stability.  
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Chapter 4: USA Case Study 
 
"Pride goeth before destruction, a haughty spirit before a fall"  
(The Bible, Book of Proverbs 16:18) 
 
 
 In this chapter I will first describe the historical development of the United States 
and how the nature of that development affected both the state/society complex, and the 
long-term determinants of the strategic culture of the policy-making elites. I will show 
that the history of the US (and the precursor British colonies) has been one of continual 
expansion; to begin with predominantly through military means (the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries), and then through a mixture of economic, political, covert, and 
when deemed necessary, overt military means. I will then utilize these insights to assess 
current energy-related policies in the context of major power competition. In the final 
piece of this chapter I will summarize the current US configuration with respect to the 
possible paths open to the nation. 
 
If the young United States had a mission, it was not to liberate but to expand. “Of 
course” declared Theodore Roosevelt in 1899, as if explaining the self-evident to 
the obtuse “our whole national history has been one of expansion.” TR spoke 
truthfully … How was this expansion achieved? On this point, the historical 
record leaves no room for debate: by any means necessary. (Bacevich 2009, pp. 
19-20) 
 
 I will also show that the historical experiences of the British colonies prior to the 
mid-eighteenth century, together with the following extermination of the native peoples, 
have produced a creation myth that sanctifies the US as “The Shining City On A Hill” 
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that is in a constant civilizing struggle with the Other; a conceptual structure and 
discourse that has been repeatedly used to support aggressive actions against other 
nations. Only when all of the world has been “civilized” and accepts the US as the 
“indispensable nation” and “global policeman” will America’s work be done. 
 
The notion of American exceptionalism – that the United States alone has the 
right, whether by divine sanction or moral obligation, to bring civilization, or 
democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world, by violence if necessary – is not 
new. It started as early as 1630 in the Massachusetts Colony when Governor John 
Winthrop uttered the words that centuries later would be quoted by Ronald 
Reagan, Winthrop called the Massachusetts Bay Colony a “city on a hill”. Reagan 
embellished a little, calling it a “shining city on a hill” … A few years after 
Governor Winthrop uttered his famous words, the people on a hill moved out to 
massacre the Pequot Indians … Expanding into another territory, occupying that 
territory, and dealing harshly with people who resist occupation has been a 
persistent fact of American history from the first settlements to the present day. 
(Zinn 2005) 
 
 This multi-century expansionist drive has been supported by the combination of 
extensive domestic natural resource endowments and an ever-increasing population, 
together with the ability of the US to dominate its own hemisphere; separated by two 
oceans from military attack and bordered by two weak nations. Until 1970 the US was 
self-sufficient in fossil fuel energy, after which it suffered a 40-year period of escalating 
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foreign oil dependency until the shale oil revolution that has now returned the nation to a 
position of self-sufficiency; a position strengthened by the oil production surpluses of the 
neighboring Canada and Mexico. The US is home to the majority of global private fossil 
fuel TNCs, which have for over a century developed extensive global operations 
synergistically with US foreign policy. There are also many US based TNCs, such as 
Boeing and General Electric, which are directly dependent upon the continued use of 
fossil fuels. 
 I will show that the US has been politically dominated by big business and 
finance since the late nineteenth century, a situation that has direct impacts upon US 
foreign policy. Since World War 2 that policy has been dominated by the large 
internationalized corporate elites, with an emphasis on the integration of as much of the 
globe as possible within a US-dominated market regime. This has been heavily facilitated 
by US dominance in the immediate post-WW2 period, repeated four decades later by the 
collapse of the Soviet-bloc and the liberalization of China. 
 Domestically, the US is relatively unique among Western nations in never having 
developed a labor-based, socialist mass movement as a balance to business interests. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, business, the state, and the courts, 
worked together to constrain labor organizations – aided by extreme economic volatility. 
The rapid rise of big business at the end of the nineteenth century, in the context of a still 
small business-oriented state, altered the balance of power even more against labor (and 
against smaller domestic-oriented businesses). The power of big business was only 
challenged in the depths of the Great Depression of the 1930s, with the resulting New 
Deal social compact lasting into the 1970s. Since the progressive challenge of the late 
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1960s and early 1970s, and the turmoil created by the Vietnam War, economic elites have 
returned themselves to a dominant position that is at least, if not greater than, that of the 
late nineteenth century. Such elite dominance puts the lie to the dominant US discoursal 
notions of its own democracy, as Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis noted “We may 
have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we 
cannot have both” (Shoup 2015, preface). 
4.1. Historical Positioning 
4.1.1. The Terror Dream (1584 to 1776) 
 Much of US myth making is facilitated by “forgetting”, with large voids between 
the Pilgrims landing at Plymouth Rock in 1620 and American Independence in 1776. This 
misses much of the continuity between prior colony and new nation, and leaves generally 
unseen the highly exploitative, class-ridden, and terror-inducing reality of this period. 
 
Historical mythmaking is made possible only by forgetting. We have to begin, 
then, with the first refusal to face reality: most colonizing schemes that took root 
in seventeenth and eighteenth-century British America were built on privilege and 
subordination, not any kind of proto-democracy. The generation of 1776 certainly 
underplayed that fact. And all the subsequent generations took their cue from the 
nation’s founder. (Isenberg 2017, p. 5) 
 
 The Jamestown, Virginia colony was established in 1607 as a business venture by 
the Virginia Company of London after a series of failed colonies, including the Lost 
Colony of Roanoke that had been established in 1585. Jamestown was briefly abandoned 
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in 1610 after three years of extremely high settler death rates due to starvation, disease 
and attacks from local tribes and the Spanish (this included the Starving Time from 1609-
1610); it was quickly resettled with the arrival of new supply ships.  
 
That a small fraction of colonists survived this first twenty years of settlement 
came as no surprise back home – nor did London’s elite much care. The 
investment was not in people … The colonists were meant to find gold, and to 
line the pockets of the investor class back in England. The people sent to 
accomplish this task were by definition expendable. (Isenberg 2017, p. 11) 
 
 After starting to successfully harvest tobacco from 1614 the colony began to 
prosper, but this then led to expansion that drove conflict with the neighboring tribes. In 
1622 these tribes attempted to eliminate the colony, killing 300 settlers (about a third of 
the English-speaking colonists) but failed in their elimination attempt. Despite these 
losses, the colony continued to prosper and grow, and decisively defeated the local tribes 
between 1644 and 1646. The workforce of the colony predominantly consisted of African 
slaves and currently or previously indentured servants; many of the latter poor adults and 
fatherless boys with some children “spirited” (i.e. kidnapped) from London streets and 
sold to planters. The balance switched more to slavery after Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676, 
during which indentured servants and slaves fought together against the colony’s 
administration; the enslaved portion of Virginia’s population grew from 9% in 1700 to 
40% in 1775 (Holton 1999, page xix). The rebellion had begun due to the Governor’s 
perceived lack of support for the frontier settlers’ moves to annex more Amerindian 
 151 
territory, as he refused to retaliate against tribal attacks on frontier settlements. This need 
for expansion to provide space for a growing population, with much of the colonial lands 
taken by the early settlers and large estates, would bedevil the British colonies. From 
Virginia, the British expanded into North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. The 
large estate owners became the powerful plantation elite within the colony, utilizing 
mostly slave labor; a pattern repeated throughout the American South. The nature of the 
Virginia colony, and that of the plantation South that grew from it, did not lend itself to 
the basis of a national myth based upon religious freedom and democracy. That role fell 
to Plymouth, and more generally New England, founded thirteen years after Jamestown. 
 The Plymouth colony was founded in 1620 by puritan separatists that came to be 
known as the Pilgrims (a word not popularized until 1874 [Isenberg 2017]); both as a 
business settlement and a place of escape from religious persecution. The Voyage of the 
Mayflower and the First Thanksgiving (in late 1621 after half the Pilgrims had died) 
provide foundational myths of White American history. The latter was not celebrated 
with a national holiday until the US Civil War, a time of need for Northern national myth 
making, two and a half centuries later. The larger Massachusetts Bay colony was 
established in 1628, the Province of New Hampshire in 1629, and Connecticut and Rhode 
Island & Providence Plantations colonies in 1636. The words of John Winthrop in 1630 
to a group of Massachusetts colonists before they embarked on their journey, “as a city 
upon a hill, the eyes of all people will be upon us … we shall be made a story and 
byword through the world”, were only published two centuries later and it was another 
century until US Presidents would utilize his words in the service of US exceptionalism: 
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I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set before his shipmates on the 
flagship Arabella [sic] three hundred and thirty-one years ago, as they, too, faced 
the task of building a new government on a perilous frontier. "We must always 
consider", he said, "that we shall be as a city upon a hill—the eyes of all people 
are upon us” … For we are setting out upon a voyage in 1961 no less hazardous 
than that undertaken by the Arabella [sic] in 1630. We are committing ourselves 
to tasks of statecraft no less awesome than that of governing the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, beset as it was then by terror without and disorder within. (Kennedy 
1961) 
 
 Ronald Reagan utilized Winthrop’s words many times, identifying the US as the 
shining city on a hill. Barack Obama and many other politicians have also utilized 
Winthrop’s words to underline the assumed exceptionalism of the US. In 2017 Reagan’s 
adaptation was used by James Comey, the former FBI Director, in his testimony to the 
Senate Intelligence Committee in reference to Russia: “That’s what this is about. And 
they will be back, because we remain – as difficult as we can be with each other, we 
remain the shining city on the hill, and they don’t like it” (Comey 2017). The mythical 
view of the US as an exceptional New World nation, rising above the failures of the Old 
World was well captured by Schlesinger (1952):  
 
The New World had been called into existence to redress the moral as well as the 
diplomatic balance of the Old; we could not defile the sacredness of our national 
mission by too careless intercourse with the world whose failure made our own 
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necessary … Our nation had been commissioned--whether by God or by history--
to work out on this remote hemisphere the best hopes and dreams of men. 
 
Mass migration to the New England colonies continued until the English Civil 
War (1641 to 1652) after which population growth was predominantly from natural 
increase. The New England colony utilized few indentured servants or slaves, but instead 
of being the mythical home of freedom and equality,  
 
 By the 1630s, New Englanders reinvented a hierarchical society of ‘stations’, 
 from ruling elite to household servants. In their number were plenty of poor 
 boys, meant for exploitation. Some were religious, but they were the minority 
 among the waves of migrants that followed Winthrop’s Arbella. The elites 
 owned slaves, but the population they most exploited were the child 
 laborers. Even the church reflected class relations: designated seating 
 affirmed class station. (Isenberg 2017, p. 10). 
 
 As Turner (2020, p. 180) notes “only a small percentage of adult settlers elected 
the colony’s leaders and gave consent to laws and taxes. In some respects, New Plymouth 
functioned as an oligarchy, as men like William Bradford, Edward Wilson, Mules 
Standish, and Thomas Pence filled key offices year after year.” After a peaceful start to 
relations with the local Amerindians, the expansion of the New England colonies 
produced the same result as in the southern colonies – conflict. This conflict included the 
Pequot War (1636-1638) and King Philip’s War (1675-1678). The latter led to large-
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scale destruction in the New England colonies and significant loss of life. Expansionism 
was supported by a notion of “providential and historical ‘destiny’” so strong that the 
settlers “saw the ‘clearing’ of Native American communities by disease as evidence that 
God ‘intended’ the colonists to possess Indian [sic] lands” (Kakel III 2011, p. 17). Such a 
view also supported the multi-century Amerindian genocide and land theft that started 
early in the New England colonies, historical realities that lie silent in US mythology: 
 
 
In a chilling display of the coexistence of democracy and genocide on the 
American borderlands, the settlers first held a vote on what to do with the 
indigenous Moravian converts. Indiscriminate slaughter won out … Within 
American history … The ‘c’ and ‘g’ words – colonialism and genocide – are 
rarely invoked. (Hixson 2013, preface) 
 
 The British colonies in North America had been split by New Holland until a 
series of Anglo-Dutch wars (1664-1674) that resulted in a British takeover of the area 
that now includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. The city of New 
Amsterdam, renamed New York, was a thriving port and trading center. The population 
was heterogeneous, governed with a secular pragmatism. This remained so after the 
British takeover, forming the cultural basis of the development of New York and the 
surrounding middle colonies. The British victory opened the door to large-scale 
immigration from the New England colonies. 
 The French to the north and west, the Spanish to the south and the Amerindians to 
the west hemmed in the British colonies along the North American eastern seaboard. This 
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led to the British colonies being drawn into European wars, as well as dealing with 
Amerindian resistance to their expansion. King William’s War (1688-1697: European 
War of Grand Alliance) involved conflict between the British colonies of New England 
and New York and the French colony of New France; each side using its respective 
Amerindian allies. Within five years the colonies were consumed into Queen Anne’s War 
(1702-1713: European War of Spanish Succession). This involved conflict with both 
New France and Spanish Florida and ended with significant British gains. The 1715-1717 
Yamasee War (with the Yamasee tribe) nearly destroyed the South Carolina colony, with 
it only being saved by an alliance with the Cherokee tribe. In the north, conflict continued 
with Father Rale’s War (1722-1725), King George’s War (1744-1748: War of Austrian 
Succession) and Father Le Loutre’s War (1749-1755). The wars with the French, and 
their Amerindian allies, were finally stopped with the French and Indian War (1754-
1763), which resulted in total defeat for the French and a huge expansion of the British 
colonies to the Mississippi River. 
 This ended the much-forgotten period of seemingly endless and brutal struggle; a 
period of painful attrition with the colonists continually growing in numbers and the 
Amerindians dwindling due to pandemics, war losses and outright slaughter. Added to 
this was an internal theocratic and disciplinary terror. This included in the northern 
colonies the persecution of Quakers and those accused of practicing witchcraft; 
exemplified by Salem and its infamous Witch Trials (1692-1693). The terror and moral 
ambiguity of this period, that required both a constant ideological reinforcement of the 
colonists’ spiritual uniqueness and a fostering of a hatred of the Other, is well captured by 
Faludi (2007, Ch. 8, para. 33): 
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Caught in these coils, early American settlers dwelled in a state of perpetual 
insecurity, in what they repeatedly described as an experience of ‘terror’. Time 
and again, military attempts to guard frontier towns failed. Long after King Philip 
[a native leader] himself had been shot, quartered, and beheaded, long after his 
head was impaled on a pole and displayed in Plymouth’s town square (where his 
father had dined with Pilgrim’s at the first Thanksgiving) for the delectation of 
white passers-by for the next quarter century … the  different kind of war roiled 
on, in the borderlands of the continent and the bitter hearts of the antagonists. 
 
 Founding myths are fundamental to the way in which nations see themselves. I 
have already referenced the usage of the notion of “The City Upon A Hill” above: a city 
that had the right to spread the civilizing mission of its God fearing people, even if that 
“Manifest Destiny” entailed the eradication or subjugation of “heathen” Others. “Indians 
[sic] destabilized the colonizer’s identity and his presumed providential destiny to inherit 
the land. This persistent rupturing of the colonialist fantasy combined with ‘savage’ 
anticolonial resistance had a traumatic impact on the colonizer. Euro-Americans thus 
engaged in often-indiscriminate violence aimed at fulfilling the self-serving vision of 
Indians as a ‘dying race’” (Hixson, p.4). The City Upon A Hill struggling to rid the world 
of the savage Other has been a redolent trope throughout US history, within such 
discourses as “Godless communists”, uncivilized “Muslim terrorist states”, “humanitarian 
intervention” and “the indispensable nation”. Only within such an exceptionalist 
discourse would the labeling of individuals and ideas as “un-American” make sense. 
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 “So, welcome to America as it was” (Isenberg 2017, p. 14); a small elite standing 
above a class-ridden and autocratic white society, taking land for its own through 
conquest and genocide after more than two centuries of a brutal “total” war with the 
Other (Amerindians), and profiting from the enslavement of hundreds of thousands 
kidnapped from their home continent or born into slavery; a societal reality that would 
continue into the twentieth century. 
 The defeat of the French and their Amerindian allies removed the major threat to 
the British colonies that had “thwarted Great Britain’s plans to institute new colonial 
policies” (Ferling 2013, p. 56) to better control the somewhat unruly North American 
colonies, while at the same time suddenly removing much of the colonists need for the 
defensive services of the home country. At the same time the British started to raise new 
taxes on the colonists to pay for the large costs of the Seven Years War of 1756 to 1763 
(which included the French and Indian War); taxes that the colonists were unwilling to 
pay. A third factor was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which created an Indian [sic] 
reserve west of the British colonies that was not open to settlement to the British 
colonists. This was a vast amount of territory coveted by both settlers and land 
speculators (including George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and many more of the 
elite members of colonial society). The lack of colonist voting rights, and the sometimes-
capricious decisions of colonial governors (including one directly affecting a land grant 
to George Washington [Ferling 2010, p. 72-73]), also supported ideas of gaining greater 
decision-making powers for the colonists. The Intolerable Acts of 1774, mostly passed in 
response to the Boston Tea Party, removed the self-governance of the Massachusetts 
colony and triggered the First Continental Congress in that year.  
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 Another significant factor in the elites drive for independence may have been their 
fear of slave emancipation by the British, reflecting the shifting of the legal tides within 
the mother country (including the freeing of a slave bound for the Americas by a British 
judge in 1772) and the increasing usage of Africans within the British armed forces in the 
Americas. Many of the slaveholders had moved from the Caribbean, to escape the many 
slave revolts that were aided by the large imbalances between the “white” population and 
slave population in the Caribbean islands. The threat by Lord Dunmore of Virginia to 
utilize armed Africans to quell the brewing revolt can only have intensified the fears of 
the colonial elites (Horne 2014). In the northern colonies, which benefitted very 
significantly from the slave trade and industries that served the southern slave estates: 
 
the sight of armed Africans was quite unsettling … It was in 1768 that Bostonians 
were treated to the sight of Afro-Caribbean drummers … actually punishing their 
fellow “white” soldiers. In the heart of Boston Commons, these Negroes whipped 
about ten alleged miscreants for various misdeeds … It was also in Boston in 
1768 that John Hancock and other eminent petitioners accused the redcoats of 
encouraging slaves to “cut their masters’ throats and to beat, insult and otherwise 
ill treat said masters”; it was felt that with the arrival of more redcoats, the 
Africans surmised they wold soon “be free [and] the Liberty Boys slaves” (Horne 
2014, p. 10). 
 
 Hostilities began with the Siege of Boston in 1775, with the colonists finally 
prevailing with extensive and decisive support from France and Spain. 
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4.1.2. Independence To The Great Depression (1776 to 1933) 
 
 In pre-revolutionary New England “there was resentment against the authority of 
Parliament, resentment against the royal officials in the colony, and finally, resentment 
against the moneyed and merchant class in Boston” (Adams 1925, p. 160). Independence 
served to replace the former two with the colonial elites, such as the moneyed and 
merchant classes, and the large landowners; less a revolution for the majority of the 
population than an assumption of power by the local elites. This model of revolt, with 
local elites opportunistically utilizing a colonial crisis for their own benefit, was 
paralleled across much of South and Central America within half a century, for example 
in Colombia (1810), Venezuela (1811), Argentina (1816), Chile (1818), Mexico (1821), 
and Brazil (1822). As Ferling (2013, p. 84) notes, some North American colonists 
“longed for the new United States to replicate the social and political structure of the 
former mother country”; still elite rule, but now local elite rule unfettered by the mother 
country, “their own powerful nation state, one which the entrepreneurs, speculators, 
exporters and importers, and men of finance would be free from London’s confining 
shackles and oppressive hand” (Ibid., p. 267). The later Haitian revolution (1791-1804) 
was a slave revolt and resulted in the expulsion and extermination of the local French 
elites (much like the fate of the elites in France during its own revolution); an example 
not propitious for the US elites nor the slave owning practices of the US South. The US 
refused to recognize the new nation and worked toward undermining its independence 
(Karp 2016). In the face of much domestic US opposition, the Jay Treaty of 1795 
normalized relations with a Britain at war with revolutionary France – completing the 
final piece of the story of the Animal Farm novel penned by Orwell (1945) a century and 
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a half later. The local US elites had re-established good relations with the old elites that 
they had taken power from and continued to rule generally in the same fashion as prior to 
the revolution. “Independence did not magically erase the British class system, nor did it 
root out long-entrenched beliefs about poverty and the willful exploitation of human 
labor. An unflavored population, widely thought of as waste or ‘rubbish’, remained 
disposable indeed well into modern times.” (Isenberg 2017, p. 14). 
 In the accepted mythology of the nineteenth century the Founding Fathers were 
considered “’to have risen to the light of prophecy’ and [to be] not at all motivated by 
economic interests” (McGuire 2003, p. 16). During the progressive era at the end of that 
century a very different view developed and was consolidated by Beard (1913). This 
view saw the Federalists as “mainly merchants, shippers, bankers, speculators, and 
private and public security holders” (McGuire 2003, p. 16) who voted with their 
economic interests; an interpretation that became the dominant one until the 1950s. At the 
start of the Cold War era this interpretation was challenged and then repudiated by the 
academy, but recent scholarship has tended to support Beard’s general hypothesis. The 
Framers can be seen as overwhelmingly representing the economic elites of society, who 
greatly benefitted from voting for a strong centralized nation state (as against the loose 
confederation and weak central government of the Articles of Confederation) that 
balanced some of the democratizing trends within the states; “what a Massachusetts 
merchant called ’plebian despotism’ and the ‘fangs’ of the citizenry” (Ferling 2013, p. 
259) – a parallel of the “basket of deplorables” of the 2016 Presidential campaign (BBC 
2016). This strong state protected the elites’ property and was able to raise the taxes 
required to pay the central and state debt securities that many of them owned; “The idea 
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of self-interest can explain the design and adoption of the constitution” (McGuire 2003, 
p. 4).  
 
These men were experienced but not disinterested. More than half were slave 
owners, a third more actively involved in foreign and interstate commerce, the 
lion’s share were land speculators, and a majority owned certificates of public 
debt. Economic considerations were part and parcel of the deliberations. (Ferling 
2013, p. 264) 
 
 The taxes claimed by the British Parliament were replaced with a national system 
of tariffs and taxes that were utilized to repay state war loans at face value. One result of 
this was the bailing out and enriching of the war debt speculators that included many of 
the political representatives that voted for repayment at face value and a number of New 
York associates of financier Alexander Hamilton, who was both a Federalist and the US 
Secretary of the Treasury. It offered nothing to the soldiers and the many that had lent 
money to the revolution who had sold their rights, many times forced to by dire financial 
need, to the speculators for as little as fifteen cents on the dollar. This was a conscious 
decision by Hamilton to create a new economic elite that could help develop the industry 
of the young nation, lubricated by the now large national debt and the predominantly 
privately owned central bank, the Bank of North America and its successor First Bank of 
the United States (the precursors of the Federal Reserve established in 1913). The 
payment of substantial bonuses to military offices also helped cement a coalition between 
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economic and military elites, “a powerful bloc of aristocratic power within the Congress” 
(Stoller 2017).  
 Overall, Hamilton’s policies may have established the sound debts and currency 
required for the development of the nation, but the way in which they were implemented 
directly benefitted the few at the expense of the many. The farmers and soldiers, who had 
sold their government notes, and those unable to pay debts and increasing taxes in hard 
currency, were not so well looked after; an “open struggle between ordinary people and 
upscale investors, [which] was edited out of our common memory long ago” (Hogeland, 
p. 3). This struggle included protests that “broke out in the western parts of the country, 
similar to pre-Revolution-era revolts against the British, who, in extracting revenue for 
the Crown and its allies, were pursuing the same policies that Hamilton did” (Stoller 
2017). This became the Whiskey Rebellion (1791-1794), “’a deluded multitude’ of 
‘Ignorant, wrestless [sic] desperados, without conscience and or principals’” (Ferling 
2013, p. 241) according to Abigail Adams (wife of Vice President, and later President, 
John and a war debt speculator) that was crushed by a Federal army and extensive human 
rights abuses. The same bailing out of the rich at the expense of the rest can be seen in the 
US government responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Johnson 2009), and the 
2020 COVID-19 Crisis, while the hagiographic musical Hamilton was lauded by the 
neoliberal establishment (Stoller 2017), as well as the repeated nineteenth century battles 
between the “sound money” (i.e. gold and silver backed) creditors and the “paper money” 
debtors – especially during periods of price deflation. 
 Like many of his Federalist and other elite peers, Hamilton was no supporter of 
democracy, proposing a President and upper house serving for life atop a highly 
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centralized federal government with extraordinary powers – against the previously 
envisaged decentralized state-centric approach; he gained the centralized national 
government with a large standing army, but had to compromise with respect to the 
President (indirectly elected by a Senate, itself selected by state legislators rather than 
directly).  
 
He wanted to bring an elective monarchy and restore non-titled aristocracy to 
America. “The people are turbulent and changing”, he declared. “They seldom 
judge or determine right.” They must be ruled by “landholders, merchants and 
men of learned professions,” whose experience and wisdom, “travel beyond the 
circle” of their neighbors. America, Hamilton argued, … had to insulate rulers 
and the economy as much as possible from the jealous multitude. (Frank & 
Kramnick 2016) The same Platonic philosopher king logic used to justify the 
“independence” (from democratic control) of the later Federal Reserve. 
 
This is the “Framers’ Coup” that Klarman (2016) refers to in his account of the 
making of the US Constitution, centralizing power in a way that protected elite interests 
and buttressed that power against the democratic whims of the common citizenry. The 
Quasi-War (1798-1800) with France was used by the Federalists to pass the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 in the name of “national security”, which allowed for the summary 
deportation of non-citizens and criminalized criticism of the government; “Not for the 
last time in American political history did conservative extremists … exploit a perceived 
foreign threat to … consolidate their strength and destroy their political opponents … to 
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muzzle dissent and browbeat [their opposition] into submission’” (Ferling 2013, p. 413). 
Thomas Jefferson proclaimed, “that in less than ten years the federal government ‘has[d] 
swallowed more of the public liberty’ than had England before 1776” (Ibid., p. 414). 
With the Democratic-Republican victory in the highly contested federal elections of 1800 
that took place in the shadow of possible civil war, the anti-elitist but also deeply racist 
(Ferling 2013, p. 90) plantation and slave owner Jefferson became the President on the 
thirty-sixth ballot. The Alien and Sedition acts were rescinded (excluding the Alien 
Enemies Act which remains in place today) and the military was reduced in size and 
restructured to remove the dominance of the Federalist Party and create a depoliticized 
and professionally trained military. Jefferson also oversaw the extension of the franchise 
to nearly all white men, as part of a general democratization of society. A first Military-
Industrial Complex (MIC), combined with an autocratic Homeland Security apparatus 
and Imperial Presidency was averted.  
 Hamilton did help put in place the Infant Industry approach of high targeted tariff 
protections and a development state, to allow for the successful industrialization of the 
US (Ho 2005; Melitz 2005; Chang 2010; Hudson 2010; Ho 2013; Parenti 2020). After 
the Treaty of Ghent signed in 1814, following the War of 1812 with Britain, the “great 
influx of low-priced British manufactures threatened to extinguish American industrial 
capital, and thereby to restore American industrial dependence on England, leaving it 
prone in the event of warfare.” (Hudson 2010, p. 40). The resulting tariffs, passed with 
bi-partisan support, “introduced a schedule of minimum duties, a forerunner of the 
‘American Selling Price’ system of import evaluation for tariff purposes.” (Ibid., p. 41). 
Between this period and the 1860 fracture of the Democratic Party between the Free Soil 
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and pro-slavery factions, a coalition of the agricultural Southern and the merchant 
Northeastern Seaboard states worked successfully to reduce the tariffs, with the latter 
coming to see them as benefitting their national opponents at their own expense – the 
industrial North. The issue was resolved by the US Civil War, “the moral end of the Civil 
War was free soil, and later abolition of slavery altogether, the economic end was 
protectionism and industrialization, and the ancillary policies that went with it” (Ibid., p. 
50). 
 The newly formed US of only 3 million people set about establishing primacy in 
the Western Hemisphere through a series of conquests, together with the explicit claim to 
hemispheric hegemony contained in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. The genocidal Indian 
Wars (1775-1924) included the War of 1812 that removed Britain as an ally of the native 
peoples, and the First Seminole War (1816-1819) that led to the ceding of Florida to the 
US by Spain. The British had proposed the creation of an Indian [sic] state during the 
Treaty of Ghent negotiations, but the US had made its position clear beneath the 
misleading decorum of its language: 
 
The United States, while intending never to acquire lands from the Indians 
otherwise than peaceably, and with their free consent, are fully determined, in that 
manner, progressively, and in proportion as their growing population may require, 
to reclaim from the state of nature, and to bring into cultivation every portion of 
the territory contained within their acknowledged boundaries … for the sake of 




With the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 from France, made under threat of seizure, 
and the approximately half of Mexico gained through the Mexican-American War (1846-
1848), the nation spread from “sea to sea”. The US military also backed the Open Door 
policy of gaining access to other nations’ markets, with the Treaty of Wanghia with 
China in 1844 and the opening of Japan thanks to the “persuasion” of Commodore 
Perry’s naval squadron that resulted in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1858) 
between the US and Japan; both treaties providing US rights of extraterritoriality 
(Rubenberg 1998). The peak of the native genocide occurred after the brutal American 
Civil War (1861-1865) that ended with the victory of the industrial North over the 
agricultural (and slave owning) South; with over 600,000 war casualties alone from a pre-
war population of approximately 30 million. 
 
the ‘clearing’ of the continent moved to its grand finale. By 1890, vast Indian 
populations had been wiped out and their remnants consigned to reservations. 
America had quarantined its remaining illegal enemy combatants and, along with 
them, centuries-long contagions of shame. (Faludi 2008, Ch. 11, para. 27)  
 
 In 1867 Alaska was purchased from Russia. Ten years later, the brief period of 
freedom for the former slave population under Reconstruction (1863-1877) after the Civil 
War was quickly replaced with the virtual slavery of the share cropping system, 
reinforced by a terror campaign targeted at the African-American community (Blackmon 
2009); a reality that would continue until the 1960s. With the closure of the western 
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frontier, US expansionism moved further west into the Pacific and Far East. The Spanish-
American and Philippine-American wars (1898-1902), together with the defeat of the 
Philippine Moro Rebellion (1902-1913), established US control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Guam and The Philippines; after numerous atrocities committed against the civilian 
populations. Hawaii was also annexed in 1898 after a revolution “instigated by American 
sugar barons” (Grandin 2006, p. 20). The US was also involved in putting down the 
Chinese Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901). The brutality shown in many of these 
interventions, especially during the Philippine campaigns, paralleled that of the Indian 
Wars; “The Christian Filipinos had not particularly appreciated benign assimilation until 
compelled by a ruthless combination of military might, concentration camps, and 
starvation” (Arnold 2011, p.20). Many US troops fought in both the domestic and 
international subjugations of Others, “Led by officers whose formative experience had 
come during the Indian Wars, American military leaders considered Moroland [in the 
Philippines] to be like a huge Indian reservation populated by savage tribes rules by 
warrior chieftains” (Ibid., p. 20). Grandin (2006) notes the widespread usage of the terms 
“Indians” and “Indian country” to describe the peoples and lands to be subjugated; terms 
later used in Vietnam and Iraq. Chomsky (2016, p. 16) notes the naming of the 
contemporary bin Laden operation “Geronimo”, and US helicopters as “Apache, 
Blackhawk, Cheyenne”. 
 There were also extensive interventions in Latin American internal politics, with 
US warships being sent to Latin American ports “a staggering 5,980 times between 1869 
and 1897” (Grandin 2006, p. 21). US hegemony over Central America and the Caribbean 
was asserted through its occupation of Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) in 1904, 
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Nicaragua in 1911 and Haiti in 1915 to recover international debts; with President 
Theodore Roosevelt (who had led the famous Rough Riders in the invasion of Cuba) 
claiming the right of “international police power” to curb “chronic wrongdoing” 
(Roosevelt 1904). This assertion of policing power resulted in over thirty-four US 
interventions in Caribbean countries in the first few decades of the new century; the 
discourse of “global policeman” has been heavily utilized by the US in the post-Soviet 
era. In addition, in 1903 a rebellion was fermented in Colombia, which resulted in the 
creation of a Panama that allowed US jurisdiction over the construction and operation of 
the Panama Canal. The continual expansion of US territory and US geographic 
dominance during this period is at odds with the US isolationist mythology, as Bacevich 
noted “I think that the abiding theme of U.S. policy virtually from the founding of the 
Republic has been expansionism” (Bacevich, quoted in Chotiner 2020). At the start of the 
new century, the United States was bordered by two weak states (Canada and Mexico), 
had gained significant Pacific territories, and was unsurpassed by any other state in the 
Western Hemisphere; the “homeland” was safe from any conceivable foreign invasion.  
 Skilled labor unions grew in fits and starts due to the repeated economic 
depressions (post-1812, 1828-31, 1839-43) and aggressive business anti-union tactics 
such as “Pinkertons, imported strikebreakers, militia, black lists, and yellow dog 
contracts” (Rayback, p. 160), together with a judiciary that viewed unions as illegal 
conspiracies. The movement revived in the recovery of the 1840s, successfully gaining a 
reduction in working hours (the 10-hour day) and survived the Civil War. The post-war 
depression (1868-70) and aggressive employer associations then greatly reduced its 
membership. After a short recovery from 1870, the US economy fell into the Long 
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Depression of 1873-79, “For labor the depression was disastrous. By 1877 it was 
estimated that one-fifth of the nation’s workmen were completely unemployed, two-fifths 
worked no more than six or seven months a year, and only one fifth worked regularly” 
(Rayback 1966, p. 129). A short recovery was then followed by the depression of 1882-
85, and the following recovery stopped with the depression of 1893-97. 
 The growth of the nation was supported by accelerating waves of mostly 
European immigrants that started from 1830, with the US population increasing from 
under 13 million in 1830 to 76 million in 1900; a nearly six-fold increase. Late in this 
period the theory of Eugenics became popular among elite groups, directed at 
maintaining the quality of the homogeneous “white stock” (animal husbandry terms were 
widely used in the Eugenics discourse). Numerous states legislated the enforced 
sterilization of those deemed to be “defective” and the Federal Government legislated to 
maintain the ethnic shares of the US population while banning the immigration of 
“Asian” peoples (e.g. the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act which was only revised in 1952). Such 
racism was also shown in the internment of the Japanese-American population during 
WW2, something markedly not carried out against the German-American population. 
The continual westward movement of The Frontier, at the expense of the Amerindian 
population, had provided the equivalent of the Lebensraum later sought for the white race 
by Nazi Germany  (Kakel III 2011); the two being “strikingly similar projects of ‘space’ 
and ‘race’” (Ibid., p. 7). Such parallels, including widespread US anti-Semitism and 
business linkages with the Nazi regime (e.g. Henry Ford), were to be quickly forgotten 
once the horrors of a Nazi regime deemed exceptional in its own way (and therefore 
unrepresentative of Western civilization) came to light. 
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 The nation was also blessed with natural resources that far exceeded the needs of 
its growing colonist population, including extensive deposits of the coal required for 
industrialization. Following the Civil War, the massive expansion of the railways created 
a more national market, and benefitted factories, machines and semi and unskilled labor 
who “came from the farm and from Europe” (Rayback 1966, p. 159) and came to 
constitute 56-75% of the labor force. With this industrialization, the manufacturing 
workforce grew from 1.3M in 1860, to 2M in 1870, and to 4.25M in 1890 (Rayback 
1966, p. 53). In spite of the repeated economic contractions and financial panics, between 
1865 and 1880 industrial production more than doubled, and then nearly trebled in the 
following two decades (Davis 2004). In 1890, the US economy surpassed that of the UK, 
becoming the largest economy in the world. 
 
No nation in history (now with the possible exception of China) industrialized as 
rapidly as the United States. In a historical eye-blink America went from being an 
underdeveloped nation to an industrial goliath mightier than the chief economies 
of Europe combined. (Fraser 2015, p. 28) 
 
 This was also a period of increasingly large corporations and the monopolistic 
“trusts”, together with a “a violent anti-labor campaign” (Rayback, p. 168) that followed 
the Haymarket Affair of 1886 and continued into WW1. The 1892 Homestead Strike that 
pitted Andrew Carnegie’s massive steel company against one of the best organized labor 
unions in the country showed the new reality: a combination of corporate financial 
resources, 300 Pinkerton agents, 8,000 state militiamen, and an anti-labor judiciary broke 
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the union. The same result was achieved with the addition of federal troops and U.S. 
marshals in the case of the Pullman railway strike of 1894, together with a new legal 
weapon of blanket injunctions that effectively rendered strikes illegal; a weapon that 
became widely used. It became evident that “the corporations of the late nineteenth 
century were … capable of defeating the strongest labor organization, and that capital had 
secured a firm grip on state and local governments and would use the state’s power to 
protect its own interests” (Rayback 1966, p. 53). The period was a pivotal point with 
respect to corporate size and power: 
 
Before 1880, few industrial enterprises employed more than 400 workers … By 
the 1890s, large-scale enterprises had grown common. Individual firms in steel, 
oil, and especially several of the large railroads, employed over or near 100,000 
workers … The corporations soon outweighed the government in size, bankroll, 
and, increasingly power. (Cowie 2016, pp. 35-36) 
 
The Crisis of the 1890s was a major turning point in American history. It marked 
the close of the age of Jacksonian Laissez Nous Faire, and provided the setting for 
the death scene of the individual entrepreneur as the dynamic figure in American 
life. At the same time, it marked the triumph of a new system based upon, 
characterized by, and controlled by the corporation and similar large and highly 
organized groups throughout American society. (Williams 2009, p. 29) 
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 Churella notes (2013, Intro., para. 11) that the Pennsylvania Railroad (the largest 
US corporation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century) “In an era of weak 
national government … was a highly developed bureaucracy. In an era of relatively 
modest federal budgets [it] had a budget … second only to that of the national 
government”. The benefits of growth accumulated mainly at the top, as the increasingly 
semi and unskilled nature of jobs provided little bargaining leverage, especially with the 
inflow of workers from abroad and the agricultural hinterland, and unions that had been 
rendered ineffective. The possibility of a strong working-class movement was also 
stymied by the hope of upward mobility and divisions along racial and ethnic lines. 
Farmers were also defeated in their attempts to organize through Farmers’ Alliances and 
overcome the factors of “monopolistic railroads, greedy bankers, and a punitive credit 
system” (Painter 2008, Ch. 2, para. 58) that they saw as keeping them poor.  
 
Remarkable national wealth, on the one hand, and ethnic and racial divisions 
within the working class, on the other, meant that broad working-class solidarity 
materialized briefly in moments of crisis and endured only until the inevitable red 
scare scattered the forces of labor. (Ibid., Intro, final para.) 
 
 The resulting concentration of wealth was extreme, with the top one percent of 
families owning more than the bottom 44%, and the top 12% owning 86% of the wealth. 
The top 2 percent of families received more than half of all income (Ibid., Intro., para. 8-
9); a level of income and wealth inequality paralleling that of the present day. 
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 In reaction to the rapid social changes driven by industrialization, the rise of big 
business and monopoly, the scale of violent industrial strife, and perceptions of a 
corrupted politics, the Progressive Movement developed from 1890 onwards. This was 
predominantly led by the middle class and supported a general technocratic reformative 
modernization and democratization of society. Corporate legitimacy was challenged by 
muckraking publications that exposed corporate misdeeds, together with events such as 
the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911 in which 146 died, the machine-gunning of 
a miners’ tent village at Holly Grove in 1913 and the Ludlow Massacre of 1914. The 
causes of the widespread industrial strife were laid out in a 1915 government report: 
 
After hearing more than seven hundred witnesses, the United States Commission 
on Industrial Relations had identified four problems. Workers had not shared in 
the fruits of the enormous economic growth that the country had experienced. 
Between 25 and 33 percent of working families received too little to support 
‘anything like a comfortable decent condition’. Workers were also haunted by the 
threat of a sudden layoff. A majority of them were unemployed for up to ten 
weeks in any twelve-month period. These men and women did not view the 
government as their friend. On the contrary, they believed that every agency of 
the government operated to uphold the power of the bosses and thus to degrade 
them further. The best proof of this was the refusal of the government to offer 
them any support in their efforts to organize. (Finan 2007, Ch. 12, para. 9). 
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 The rapid build-up of monopolistic trusts was slowed somewhat, but many were 
able to reform under less formal arrangements. Any ability to change the balance of 
economic power in the favor of labor also came up against the “U.S. and state 
governments’ hostility to the collective interests of working people [that] was 
unremitting, and often violent. Justifications for state involvement were grounded in 
broad, often counterintuitive interpretations of the law” (Cowie 2016, p. 68). Such 
interpretations were evident in the courts’ acceptance of the misuse of the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act of 1906, which was used in the post-WW1 period predominantly against unions 
rather than the intended target of corporate trusts. In addition, “the courts’ insistence on 
the unconstitutionality of wages and hours legislation stymied reformers until well into 
the New Deal Era” (Ibid., p. 70). A new era of corporate consolidation ensued in the 
decade after WW1. Throughout the period from US independence to the 1930s, 
excluding the Civil War and WW1, government spending had averaged about 3% of 
GDP. This was a much smaller share than in Germany, France and the UK (Mauro et al 
2015); unlike in other industrialized nations, big business preceded big government. 
Starting in the post-WW1 period, a multi-decadal “great migration” of African 
Americans from the South to the North took place that triggered both overt racist 
violence and structural racism such as real estate practices designed to limit African 
Americans to specific areas (Anderson 2016). 
 Energy usage was changing substantially, in 1900 domestically mined coal had 
provided 90% of the US energy supply, but by 1930 this share was cut by a third; the use 
of cars drove the consumption of petroleum, and hydroelectricity and natural gas usage 
also significantly increased. All of these energy sources were domestically produced, and 
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the US was a major exporter of fossil fuels; “U.S. oil fields accounted for slightly less 
than two-thirds of world oil production in 1920, slightly more than two-thirds in 1945, 
and 16.5 percent in 1973” (Painter 2014). The US oil majors also worked hand in hand 
with the US state as they started to develop deposits abroad, with control of the core 
energy source required for modern industrial nations having major geopolitical 
ramifications in addition to profit making. For example, the 1928 Red Line Agreement 
allowed for the domination of Middle East oil production by seven western oil 
corporations; five of which were American. Monopolies and trusts were central to the 
fossil fuel sector, with Standard Oil controlling 90% of US oil refining capacity in 1880. 
This had been reduced to 65% by the time the company was broken up in 1911 under the 
Sherman Act, due to the continued rapid growth in the sector. Many coal mining 
companies claimed penury when asked for wage rises, but were in fact transferring those 
profits to railway corporations that they also had ownership interests in; the concept of 
transfer pricing that has been extensively used by TNCs in the present day. 
 The intervention of the United States in WW1 brought a political clamp down that 
mirrored that during the time of Alexander Hamilton, including the passage of the 
Espionage Act in 1917 and the Sedition Act in 1918, together with extensive censorship 
and pro-war government propaganda. Under the former act, the US Postmaster was given 
the power to exclude any material that he considered critical of the war. In essence, he 
was given control of what US citizens could read, as periodicals were distributed through 
the US mail. This resulted in repeated refusals to carry left-wing periodicals, together 
with threats and even refusals to deliver mail to certain outfits; much left wing and 
progressive discourse was removed. Foreign periodicals “generally abandoned any 
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commentary on the war in order to win a license to publish under the Trading with the 
Enemies Act” (Finan 2007, Ch. 1, para. 27). A significant victim among the thousands of 
arrests was that of socialist Eugene Debs, who had garnered 6% of the votes in the 1912 
presidential election. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, of which he served two and 
a half after being convicted for publicly saying “You need to know that you are fit for 
something better than slavery and cannon fodder” (Ibid., Ch 1., para. 29).  
 The largest prosecution under the Espionage Act was against the leadership of the 
Industrial Workers of the World, a radical union, with nearly 100 convicted and 
sentenced to terms of up to twenty years. The government and the media fostered societal 
feelings of being under siege by foreign agents, with the Attorney General supporting 
such vigilante organizations as the American Protective League with a membership of 
250,000. He asserted that its role was “keeping an eye on disloyal individuals and making 
reports of disloyal utterances” (Ibid., Ch. 1, para. 31); such statements could be expected 
from the later novel 1984 (Orwell 1949), or a communist Soviet Union which had only 
recently been established after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, when replacing “disloyal” 
with “bourgeois”. In the immediate post-war years, a “Red Scare” was instigated, 
operationalized through the Palmer Raids; suppressing left-wing activists in parallel with 
the anti-Bolshevik US involvement in the Russian Civil War (1918-21).  
 
The great majority of American leaders were so concerned with the Bolshevik 
revolution because they were so uneasy about what President Wilson called the 
‘general feeling of revolt’ against the existing order, and about the increasing 
intensity of the dissatisfaction. (Williams 2009, pp. 105-106) 
 177 
 
 The following decade was one of concerted anti-union campaigns by businesses. 
Union membership had increased substantially during wartime planning, but all those 
gains were lost in the 1920s (Cowie, p. 11). This period can be seen as the end of the 
Progressive Era, as well as any possibility of the kind of labor-based political party that 
had developed in other countries. The control of the African American population 
through terror also increased with the reinvigoration of the Ku Klux Klan, aided by a 
deeply racist President Woodrow Wilson who re-segregated the federal government 
(significantly increasing the earnings gap between black and non-black civil servants 
[Aneja & Xu 2020]) and held a viewing of the Birth of a Nation (Griffith 1915) in the 
White House; a film that included the following quote from Wilson himself: 
 
The white men were roused by a mere instinct of self-preservation ... until at last 
there had sprung into existence a great Ku Klux Klan, a veritable empire of the 
South, to protect the Southern country. (quoted in Matthews 2015) 
 
 The end of the 1920s completed a period in which business elites, especially big 
business elites, had established and maintained their political pre-eminence while greatly 
restricting the ability of labor to successfully organize itself in opposition. The remaining 
Amerindian population had been cleared from their lands and housed in government-run 
reservations, and a neo-slavery had been fully implemented in the South. The United 
States had expanded its dominance across the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific and 
was now the leading nation of the globe. The only failure had been the inability of the 
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Executive to gain support from the Congress for the League of Nations. WW1 had 
demonstrated that the US state could enter into a major foreign war against significant 
domestic political opposition and then through extensive propaganda and censorship 
bring the nation fully behind the war effort. The usefulness of a major crisis to crackdown 
on dissonant voices and organizations was also demonstrated, especially the labeling of 
such elements as agents of a foreign country or oppositional ideology (i.e. communism).  
4.1.3. From The New Deal to The Age of Diminishing Expectations (1933 to 1979) 
 
 It was only during the New Deal Era of the 1930s, which arose from the urgent 
need to stabilize society during the Great Depression that had significantly delegitimized 
laissez faire capitalism, that labor gained full rights to organize and effectively challenge 
management power through the Wagner Act of 1935. Although this was at least partly the 
result of extensive labor pressure, Ferguson (1991) also proposes that the internationally 
oriented and capital-intensive segment of the economic elite were instrumental in such 
changes as they were, “not seriously jeopardized by the epochal welfare measures that 
they and the administration collaborated in preparing. And because they were 
internationally oriented, these enterprises were the primary beneficiaries of the 
administration's historic turn to free trade after 1934” (Ibid., p. 494). A turn facilitated by 
US industrial dominance, and accompanied by a rapid forgetting of America’s 
Protectionist Takeoff (Hudson 2010); in the same way that an industrially dominant 
Britain had rapidly forgotten the high tariff protections, slave-produced cotton, war 
disruptions of its European competitors and dominance over India that so benefitted its 
fledgling textile industry (Chang 2002 & 2010; James 2012). The mixture of a liberalized 
trade Open Door combined with a limited business-labor compromise would continue for 
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another four decades, during which business interests would strive to undermine the latter 
compromise. 
 Attempts to roll back parts of this compromise by economic elites quickly gained 
momentum (Domhoff 2013). A major step was the Democratic National Convention 
machinations of 1944 (“shutting down the convention with Wallace on the verge of 
victory” [Nichols 2020, p. 99]) that chose the unknown and inexperienced Truman as the 
vice presidential candidate instead of the in-place and extremely popular and progressive 
Vice President, Henry Wallace. With Roosevelt in serious decline, this was a choice of 
the next US President. The highly supportive environment for union organization lasted 
for only 12 years, as the post-WW2 Taft Hartley Act of 1947 (passed with a bipartisan 
rejection of a presidential veto) removed many of the previous legislation’s benefits to 
labor. With the support of the state, union density had trebled, peaking at about 36% 
during the 12-year period. It stayed at around that level for the next decade, before 
starting the six-decade decline that would take union density below its pre-WW1 level 
(Cowie 2016). Government spending was still under 5% of GDP in 1930; during the 
depression it jumped above 10%, and then stayed in the mid to high teens in the post-war 
period until 1960 (Mauro et al 2015).  
 Grandin (2006) proposes that during the inter-war years the US moved away from 
an expansionary policy based upon military intervention and occupation toward one 
based more upon economic, political, financial, cultural and covert methods together with 
the support of comprador elites; much of this was the usage of the soft power later coined 
by Nye (1990 & 2009): 
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By the late 1920s, then, the United States had apprenticed itself as a fledgling 
empire in Latin America, investing capital, establishing control over crucial raw 
materials and transit routes, gaining military expertise, and  rehearsing many of 
the ideas that to this day justify American power in the world. But the experience 
in Latin America, both during the initial ‘drive toward hegemony’ and then during 
the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930s and 1940s, also pushed US leaders to 
develop a coherently sophisticated imperial project, one better suited for a world 
in which rising nationalism was making formal colonialism of the kind European 
nations practiced unworkable. (Grandin, p. 22) 
 
 The Mexican revolution (1910-1920), “which destroyed massive amounts of U.S.-
owned property” (Ibid., p. 28), had shown the force of Latin American nationalism. The 
Nicaraguan guerillas (1927-1933) had also fought US troops to a standstill, in spite of the 
US military’s overwhelming advantage in firepower; an outcome to be repeated a few 
decades later in Vietnam; and a few decades later again in Afghanistan. Instead of direct 
intervention, “friendly ‘strong men’ who promised to respect American interests and 
establish stable self-government” (Foglesong 1995, Intro. Para. 9), would be supported. 
The Great Depression also significantly reduced US power and precipitated a greater 
domestic focus. A leading member of the elite, Nelson Rockefeller, had witnessed 
firsthand “widespread poverty and labor unrest in Venezuela, Bolivia and Mexico” (Ibid., 
p.30) and proposed that US corporations work with local states to preempt nationalist 
revolutions through improving local living standards. In 1933 President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt established the Good Neighbor policy, withdrawing US occupation troops 
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from the Caribbean, asserting a non-interventionist stance, and actively supported Latin 
American development, including the nationalization of some US company holdings. The 
Open Door orientation, focused on the international free flow of US goods and capital, 
was operationalized through numerous bilateral trade and investment treaties. 
 The United States emerged unscathed from WW2, its productive capacity having 
grown substantially during the war, and war deaths numbered just over 400,000 from a 
population of 133 million in 1941. With the Axis Powers defeated and Europe, the USSR 
and Asia economically and socially devastated, it was the preeminent global power. Its 
economy represented approximately half of global GDP, and the previous leading power, 
the UK, was to all intents and purposes financially bankrupt (Barnett 1972 & 2014). 
Taking the lessons of the inter-war years, the US imposed an international order that was 
structurally beneficial to itself and the international expansion of US corporations, while 
at the same time maintaining an overwhelming military capability and global network of 
military bases (Vine 2015) with which to police that order. The Open Door orientation, 
embedded within the Bretton Woods system, facilitated the outward expansion of US 
corporations. The Marshall Plan provided external demand for the demobilizing US 
economy, facilitated the much greater entry of US corporations into European markets, 
and supported the efficacy of capitalism against the arguments of left-wing groups that 
had played large roles in the wartime resistance movements.  
 
[at Bretton Woods] American officials set up institutions designed to open up free 
trade around the world … These institutions would be largely funded and 
controlled by Americans; and they formulated precisely to establish a new 
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economic order to replace the previous one associated with European imperialism 
… By accepting these plans, London quietly transferred the mantle of hegemonic 
control to the United States. (Craig & Logevall 2009, Ch. 1, sub-sect. Distant 
Allies, para. 14) 
 
 Widespread clandestine US political and paramilitary interventions in countries 
such as Italy and France, as well the military intervention in Greece (Francovich 1980 & 
1992; Ganser 2005 & 2006; Weiner 2007; O’Rourke 2018), also made sure that the more 
radical left-wing interests would not gain political power. “From 1945 to 1975, U.S. 
government agencies gave an estimated $75 million to right-wing organizations in Italy, 
including some with close ties to the neofascist Moviments Sociale Italiano (MSI)” 
(Parenti 1997, p. 30); this “covert financing of the far right fueled a failed neofascist coup 
in 1970” (Weiner 2007, chapter 28, sub-sect. The Only Way To Go Was The Old Way, 
para. 10). The occupying forces in Japan instigated a post-war Red Scare, selected both 
Japan’s Prime Minister and “number one gangster” (Weiner 2007, chapter 12, para. 2), 
repurposed the wartime Japanese intelligence services for its own covert operations 
(Morris-Suzuki 2014), and then after the end of the US occupation the CIA “spent 
millions of dollars to support the conservative party that dominated Japan's politics for a 
generation” (Weiner 1994). In Germany and Austria, extensive use was made of ex-Nazi 
officials to staff the administration and the intelligence services (Beste et al 2012; 
Simpson 2014). The USA actively guided the politics and economics of Europe and 
Japan toward the capitalist camp, supported with military and trade arrangements (The 
Bretton Woods Institutions, North American Treaty Organization (NATO), the US-Japan 
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Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security etc.,), financial incentives and military bases. 
The discoursal construction of an expansionist communist threat inherent in the creation 
of NATO and the Truman Doctrine also aided group cohesion. A post-WW2 system was 
constructed whereby “the plutocracy that dominates the system is centered in the United 
States, but has powerful allied branches in Western Europe and Japan especially” (Shoup 
2015, preface, para. 2). 
 As noted in chapter 2, this “liberal international order” order was in fact neither 
liberal nor international, as it excluded the Soviet bloc and China, included numerous 
military and covert interventions across the globe, and actively supported autocratic 
governments. The US also acted as a sovereign that deemed itself above the law, as with 
its 1946 acceptance of the World Court that was conditioned “with very broad 
reservations which some regarded as virtually nullifying [US] acceptance” (Bidler 1991). 
The use of the “Soviet threat” as a cover for the real motives for many US interventions 
is stated clearly by Huntington, “If you draw from that analysis the conclusion that you 
have to intervene or take some action, however, you may have to sell it in such a way as 
to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting. That is what 
the United States has been doing since the Truman Doctrine” (Hoffman et al 1981, p. 14). 
Kennan (1948, sec. VII) captured the fundamental economic drive behind post-WW2 US 
foreign policy: 
 
Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its 
population … Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of 
relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity …  our 
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attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national 
objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of 
altruism and world-benefaction. 
 
 The US view of the USSR had been a generally negative one driven by the latter 
country’s post-revolutionary exit from WW1 hostilities, and the ideological threat of 
communism. After the failed US and European interventions in the Russian Civil War on 
the side of the Mensheviks (Foglesong 1995); diplomatic relations between the US and 
USSR were not established until 1933. The rapid Soviet industrialization of the 1930s 
also turned it into a much stronger ideological competitor. Stalin’s pact with Germany in 
1939, together with the USSR’s invasion of neighboring Finland, only added to the 
generally negative view of it held by the US. This was put aside with the German 
invasion of the USSR in mid 1941, although even after that time there was still much 
domestic opposition to sending aid to the USSR (Fischer 1950); the dread of a separate 
German-Soviet peace overrode ideological concerns. After being allies with the USSR 
during the war, the animus of the US returned with the end of hostilities and the Soviet 
bloc identified as an existential threat to US interests; a move partially triggered by the 
“loss” of China to its own communist revolution and the USSR’s imposition of friendly 
regimes in Eastern Europe (as agreed at the Tehran meeting [Kitchen 1987, p. 427]).  
 
He [Roosevelt] accepted Soviet demands for preponderance in the Baltic states 
and Poland, protesting only that he could not officially accept Soviet domination 
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over the latter for domestic political reasons. (Craig & Logevall 2009, Ch. 1, sub-
sect. Distant Allies, para. 11) 
 
 A greater reason may have been the inability of Roosevelt to “duplicate with 
Moscow the relationship he sought with the British – that he could incorporate the 
Kremlin into a partnership dominated by the United States, not only during the war but 
after it” (Craig & Logevall 2009, Ch. 1, sub-sect. Stalin Recalcitrant, para. 1). At Bretton 
Woods the “U.S. negotiators conspicuously sought to secure the Soviet Union 
involvement, by offering it a vast postwar loan in exchange for its participation in the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund” (Ibid., para. 4) to no avail. At the end 
of World War 2 the USSR was exhausted, having suffered over 25 million deaths (one in 
eight of the pre-war population) and countless other casualties fighting the vast majority 
of the German armed forces, and having had much of its physical infrastructure, 
agriculture and industry destroyed. Underlining the weakness of the Soviet position, the 
“USA’s Central Intelligence Agency carried out a study in 1946 which concluded that the 
shattered Soviet Union would not be in a position to wage a war for fifteen years” (Ibid., 
Ch. 1, para. 32). The same was true of a devastated China, after fighting the vast majority 
of the Japanese ground forces for a decade and then being devastated again in a brutal 
civil war. Although this meant that the US could operate with a relatively free hand in the 
rest of the world, it could not gain access for its internationalizing corporations to the 
Soviet bloc and China.  
 The US was now faced with both a Russia and a China that would not accept its 
hegemony, and therefore especially after the Russian production of its first nuclear bomb, 
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the communist Other had to be both created and contained. The well founded Russian 
fear of foreign aggression, based upon two incredibly destructive German invasions, the 
US and European interventions, the previous century’s Crimean War and Napoleonic 
march on Moscow, was put down to the “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs” by 
Kennan (1946); an understanding very different to the one taken by Roosevelt only a 
couple of years earlier (Craig & Logevall 2009). 
 
there was a puzzling refusal to acknowledge the Soviet claim that two invasions 
by Germany in twenty-seven years made the control of Eastern Europe essential 
to Russian security. Truman insisted on seeing the Soviets as a determinedly 
expansionist enemy of the free world almost from the day he assumed office. 
(Alexander 2011, Ch. 1, para. 12) 
 
 An extensive discourse of Othering is evident in the Kennan Long Telegram 
(1946), that used descriptions of the Kremlin such as “oriental secretiveness and 
conspiracy”, and “inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions” and 
“Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force” and stated that 
the USSR was committed to a belief that “the internal harmony of our society be 
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed”. Such nightmarish words could have 
been written about the US Amerindian populations during the time of another Terror 
Dream (Faludi 2007); those that would not accept the dominion of the The Shining City 
On The Hill would become a heathen Other and treated as a malevolent source of threat 
and terror. The Cold War fell into place, producing a discoursal binary between the 
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communist East dominated by the USSR and a “free” West dominated by a benevolent 
US policeman. The opening up of Soviet archives after the collapse of the USSR has 
shown that that US military and intelligence entities consistently inflated the military 
strength of the USSR far above its realities, producing a menacing dark presence from a 
relatively weak defensive entity. Pressure from the domestic Red Scare, together with the 
start of the Korean War in 1950, helped the US “hawks” such as Nimitz to get President 
Truman to approve National Security Council (NSC) 68 – a document that greatly 
exaggerated the threat from the Soviet Union to justify large increases in US defense 
expenditures and an active policy of containment. President Truman went on television to 
tell the nation that “Our homes, our nation, all the things we believe in are in great danger 
… this danger has been created by the rulers of the Soviet Union” (Truman quoted in 
Ritter 2020, p. 39). After the near mutual annihilation of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962, a more rational relationship was established with the Soviet Union – culminating in 
the period of détente. The Cold War permanent war economy, the MIC that Eisenhower 
warned Americans of in 1961 (US National Archives 2020), was unprecedented in 
peacetime (excepting the short-lived Hamiltonian version) and provided a new subset of 
the power elite (Mills 2000). 
 Within the US, corporate power remained preeminent but the legacy of the New 
Deal, together with the experience of successful wartime central planning and the scale of 
the citizenry’s patriotic exertions during WW2, led to the compact of Fordism; mass 
production, high wages for white males, mass consumption, and politically docile unions, 
with the latter even working with the CIA on covert foreign operations abroad (Wilford 
2008). The second Red Scare (the first occurring after the Bolshevik revolution), through 
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such things as the infamous McCarthy Hearings (1954) and extensive investigations of 
government employees, significantly restricted what was deemed to be acceptable 
political beliefs – both in society in general and within the state apparatus (Finan 2007; 
Storrs 2013). There was also a coordinated effort by the CIA to directly manipulate the 
media, academia and citizen groups (Bernstein 1977; Saunders 2000; Wilford 2009). As 
shown by the Church Committee hearings of the mid 1970s, these efforts were paralleled 
with extensive covert FBI political activities, such as the Counter Intelligence Program 
(COINTELPRO) that was started in 1953, against those deemed to be too politically 
“radical” (US Senate Church Committee 1976/2009 & 1976/2010; Cunningham 2004; 
Weiner 2007; Blackstock 2020). Additionally, there was extensive propagandizing in 
support of the “free market system” by business interests, both within their own 
establishments and throughout society (Fones-Wolf 1995). In parallel, the US at least 
tacitly supported, and in the many cases actively participated in, the subjugation of 
progressive democratic movements in Central and Southern America. Within the latter, 
coup d’etats established dictatorships in many nations (Paraguay 1954, Brazil 1964, 
Bolivia 1971, Uruguay 1973, Chile 1973, Argentina 1976). This facilitated the 
cooperation between the US state and South American military intelligence agencies that 
grew into an Operation Condor that involved the extensive surveillance, torture and 
murder of progressive regime opponents in the name of “combating communism” 
(McSherry 2002, 2005 & 2019; Zanchetta 2016). A multinational COINTELPRO with no 
institutional limits on the actions of the security forces, many of the members of which 
were trained and armed by the US. 
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The post-war period has been dubbed The Great Compression, as income 
inequalities were significantly reduced; a process that lasted into the 1970s. The heavy 
regulation of the financial sector that stemmed from the Great Depression reduced 
economic volatility and rentier capitalism, the post-war labor-capital Fordist compact 
facilitated an extensive (white) middle class consumer economy, and highly progressive 
taxation rates were carried over from wartime. With even factory workers becoming 
“middle class”, mainstream sociology could envisage the Embourgeoisement of the 
working class. This was a period of a racially specific and partial Embedded Liberalism 
(Polanyi 1944; Ruggie 1982) at home (within strict limits set by an ever-present anti-
communism and widespread state covert political actions) and between the Western 
nations, counterposed with Cold War conservatism with respect to the rest.  
 The war had led to the extensive funding of military-relevant scientific research, 
much of which could be commercialized to facilitate economic growth. In the post-war 
years a significant development state was “hidden” within the military, through such 
things as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Controlled 
Thermonuclear Research Computing Center (now known as the National Energy 
Research Scientific Computing Center – NERSC) and the Lawrence Radiation 
Laboratory (now known as the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the spin-off 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). Together with other military research, the 
North Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space program, and much 
increased research funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), this hidden 
development state was responsible for much of the US dominance in areas such as 
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computing, communications and pharmaceuticals (Mazzucato 2015). As Chang (2010, p. 
55) notes: 
 
Between the 1950s and the mid 1990s, US federal government funding accounted 
for 50-70% of the country’s total R&D spending, which is far above the figure of 
around 20%, found in such ‘government-led’ countries as Japan and Korea. 
Without federal government funding for R&D, the US would not have been able 
to maintain its technological lead over the rest of the world in key industries like 
computers, semiconductors, life sciences, the Internet and aerospace.  
 
 A new progressive era emerged in the 1960s, around such issues as African-
American voting repression, women’s rights, corporate malfeasance and environmental 
pollution. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1960’s Great Society extension of the 
welfare state, Roe vs. Wade in 1973, and the establishment of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 are some of the accomplishments of this era. The 
majority of these dealt with social issues and none directly challenged business 
dominance – paralleling the previous progressive era. Those that more directly 
challenged the fundamental status quo, such as the Black Panthers, the Nation of Islam, 
anti-war protestors and draft resisters such as Muhammad Ali, Martin Luther King 
toward the end of his life, and student demonstrators in the early 1970s, were the subject 
of widespread state espionage, infiltration, propaganda, and violence (including the 
murder of Fred Hampton [Haas 2019]). With the implementation of the Great Society, 
together with spending related to the Vietnam War, government expenditure increased to 
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over 30% of GDP by 1970. It then continued to increase to over 40% by the mid-1980s 
(Mauro et al 2015). 
 Domestic politics became increasingly turbulent, driven heavily by racist 
violence, civil rights agitation, and then growing resistance to the war in Vietnam. The 
eight-year period from 1962 to 1970 was especially convulsive; the Cuban missile crisis, 
two Kennedys, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and Fred Hampton assassinated, the 
violence of the voting rights campaigns, and the escalating protests against the Vietnam 
War culminating in the Kent State shooting of students in 1970. The next five years 
brought the US retreat from Vietnam, the US repudiation of fixed exchange rates, and the 
undermining of the Keynesian Consensus by a stagflation triggered by the first oil shock. 
State authority was further reduced by the indictment and resignation of a sitting US 
President, together with a series of congressional hearings into extensive CIA, NSA and 
FBI post-WW2 abuses that served to delegitimize major parts of a coercive state 
apparatus that had already been heavily undermined by the Vietnam debacle. The general 
feeling of decline continued as the government rescued Chrysler in the face of intensified 
European and Japanese trade competition, the US dollar became chronically weak, and 
the Iranian hostage crisis dragged embarrassingly on for 444 days. The nearly farcical US 
rescue attempt of the hostages in Iran, Operation Eagle Claw, of 1980 “was a disaster 
that ended with American deaths, ruined military planes, and the hostages no closer to 
freedom” (Kamarck 2019); in brutal contrast to the successful Israeli raid on Entebbe 
four years earlier. The Others of Vietnam and Iran had defeated, divided and bewildered 
the forces of the Shining City On A Hill; a city more perceived to be in sad decline than 
serving as a beacon for the “free world”. 
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 The legitimacy of the US state was being assailed, from both within and without, 
and for the first time a major war had to be ended in the face of widespread popular 
opposition (together with extensive insubordination among enlisted military personnel in 
Vietnam). US corporations were also being delegitimized by their failures against foreign 
competition, together with the revelations of corporate misdeeds by consumer rights 
activists such as Nader (1965 & 1976) and environmental activists such as Carson (1962) 
(Vogel 1983). They were also being subject to greater levels of regulation, as with the 
new EPA and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In addition, early 
in the “1970s, antiwar activists pioneered a new kind of protest, one hinged on exposing 
the corporate role in the war” (Phillips-Fein 2009, Ch. 7, para. 4) and which transformed 
into a general opposition to the rule of “a violent minority” (Ibid., Ch 7., para. 5) 
establishment; “A study done by Oklahoma Christian University in 1973 found that 
undergraduates gave businessmen the lowest rankings for ethical standards (Ralph Nader 
was at the top). Half of all seniors identified themselves as leftists, compared to one third 
of all freshmen” (Ibid., Ch. 7, para. 7) and only a minority of the general public expressed 
confidence in business leaders. Calls for limits to economic growth (Meadows et al 1972) 
in the name of environmental sustainability also challenged the growth that supported 
corporate profits. 
 
The student demonstrations of Columbia University, the University of Chicago, 
and Kent State, the bombs at the Bank of America, the accusations of Ralph 
Nader, the new government regulations, the sudden new working-class militancy, 
the activists invading corporate offices – all of it seemed a single continuum, one 
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discordant challenge rising against American businessmen. In 1972, Business 
Week reported on ‘America’s growing antibusiness mood’. (Ibid., Ch. 7, para. 9) 
 
 The geopolitical importance of oil had been underlined by the 1941 US oil 
embargo of Japan and the 1953 US and UK backed Iranian coup that overthrew an 
elected leader who threatened the control of Iranian oil production by those two nations. 
The dominance of the US oil majors over US energy policy was underlined by repeated 
anti-competitive measures taken by the US government to bolster domestic oil prices. In 
1933 the government instigated production rationing to stop cheap oil from flooding the 
marketplace and in 1959 oil imports were restricted to a maximum of 9% of domestic 
demand to stop a plethora of new foreign production sources from crashing the domestic 
price of oil. The latter resulted in significantly higher oil prices within the US with 
respect to global oil prices, an explicit subsidy provided by US oil consumers to US oil 
producers. This was only removed in 1973 after the peak in 1970 of US oil production; a 
peak that occurred after a nearly continuous increase in US oil production that stretched 
back to the previous century. Climbing domestic demand then led to a rapidly growing 
trade deficit in oil products and the dependence of the US upon the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil cartel; a reality shown in the domestic oil 
shortages caused by the two Middle East driven oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. The oil 
trade deficit was thereafter reduced until the mid 1980s through price-induced US energy 
efficiencies and the stabilization of domestic oil production due to new finds in Alaska 
and the Gulf of Mexico.  
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 In retrospect, the post-war “miracle” years can be seen as a period of exception in 
US history (Cowie 2016), with the lingering effects of the New Deal, wartime planning, 
popular expectations after wartime patriotic exertions and a Fordist economic structure 
facilitated by US post-war economic and military dominance. Another factor may also 
have been the need to maintain the myth of the Shining City On A Hill in ideological 
competition with the Communist Other. The confluence of military defeat, economic and 
political crisis and more radical domestic populism brought forth a coordinated response 
from the economic and political elites. The New Deal coalition had also been weakened 
through religious, cultural and racial cleavages opened up by the success of the new 
social movements, providing exploitable social and cultural divisions (Domhoff 2013); as 
was exploited with the Republican Southern Strategy (Lopez 2014; McAdam & Kloos 
2014; Maxwell & Shields 2019). Much of the working class may have been economically 
leftist, but it was much more socially conservative than the left elites – a difference open 
to political exploitation. The increasingly non-Caucasian share of immigration, together 
with the civil-rights movements and residual racism, also provided avenues for 
scapegoating and “dog-whistle” political tactics. In addition, the ire of the progressives 
was heavily directed at the government, greatly reducing its legitimacy in the eyes of 
citizens. 
 This allowed for a coalition of elite interests with socially conservative citizens 
(including the highly religious), which served the economic interests of the former while 
pandering to the cultural conservatism of the latter (e.g. racism, homophobia, opposition 
to Roe vs. Wade and the feminist movement) and taking aim at “Big Government”. The 
“’grand bargain’ of white supremacy, buttressed by paternalism and evangelism, whereby 
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the southern white masses relinquished political power to the few in exchange for 
maintaining their social status as better than the black man” (Smith quoted in Maxwell & 
Shields 2019. p. 1), and now Latinos, together with the sanctity of the “traditional family” 
and “life”, had been rejected by a Democratic party that was shedding its interest in the 
economic welfare of the working class. In this way, a substantial share of the American 
populace was brought to vote against its own economic interests, with a false 
consciousness facilitated by such things as a Prosperity Gospel that conflates US 
capitalism and religion (Bowler 2013). This was also aided by the move away from 
criticisms of big business and the diminution of the influence of the unions within the 
Democratic party; the Republican party would now fill the role of protecting 
“mainstream” white “values”. A core part of this was a carefully constructed synonymy 
between “crime and blackness … The point longtime aide John Ehrlichman explained, 
was to present a position on crime, education, or public housing in such a way that the 
voter could ‘avoid admitting to himself that that he was attracted by a racist appeal’” 
(Anderson, 2016, p. 104). The Nixon administration, together with a Supreme Court with 
four new conservative appointees, facilitated the ongoing segregation and unequal 
funding of the school system “by eviscerating the constitutional right of black children to 
an education and then some” (Ibid., p. 110). The Supreme Court then followed up later in 
the decade with the undermining of positive discrimination based on race for university 
admissions, while leaving discrimination based on alumni funding and connections in 
place. 
 From the late-1970s onwards the US economy and society was returned to the 
structure of the late nineteenth century, through waves of corporate consolidation, 
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financial deregulation, the restriction and outsourcing of government services, massively 
reduced taxation for the rich, and the destruction of much of the labor movement; 
facilitated by what constituted an elite funded and organized neoliberal counter-
revolution (Harvey 2005; Phillips-Fein 2009; Hacker & Pierson 2010; MacLean 2017; 
Mayer 2017). The formation of the large-corporation dominated Business Roundtable in 
1972, the Lewis Powell Memorandum (1971) to the US Chambers of Commerce, entitled 
“Attack On The American Free Enterprise System” and the “Crisis of Democracy” report 
(Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975) for the recently established Trilateral 
Commission (founded by David Rockefeller) exemplified this period of economic elite 
coalition building. The elite reaction was able to build upon the work of some of its more 
radical elements who had opposed the New Deal through such things as the American 
Liberty League (1934: heavily supported by the Du Ponts), the American Enterprise 
Institute (1938: Eli Lilly, General Mills, Bristol-Myers, Chemical Bank, Chrysler, Paine 
Webber), the Mount Pelerin Society (1947), and over “the course of the 1950s, dozens of 
new organizations devoted to the defense of free enterprise and the struggle against labor 
unions and the welfare-state” (Philips-Fein 2009, Ch. 3, para. 7). The discoursal and 
ideological weaponry was greatly enhanced in the 1970s, through a new raft of elite-
funded organizations, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute (and its 
spin-off the Ludwig von Mises Institute). A more recent addition has been the highly 
influential Center for American Progress in 2003. 
4.1.4. From Morning In America To Making America Great Again (1979 to present) 
 
 The election of Ronald Reagan, who had previously worked extensively in the 
post-war capitalism-promoting efforts of General Electric (and had also acted as an FBI 
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informant during the post-WW2 red scare [Rosenfeld 2012]), provided a President that 
actively supported the corporate and political elite pushback. “Reagan received what he 
called his ‘post-graduate education in political science’ while serving as General 
Electric’s ‘travelling ambassador’ under its vice president, Lemuel Boulware, a union 
buster extraordinaire” (Marcetic 2020, p. 45). Labor-power had already been weakened 
by a less union supportive National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and anti-union 
decisions by both Republican and Democrat administrations during the 1970s (Domhoff 
2013). The push for a government-financed universal healthcare system and a guaranteed 
minimum income for all had come to nothing with the defeat of Teddy Kennedy at the 
Democratic convention (Ward 2019). Labor-power was now greatly reduced by the firing 
of the striking air traffic controllers by the state (legitimizing the firing and replacement 
of striking workers), the high unemployment created by the Fed-induced Volcker Shock 
recession of the early 1980s (Greider 1987), and new employer-friendly interpretations of 
labor law. The Reagan (1980 – 1988) administrations also “ordered a scorched-earth 
policy through the Great Society from education, to housing, to employment [and] 
targeted very specifically those programs in which blacks were overrepresented even as 
he protected [programs such as] social security, where African Americans were but a 
small fraction of the recipients” (Anderson 2016, p. 119). Large-scale federal layoffs also 
disproportionately affected African Americans, and Reagan rendered the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) ineffective. The racialization of the War 
on Drugs (including the 100-1 difference in sentencing between crack cocaine and 
powdered cocaine in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; in 1992, 91.4% of federal crack 
offenders were African American [Stolberg & Herndon 2019]), a problem at least 
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partially created by the administration’s facilitation of Contra drug running, also led to a 
substantial undermining of the cohesion of African American neighborhoods. 
 This following decade brought two Democratic presidential terms which resulted 
in the End of Welfare As We Know It (Law 1997; Brown 2013), three-strikes laws, and 
the biggest crime bill in US history that had an over-weighted impact upon the African 
American community through both the massive reductions in the social safety net and a 
doubling in the level of incarceration from 1994 to 2009; amid a “highly racialized world 
of welfare politics” (Brown 2013, p. 584) and a dog whistle discourse of “welfare 
queens”, “predators” and “super predators” (Dyck & Hussey 2008; Brown 2013; Lopez 
2014; Stolberg & Herndon 2019). “Clinton’s policies proved that he was no friend to 
poor black women” (Baldwin 2010, p. 9), nor poor black men, nor black children who 
“Clinton used racially coded rhetoric to cast ... as animals” (Alexander quoted in 
Robinson 2016, p. 20). He, and the Corporate Democrats, were also no friend of labor as 
they passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), made the US a 
member of the new World Trade Organization (WTO), and provided China with 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR); facilitating extensive corporate offshoring. 
In addition, “By the end of the twentieth century, the once vaunted Wagner Act had 
become worse than null and void – it had become, as David Brody put it, a ‘tool of 
management’” (Cowie 2016, p. 25). 
 The Clinton administration was a friend of finance though, ignoring the US$500 
billion bill for the extensive illegal looting of the Savings & Loan industry facilitated by 
the Reagan-era deregulation that was met with little or no punishment for the looters 
(Pizzo, Fricker & Muolo 2015) and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, to 
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further deregulate the financial industry. It also ignored the head of the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commissions (CFTC) in refusing to regulate over the counter (OTC) 
derivatives generally and to treat credit derivatives as insurance instruments (which they 
are). At the end of the decade it also ignored the lessons of the Great Depression, 
removing the separation between commercial and retail banking, with the Treasury 
Secretary responsible for this regulation, previous co-chair of Goldman Sachs Robert 
Rubin, decamping to the biggest beneficiary Citigroup where he received over US$100 
million in compensation. 
 After stabilizing at about 23% in the late 1970s, US union density declined to the 
point in the 2010s where it was below the level prior to that of the passing of the Wagner 
Act (Cowie 2016, p. 11). Wealth and income inequality levels returned to those of the 
1920s (Cowie 2016, p. 12) aided by an increasingly regressive tax structure (both 
technically and even more de facto), and the repeal of the New Deal financial regulatory 
environment. Reflecting and reinforcing the new power realities, the US Supreme Court 
issued rulings that equated money with protected free speech. After government spending 
fell somewhat during the 1990s, benefitting from the short-lived Peace Dividend and the 
Dot.com Bubble and restrictive fiscal policies, it rose back above 40% with the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (Mauro et al 2015). The Christian Right rose in power within the 
Republican party from the 1980s onward, with a hybrid mixture of religious 
fundamentalism, neoconservative foreign policy, and a gospel of wealth that supports 
free market fundamentalism; “Getting Christianity and elite economics together on the 
same page is useful in signaling that policies that serve the rich are simply articles of 
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faith, the dispute of which is akin to arguing with a literal interpretation of the Bible” 
(Parramore quoted in Maxwell & Shields 2019, p. 300-301). 
 One area not affected by reductions in state spending was that of the Hidden 
Development State (Block 2008) that benefitted corporate interests through providing the 
basic research that facilitated new product generation. The Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program was put in place in 1982 to provide federal state funding to 
small business research initiatives. A near tripling of funding to the NIH, together with 
the Orphan Drugs Act of 1983, greatly aided the dominance of the US pharmaceutical 
industry. The National Nanotechnology Initiative, started in 2003, brought much greater 
coordination for federal nanotechnology research. This state directed development ran 
counter to the prevailing discourse of market-fundamentalism, but reflected the reality of 
the need for federal funding for future-oriented basic research. The discourse of the 
entrepreneurial “risk taking” venture capital and high-tech industries had been built upon 
a substantial amount of myth. As Mazzucato notes, it is as much the risk taking of the 
entrepreneurial state that is responsible for successful technological development, “As 
has been the case in the development of other industries such as biotech and IT, private 
businesses have entered the game only after successful government initiatives absorb 
most of the uncertainty and not a little risk of developing new energy technologies in the 
first place” (Mazzucato 2015, p.127). The discourse of neoliberalism both “hides” this 
development state and endangers its future: 
 
From the Internet to biotech and even shale gas, the US state has been the key 
driver of innovation-led growth – willing to invest in the most uncertain phase of 
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the innovation and let business hop on for the easier ride down the  way. If the rest 
of the world wants to emulate the US model they should do as the United States 
actually did, not as it says it did: more State not less … This is something that 
needs to be understood not just by the rest of the world, but in the United States 
itself, where the dominant political narrative is endangering funding for future 
innovation and economic growth. In 2013, US government spending for basic 
research fell below where it was a decade earlier. (Mazzucato 2015, p 1) 
 
 The discourse of “unleashing private entrepreneurial energies” was used to both 
greatly reduce state regulations and to greatly reduce levels of taxation – especially upon 
capital gains:  
 
In the late 1970s capital gains taxes fell significantly following lobbying efforts 
on behalf of the US venture capital industry … The lobbyists argued before the 
government that venture capitalists had funded both the Internet and the early 
semiconductor industry, and that without venture capitalists, innovation would not 
happen. The same actors that rode the wave of expensive State investments in 
what would later become the dot.com revolution successfully lobbied government 
to reduce their taxes. (Mazzucato 2015, p. 25) 
 
 Repeated reductions in corporate taxes and those on rich individuals, together 
with extensive use of tax havens and transfer pricing, significantly reduced the level of 
state funding provided by the economic elite. In contrast those elites benefitted from 
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many state policies, including repeated state bailouts for the financial sector. The removal 
of the New Deal financial regulatory framework, together with the legalization of share 
buy-backs and the failure to regulate the derivatives market, facilitated a vast expansion 
in the financial sector. This financialization of the economy precipitated both extractive 
and rentier forms of capitalism. Increasingly value was extracted from corporations and 
society by executive management and shareholders (including private equity), and 
through income sources based upon economic rents. With respect to private equity 
investment, which tends to greatly increase the debt level of corporations and extract 
value through large dividends and fees, “between 1985 and 2005, private equity funds 
experienced a compound annual growth rate of 18.5 per cent, and in the last few years, 
growth has been even more marked” (Froud & Williams 2007, p. 4). There has been a 
general tendency to see corporations as simply a set of cash flows that can be leveraged 
up (increased debt) to increase the returns to the equity holders. With respect to private 
equity, in many cases the initial investment is rapidly returned through large management 
fees and dividend payments, leaving only upside for the investors. 
 
the extraction of value is pure financial engineering because the operating 
business acquires liabilities in the form of debt equal to the sum of cash taken out. 
But the cash goes into the hands of elite private equity providers and fund 
managers while the liabilities are passed onto the business … This  serves to 
normalize the pursuit of value through financial re-engineering as businesses 
become bundles of assets that can be sold, unbundled, sold again through several 
cycles of refinancing for value extraction. (Ibid., p. 12) 
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 All of the downside risk is placed upon the employees and debt holders (and the 
state with respect to possible increases in social welfare payments and employee pension 
bailouts), with the corporation being placed into bankruptcy if unable to service its large 
debts. 
 
the private equity business model concentrates equity ownership and fee income 
in a few hands so that a managerial elite can gain what the Financial Times have 
described as ‘life changing amounts of money’. (Ibid., p. 10) 
 
 In many cases US corporate expenditures on stock buy-backs, which are tax 
advantageous to investors as the additional income comes in the form of lower-taxed 
capital gains and executives who get to boost the value of their share options (which are 
not rebased to reflect the higher share prices created by the buy backs), exceed all R&D 
expenditures as well as increasing the corporation’s debt levels. The outcome of such 
value extraction may be a serious relative diminution in basic US technology innovation, 
“In the end, an increasingly timid (and sometimes austerity-driven) public sector and an 
increasingly financialized business sector will surely get us secular stagnation” 
(Mazzucato 2015, p. 15). With US economic power relying less and less on physical 
manufacturing, and more and more on the control of global value chains (GVCs) and 
intellectual property (Phillips 2017), this could be seriously detrimental in a geostrategic 
sense. At the international level, US corporations are relying more and more upon patent 
and copyright protections to both limit competition and to provide licensing revenue. 
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This has been aided by the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) that became effective in 1995. This was the first time that intellectual property 
rights law was embedded in the international trading system, and it also changed the basis 
of patents from that of process (allowing other nations to “reverse engineer” patented 
products) to the product itself (Prashad 2014, p. 181). The US state has used extensive 
pressure to force other nations to integrate the WTO TRIPS into their laws and to accept 
the extended monopoly protection periods of US law. The rise of competitive patent-
producing Chinese global corporations such as Huawei and the Made in China 2025 
Chinese development plan, directly threaten the US dominance of GVCs. 
 Increases in corporate rents (and power) have been further aided from the late 
1990s by an extensive level of US corporate consolidation driven by merger and 
acquisitions (M&A) facilitated by increasingly novel and flexible interpretations of anti-
trust regulations; “one can make the case that merger reviews have become rather lax in 
the US” (Phillipon 2019, p. 90) with the number of US publicly listed companies per 
capita falling by more than half. An example of this lax regulation is that “the agency 
[US Federal Trade Commission] seems to have decided that five competitors are enough 
to ensure adequate competition in most markets” (Ibid., p. 91). In addition, there have 
been less new entries into concentrated markets, which may be significantly explained by 
hurdles erected by regulation and industry lobbying. Adding to the level of concentration 
has been the Pentagon’s move to a greatly reduced number of major military contractors, 
as well as the US Federal Communications Commissions (FCC) facilitation of extensive 
M&A that has resulted in six corporations that “Control 90% Of The Media In America 
… from 50 companies back in 1983” (Lutz 2012). The supposed democratizing nature of 
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the Internet has been overcome, as with previous information revolutions, by the 
formation of “a highly centralized and integrated new industry” that has taken its place to 
“uphold the social structure that has been with us since the Industrial Revolution” (Wu 
2010, intro. para. 11). The internet “doesn’t reverse the economic logic of concentration – 
it amplifies it” (Hindman 2009, p. 132) with the result that the “public sphere is already a 
de facto aristocracy” (Ibid., p. 139). Recent consolidations across Internet behemoths 
(e.g. Google buying Youtube; Facebook buying Instagram and WhatsApp) have added to 
the level of concentration. Within the financial industry, the removal of the Glass 
Steagall separation of investment and commercial banking, together with retraction of 
regulations against inter-state banking, has resulted in a multi-decadal merger wave. This 
was exacerbated by the consolidations carried out during the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, with the resulting handful of “Too Big To Fail” financial institutions, such as 
Wells Fargo and Bank of America, dominating the industry; in severe contrast to the 
1930s policies that enforced the division of retail and commercial banking and led to the 
prosecution of a number of banking executives. 
 In the 1980s, as noted in chapter 2, the US led a stealth neoliberalisation of the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These institutions were utilized during the 
Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s to force nations to implement policies that would 
both open up their economies to foreign TNCs, and to move much of the public sector 
into the market economy. In this way both an extensive expansion of capital (the spatial 
fix [Harvey 2001; Arrighi 2004]) and an intensive one through the commodification of 
social services, utilities, health and education were facilitated. The blockage of the option 
of debt default that had been successfully utilized by many nations in the 1930s greatly 
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benefitted US and other Western (and local elite) creditors, while creating a “Lost 
Decade” for much of Latin America and Africa. The commodification of government 
services has been brought home, with extensive privatization of US government services 
– including significant functions of the US military, privately-run charter schools and 
educational testing. 
 US economic growth was aided by the ongoing fall in oil prices from 1980 until 
2000, which acted to both increase real incomes and to lend support to the US car 
industry by supporting demand for less fuel efficient and much more profitable large 
vehicles; the minivan and sport utility vehicle came to provide the bulk of US automobile 
industry’s profits. Starting in the late 1990s there was also a slew of mergers and 
acquisitions between the large oil corporations, resulting in the “super-majors” such as 
Exxon Mobil. Domestic legislation required the increasing use of biofuels mixed with 
gasoline (predominantly corn-based ethanol), with about 10% of US fuel being composed 
of ethanol by the late 2010s. Although seeming to reduce oil import dependency and 
GHG emissions, the overwhelming evidence is that corn-based ethanol at best marginally 
contains more energy than is used to produce it – with a significant amount of that energy 
being diesel fuel - and creates only marginally less GHGs than oil production. 
Resultantly, the legislation has been seen as more a forced consumer subsidy to large 
corporate agriculture than providing increased energy security and reduced GHG 
emissions. 
 The Vietnam Syndrome (Summer Jr. 1992; Bagdikian 1993) was seen as limiting 
large-scale military operations, compounded by the mass casualties produced by the 
bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; in this context the highly secretive and 
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illegal Contra operations against Nicaragua can be understood (Rubenberg 1988). When 
faced with a lack of public support, even in Congress, the executive branch utilized 
illegal and covert actions, rather than accept limitations upon its actions. Robinson 
proposes that the overthrow of Antonio Samoza in Nicaragua, together with other 
populist revolutions in a number of other US authoritarian allies, oriented US tactics 
toward “democracy promotion” [sic] as a way to “manage political change in order to 
preempt more fundamental social change …” emphasizing “the penetration of civil 
society itself in order to secure social control and limit control from therein” (Robinson 
2007, pp. 32-33). In 1983 the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was formed as 
a conduit for such efforts and “went on to provide aid to pro-US democratic forces in the 
Philippines in 1986 and in Chile from 1984–1990, contributing to nonrevolutionary 
regime transitions [and] broadened its mission beyond the non-Communist Third World 
to include aid to friendly democratic movements in Poland and Nicaragua” (Pee 2017, p. 
707). This did not constitute a change in strategy, but rather a change in tactics within the 
same Open Door strategy; as noted by the man who helped draft the NED legislation “A 
lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA” (Allan Weinstein 
quoted by Engdahl 2015, chapter 2, sub-sect. US-Sponsored NGOs, para. 6).  
 After the rekindling of the Cold War in the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR 
removed the core Other (the “Evil Empire”) while enabling the inclusion of the ex-Soviet 
bloc (and a liberalizing China) within the neoLIO. The collapse of the ideological 
alternatives created a discoursal closure at home, while also providing a much greater 
freedom of action for the US. Perhaps even more than in the immediate post-WW2 
period, the US (aided when possible by other parts of the West) found itself in a highly 
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permissive position relative to the international system, allowing it to seemingly remake 
the world at will to its benefit; the natural conclusion to its multi-century efforts to defeat 
the recalcitrant Other. The escalating level of foreign oil dependence from this time 
onwards also created an increased need to maintain the stability of foreign oil providers. 
Instead of a peace dividend being provided through a reduction in defense spending, the 
MIC was reoriented toward a role of global dominance. 
 These drivers can be seen in the facilitation of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the 
support of shock therapy in the ex-Soviet bloc, funding and support for “color” 
revolutions, support for EU/NATO membership for the Eastern European and Baltic 
States (in contravention of explicit guarantees given to the USSR leadership [Majumdar 
2017]), the removal of Iraq from Kuwait, the actions of the IMF and World Bank during 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and the inclusion of China within the WTO. The first 
US-Iraq war was also celebrated as removing the Vietnam Syndrome of domestic 
resistance to large-scale US foreign intervention (Summers Jr. 1992); a removal aided by 
US-Kuwaiti elite propaganda collaborations such as the infamous Baby Incubator Hoax 
congressional testimony by the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the US Senate 
masquerading behind a hidden identity and aided by extensive coaching from the US 
public relations firm Hill & Knowlton (Stauber 1995; Knightley 2001; MacArthur 2004); 
an early example of the western interventionist human rights discourse (and reminiscent 
of British WW1 propaganda about German soldiers bayonetting babies).  
 The GWOT then facilitated an escalation of Middle East interventionism with the 
invasion and occupation of firstly Afghanistan and then Iraq. The rapid rise in oil prices 
from 2000 onwards, together with rapidly increasing US oil imports and fears over Peak 
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Oil raised the visibility of the control over global oil supplies within US strategic policy 
circles. This led to the alleged Seven Nations in Five Years plan of the Bush 
administration (Burke 2007), and has been seen as a major determinant of the US 
invasion of Iraq; a nation belligerent toward Al Qaeda (in contrast to US claims) and 
lacking the consciously fabricated Weapons of Mass Destruction (Leopold 2015). The 
GWOT, together with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, provided permanent US 
military bases across the Middle East, while aiding in the construction of the Muslim 
Other. It also, as with both WW1 and the Quasi-War with France, facilitated the passing 
of politically repressive legislation (e.g. the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act) and 
extensive domestic spying (Angwin et al 2015), together with providing extensive profit-
making opportunities (aided by the privatization of military and homeland security 
functions), and indirectly, furthering neoliberal ideological dominance. 
 
The ‘war on terrorism’ provided a seemingly endless military outlet for supplier 
capital, generated a colossal deficit that justified deeper dismantling of the 
Keynesian welfare state, locking neoliberal austerity in place, and legitimated the 
creation of a police state to repress political dissent in the name of security. 
(Robinson 2018, Ch. 5, para. 44). 
 
 From a purely realist perspective many of the US actions would seem not to make 
sense, for example the aggressive march of NATO toward Russia’s borders, as they 
needlessly increased the risks of conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries. When a 
critical lens is added, including an understanding of the dominance of TNC capital within 
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US foreign policy, rational motives become more evident. NATO and EU membership 
both fully integrate the ex-Soviet bloc states into the neoLIO and recreate the policy of 
Cold War containment with respect to an independent Russia; that nation may not be the 
ideological competitor that the USSR was, but after the turn of the century it has become 
much more nationalistic and resistant to Western dominance. China represented a 
colossal new profit-making opportunity for the TNCs; together with the ex-Soviet bloc it 
provided the spatial fix par excellence for TNC capital. This entailed:  
 
a geographical restructuring of capitalist activity (deindustrialization here and 
reindustrialization there, for example) across the face of planet earth, the 
production of new forms of uneven geographical development, a recalibration and 
even re-centering of global power (with far greater emphasis upon the Pacific and 
newly industrializing countries) and a shift in the geographical scale at which 
capitalism is organized (symbolized by the growth of supra-state organizational 
forms such as the European Union and a more prominent role for institutions of 
global governance such as the WTO, the IMF, the G8, the UN and the like). 
Contemporary globalization has been, we can argue, the product of these specific 
geographically grounded processes. (Harvey 2001, p. 24). 
 
 These geographically grounded processes may have been facilitated by relatively 
inanimate factors such as new communications and transport technologies, but were also 
driven by the very animate and conscious actions of TNCs and the US foreign policy and 
military establishments (generally supported by their Western counterparts). For 
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approximately two decades, the US elites had an unparalleled ability, and opportunity, to 
remake the world to their liking; as noted above possibly greater than during the 
immediate post-WW2 period. Without the need to build a positive buttress to an 
ideological competitor, and the legacy of the New Deal, the reaction was much more 
shock therapy and aggression than Marshall Plan. It was also one of hubris in much of the 
US policy-making and military establishments: 
 
we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other 
countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us. (US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright interviewed on the Today show [Albright 1998]) 
 
full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in 
combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary 
and control any situation across the full range of military operations. (US National 
Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies 2000, p. 61) 
 
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating 
other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. 
We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. 
(a senior advisor to President G.W. Bush, which the article’s author identified as 
Karl Rove, quoted in Suskind 2004) 
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We came, we saw, he died. (US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, referring to the 
torture and murder of Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan head of state [CBS 2011]) 
 
 As Cohen (2001; 2019) notes, the inability of the US to engage with Russia in a 
more supportive and respectful way may be seen as a major foreign policy blunder. The 
aggressive US reaction to Russia’s renewed nationalism has created a powerful coalition 
between Russia and China, on the basis of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Instead of 
dividing and conquering, the US has united its opponents. Given the significant synergies 
that exist between China and Russia, together with the economic weakness of the latter, 
such strategic blindness can only be seen as a symptom of the hubris noted above and 
anger at the “loss” of Russia. The active US support for the coup against the elected 
President of the Ukraine, and then the resulting anti-Russian administration (including the 
deployment of NATO troops to the country), has only served to drive Russia closer to 
China. 
 After the mass domestic resistance to the Vietnam War, the freedom of action of 
US foreign policy with respect to domestic opinion was greatly increased by a number of 
factors. The US military have relied upon a voluntary membership, rather than one based 
upon a conscription army that would spread the experiences of the nation’s wars across 
the citizenry, “The Nixon Administration was very clear on that point: to give yourself a 
chance of fighting a lengthy limited war, you must get away from conscripts” (Hoffman 
et al 1981, p. 8). In more recent years the large-scale use of private armed mercenaries 
and the extensive outsourcing of administration and support tasks previously performed 
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by military personnel has served to reduce the “official” casualties, as the outsourced 
personnel tend to die much less publicly. 
 
Too many soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines dying … would draw unnecessary 
attention … Mercenaries die in warzones. They absorb deaths that would 
otherwise bloody the military ranks. This allows the War Department [sic] and 
Capitol Hill to cite low casualty figures … Additionally, using mercenaries keeps 
conscription off the table. Conscription would expand the burden of war into the 
upper-middle and upper classes of society, dragging in the sons and daughters of 
the ruling elite. (Sorensen 2020, p. 20)  
 
In addition, media access to war zones has been greatly restricted, with 
“embedded” journalists becoming the norm, and independent (of the US state) journalists 
treated as an opposition rather than as part of the free press (MacArthur 2004), and 
extensive cooptation of media organizations has taken place (Taylor 1992; Bagdikian 
1993; Isikoff & Corn 2006; Brewer 2009). Instead of having to “keep transmission 
equipment out” (Hoffman et al 1981, p. 8), the US state and a compliant media have 
become proficient at managing the media messages emanating from conflict zones.  
 Kreps (2018) also notes the move away from war taxes and war bonds, that 
produce a directly identifiable financial impact to the citizenry, to war funding through a 
general increase in state indebtedness. As with the lack of a military draft, this helps 
remove the impact of wars away from the consciousness of the general citizenry; the $6.4 
trillion costs of the post-911 wars (The Watson Institute 2019) have been added to the US 
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state debt with no immediate financial impact upon the general populace. Foreign 
interventions have also been restructured in ways that reduce US casualties and increase 
secrecy, though the extensive use of air power, drones, covert special operations, proxy 
armies, covertly supported “color revolutions”, and economic and financial sanctions. 
The reaction of the majority of US citizens to the 2018 deaths of US troops in Niger was 
one of surprise that US troops were even in Niger; a measure of the ability of the US state 
to successfully utilize such covert operations with limited or no external oversight 
(Cooper, Gibbens-Neff & Schmitt 2018).  
  
 In 2010, Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe of the Washington Post reported that 
 the U.S. Special Operations Forces were deployed in 75 countries … By the 
 end of 2011, U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman Colonel Nye told 
 me, that number would reach 120. (Turse 2012, p. 12) 
 
 As of 2020, there are only 195 countries in the world. A lesson initially learnt 
from Nicaragua at the turn of the century, then relearnt from Vietnam that had to be 
painfully relearnt again from Iraq and Afghanistan was that: 
 
Nothing is more destructive of army morale than being in a situation in which it is 
nearly impossible to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys; in which one 
does not know whether the terrain on which one fights is yours or theirs. 
(Hoffman et al 1981, p. 10) 
 
 215 
 Sorenson (2020) proposes that the balance of power within the Military Industrial 
Complex (MIC) has become corporatized, that the profit-maximizing private defense 
industry corporations – a “war industry” - have become the predominant power within it.  
He identifies a highly effective five-step strategy to capture government: 
 
1. Pull retiring military officers into war corporations. 
2. Stack the deck by placing ex-industry officials in the Pentagon leadership. 
3. Finance congressional campaigns. 
4. Lobby creatively. 
5. Fund think tanks and corporate media. (Ibid., p. 68) 
 
U.S. foreign policy then becomes heavily affected by the profitability 
requirements of the defense industry corporations – peace is very bad for profits. This 
extensive capture of government by private interests greatly restricts the set of foreign 
policy alternatives deemed to be “politically acceptable” – especially with many 
corporations and industry bodies funding both Democratic and Republican politicians. 
Hillary Clinton may call for a redirection of defense spending to rebuild the industrial 
policy hidden within the MIC (Clinton 2020), but the willingness of the major defense 
corporations to give up their massively profitable military contracts may severely limit 
the ability to significantly implement such a change. No-bid service contracts and overly-
complex “cost plus” military hardware specified by captured buyers are just so much 
more profitable than producing batteries, wind turbines and smart electricity grids in a 
competitive market place. 
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 The consolidation of the media into large TNC enterprises has also greatly 
reduced the scope for a diversity of domestic discourses. The lack of impact of 
revelations of executive branch misrepresentations with respect to the war in Afghanistan 
(Chotiner 2019), extensive torture programs (US Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence 2014) and large-scale domestic surveillance (McCoy 2013) highlight this 
discoursal closure. The partnership between Facebook and the TNC-dominated Atlantic 
Council (Vanian 2018), and changes to Google algorithms that downgraded respected 
non-mainstream media sources (Pop 2017), all point to reductions in non-elite entities’ 
ability to engage in the national political discourse. The concept of Humanitarian 
Intervention has also been used as a domestic legitimizer of intervention (e.g. 
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya), together with extensive media manipulation (MacArthur 2004; 
Rampton & Stauber 2006), and a jingoistic nationalism added after 9/11. Taken together, 
and with a bipartisan political party consensus for foreign interventions, the result is little 
if any domestic constraint upon US foreign policy – short of a long-lasting major war 
requiring conscription.  
 The recent case of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) whistleblowers that have exposed serious concerns of political bias and 
malpractice with respect to the investigation of the Douma, Syria “gas attack” is highly 
instructive. The numerous whistleblowers call into question the OPCW’s official findings 
that a gas attack even happened; findings that were used as a casus belli by the US, 
resulting in a cruise missile attack upon Syria (Hitchens 2019). The very limited and 
generally dismissive coverage of the mainstream media with respect to these 
whistleblower testimonies given what would appear to be their high “newsworthiness” is 
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instructive of the level of discoursal discipline followed by the media (Mate 2020); a 
discipline that led to the resignation of a Newsweek journalist due to the refusal to print 
his story on the OPCW whistle-blower revelations (Haddad 2019; MacLeod 2019). The 
only coverage dealing fully with the details exposed by the whistleblowers has been 
through alternative media sites such as the Gray Zone (Mate 2019 & 2019a). 
 Technological breakthroughs that allowed for the exploitation of shale oil and gas, 
supported over an extended period by the US development state, have completely 
changed the energy security position of the US within a decade. From being heavily 
dependent upon oil imports in 2010, the US has become nearly self-sufficient in oil 
products and has become a net exporter of natural gas. Together with the increase in 
Canadian Tar Sands production, which relied upon the patient support of the Canadian 
development state, this has created a surplus within the global oil market. This surplus 
has allowed the US to place extensive economic and financial sanctions upon oil 
producing nations that have not fully integrated with the neoLIO, specifically Iran and 
Venezuela, without creating substantial and damaging increases in oil prices. The US has 
also placed such sanctions, but not explicitly restricting fossil fuel exports, upon Russia. 
The belated attempts to stop the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany 
are an escalation in this respect (Jacobs, Wadhams & Paulsson 2019); as well as the 
stated “security” concerns, the new competition between the US and Russia for European 
gas imports may also be a factor. 
 Unlike the consistent multi-decadal support for the innovations that allowed for 
the exploitation of shale oil and gas, state development support for renewable energy has 
been limited and inconsistent; suffering from its alignment with the politically-contested 
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concept of climate change (in the US) and lack of political power with respect to the 
fossil fuel industries. The promising Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980 was quickly 
reversed by the Reagan administration, with federal R&D funding falling to minimal 
levels by 1988 (Jones & Bouamane 2011). The lead was taken by Denmark and 
Germany. Later, extensive Chinese government support allowed China to develop a large 
wind energy industry. With respect to solar, “In 1986 President Reagan removed even the 
solar panels which President Carter had installed on the White House” (Ibid., p. 25). 
During the 2010s global crisis of over-capacity in solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturing 
the Chinese state continued to provide significant ongoing support to its manufacturers, 
in contrast to the much more limited US state approach (Fialka 2016); resulting in global 
dominance by the Chinese manufacturers. The only major US electric vehicle 
manufacturer, Tesla, has been heavily dependent upon early-stage federal loans, 
consumer subsidies for EV purchases (an increase in the number of vehicles covered by 
US federal subsidies was vetoed by the US President in late 2019), and its ability to 
realize significant revenues from the sale of excess EV credits to other manufacturers. 
State supportive policies have been seriously constrained due to a combination of the 
dominant market-fundamentalist discourse and oppositional fossil fuel interests that have 
been able to discoursally and politically restrict any attempts at policies related to climate 
change. This has involved the lack of ratification of both the Kyoto protocol and the 
rejection of the Paris Accord by President Trump (recently reversed by President Biden). 
This failure of state development policy, across both Democrat and Republican 
administrations, has placed the US at a significant disadvantage with respect to the green 
technologies that may represent a major basis of future economic growth and geopolitical 
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power (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA] 2019). The political 
dominance of fossil fuel interests with respect to energy policy is underlined by an 
Obama administration that oversaw a massive expansion of shale oil and gas production; 
an expansion that President Obama was happy to celebrate as an achievement of his 
administration (Meacham 2018). 
 The acceptance of miscalculation through cognitive misinterpretations within 
neoclassical realism shows its utility with respect to the present-day US. At the very 
zenith of its global power, the US made fundamental foreign policy errors.  The 
assumption that the fall of the Soviet Union produced an “end of history”, in which the 
global acceptance of American-style democratic-capitalism was inevitable, fulfilled the 
creation myth of the Shining City On A Hill bringing civilization to the whole world and 
acting as the Global Policeman. Such a belief led firstly to the provision of US permanent 
normal trade relations and then WTO membership, to a highly non-liberal China. The 
massive profit-making opportunities available to US TNCs through the US-China wage-
arbitrage may also have been a significant factor in these decisions. This allowed the 
Chinese CCP dominated economy to enter a period of rapid exponential growth during 
the next decade. At the same time, as Cohen notes, the plundering and arrogant treatment 
of Russia created a nationalist backlash led by Putin. The inability of the US to accept 
Russia as an independent power, with its own sphere of influence, then turned it into an 
opponent and natural ally of China. 
 Instead of leveraging the huge amount of global goodwill that stemmed from the 
9/11 attacks, the hubristic and aggressive way in which the US responded alienated 
many. The invasion and occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq went against the lessons 
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taken to heart in the inter-war period and learnt again in Vietnam. The extensive focus on 
the GWOT, together with the problems created by the two occupations, allowed for little 
geopolitical focus on Russia and China. The growth of the latter not only strengthened a 
possible opponent, but also weakened the US through extensive deindustrialization. The 
perceived (by Russia and China) misuse of a UN mandate in Libya, together with the US 
support for the Ukrainian coup, then helped solidify the budding alliance between Russia 
and China. The destruction of the Middle East power-balance through the invasion of 
Iraq has also increased the local position of Iran, including with the majority-Shia Iraq. 
The at least tacitly sponsored by the US destabilization of Syria has also provided much 
greater influence for both Iran and Russia within that country. 
 With respect to South America, the United States has recognized and actively 
supported highly questionable changes in government in countries such as Brazil (with 
the removal of the serving President and a leading candidate jailed under highly 
questionable circumstances) and Bolivia (with the unsupported assertion of “electoral 
irregularities” by the OAS [Chang et al 2019]) as part of a general reversal of the South 
American Pink Tide (Encarnacion 2018). This may at least partly be seen as a reassertion 
of US dominance over the Western Hemisphere in the face of the Chinese challenge. 
4.1.5. Current Domestic Energy Consumption 
 
 US domestic primary energy consumption is predominantly provided by oil and 
natural gas, with the balance provided by coal, nuclear, hydro, and a very small share of 
new renewables (predominantly wind and solar). US energy intensity increased in 2018, 
after four years of improvements (BP 2019a); this increased energy usage was 
predominantly supplied by natural gas and oil. Coal consumption fell, as natural gas and 
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new renewables consumption increased. The new renewables have been provided with 
limited government support, but their capacity growth rate has decelerated while their 
share of primary energy consumption is only 4.5%. The political strength of fossil fuel 
interests in the US still represents a significant bar to an energy transition, as shown by 
the lukewarm climate change and energy transition policies of the Obama administration 
and the outright repudiation of such policies by the Trump administration. 
 
Table 4 1: US Primary Energy Consumption      
     Mtoe         2007-18     2018         2018  
             Mill. Tons Oil Equiv.  Growth    Growth      Share         
Primary Energy Consumption 2,301 -0.4% 3.5% 100% 
- Oil 920 -0.6% 2% 40% 
- Natural Gas 703 1.7% 10.5% 31% 
- Coal 317 -4.9% -4.3% 14% 
- Nuclear 192 0% 0.3% 8.4% 
- Hydro 65 2% -2.7% 2.8% 
- Wind, Solar, Biomass, Geo 104 14% 10% 4.5% 
Data from BP 2020 Statistical Review and IRENA Renewable Energy Statistics 2019 
 
4.2. Current Strategic Culture & International Political Economy 
 
 The US state/society complex has been dominated by elite business and financial 
interests since its independence, and prior to that within the predecessor British colonies; 
especially within the central and southern colonies. The period from the mid-1930s to the 
mid-1970s, when there was somewhat of a compromise between the elites and the rest, 
was an exception to the general rule of US history. In the past four decades political 
power, together with wealth and income, has been re-concentrated to the level of the late 
nineteenth century Gilded Age. This has been underlined by the multi-trillion-dollar 
rescue packages for the financial system and large corporations in response to both the 
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2008 GFC and the most-recent COVID-19 crisis. In contrast, monies allocated to the rest 
of society, including small businesses, have been both small and grudgingly provided; for 
example, the lack of aid for defaulting homeowners after the 2008 GFC and the 
resistance to providing direct financial aid to individuals during the COVID-19 crisis. 
This “socialism for the rich, free markets for the rest” was also shown in previous state 
rescues of the financial system (1982 Mexican Peso Crisis, late 1980’s Savings & Loan 
Crisis), but the level of state favoritism to elite sectors has intensified over time. 
 Another confirmation is the resistance shown by both mainstream political parties 
to the provision of the type of socialized healthcare (“Medicare for All”) provided in 
other Western nations, something repeatedly shown to be supported by a majority of the 
population, in contrast to the ease with which increased military spending, business 
bailouts and subsidies, and repeated elite tax cuts have been passed. The nearly complete 
lack of state action against monopolistic and monopsonistic business practices both 
underlines elite dominance and serves to intensify that dominance; as does the repeated 
refusals of the Democratic Clinton and Obama administrations to support legislation that 
would improve the position of unions. This Democratic Party indifference is in contrast 
to an Economic Policy Institute article that points out a “huge unmet demand for 
collective bargaining”, as a result of workers having been “systematically disempowered 
as a result of corporate practices and economic policies that were adopted – or reforms 
that were blocked – at the behest of business and the wealthy” (Mishel 2020).  
 The case of the investment bank Goldman Sachs is illustrative of the elite 
domination and corruption of the Federal Government. Facing illiquidity and insolvency 
in 2008 it was provided with a commercial banking license so that it had direct access to 
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Federal Reserve financing, and was made solvent through the state-approved full 
payment of US$12.9 billion on derivative contracts by the state-rescued American 
International Group’s that would have been nearly worthless otherwise (Rush 2011). 
Goldman Sachs was also allowed to hide its losses in a “missing month” by switching its 
fiscal years (Norris 2009), allowing for reported profits and large executive bonuses in 
the next fiscal quarter. No such largesse was shown to the many that lost their jobs and 
houses in the ensuing deep recession by the ex-Goldman Sachs CEO (a role that he had 
only relinquished in 2006) who served as the Treasury Secretary. At the same time, 
instead of the already highly concentrated banking industry that had facilitated the crisis 
being broken up into much smaller entities, further consolidation was facilitated with 
government funds and guarantees. There would be nothing like the Pecora Commission 
(Perino 2010) and fundamental industry re-regulation of the 1930s; nor any individual 
prosecutions for what appeared to be widespread control fraud (Marrs & Ferguson 2010; 
Pontell, Black & Geis 2014; Cohan 2015). The massive scale of the fiscal and monetary 
largesse to the financial and corporate sectors was not fully disclosed until a Freedom of 
Information lawsuit from the Bloomberg news organization forced disclosure by the 
Federal Reserve a few years later (Bloomberg 2011). 
 Such economic elite dominance of government is described by Wolin (2008) as 
Inverted Totalitarianism; a political sphere subservient to the economic. To all intents 
and purposes a single business party, masquerading as a duopoly (Democratic and 
Republican parties), dominates the US political system; the substantial policy differences 
between the two parties are minimal and focused within the area of culture (e.g. Roe vs. 
Wade, sexual and racial discrimination, “political correctness” etc.) rather than political 
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economy. In 1964 Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, captured this dynamic well 
when he stated, “The United States is also a one-party state, but with typical American 
extravagance, they have two of them” (quoted in Sharlet 2008, p. 384). 
The extensive Democratic party machinations in both 2016 and 2020, aided by 
allied “liberal” media organizations, to defeat the economically progressive Bernie 
Saunders campaigns for the Party’s presidential nomination are evident of the political 
alignment of the Democratic party’s leadership. The two parties may represent slightly 
different combinations of economic elite factions (although many large political donors 
provide support to both parties), such as transnational and domestic groups, but this does 
not alter the overall ascendancy of economic elite interests. The lack of any real choice 
within the political system, and the prior destruction of the private sector unions, together 
with a highly concentrated and co-opted media, serves to demobilize the population (in 
contrast to the popular mobilization of a classical totalitarian state). The elite antagonism 
shown toward public sector unions (the last redoubt of concentrated labor power) and 
state support for the average citizen (e.g. Medicare and Social Security) is indicative of a 
continued drive to return US society to the realities of the late nineteenth century. Elite 
economic interests, to a level exceptional among Western nations, dominate the US 
state/society complex: 
  
In modern America, concentrated wealth controls politics and government, 
leading even the extremely conservative Senator John McCain to remark that 
“both parties conspire to stay in office by selling the country to the highest 
bidder.” The American nation with its incredibly powerful chief executive, 
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gargantuan military, repeated interventions in the affairs of foreign states, and 
political system in the thrall of great wealth, this is the very world that [Thomas] 
Jefferson abhorred. (Ferling 2013, p. 497) 
 
 Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) and Layne (2017) detail 
the continuity of US TNC domination of the strategic planning apparatus and foreign 
policy elite. The TNC leadership, their think-tank networks, foundations, and lobbyist 
organizations are significantly merged with the strategic planning process; to view them 
as separate entities is both ontologically and epistemologically misleading,  “the foreign 
policy establishment is a subset of the corporate and financial elite (the ‘one percent’)” 
(Ibid., p. 264). The myriad of connections between the defense bureaucracies and the 
oligopolistic defense industries within the MIC (itself significantly expanded through 
increased defense spending and privatization) only adds to the level of merger. This leads 
to a strategic culture that has had a consistent worldview since at least the early 1940s, 
after the fall of France to Nazi Germany, when the possibility and the benefits of US 
global dominance became evident (Wertheim 2020). 
 
This is based on: American primacy (“American leadership”), the imperative of 
national security. Liberal ideology – perhaps most importantly – the economic 
Open Door. From 1945 until today, the foreign policy establishment has aspired 
“quite simply to the moral and political leadership of the world” (Hodgson 1973, 
10-11). (Layne 2017, p. 263).  
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This was a leadership gained through US economic, political, cultural and 
military (both overt and covert) dominance; a worldview seemingly triumphant with the 
fall of the Soviet bloc and the liberalization of China – only for triumph to be seemingly 
snatched away. 
 Up until the 1970s US elite interests and the raison d’etat were generally aligned, 
a strong nation as the underlying base for expansion and dominance; what was “good for 
GM” could be said to be “good for America”.  In the post-WW2 period, the seemingly 
idyllic lifestyles of the American white population and the nation’s industrial and 
scientific leadership were important in the establishment of US hegemony over the 
neoLIO. With the move toward increased globalization at the turn of the century, together 
with the remaking of domestic political-economic relations from the 1970s, US elite 
interests and the raison d’etat started to become less aligned. The increasingly extractive 
relationship of the elite to the nation (Lazonick & Shin 2020), together with the profit-
driven movement of economic activities to China and other nations, reduced relative 
national capabilities and increased those of geopolitical competitors. The increasing 
destruction and precarity of what used to be called the “US middle class” also reduced 
the strength of the US “brand” required for hegemonic leadership. The extreme state 
ineptitude and elite favoritism of the response to COVID-19, on both sides of the political 
aisle, has only added to the tarnishing of this brand image. A major conundrum for US 
elites, which has not found its way into mainstream discourse, is that its increasingly 
extractive relationship to the nation serves to reduce the geopolitical strength that the US 
transnational elites are reliant upon – a situation reminiscent of the British elite’s lack of 
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interest in protecting and developing critical industrial sectors in the first half of the 
twentieth century (Barnett 1972, 2014).  
 The foreign policy establishment itself maintains the continuity of the strategic 
culture through the ways in which new entrants are recruited, the socialization process of 
those recruits at all elite educational levels, and the career limiting nature of dissent with 
respect to the consensus of “the cardinal points of US grand strategy [which] are pretty 
much set in concrete” (Layne 2017, p. 265). The instrumentality of these cardinal points 
with respect to the dominance and profits of US TNCs provide their material support. 
 
 The core components of the policy establishment’s world view are: the 
 primacy of national security, the imperative of American leadership, the 
 importance of the open international system, and the need to export 
 America’s liberal political ideas. (Ibid., p. 267). 
 
 Parmar and Ledwidge capture the effectiveness of the integration of chosen 
racialized individuals into US elite beliefs and behaviors with respect to a President 
Obama who they propose represents a “’Wasp-ified’ black elite, assimilated into the 
extant structures of power that remain wedded to a more secular, non-biologically racial, 
version of Anglo-Saxonism or, more broadly, liberal internationalism” (2017, p. 374). 
They argue that Obama is “a part of that establishment and shares its elitist, secularized 
religio-racial-in-origin mindsets … the power of Establishment socialization and 
cooptational processes is fundamental” (Ibid., p. 377); other exceptional examples would 
be Susan Rice, Condoleeza Rice and Kamala Harris. The “establishment is open to the 
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most talented minorities – exhibiting a formal commitment to a superficial but important 
visible ‘diversity’ – who share, or can learn to share, their mindsets” (Ibid., p. 377); a 
diversity of identities but not a diversity of worldviews. The very efficiency of the co-
option of racialized and female individuals into elite policy circles, and the cultural 
disciplining of those circles, may produce a longer-term failure – a group cognitive 
inflexibility with respect to changing international realities, as noted by Layne (2017). 
 There is no strategic policy elite problematization of a continued framing of the 
US as both The Shining City On A Hill, munificently providing the benefits of its 
exceptionalism and leadership to the rest of the world and as The Indispensible Nation 
always faced with a new Frontier of external threats to be subjugated for the common 
good; “Even during the triumphalist interlude of the 1990s, the foreign policy 
establishment warned (in the words of President George H. Bush) that America’s security 
now was imperiled by amorphous forces of ‘uncertainty, instability, and danger’” (Ibid.). 
The GWOT provided a new Terror Dream inhabited by unknowable, unpredictable, 
amorphous forces that were “out there” in the “borderlands” while also “among us”. The 
threats of “non-liberal” and unsubordinated Russia and China have now created 
additional Others that threaten “our way of life”, and therefore need to be met with a 
reinvigorated US focus on global primacy. Their very existence in a form not acceptable 
to the US is seen as an existential threat. At the same time, US economic and financial 
elites do not accept that they must contribute toward this reinvigoration of the US as a 
nation – quite the contrary as they look for yet more tax cuts, less state support for the 
average citizen, continued maximization of short term profits, and even greater state 
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subsidization; “In the United States, economically and politically, predatory value 
extraction has trumped sustainable prosperity” (Lazonick & Shin 2020, p. 239). 
 The prior weakening of US national strengths, together with the lack of the 
readiness of the elites to commit to a domestic regeneration, produces a reliance upon 
external actions designed to retard the development of Russia, and especially China. The 
actions taken to damage some of the leading Chinese TNCs and limit the ability of Russia 
to monetize its fossil fuel deposits, represent such actions. With an inability to move 
away from a policy of global primacy, an escalating use of such external actions would 
be expected; with the possibility of military conflict increasing.  
 A move away from the policy of primacy, and perhaps a move to the offshore 
balancing proposed by Layne (1997 and 2017) and other realist scholars would represent 
a fundamental turn in the 400-year history of the US and its colonial precursors. It would 
also bring an end to the Western European global dominance, of which the US represents 
the pinnacle. Such a change also has a significant racialized element if the ascendancy of 
China within the geopolitical system, and that of the “East” in general, is to be accepted. 
It would represent the rejection of the universalist Western “civilizing” mission based 
upon Greco-Roman concepts, and the acceptance of the validity of other civilizational 
philosophies and foundational histories. Japan had represented a smaller-scale challenge 
that had led to a “Yellow Peril” anti-Japanese racist response due to its own ascendancy 
in the 1970s until its financial crisis in 1993 (Heale 2009), echoing the earlier anti-Asian 
scares nearly a century earlier; even though Japan had already integrated significant 
liberal institutions during the US occupation and accepted US geopolitical primacy. Such 
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considerations represent some of the unstated reasons for resistance to the end of US 
primacy.  
4.3. The Drivers of Current Energy Policy 
  
 As noted above, the interests of the US fossil fuel corporations, especially the 
transnational oil corporations such as Exxon Mobil have heavily driven US energy policy 
since large-scale US oil deposits were discovered in the mid nineteenth century. In 
addition, the geopolitical importance of control over global oil supplies has had a major 
impact upon US foreign policy. 
 The explosive growth in domestic US oil and gas production from 2010 onwards, 
due to the shale oil and gas revolution, has erased the net oil and gas import position of 
the US. In addition, the growth in Tar Sands production in Canada has provided 
additional energy security. These increases in North American oil production have led to 
significantly lower global energy prices, and an overall over-supply. This over-supply has 
provided the US with the ability to take actions against the oil production of states that do 
not accept its “leadership” without repercussions to the global oil price. The result has 
been crippling sanctions for Iran and Venezuela, and significant sanctions against Russia. 
 The dominance of fossil fuel interests within the US provides a very limited range 
of policy options – from a mix of limited support for renewables while still providing 
significant policy support to the fossil fuel industry (Obama) to outright and unapologetic 
support to the fossil fuel industry (Bush, Trump). With respect to international climate 
change negotiations the range has been between lukewarm support for global climate 
agreements (Obama) to outright rejection of those agreements (Bush, Trump). Such a 
limited range of policy options can be expected to continue short of fundamental 
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domestic political economic changes, a secular fall in global oil production, or a climate 
emergency. The energy policy focus of the Biden presidential campaign in late 2020 
belies this reality, with its reliance on the capture and storage of GHGs rather than on a 
significant reduction in the usage of fossil fuels (Horn 2020). The need to limit the 
relative GDP growth gap with respect to the faster growing China will also tend toward 
state support of a shale oil and gas industry that has been one of the greatest areas of 
strength within the US economy. 
4.3.1. Geopolitics and Energy Security 
 
 Being self-sufficient in fossil fuel energy supplies, and with energy exporting 
nations on its borders, the US can be deemed to be energy secure. As a rich nation with a 
highly diversified economy and relatively small net exports of fossil fuels, it also has 
little reliance upon energy export revenues; a dependence completely nullified by its 
possession of the global reserve currency.  The US was becoming more energy insecure 
after its domestic oil production peaked in 1970 while demand continued to increase, but 
this position has been reversed with the recent massive increases in domestic oil and gas 
production (and the increases in Canadian oil production). 
 With the exception of the three decades following the 1970 domestic oil 
production peak, the US has tended to utilize its domestic fossil fuel resources as a 
facilitator of foreign policy actions designed to produce insecurity in nations oppositional 
to what it has determined as its interests (and/or those of the US fossil fuel corporations). 
This was the case with the Japanese oil embargo in 1941, when the US was the dominant 
global oil producer. It has most recently been the same with respect to the sanctions 
against Venezuela and Iran that have had the side effect of reducing global oil production 
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at a time of US-induced global glut. Sanctions have also inhibited new oil and gas 
exploration with respect to Russia, as well as delaying that nation’s ability to sell more 
natural gas to Europe. 
4.3.2. Industrial Policy  
 
 As noted above, consistent and supportive US industrial policy has been glaringly 
absent from the field of low carbon energy, including the failure to maintain the wind 
energy industry in the 1980s and the solar power industry in the 2010s. There have been 
some limited attempts to support the nuclear industry, but these have not reversed the 
long-term decline of that industry. This decline, as well as the decline of the coal 
industry, is predominantly the result of the North American glut in natural gas stemming 
from the shale gas revolution; with some impact from the increases in wind and solar 
electricity generation. In the area of EVs, policy support has been very limited; with 
Tesla being the main result. Overall, the US EV industry is significantly behind that of 
China and is in danger of falling behind a newly EV-focused Europe. 
 As can be seen in the table below, the growth rate of US energy supplied by wind 
turbines has declined significantly, from over 20% to single digits. The same deceleration 
can be seen with respect to solar energy, more than halving from above 50% to 24%. This 
deceleration is occurring while wind and solar provide only 3.7% of US primary energy. 
Industry forecasts are for at best stabilization at the current growth rates, which would 
produce a doubling for wind in approximately 9 years (from 2.7% to 5.4% share) and for 
solar in about 3 years (from a 1% share to a 2% share); assuming no growth in overall 
energy usage. Even slow growth in energy usage could offset these increases, continuing 
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the trend of increased wind and solar output being combined with increased fossil fuel 
usage. 
Table 4 2: US Low Carbon Energy Sources 
     Mtoe      2007-17     2018                  2018 Cap. 
         Mill. Tons Oil Equiv.  Growth    Growth    Share        Growth        
Low Carbon Energy 361 n/a n/a 15.7% 11% 
- Nuclear 192 0% 0.3% 8.4% 0% 
- Hydro 65 2% -2.7% 2.8% 0% 
- Wind 63 22% 8% 2.7% 7.7% 
- Solar 22 53% 24% 1% 20% 
- Biomass, Geothermal 19 1.2% 1% 0.8% -1% 
Data from BP 2020 Statistical Review and IRENA Renewable Energy Statistics 2019 
4.4. Summary 
 
 From the above, it can be ascertained that the main domestic determinant of US 
foreign policy is the TNC orientation of the state, which includes a significant weighting 
of global fossil fuel and related corporations directly threatened by an energy transition. 
This orientation both blocks significant central state action to facilitate a low-carbon 
energy transition and creates a policy bias toward the opening of foreign markets and 
resources to US-based TNCs together with those of other nations. This predisposes the 
US state toward the maintenance of a dominant (certainly no longer hegemonic) position 
within the international community and the neoLIO that facilitates the operation of US 
(and other allied) TNCs across national economies, the privatization, marketization and 
commodification of societies, and the containment/destruction of nationalist and populist 
organizations. The is reinforced by the continuity of a strategic culture that views US 
global primacy as its sine qua non, supported by the view of an exceptionalist US as the 
Indispensible Nation tasked with bringing the civilizing Liberalism to the rest of the 
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world; The Shining City On A Hill must never rest until its light is felt by all across the 
globe. The general consistency of US foreign policy across administrations is evident: 
  
Over time the various policies employed to advance American interests have 
shown a remarkable continuity … The most effective of these doctrines has been 
the 'open door policy', conceived in the mid-nineteenth century and originally 
designed to ensure US access to (or rights in) China and Japan … And for a 
century and a half far beyond China and Japan, this doctrine has assured the 
USA's access to resources, markets, and investment  opportunities throughout the 
world … Another policy with a lengthy history is opposition to nationalist 
movements. (Rubenberg 1988, pp. 1471-1472) 
 
 even though … the Bush administration was widely unpopular … its policies 
 regarding NATO expansion, free trade, and a host of other programs aimed at 
 maintaining clients were for the most part continuations of what the Clinton 
 administration had done. (Sylvan & Majeski 2009, p. 245) 
 
 With an orientation toward economic growth and the expansion of the global 
reach of US-based TNCs, and the continued dominance of the neoLIO: 
 
The United States cannot disarm, significantly lower the defense budget, or relax 
economic warfare against commercial competitors, nor can the American 
businessman halt the restless, exploitative search for economic opportunity abroad 
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unless the economy is managed in a very different way ... as long as the American 
economic imperative is growth, the pressures toward economic expansion and 
military presence abroad will be irresistible. (Barnett 1971, referenced by 
Rubenberg 1988, p. 1471) 
 
 The tight alignment between US national cultural myths and the interests of US 
based TNCs may argue for a certain degree of cynicism with respect to the actual belief 
of strategic policy makers in these myths. Such cynicism can be seen, as with the 
observations of Huntington noted earlier, but this does not negate the reality of these 
shared beliefs within the US elite and strategic policy making circles. The challenge of 
China is not just to the material position of the US within the international system, but 
also to the Ontological Security of US elites as it provides a competing vision of 
modernism that challenges the universality of Western Liberalism and hundreds of years 
of Western (white) European supremacy (Jacques 2012).  
 
[They] cannot yet comprehend an order that encompasses on the basis of 
something approaching equality the broad mass of people – citizens – at home, let 
alone the non-western peoples of the global South, or even their elites. (Parmar 
2018)  
 
 The US state has also greatly increased its ability to conduct foreign policy 
relatively independent of domestic (i.e. non-TNC) concerns, in contrast to the impacts of 
popular isolationism in the period between the two world wars and the anti-Vietnam 
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activism, short of the need for a large-scale draft and inability to finance the cost of wars 
through debt (estimated at US$6.4 trillion just for the post 9/11 wars [Macias2019]). The 
extreme consolidation of the media, including the major Internet platforms, has also 
limited the avenues for dissenting voices to be heard; an issue which is greatest “when it 
comes to macro-oriented issues, such as US foreign, military, and international monetary 
policy” (Kennis 2015, p. 109). These factors substantially negate the ability of domestic 
oppositional forces, as was seen with the demonstrations against the Iraq War, to inhibit 
the decision-making process of the policy making elites. As Layne (2017) notes, as well 
as other realist scholars such as Mearsheimer, the resulting policy decisions may not be in 
the best interests of the US nation as a whole. The US strategic policy apparatus may be 
significantly misaligned with the raison d’etat; due to both short-term elite self-interest 
and an inability to alter a strategic culture at odds with a new geopolitical reality 
(especially after the hubris of the two decades straddling the end of the last century). This 
is different to the immediate post-war period, when what was good for General Motors 
could with some alignment with reality be said to be “good for America”. 
 This national dysfunctionality is exacerbated by the financialization of the 
economy, which advantages extractive behavior through the manipulation of corporate 
financial and control structures to benefit the few while providing costs to the many. A 
side effect of this extractive behavior has been a move away from costly basic technical 
research toward more immediate product-driven research; a move that may lead to a 
lower level of US-based technological advance going forward. Any movement to 
reinvigorate the US manufacturing base could significantly reduce the profitability of US 
TNCs given the cost differentials between onshore (i.e. US) and offshore locations, 
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producing major TNC resistance to any policies that would enforce such a change. What 
would be good for a GM that in 2019 sold more vehicles in China than in the US (Statista 
2020), may no longer be good for the US. 
 The interests of the many US fossil fuel, and fossil fuel dependent, large 
corporations will serve as a significant break to any move toward low carbon energy 
sources. This leaves the avenues of the capturing and storage of GHGs and direct 
attempts to reduce the global temperature through Solar Radiation Management. The 
dependence of the reserve currency status of the US$ upon the global purchases of oil in 
that currency may also limit any moves to pressure others to reduce oil consumption. 
 The Trump administration can be seen as a continuation of trends from previous 
administrations “these two sectors [finance and law firm/consultancy], which are  
generally trans-nationally oriented, make up more than 50 per cent of the total 
[administration positions], which is similar in all four post-cold war administrations” (van 
Apeldoorn & de Graaff 2019, p. 12). Notwithstanding this, there were some differences 
from previous administrations “the kind of firms to which Trump’s foreign-policy makers 
connect are on average smaller and include fewer large transnational corporations than 
the other administrations” (Ibid., p 13), and the financial sector representatives include a 
significant number of domestic real estate interests. This produced an inner policy circle 
with few linkages to the usual network of thinks tanks that have been “so central to top 
foreign-policy makers over the past decades across both Democratic and Republican 
administrations” (Ibid., p. 18). This partial break with the historically dominant 
institutions of US strategic planning represented somewhat of a more nationalist-oriented 
segment of US economic elites and provided a significant driver of the “establishment” 
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antagonism toward the Trump administration. Any differences can be seen as more in the 
form of tactics though, such as the best way to contain Iran, rather than a fundamental 
challenge to the US strategy of global pre-eminence. 
 Below the discoursal “smoke” there has been extensive bipartisanship with 
respect to such things as increases in defense and homeland security spending, the 
aggressive economic and political moves made against Venezuela, intensified sanctions 
upon Russia, and the attempts to force changes to the Chinese development state. In the 
latter case, a bi-partisan misperception of the Chinese capabilities resulting significantly 
from US arrogance has been apparent. A China that is well past the development stage of 
simply copying foreign technology may be substantially able to remove its dependence 
upon US technology. The Trump administration also continued and extended the Obama 
administration policies of focusing on economic and covert political and military actions, 
together with the use of air power, to reduce the costs and political and geopolitical 
fallout of foreign policy actions.  
 Some consciousness of the need to bolster US industrial capabilities can be seen, 
but contrary to the rhetoric little real policy action has been taken in this area. With the 
military strength that supports the neoLIO founded upon the financial and technological 
strength of the US, as well as its domestic social and political stability, there may be a 
limit of relative decline that TNC elites will accept. Such a viewpoint has been voiced by 
some sections of the elite with respect to their low levels of taxation and also concerns 
about the lack of self-sufficiency with respect to critical military technologies. Significant 
failures and shortcomings with respect to US military equipment and capabilities 
(Martynov 2019), such as the F35 aircraft (Broder 2015; Insinna 2019), the Littoral class 
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ships (Axe 2019), and the inability to get the weapons elevators working on a recently 
built aircraft carrier (Mizokami 2019), may help focus attention on US manufacturing 
capabilities. The significant recent failures of leading US technology corporations, such 
as Boeing with respect to the 737-Max and Intel with respect to the next generation of 
microchip technology, may also raise this awareness. There have also been concerns 
stressed by some US elites about the multi-decadal lack of income increases for the 
bottom 80% of the US population, and ever-widening income and wealth inequalities. A 
more “realistic” US elite may utilize such things as the eco-modernist “Green New Deal”, 
possibly stripped of its most progressive elements, on a bipartisan basis. The discourse of 
a new Cold War may also provide the discoursal cover for a much more active state 
driven development focus; one is reminded of the 1960s “race for the moon”. Combined 
with a foreign policy oriented more toward alliance building, this may reduce the speed at 
which the US geopolitical position is reduced relative to China. 
 The capability of the US policy elite, so used to operating from a position of 
overwhelming economic and geopolitical preeminence, to accurately ascertain the 
position of the US both domestically and within the current global system may be the 
determining factor for the future of the US and possibly the peaceful development of the 
international system as a whole. Without a large focus on the rebuilding of domestic 
economic, social and cultural strength, the policy alternatives available to the US to slow 
its relative decline will be more oriented to ones designed to interdict the further 
development of China. By their very nature, such policies risk a spiral of escalation – 
especially if the US is unable to accept a larger role for China within the international 
system. Such a reorientation will require a fundamental change in the US elites that have 
 240 
become used to providing less resources to the state and society through taxes and labor 
income, while extracting more value through increased economic rents and outright 
predation (Hudson 2015; Philippon 2019; Lazonick & Shin 2020). 
 A continuation of current trends would result in at best lukewarm policy support 
for climate change action and a transition to a low carbon energy system (especially after 
the closure of the aged coal electricity-generation fleet has exhausted itself). In the worst 
case, the perceived need to compete with a growing China will produce a “growth at all 
costs” mentality that will support further fossil fuel exploration and development – 
fulfilling Nyman’s (2018) pessimistic paradox between short term security optimization 
and the cost of longer term climate-change driven insecurity. 
4.5. Framework Insights In The US Study 
The current dynamic of the international system (what Cox refers to as the world 
order), places the US as the dominant power undergoing a possible challenge from China; 
the incumbent with a rational focus on limiting the rise of its challenger through increases 
in its own relative power and/or that of its coalition with respect to China and its 
coalition. In neorealist terms, the rise of China as a Great Power threatens US hegemony 
and requires a strategy of containment (as practiced with the Soviet bloc during the Cold 
War) and perhaps even inevitable military conflict.  
The analysis of the internal dynamics of the US provided for by the neoclassical 
realist approach of Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell directs us to significant internal 
dynamics that may affect foreign policy decisions. The political system is dominated by 
two political parties, the Republicans and Democrats, who differ very little in political 
worldview when compared to other Western democratic nations (the Democratic Party 
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would be on the right of the political spectrum in many other nations). In many cases they 
share the same corporate and rich individual political donors, in a system with few checks 
on the dominance of money in politics and subject to extensive corporate lobbying. In 
addition, there are no substantial limitations on the “revolving door” between state roles 
and positions in private industry, political lobbying and consultancy organizations; even 
between the military and the highly concentrated oligopolistic organizations from which 
it purchases equipment and services. Exacerbating this is the high degree of corporate 
concentration, producing oligopolies that multiply the power of their owners and senior 
executives (the vast majority of which are de facto owners through stock option grants); 
with further concentration provided by huge asset management firms such as Blackrock 
which holds over US$9 trillion in financial assets. Blackrock’s role in managing the 
Federal Reserve’s large scale purchasing of bonds as part of the 2020 COVID financial 
support activities, some of which overlap with Blackrock’s own portfolios, underlines the 
extremely close and possibly conflict-ridden relationship between the state and economic 
and financial elites. State-society relations are resultingly dominated by large 
corporations and rich individuals, with domestic policies heavily skewed toward their 
benefit (extensive deregulation, little regulatory resistance to corporate concentration, tax 
cuts, privatization, little or no state support to labour unions, and a general resistance to 
social programs that are prevalent in many other Western nations). In the past four 
decades this domestic policy orientation has greatly exacerbated income and wealth 
inequality, reversing the significant reduction of these in the post-WW2 “miracle” years. 
The strategic culture tends more toward the raison d'élite than the raison d'état, with the 
larger and internationalized concentrations of capital highly advantaged; with an Open-
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Door foreign policy that serves to open up other nations to the profit-making of large US 
corporations and rich investors. The neoliberal “Washington Consensus” of the US 
Treasury and US and Western dominated international financial institutions (IMF, World 
Bank, WTO) utilizes financial and economic levers to pressure other nations to remove 
capital controls and state support for domestic industries, deregulate, cut social spending 
and privatize significant segments of the state. A common sense that sees the US as an 
“exceptional” nation with a mission to bring liberal capitalist democracy to the world also 
supports overt and covert interference in the internal dynamics of other nations that 
require help to become truly “modern”. The view of the US as the “global policeman” 
(the sovereign that can act above the law to protect the “rules based international 
system”) also legitimizes such intervention. Within such a worldview, US actions that 
veer from liberal ideals are seen as either “mistakes” or unfortunate ones required with 
respect to “uncivilized” (as defined by the US strategic culture) nations which tend to be 
branded as dictatorships, authoritarian or lacking respect for universal human rights. Only 
with such a worldview can humanitarian interventions that violate other nation’s 
sovereignty be rationalized, and examples such as Libya be seen as unfortunate “failures” 
rather than instrumentally driven regime change operations. The obfuscation of 
underlying economic and financial motives by this ideology leads some foreign policy 
analysts to bemoan the “human rights” focus of the US, rather than seeing the interests of 
the US elites that underly the strategic culture. 
These insights provide for a very different view of US foreign policy from that of 
the neorealist school, a foreign policy directed at the protection and advancement of US 
corporate and investor interests in foreign nations – even if those interests may 
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undermine the welfare of significant segments of the US population or even national 
security (e.g. the offshoring of significant segments of US manufacturing, the facilitation 
of the rise of China). The US policy of global pre-eminence serves to remove the threat 
of competitor economic elites, back up pressure on individual nations to “open up” with 
overwhelming military (both overt and covert) force and to physically protect the 
sprawling activities of US-dominated global supply chains. The extreme aggression 
shown toward states with governments that do not support economic opening, or the 
“free” market in general, reflects the raison d'élite. The greatest challenge of nations such 
as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, Russia, and China to this elite is that they block 
attempts to open themselves up to the exploitation of US capital, as well as representing 
an example of a different path for both other nations and the US general populace. Six 
decades of economic and financial sanctions, and repeated attempts at regime change and 
leader assassinations, is the result for a Cuba that in no way can be conceived of as a 
threat to the US in neorealist terms after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. A strategy of pre-
eminence also directly benefits a heavily privatized US Military Industrial Complex that 
gains financially from both covert and overt aggression, with the oligopolistic military 
contractors being some of the most profitable US corporations. Of the over US$2 trillion 
spent on the 20-year occupation of Afghanistan (and the US$8 trillion spent on the post-
2001 wars) much went to boost the profits of military contractors, as well as the pre and 
post retirement careers of the military leadership; many of which retire into very lucrative 
positions in defence contractor and related organizations. The GWOT provided the means 
with which to reverse any possibility of a “peace dividend” after the fall of the Soviet 
bloc, and the US has increased its number of foreign bases rather than reduce them since 
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that fall. The continued stationing of 35,000 US military personnel in Germany, 12,000 in 
Italy and 10,000 in the UK when the threat of a Soviet bloc invasion evaporated decades 
ago is evidential of these dynamics. This, together with the expansion of NATO (against 
explicit promises made to the USSR President, Gorbachev, at the time of the 
reunification of Germany) to the borders of Russia, a major nuclear power second only to 
the US, tends to increase the possibility of conflict rather than reduce it. When viewed 
through a neorealist lens, such actions could be seen as actively reducing the security of 
the US given the lack of any real threat from a much diminished and defensive Russia. 
An understanding of the internal dynamics of the US, and its resultant strategies of the 
Open Door and global pre-eminence, provide some answers to this conundrum. 
This foreign policy orientation may significantly account for what may go down 
as one of the greatest errors of US foreign policy – the derogatory and aggressive stance 
toward post-Soviet Russia that has resulted in the increasing alignment of Russia with 
China. A Russia in the Western camp would have placed the West across the northern 
border of China, brought Central Asia under Western influence, removed Russian 
military support and technology from the Chinese, and greatly strengthened any Chinese 
energy embargo; what could be considered a “no brainer” perhaps in neorealist balancing 
terms. Instead, China is significantly strengthened by its symbiotic alliance with Russia; 
an alliance protected from the early efforts of President Trump for a rapprochement with 
Russia by the dominant elites, strategic decision-making institutions and a mainstream 
US media through the “Russia, Russia, Russia” propaganda blitz. In the 1990s it seemed 
as if Russia would become subservient to US and Western interests, with no need to treat 
it with diplomatic respect. This assumed inevitability was reversed by Putin and the 
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nationalist elements of the Russian capitalist and state classes. The US strategic culture 
seemed unable to accept this “loss” of Russia (with parallels with the “loss” of China in 
1949), responding with an unprecedented vilification of a leader of a major foreign power 
and the obviation of any possibility of reconciliation between the two powers. Any 
relationship with Russia other than a completely subservient one, with a Russian 
economy open to US profit making and exploitation, seems to be unacceptable to the US 
strategic culture. 
 Neoclassical realists also take into account the level of permissiveness of the 
international system. In an international system with an extremely low level of threat, as 
with the US immediately the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s, domestic political 
and economic dynamics may play a greater role in foreign policy as the international 
system is less constraining. This can be seen in the aggressive regime change actions 
taken by the US to force open the economies of other nations from the 1990s onwards; 
with military actions against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and “colour revolutions” fomented 
and/or supported in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and the Ukraine, and sanctions and outright 
support for opposition groups with respect to North Korea, Syria, Iran, Venezuela and 
Russia. With the resurgence of Russia, and the arrival of China as a great power, this 
level of permissiveness has already been significantly reduced, and may be completely 
removed in many areas of the world as the combination of Russia and China (as well as 
Iran) become more assertive in the international realm.  It could be said that the US 
strategic culture mistook a temporary period of permissiveness for a final liberal capitalist 
victory; leading to hubris and possibly an inability to accept the new emerging pluralistic 
reality that could lead to significant foreign policy errors. 
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Such an analytical picture does provide a relatively nuanced view of the present, 
and provides significant insights into future state policy making, but does not provide a 
vision of the historical processes that created the current US, nor their possible impact 
going forward. It also takes the present as a given, without problematizing its elements; 
how and why the present came into being may have significant exculpatory value with 
respect to how the future may progress. This is where the benefit of a historical 
materialist analysis comes into play. 
The US started as a series of British (and Dutch in the case of New Amsterdam) 
white settler colonies on the western seaboard of North America, both as business and 
religious extremist ventures, reflecting the hierarchical structures of the home country. 
The settlers considered it their God-given right to take the lands inhabited by the 
indigenous nations; including the extermination of those inhabitants if required. The first 
two centuries of conflict with these “heathen” Others helped create the conditions for the 
intensification of the indigenous genocide and the creation of a new “living space” (a 
genocidal project that Hitler drew many parallels with in his own quest for lebensraum) 
for white settler capitalism free of the constraints of the mother country. The mass 
utilization of African racialized slaves removed the threat of a combination of lower-class 
whites and others against the ruling elites while creating great concentrated wealth in the 
South and a huge market for the industries of the North. Independence replaced the 
authority of the British elite with that of the US elite, one that created a central state and a 
constitution designed to protect its interests within a nation created through “indigenous 
genocide, racialized slavery and hyper-capitalism” as Sjursen succinctly puts it (2021); 
allied with a belief in a civilizational exceptionalism buttressed with religious extremism 
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and chauvinism. The modern-day sense of terror of the not yet subjugated Others, which 
practice “aggression” against the US through their very existence, carries over from the 
centuries of genocidal clearance of the continental US of the uncivilized (i.e. non-white, 
non-liberal and non-Christian) Other. The terror of such others as “Muslim terrorists”, 
“Godless communists”, “Reds under the bed”, and “authoritarian leaders” has been 
invoked from the Philippine Moro War (“Indian country”) to Vietnam (“gooks”) to the 
“yellow peril” of Japan (both in WW2 and in the 1990s), the invasion of Iraq (“hajis”), 
and now the demonization of first Putin and now Xi (and the CCP). This is not just 
conscious propaganda but reflects a widely held worldview within the strategic culture – 
as evidenced by the statements of officials covered in the case study.  
The victories over Mexico and then Spain (adding militarist imperialism to US 
practices) reinforced these beliefs, and the fratricidal self-destruction of two world wars 
emanating from Europe further strengthened the view of the US as the saviour of Western 
civilization from a decadent and decaying Europe. The scale and resources of the nation, 
“from sea to sea”, when combined with the railway and the telegraph helped create huge 
oligopolistic corporations that dominated major sectors of the economy, together with 
concentrated financial capital. The combination of these with the power of a state and the 
courts dominated by the wealthy, together with mass immigration, overwhelmed any 
attempts at working class solidarity and the creation of the labour-based political parties 
seen in other Western nations. The resulting truly exceptional, but not in the ways 
promulgated by the US elites, nation was then provided with an overwhelming position in 
the world system through the three-decade self-destruction of the other great powers. A 
position gained with no military attacks upon the continental US, the homeland; the US 
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Civil War (1861-1865) being the only major US military action to occur on what is now 
US soil since the Mexican American war of 1846-1848. The relative ease of the US rise, 
without the invasions and widespread destruction suffered by both China and Russia, also 
serves to reinforce the common sense of US exceptionalism.  
Within this context the “post-war miracle” can be seen as a historical exception, 
as the New Deal compromise stemming from the Great Depression greatly reduced 
inequality among the white population and the US remained mostly unchallenged outside 
the cordon sanitaire that had been erected around the Communist bloc. After the 
economic and political crises of the 1960s and 1970s, the US elites drove a four decade 
reversal of the New Deal policies and the collapse of the Soviet bloc combined with the 
opening of China seemed to deliver a completion of the US civilizational project of 
making the world “safe” for liberal capitalist democracy (and US economic and financial 
exploitation). The “End of History” and a “permissive” international system that 
facilitated the US civilizational project on a global scale. Strategies such as offshore 
balancing were rejected in favour of the globalization of the hybrid capabilities of 
interference in other nation’s affairs that had been perfected in South America in the 
twentieth century, with all of the globe now seen as the US hemisphere. This has been 
given military representation by US military commands that encompass the globe – 
Africa Command, European Command, Central Command, Indo-Pacific Command, 
Northern Command, Southern Command and Strategic Command; with new commands 
recently added for the internet, “Cyber Command” and even space “Space Command”. 
Added to these are the US covert operations taking place within the majority of the 
nations upon the Earth. 
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The extensive privatization of state functions, the reduction of unions to near 
irrelevancy in the private sector and the gutting of the welfare state, the wholesale 
deregulation which included the removal of the New Deal limitations upon the financial 
sector, the repeated reductions in individual and corporate taxes, the oligopolization of 
major segments of the economy and the private capture of state regulatory and 
purchasing functions, have all served to increase the profitability of rentier activities that 
favour financial, market and political manipulation. Widespread rentier capitalism 
removes the discipline of both the market and state oversight, as well as moving 
resources away from core activities that do not offer rentier returns and continuously 
undermines good governance. An important insight from neoclassical realism is that 
although a given nation may have huge resources it is dependent upon the capacity of the 
state to mobilize those resources for the national interest. The US state’s ability to 
effectively mobilize resources is open to considerable question given the lack of increases 
(and possible significant decreases if the pre-1990 inflation calculations were used) in 
welfare for the majority of the citizenry over the past decades. Why should citizens give 
their lives to a state that they see as not operating in their best interests? This inability 
was evident during the occupation of Iraq, with the military doing everything possible to 
stave off the need for a general military draft. In addition, the repeated failures in military 
procurement (e.g. the F35 jet and the Littoral combat ship), the regulatory incompetence 
shown with respect to both the Boeing 737 crisis and the COVID response, and most 
recently the fiasco of the Afghanistan withdrawal, put into question the basic competency 
of the US state. The rentier orientation of the elites may also place parts of it at direct 
odds to important US foreign policy objectives, such as the nurturing of soft power. 
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Whilst China has been able to take significant advantage of “vaccine diplomacy”, the 
brazen rent-seeking behavior of the US pharmaceutical companies that was seemingly 
backed up by the US State Department can only have reduced the positive image of the 
US to other nations. 
In Cox’s terms, the US state/society complex is dominated by the capitalist elite 
class that has set itself the task of rendering all other state/society complexes into an 
idealized version of itself that opens up those complexes to US (as well as that of its 
Western junior allies) domination and exploitation. Over a number of centuries, capitalist 
class dominance and a limited role for the state (i.e. roles that do not benefit the capitalist 
class) have been integrated into the societal common sense as has also been the innate 
superiority of the US with respect to other nations and its right to interfere with the 
internal dynamics of those nations; liberal imperialism. The dialectical processes that 
have challenged this common sense have been repeatedly crushed with few exceptions, 
whether they be those provided by the indigenous population, labour unions, communists, 
small farmer organizations, the former slave population, anti-war protestors, or the recent 
Occupy Wall Street movement. The US elites and their co-opted state and judiciary have 
utilized widespread authoritarian and cooption measures many times in US history to 
restrain and defeat challenges to this common sense. These measures being the norm 
rather than the exception; the Red Scares after both world wars, COINTELPRO, the 
Espionage Act, the Homeland Security Act, the illegal domestic surveillance programs of 
the NSA, and mass incarceration being some examples. Ironically, the reversal of much 
of the New Deal by the capitalist elites, their even greater domination of state functions in 
the past four decades, together the removal of the competing state/society complex of the 
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Soviet bloc may have paradoxically led to an overemphasis on rentier activities and a 
level of arrogant self-deception that has degraded important capabilities; as noted above. 
The Amsterdam School, focusing on the nature and impact of the elites, captures 
the elite dominance of the US state/society complex well:  
In the case of the United States, its liberal capitalist political economy is 
characterized by a structure at the apex of which we find the oligarchic top 
segment of an autonomous capitalist class. The US political system is 
consequently structurally biased towards the interests of the corporate community, 
secured through persistently revolving door and through the so-called policy 
planning process. That process takes place primarily within think-tanks and 
foundations which are in turn closely interlocked with the corporate elite, 
generating a particular (pro-business) elite consensus and world-view that then 
feed into public policy-making. It is our argument that the close nexus of this 
corporate elite, and its predominantly globalist outlook, with the foreign policy-
making establishment helps to account for America’s overall foreign policy of the 
past decades, and will remain an important variable in determining future US 
strategy vis-à-vis China. (de Graaff & van Apeldoorn 2018, p. 116) 
The Amsterdam School also captures the ways in which the US elite has 
integrated other Western elites into their global project, and subordinated other 
comprador elites to serve its (and their own) interests rather than those of their own 
nations. These elite connections are fostered across business, educational, state and 
military realms – providing extremely flexible and powerful ways with which to 
undermine and overthrow governments that take actions against US interests; backed up 
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by US-allied NGOs and agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED). South America offers a great number of examples of the US utilization of such 
elites, through coups, the delegitimization of opposing governments, and general social, 
political and economic destabilization. 
China is not just a rising power threatening the interests of the United States, but 
also a nationalist Party-state dominated state/society complex that both resists domination 
by a capitalist class and serves as a competing state/society model to that of the US for 
other nations to follow; and perhaps the domestic US population itself. The Chinese 
challenge is not to the US nation as a whole but to the capitalist class that dominates the 
US. A class which is somewhat “trapped” by its own highly profitable labour-arbitrage 
and consumer market activities in China and Asia in general; “a loss of economic 
openness in Asia and the ability to maintain and control that openness on US terms—is 
what constitutes the greatest threat to US interests” (de Graaff & van Apeldoorn 2018, p. 
124). At the same time, the Otherness of the Chinese civilizational project is reinforced in 
the US strategic culture through the latter’s somewhat unconscious beliefs in racial 
superiority that are couched in cultural terms and Orientalist language. As Siu and Chun 
(2020) note, racialized tropes such as the “Yellow Peril”, accusations of Oriental 
economic and technological “cheating” and even assertions of the Chinese creation of 
COVID, have surfaced as China becomes a greater challenge to US dominance. 
The challenge is not just to the elite’s power and status, but also to its sense of 
self; its ontological security. This latter challenge has been shown in the US responses to 
the new assertiveness of both Russia and China, “the United States finds it extraordinarily 
difficult to accept [being on the receiving end of the type of lectures that it is used to 
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being the one to deliver]” (Mercouris 2021). The Coxian materialist understanding that 
ideas can significantly outlive the material and institutional realities that supported them 
may provide insight into a significant complication of US foreign policy, as its elites 
struggle to comprehend a world in which they need to accept the Other as their legitimate 
equal or even perhaps as their better. The resulting cognitive dissonance may lead to 
dangerous policy errors, as US elites seek to reject facts that threaten their sense of self 
and attack the perceived purveyors of those facts. 
The Amsterdam School allows for a heterogeneous capitalist elite, that may come 
together when overall class interests are involved but may also have conflicting interests. 
Within the US, the fossil fuel and related interests form a significant capitalist class 
fraction that greatly constrains US climate change policies within a bound of outright 
denial of the existential threat (under Presidents Bush and Trump) and a soft acceptance 
(under Presidents Clinton and Obama) that does not significantly hinder fossil fuel 
interests. Within such a constraint, no significant climate change-oriented policies should 
be expected outside the circumstances of a climate change emergency; even then policies 
would tend toward technology solutions such as Solar Radiation Management that could 
facilitate a slow move away from fossil fuels. The fossil fuel related grouping, together 
with domestic interests that are dependent upon the health of the US domestic economy – 
such as real estate development and resource extraction in general – were evident in 
coalition of elite forces that supported Trump; a very different coalition to the Open Door 
one that dominated foreign policy up to Trump’s election and strove mightily to nullify 
parts of his agenda that they did not agree with. With the election of President Biden, the 
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Open Door fraction has fully reasserted its dominance, and outright climate denial has 







Chapter 5: Russia Case Study 
 
“In his present mood, PM [Neville Chamberlain] says he will resign rather than sign 
alliance with Soviet” 
(Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, private diary entry, May 
20th, 1939, quoted in Kotkin 2017, p. 642) 
 
“Russia … a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” 
(Winston Churchill, October 1939, quoted in Mettan 2017, p. 176) 
 
“The Russian bear has always been eager to stick his paw in Latin American waters … 
Now we’ve got him in a trap, let’s take his leg off right up to his testicles. On second 
thought, let’s take off his testicles, too.” 
(Air Force General Curtis LeMay’s advice to President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 
quoted in Joshua Rothman, Waiting For World War III, The New Yorker Oct. 16th, 2012) 
 
“The historical practices of the Russians, who are typically, almost genetically, driven to 
coopt … penetrate … gain favor … typical Russian technique” 
(James Clapper, Former US Director of National Intelligence 2010-2017: interviewed on NBC News Meet 
The Press May 28th 2017) 
 
 
 In the West, Russia has been caricatured as a dark and dangerous presence for 
centuries, irrespective of its internal political economic configuration and its actual 
foreign policy orientation. Mettan (2017) exhumes the history of this caricature, seeing its 
roots in the Great Schism of the Christian church in the 11th century: 
 
religious confrontation [between the Eastern and Western Christian churches] has 
lost nothing of its virulence and continues even now to impregnate the minds with 
the same anti-Orthodox and anti-Russian prejudices as in 1054, even if they now 
hide behind other terms and other arguments. (Ibid., p. 135) 
 
The Mongol invasion of Europe in the 13th century can only have increased the 
fear of an unknowable terror lurking in the east. Mettan also sees the base of the trope of 
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Russian expansionism and despotism in the period of the European Enlightenment in the 
18th century: 
 
The myth of Russian expansionism was born under Louis XIV with the 
fabrication of Peter the Great’s fake will, written with the aid of Polish aristocrats. 
The myth of oriental despotism took shape in Enlightenment times, with 
Montesquieu, the later Diderot, and the liberal intellectuals of Restoration, Guizot 
and Tocqueville in particular. (Ibid., p. 137) 
 
 This period is also seen by Wolff as one of geographical ontological change, as 
Europe became defined more though its alignment to the east and west, than through its 
alignment to the north and south, creating an Eastern European Other to the Western 
European enlightened civilizational project: 
 
The invention of Eastern Europe was an event in intellectual history that occurred 
as the Enlightenment invested an overwhelming significance in the alignment of 
Europe according to the east and west, while, correlatively, reducing and revising 
the significance of the Renaissance alignment according to north and south. 
Eastern Europe, on the map, came to exist in the analytical eye of the enlightened 
beholder. (Wolff 1994, p. 357) 
 
For the United Kingdom, the caricaturing of Russia arrived in the 19th century, 
after centuries of good relations, as the Russian defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Armée both 
elevated Russian power and removed much of the French threat which was finally 
extinguished at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Following a strategy of offshore 
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balancing, it made sense for the British to reconsider who they defined as their enemy 
and their friend. It is notable that the UK and France allied together in the later Crimean 
War (1853-1856) against Russia: 
 
Russophobia is a paradox in the history of Great Britain. Within the United 
Kingdom there developed early in the nineteenth century an antipathy toward 
Russia, which soon became the most pronounced and enduring element in the 
national outlook on the world abroad. The contradictory sequel of nearly three 
centuries of consistently friendly relations, this hostility found expression in the 
Crimean War. (John Howes Gleason, quoted in Mettan 2017, p. 178) 
 
 The underlying antipathy toward Russia was intensified with the Bolshevik 
Revolution, as communism provided an ideological threat to liberal capitalism. For a 
short while after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this antipathy was replaced with a 
patronizing Western stance of being the liberal capitalist teacher to the Russian student. 
The reassertion of Russian nationalism and self-determination then resurfaced the 
caricature. As James Brown notes, the current Western view of Russia is a “Stereotype, 
Wrapped in a Cliché, Inside a Caricature” (quoted in Mettan 2017, p. 176). Such 
misrepresentations are voiced in the quotes at the beginning of this chapter, resulting in 
actions that may be seen as against a nation’s own self-interest (in the case of 
Chamberlain) or against the interest of humanity as a whole (in the case of LeMay), and 
even producing what could be seen as paranoid delusions in a man who was the US 
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Director of National Intelligence for seven years (Clapper). The analysis below will strive 
to cast aside such caricatures and see Russia as it really is. 
In this chapter I will first describe the historical development of Russia and how 
the nature of that development affected both the state/society complex, and the long-term 
determinants of the strategic culture of the policy-making elites. I will show that Russia 
had been an expansionary state for a number of centuries prior to the late 19th century, 
when it fell behind economically and militarily with respect to other nations (e.g. Britain 
and France in the Crimean War and Japan in the Russo-Japanese War [1904-1905]), and 
has since followed a predominantly defensive posture – both in the shape of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and as the more recent Russian Federation. In the past 
century, the nature of Russian society has progressed through two convulsive periods, the 
transition to communism after the end of the Civil War in 1922 and the transition to a 
deeply flawed capitalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. I will then 
utilize these insights to assess current energy-related policies in the context of major 
power competition. In the final piece of this chapter I will summarize the current Russian 
configuration with respect to the possible paths open to the nation. 
5.1. Historical Positioning 
  
5.1.1. Ryurikid Dynasty (862-1598) 
 
 
 A founding myth is that the Slavic tribes of what was to become Russia invited a 
Viking (the Rus’) prince to rule over them, as they were unable to effectively govern 
themselves, “Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come rule and reign 
over us” (Galeotti 2020, p. 14). This is a lovely story “however, the evidence that he was 
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invited in seems, alas, distinctly lacking” (Ibid., p. 15), but “it does reflect the fact that 
Scandinavian Vikings, called Rus’ were present in the territories of the eastern Slav and 
Finnic tribes by the ninth century and that they eventually became rulers or princes over 
the native population” (Martin 2007, p. 2). It is probable that a Ryurik did establish a fort 
at Ladoga, east of present-day Saint Petersburg, at about this time. He then established 
the city that became Novgorod, about 125 km to the south. Ryurik’s successor, Oleg 
(879-912) then took the lands around Kiev from two other Rus’ leaders, creating the 
lands of the Rus’ with Kiev as its capital (the Kievan Rus’) and he as the Grand Prince of 
Kiev. After his death the Kievan Rus’ were ruled by Igor 1 (912-945), then Olga (Igor’s 
wife who acted as regent due to her sons’ young ages: 945-959) who was later sainted 
for her work to spread Christianity within Russia, then her son Sviatoslav 1 (959-972); 
the latter’s death lead to a fratricidal contest between his three sons. The eldest, 
Yaropolk (972-980) killed the middle brother, but then was killed by the youngest 
brother – who became Vladimir the Great (980-1015). The problem of contested 
succession was to dog the Rus’ until the time of the Romanovs, the Soviet Union after 
the death of Lenin, and may possibly become an issue after the time of Putin; a threat 
that Putin himself has repeatedly striven to delay. Vladimir the Great both expanded his 
territories and forced his lords and subjects to convert to Christianity. This latter act 
provided a highly beneficial alliance with Byzantium and the state-church combination 
that was only interrupted by communist rule in the twentieth century; a combination 
resurrected by Putin. 
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 With the death of Vladimir, another bloody dispute for the crown broke out 
between his sons that lasted for nine years, ending in the division of the territory 
between the brothers Mstislav and Yaroslavl (1024-1036) and the reunification under 
Yaroslavl (1036-1054) after the other brother’s death. The sprawling lands of the Rus’ 
were governed in a distributed fashion, with the sons and trusted acolytes of the Grand 
Prince being assigned to govern, and sometimes rotated between, specific areas. With 
repeatedly conflicted successions, and individual principalities growing in strength, the 
lands were beset by fratricidal succession wars and increasing fragmentation. 
Competitors on all sides surrounded the lands of the Rus’, with the Vikings to the North, 
the aggressive roaming tribes of Pechenegs (who seized Kiev in 1036) and Polovtsy to 
the East and South, and new challengers such as the Poles to the West. The result was 
ongoing conflict with other states, and the involvement of those states in the internal 
politics of the Rus’; including marriage alliances between Rus’ and foreign elites. The 
Polovtsy, who repeatedly penetrated Rus’ defences and roamed across the Rus’ interior, 
provided the greatest challenges. “The conference at Lyubech in 1097 was a direct 
response to the crisis generated by the Polovtsy attacks and the failure of the [internal 
political system] … [which] proved to be inadequate to withstand the power of the 
Polovtsy” (Martin 2007, p. 59). This conference made governance positions inherited 
within bloodlines and set inheritance rules; establishing a feudal structure with Kiev at 
its center. The improved cooperation and coordination that resulted was reflected in 
successful campaigns against the Polovtsy that removed them as a threat to the 
southern border. President Putin raised the memory of the Pechenegs and Polovtsy 
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when he compared the challenge of COVID-19 to their challenges to Russia (Shevchenko 
2020). 
 During the 1125-1237 period, “the number of principalities within [the Kievan 
Rus’] and the relative power among them was continually changing” due to dynastic 
competition and conflict, “but these trends neither destroyed the integrity of the Kievan 
Rus’ nor undermined the role of Kiev as its real and symbolic center” (Martin 2007, 
p.105). At the end of this period, far to the east the Mongol conquest of northern China 
was being completed; the Mongol attention now turned to the west, to the land of the 
Rus’. The first encounter was at the battle of the Kalka River in 1223, with the Mongol 
advanced guard crushing the Rus’ army. Four years later came the main invasion force, 
which swept aside any resistance from 1237-1240. The destruction of those that did not 
surrender was typified by the destruction of Riazan captured in the Tale of the 
Destruction of Riazan by Batu, “the Mongols ‘burned this holy city with all its beauty and 
wealth … And churches of God were destroyed and much blood was spilled on the holy 
altars. And not one man remained alive in the city. All were dead … And there was not 
even anyone to mourn the dead’” (Martin 2007, p. 153). The 50,000 strong population 
of Kiev was also nearly completely wiped out (Galeotti 2020); Novgorod sued for peace, 
therefore escaping such destruction. For more than two centuries, the land of the Rus’ 
would fall under the Mongol Yoke.  
 The Mongol Golden Horde (the western portion of the Mongol Empire) 
established its own capital to the East of the Rus’ and required obedience and tribute 
from the conquered lands; in a structure reminiscent of the later Chinese Tribute 
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system. It is during this period that the previously smaller town of Moscow flourished, 
especially from the 14th century onwards as its Ryurikid rulers proved able quislings that 
were highly adept at using Mongol power and politics to consolidate their own position. 
For example, Prince Ivan (1325-1341) led a Mongol army to suppress an uprising in the 
competing principality of Tver. He also solved the succession issue by instituting the rule 
of primogeniture, full succession by the eldest son. With continued expansion and 
increasing wealth, Moscow started to push back against a fading Golden Horde that was 
impacted by the Black Death, the disruption of the Silk Road trade route by the 
overthrow of the Mongols in China and by the Ming and Turkish advances, and internal 
Mongol conflict. Dmitry (1359-1389) fought and defeated Tver against the Mongol ruler 
Mamai’s wishes, and then routed a Mongol army at the Battle of Kulikovo (1380). 
Although Kulikovo is seen as a monument to Russian nationalism, and in 1988 the 
Russian Orthodox Church sainted Dmitry, it would take another hundred years to end 
Mongol rule; Moscow being sacked and once more subjugated only two years after 
Kulikovo. During this century, Moscow continued to consolidate its position with a 
“Gathering of the Russian Lands” (Galeotti 2020, p. 42).  
 Ivan III (“the Great”, 1462-1505) brought Novgorod under the rule of Moscow in 
1478, fended off the Mongols at the Great Stand on the Ugra River in 1480, and 
expanded to the west at the expense of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. With the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, Moscow became the center of an Orthodox Christian Church 
that was fully supported by, and supportive of, the Muscovite rulers. Power was 
increasingly centralized within the Grand Prince, supported by a new legal code, the 
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Sudebnik; a process of centralization continued by Ivan the Great’s successor, Vasily III 
(1505-1533). With his death, the three-year-old Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) ascended to the 
throne, with firstly his mother and then the squabbling Boyar families holding the 
regency. In 1547 he was crowned Tsar of All the Russias, a move toward autocratic rule 
rather than that of “first among equals”. He built the basic structures of the Russian 
state bureaucracy and formalized the relations between church and state. He also set up 
a salaried army answerable directly to the Tsar, rather than the nobility, which was used 
to conquer the Khanate of Kazan (1552) and the Astrakahn Khanate (1556) – massively 
expanding Russia’s territory to the south and east; with an ongoing expansion into 
Siberia providing further expansion. The indecisive Livonian War (1558-1583) with 
Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania and Poland followed. In parallel to this in 1572 the 
remaining Khanate of Crimea nearly sacked Moscow before being turned back. At the 
same time, Ivan had launched a paranoid time of terror within the nation – which 
included “a month long orgy of massacre and rape in Novgorod in 1570” (Galeotti 2020, 
p. 56), the torture and execution of numerous perceived internal enemies, and the 
death of Ivan’s son at his own hands. This mixture of genius and paranoia would revisit 
Russia centuries later during the rule of Stalin. At Ivan’s death in 1584 a socially and 
economically devastated Russia was handed over to his incompetent young son Fyodor 
(rather than the competent elder son that he had murdered). Power was contested 
between the rival families, and when Fyodor died childless in 1598 the Ryurikid dynasty 
died with him.  
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5.1.2. Godunov, Time of Troubles and the Romanov Dynasty (1598-1917) 
 
 
 In 1598, Godunov seized power (1598-1605) and became the first non-Ryurikid 
Tsar. He was succeeded by his 16-year old son Fyodor II, but Fyodor was murdered after 
only being in power for 2 months. Following the murder of Fyodor came the Time of 
Troubles (1605-1613) during which there were two False Dmitry imposters 
(impersonating the elder son that Ivan the Terrible had murdered), palace coups, 
rebellions, and foreign interference and occupation. The Polish manipulated internal 
Russian politics, and then later invaded and occupied Moscow, with King Sigismund III of 
Poland seizing the Russian throne. A Russian revolt forced the Poles out of Moscow in 
1612. 
 In 1613 the elite of Russia offered the Tsardom to the sixteen year old high 
ranking aristocrat Mikhail Romanov (he was the son of the Patriarch of Moscow, who 
became the de facto ruler of Russia upon his release from Polish imprisonment in 1619), 
after several other options had been exhausted; this began the Romanov dynasty that 
would last until the Bolshevik Revolution three centuries later. Over the next century 
Kiev was retaken, access to the Gulf of Finland gained (including the site of what is now 
Saint Petersburg), the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan once again defeated, and the 
Khanate of Siberia defeated – creating a sprawling multiethnic state. Under the rule of 
Peter the Great (1682-1725) the Great Northern War (1700-1721) with the Swedish 
Empire was initiated, stretching across western Russia, Poland and Denmark. The 
decisive Battle of Poltava of 1709, fought deep in the Ukraine, established Russia as a 
major European power. In 1721 Peter the Great was proclaimed Emperor of All the 
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Russias, an Empire that over the next century would expand to the approximate 
geography of the post-WW2 Soviet Union. Peter changed the basis of the political 
hierarchy from that of birth to that of merit and service to the Emperor; depriving the 
Boyar nobles of their inherited seniority and therefore reducing their political power. In 
addition, he abolished the Duma and concentrated power in a ten-member Senate that 
more reliably served him, together with formally subordinating the Russian Orthodox 
Church to the Russian state. These changes reinforced the position of the Tsar as an 
absolutist monarch in command of an autocratic state bureaucracy; a position that would 
remain largely unchanged until the reestablishment of the Duma in 1905. He also 
modernized the Russian army and state functions, as well as carrying out many reforms 
aimed at Westernizing Russian culture and producing a modern industrial economic 
sector. Catherine the Great (1762 to 1796) extended the territories of Russia to the Black 
Sea and into the Caucasus, and into Europe through the annexation of the much of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (with the rest being partitioned between Prussia and 
the Habsburg Empire). During her reign, the elites adopted many aspects of Western 
European culture and philosophy. Alexander I (1801-1825) then continued by taking over 
Finland in 1809, Bessarabia in 1812, and expanding further into the Caucasus. Russian 
power reached its apogee under Alexander I with the defeat and destruction of 
Napoleon’s invading Grand Armee of nearly 700,000 men in 1812 (Napoleon only had a 
significantly outnumbered 73,000 men at Waterloo), which included the Fire of Moscow 
that destroyed much of the city. 
 The coronation of Nicholas I (1825-1855) was marred by the Decembrist Revolt 
of thousands of liberal minded army officers and citizens, demonstrating for a more 
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representative form of government, that was quickly crushed by the army. The inability 
to move toward the kind of constitutional monarchy established through the British 
Glorious Revolution (1688-1689) and by the Unification of Germany (1871), or the 
federal republic established in the US in 1776 and the re-established republic in France in 
1870, became a fundamental issue as Russia attempted to join the industrial revolution 
later in the century. Nicholas’ reign would be known for political repression backed by 
extensive censorship and a huge network of spies and informers; a modus operandi later 
taken up by Stalin. Regional autonomy was also substantially reduced, as power was 
further centralized.  
 Despite large expenditures lavished upon the military during the reign of Nicholas 
I, the crushing defeat in the Crimean War (a misnomer for a war that stretched “from the 
Balkans to Jerusalem, from Constantinople to the Caucasus” [Figes 2011, Intro., para. 
10], better known as the Eastern War in Russia) of 1853-1856 at the hands of the 
Ottomans and their allies Britain and France exposed Russia’s relative military, 
bureaucratic and industrial backwardness. Nicholas had miscalculated that the Christian 
nations would not support the crumbling Muslim Ottoman Empire. Instead, the European 
nations saw both the need to stop an expansionary Russia from becoming a more 
dominant power, and the opportunity to increase their own interests in the Ottoman 
Empire. The conflict was also seen as  “a crusade for the defence of liberty and European 
civilization against the barbaric and despotic menace of Russia, whose aggressive 
expansionism represented a real threat, not just to the West but to the whole of 
Christendom”  (Ibid.); sentiments that have stretched from the time of Russia’s alignment 
with Byzantium to the present day (Bailey 2020; Cohen 2019, 2019a; Tsygankov 2019; 
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Mettan 2017; Taras 2014; Tsygankov 2009; Foglesong 2007; Foglesong & Hahn 2002; 
Gleason 1950). Nineteenth century French writers that argued that an “Asiatic Russia was 
to follow in the hoofprints of the hordes of Gengis Khan” (McNally 1958, p. 188) would 
have felt at home watching “Red Dawn” (Feitshans, Beckerman & Beckerman 1984) and 
be well employed in the current US media. Russia’s early destruction of the Ottoman 
fleet only served to increase the urgency of European concerns. Russia lost 
approximately half a million men in a trench-style warfare to be seen later in WW1 (the 
allies lost approximately 300,000), saw its Sevastopol naval base destroyed and was 
forced to cease naval operations in the Black Sea. 
 Nicholas’ successor, Alexander II (1855-1881), made efforts to instigate a much 
needed “revolution from above” to implement a state-led industrialization and to develop 
capitalist economic and social structures within Russia (Anievas 2014), including the 
abolition of serfdom and administrative and political reforms. Unfortunately, with his 
assassination in 1881 a much more reactionary and autocratic Alexander III came to 
power and ruled until 1894, during which time some of Alexander II’s reforms were 
reversed. The next Tsar, Nicholas II (1894-1917), only gave limited support to the 
required political reforms while overseeing an “ambitious programme of state-backed 
industrialization” aided by an alliance with France that “accelerated French investment, 
mainly in mining, metallurgy, and engineering, though much went also into banking, 
insurance, and commercial firms” (Smith 2017, p. 34). British investment also aided in 
the development of the oil industry, and there was significant domestic private sector 
industrial development. Notwithstanding the above, Russia still trailed significantly in 
industrialization with respect to the USA, Germany, Britain and France. 
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 By the turn of the century this industrialization had produced a concentrated urban 
proletariat that could act as a revolutionary force, especially when it was without formal, 
and legal forms of political expression; a deep industrial recession that had begun in 1899 
exacerbated proletarian restiveness. A politically conscious student population and 
emancipated peasants looking for greater control over their lives also represented forces 
for change that were without representation. It is important to note that “by 1903 peasants 
were already leasing almost half the land belonging to the landowning class and some 
had taken out loans from the Peasant Land Bank to buy noble land” (Smith 2017, p. 32) 
while “for any peasant, the nobleman … symbolized ‘them’, the privileged society from 
which they felt entirely excluded” (Smith 2017, p. 32). Increases in rural literacy may 
have also served to increase the understanding of being without political representation. 
The devastating defeat of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), a multi-year economic 
downturn after the growth at the end of the previous century, and the Bloody Sunday 
massacre of unarmed demonstrators (1905), helped spur the widespread revolt of the 
First Russian Revolution (1905) that forced the Tsar to accept the October Manifesto. 
This established the Duma as the central legislative body, elected under universal 
suffrage; a limited constitutional monarchy. 
 Nicholas II rapidly turned back to autocracy and repression though, taking steps 
to limit the power of the Duma and when the 1906 elections produced a left-wing 
political body, he dissolved it after only 73 days of existence. The Second Duma of 1907 
lasted only 103 days and was succeeded by the Third Duma (1907-1912) that was elected 
with much greater weight given to the votes of land and city property owners and was 
followed by the Fourth Duma (1912– 1917). The opening provided for a peaceful move 
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away from autocracy was rejected, producing the volatile political and social conditions 
with which Russia entered the First World War (1914-1918). 
 
Nicholas’ determination to maintain his divinely ordained position as all-powerful 
autocrat hardened in the face of the radicalism displayed by the first and second 
dumas … At the same time, the ebbing of the mass movements from summer 
1906 encouraged him to unleash the full might of state repression in order to 
suppress the insurgency. (Smith 2017, p. 61) 
 
 As Gatrell (2014, Intro., para. 17) notes “Nicholas II demonstrated a very 
impoverished understanding of the complex forces unleashed by the revolution”, and 
made no effort to remedy “the lack of institutional mechanisms to extend involvement in 
decision-making beyond a relatively narrow circle”; to the contrary, he actively resisted 
any attempts to implement such mechanisms. The repeated military failures against the 
German invasion, together with economic and social breakdown on the home front, 
greatly diminished the legitimacy of a Tsar who had taken personal control of the armed 
forces. Fundamentally, Russia had not completed the economic and social 
modernizations required to fight a multi-year industrialized war with the more advanced 
Germany: 
 
Backwardness was deeply entrenched and a constraint on the adaptability of the 
Russian economy. A dearth of skilled labour made it hard to achieve rapid 
increases in labour productivity in the short run. Industries of crucial significance 
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to modern war, such as chemicals and machine tools, remained weak. 
Backwardness implied difficulty in persuading subsistence farmers to apply 
themselves to the challenge of growing for non-farm consumption. It raised a 
question mark over the use of financial instruments to encourage the population to 
contribute to the war effort. (Gatrell 204, Intro., para. 15) 
 
 Nicholas’ legitimacy was further damaged by the influence of Rasputin on his 
German-born wife who ruled at home while he was at the front. Towards the end of 1916 
Russian society became increasingly unstable, with spiraling civilian food and fuel prices 
and bread riots, widespread strikes and an exhausted and dispirited conscripted peasant 
dominated military ridden by mass desertion, large-scale surrendering and enemy 
fraternization, self-wounding and criminal activities (Astashov 2019). With the military 
supporting the February Revolution of 1917, Nicholas II abdicated, and a provisional 
government dominated by aristocratic and capitalist interests was established. In parallel, 
the socialists set up a network of Soviets that vied for power in a socially chaotic period. 
For a while patriotic support for the war was renewed, but the positive response of the 
general population to the provisional government faded as it increasingly favored the 
interests of employers over workers. “As Trotsky wrote, their stance ‘cost the capitalists 
dear’” (Gatrell 2014, chap. 9, sub-sect. 4, para. 2) and increased the support for 
Bolshevism – seen as the only chance of safeguarding the workers’ revolution. The 
situation was resolved with the Bolshevik Revolution on October 25th, 1917 (in the Julian 
calendar), which saw the Bolsheviks led by Lenin overthrow the provisional government.  
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5.1.3 Civil War & New Economic Program (1917-1928) 
 
 
 Following the Bolshevik Revolution came a demeaning peace treaty with 
Germany that created a Polish state, took hegemony over the Baltic States, and separated 
Ukraine and a significant portion of Belarus from Russia. The Treaty of Versailles of 
1918 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 confirmed the creation of a Polish state. In 
addition, in December 1918 the Soviet government accepted the independence of 
Finland. The highly destructive Russian Civil War continued for four years from 1918 to 
1922 against the “White” counter revolutionaries and their European and US 
interventionist allies, and various independence movements (such as Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Belarus and the Ukraine). This included the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921), 
which resulted in large areas of western Belarus and Ukraine being placed under Polish 
rule with the Peace of Riga of 1921 that also recognized the independence of the Baltic 
States. Victory in the civil war delivered to the Bolsheviks a nation shattered by the 
German invasion, the brutal civil war itself, the war with Poland, and the brutality of the 
War Communism implemented by Lenin.  
 
The years between 1918 and 1922 witnessed a level of chaos, strife, and savagery 
that was unparalleled since Russia’s ‘Time of Troubles’ … It has been estimated 
that between May 1918 and the end of 1920 nearly 4.7 million members of the 
Red and White forces, partisan detachments, and nationalist armies died as a 
result of combat or disease, or simply disappeared. The population on Soviet 
territory (within 1926 borders) fell from its 1917 level by 7.1 million in 1920, by 
10.9 million in 1921, and by 12.7 million in early 1922. Up to 2.1 million of this 
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loss was due to emigration, but the overwhelming majority who died perished not 
in battle but as a result of the ravages of typhus, typhoid fever, cholera, smallpox, 
dysentery, hunger, and cold. (Smith 2017, p. 161) 
 
 The autocratic and repressive Bolshevik state that partly resulted from the 
exigencies of this period had much in common with the Tsarist state. The nation had 
passed from one autocracy to another, a continuation of the autocratic rule that had reined 
from the beginning of the Rus’. For the West, the Oriental Tsarist Other was exchanged 
for the Bolshevik Other – a “monster which seeks to devour civilized society and reduces 
mankind to the state of beasts” (US Secretary of State Lansing quoted in Carley 2014, p. 
17); a new incarnation of the wild and bestial Russian Bear was to be contained by the 
dutiful Bulldog, the Rooster and the majestic Eagle within a cordon sanitaire. The 1920 
Miracle on the Vistula that had saved Warsaw, and therefore Poland, from the Red Army 
and integration into the Soviet Union, had blocked direct Bolshevik access to Western 
Europe. The earlier failed German Revolution (1918-1919) had also reduced the 
possibility of any repeat of the Bolshevik Revolution across the continent. A US Red 
Scare and a French Peril Rouge were also utilized to crush any socialist forces that might 
catch the Bolshevik disease, as “The spirit of the Bolsheviki is lurking everywhere, and 
there is no more fertile soil than war weariness” (President Wilson quoted in Lascurettes 
2020, p. 150). The Zinoviev Letter (from the head of the Communist International to the 
British Communist Party directing the latter to engage in sedition), widely agreed now to 
have been a forgery, was also used in Britain to defeat the socialist Labour Party in the 
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1924 election. All of these actions underlined the antagonism of Western governments to 
Bolshevism. 
 The New Economic Policy (NEP) that was put in place in 1921 by Lenin allowed 
for a mixed economy reoriented toward the market and private business, in an attempt to 
recover from the devastation of the two wars and to quiet widespread unrest. In some 
ways it paralleled the approach taken decades later by Deng in China, a communist party 
overseeing a significantly liberalized economy. Unlike the post-WW1 Soviet Union 
though, China was aided by extensive trade and investments from the West and did not 
have to be concerned about future military conflict with the West. The heyday of the NEP 
was from 1924-1926, after which the Stalin-dominated group (Lenin had been seriously 
ill since 1922 and died in 1924) turned against it. The Soviet War Scare of 1927 (the 
Nationalists in China had split with the Communists, the British had cut off diplomatic 
relations to the Soviet Union, the Soviet minister to Poland was assassinated in Warsaw 
and France forced the recall of the Soviet ambassador [Sontag 1975, p. 70]) underlined 
the need for a rapid industrialization to make the USSR capable of fighting a war with 
one or more of the Western powers.  
 Without rapid industrialization the result of a major war with the West would 
most probably be a rerun of the WW1 - defeat. Great Britain, Italy and France had 
recognized the Soviet Union in 1924, but the other actions of these powers were 
interpreted as removing the possibility of them aiding in the development of the Soviet 
economy. Instead the USSR would have to rely upon domestic resources, “By the 
summer of 1927, however, it had become evident to Soviet spokesmen that the capitalist 
West would not be the source of badly needed credits; rather the West had shown its 
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hostility toward the Soviet Union and was viewed once again as a threat to the existence 
of the Soviet state” (Sontag 1975, p. 74). This was underlined by the lack of 
governmental recognition by a United States that was extremely antagonistic towards the 
Soviet communist party; in contrast to the immediate US recognition of the 1917 
Provisional Government. The period from 1917 until the inauguration of Roosevelt, who 
recognized the communist government, has been likened to a First Cold War (Davis & 
Trani 2002), “America had ‘quarantined’ Russia and asked others to do so as well. In 
March 1921, Hoover issued a statement that trade was limited by communism because 
credits could not be extended to a government that repudiated private property” (Davis & 
Trani 2002, p. 200). Such a policy of containment was reintroduced in the post-WW2 
years, representing continuity from this period – with much in common between 
President Wilson’s and George Kennan’s statements about the nature of the Bolshevik 
government; “in 1920 Wilson had come close to the conclusion that Kennan arrived at 
after World War II … If Russia were contained, the system would collapse under the 
weight of its own contradictions” (Davis & Trani 2002, p. 206). A food shortage that the 
communists believed was significantly due to the kulaks (more affluent peasants) 
hoarding food also undermined support for the NEP.  
 The above pointed toward the need to extract a much greater surplus from 
agriculture with which to carry out rapid industrialization. This would require the 
repression of any peasant resistance to that extraction, a resistance centered on the kulaks. 
Stalin utilized the War Scare to consolidate his power, and by the end of 1927 he had 
expelled his main rival Trotsky together with two other leading communists, Zinoviev 
and Kamenev from the Party.  
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5.1.4. The Communist USSR (1928 – 1988): Rapid Growth Followed by Stagnation 
 
 
 Stalin reversed the NEP in 1928 and central state planning and the forced 
collectivization of agriculture followed, “From the mid 1930s to Stalin’s death in 1953, 
the policies of forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, and centralized planning 
through a series of five-year plans held complete sway” (Keeran & Kenny 2010, chap. 2, 
para. 16). Reinforcing his position, in 1929 he removed his other possible rival, Bukharin, 
from the Politburo when the latter disagreed with the forced collectivization policy; Stalin 
had become a de facto communist Tsar. His two aims were to forcibly collectivize the 
peasantry to remove them as a threat to the revolution and to rapidly industrialize in order 
to meet the external threats. With respect to the latter, nothing was allowed to stand in the 
way of removing the nation’s backwardness: 
 
 To slacken the tempo would be to fall behind. And the backward get beaten. 
 We don’t want to be beaten … The history of old Russia consisted, among 
 other things, in her being ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness. She was 
  beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was 
  beaten by the Swedish feudal rulers … by the Polish-Lithuanian lords. She  
was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists … [and] by the Japanese barons. 
Everyone gave her a beating for her backwardness … They beat her because it 
was profitable and could be done with impunity … We have fallen behind  the 
advanced countries by 50 to 100 years. We must close the gap in ten years. Either 
we do or we will be crushed. (Stalin, quoted by Carley 2014, p. 352) 
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 The drive to industrialize was at first aided by good weather in 1930, concessions 
made to the peasants, and the Great Depression in the West; the latter made those nations 
much more open to their corporations accepting Soviet contracts. 
 
As other customers for large capital orders became scarce, Stalin shopped the 
great capitalist department store. Starting with the American companies Freyn 
Engineering and Arthur McKee … to import the new American wide-strip steel 
mills and heavy blooming mills with which to build brand new integrated steel 
plants … with the Ford Motor Company to build an  integrated mass-production 
facility … Caterpillar was engaged to re-equip facilities … to mass-produce 
tractors and harvesters … DuPont and Nitrogen Engineering to manufacture 
chemicals, nitric acid, and synthetic nitrogen, and Westvaco for chlorine … ball-
bearings technology from Sweden and Italy,  advanced plastics and aircraft from 
France, turbines and electrical technology from Britain. Virtually every contract 
would contain one turnkey installation – an entire plant from scratch to 
operations. (Kotkin 2017, p. 31-32) 
 
 The West was greatly aiding the development of a Soviet Union that it had only 
recently tried to strangle at birth, paralleling its later role with post-Mao China; “Tsarist 
Russia had produced almost no machine tools in 1914, the Soviet Union, in 1932, 
produced 20,000” (Kotkin 2017, p. 71). No such aid is forthcoming for Russia in the 
present, rather the opposite in the form of sanctions. The good luck would not continue. 
As collectivization and forced grain procurements were intensified, with one of its aims 
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the explicit destruction of the kulaks, drought visited the main growing areas; resulting in 
widespread famine, “in 1931, a cold spring followed by a summer drought – a fatal 
combination – struck the Kazakh steppes, Siberia, the Urals, the Volga, and Ukraine” 
(Kotkin 2017, p. 75). At the same time the Great Depression created deflation in 
commodity prices, the exports of which were paying for the foreign technologies critical 
to Soviet industrialization. The pace of industrialization would have to be significantly 
slowed, or the peasants would have to be sacrificed; Stalin chose to sacrifice the peasants. 
During the years of 1932 and 1933 it has been estimated that anywhere between 4.5 and 
10 million died from the direct and indirect effects of the famine, as Stalin refused to 
redirect resources to alleviate the suffering. The scale of the required repression was 
extensive, “Collectivization involved the arrest, internal deportation, or incarceration of 4 
to 5 million peasants, the effective enslavement of another 100 million” (Kotkin 2017, p. 
131).  
The higher death figures tend to be utilized by those that argue for a Holodomor 
(death by hunger), a purposefully produced famine to quell Ukrainian nationalism. Such 
claims are open to substantial academic debate, especially whether or not a conscious 
genocidal decision-making was present, and the higher death figures have not been 
confirmed by more recent academic access to Soviet-era records (Vallin, Meslé, Adamets 
& Pyrozhkov 2002; Himka 2008). The leading scholar of famine, Cormac O’Grada, 
states, with respect to theories of an intentionally ordered famine directed at the Ukraine: 
 
Recent specialist scholarship denies this, regarding the ‘years of hunger’ instead 
as the outcome of a political struggle between a ruthless regime, bent on 
 278 
industrialization at a breakneck speed, and an exploited and uncooperative 
peasantry. The recently released correspondence between Stalin and his right-
hand man, Party Secretary Lazar Kaganovich, shows no sign of a plan to single 
out the Ukraine; to the contrary, on August 11, 1932, Stalin … confided to 
Kaganovich his conviction that ‘we should be unstinting in providing money’ to 
the Ukraine, if only for fear that it might be lost to Moscow. (O’Grada 2009, p. 
236) 
 
Propaganda was also effectively mixed with repression to facilitate an extreme 
level of work intensification and exploitation, “Money was spent like water, men froze, 
hungered and suffered but the construction went on with a disregard for individuals and a 
mass heroism seldom paralleled in history” (Scott, quoted in Parenti 1997, p. 67). The 
strange mix of deprivation, persecution and optimistic propaganda is captured by Kotkin: 
 
Looked at soberly, Stalin’s anti-capitalist experiment resembled a vast camp of 
deliberately deprived workers, indentured farmers, and slave laborers toiling for 
the benefit of an unacknowledged elite. But the Soviet Union was a fairy tale. 
Unrelenting optimism spread alongside famine, arrests, deportations, executions, 
camps, censorship, sealed borders. (Kotkin 2017, p. 304) 
 
 It can be argued that Stalin made the right decision with respect to the raison 
d’etat, it was the forced industrialization that allowed the Soviet Union to withstand the 
later Nazi onslaught. With a good fall harvest in 1933, and the impacts of the crash 
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industrialization starting to be seen, the parallel collectivization and industrialization 
strategy could start to be seen as a success; especially when set against the depression 
within the capitalist realm. Unlike Mao in the early 1960s, Stalin had maintained his pre-
eminence while fully collectivizing agriculture and building the nation’s industrial might, 
“Stalin forced into being a socialist modernity, presiding over the creation of a mass-
production economy, a Soviet mass culture, an integrated society, and a mass politics, 
without private property” (Kotkin 2017, p. 296). 
 The dictatorship of Stalin, as with the Tsars, requires the analytical use of 
Mearsheimer’s first image, “within man”, in this case a single man; a man who 
“increasingly was alone. Not only had both of his wives died [the second one committing 
suicide], but now his closest friend [Kirov] was gone [murdered]”, his relations with his 
children had become strained, and “newer associates, Andreyev, Yezhov, and Zhdanov, 
were minions, not social peers, and he was not close to the unlettered Kaganovich or the 
stiff Molotov” (Kotkin 2017, p. 236). He had also been repeatedly challenged within the 
party over the previous few years and sat atop a communist state that was both alone and 
surrounded by those that had proven that they would conspire to destroy it. In such 
circumstances, paranoia may be functional, but it may also escalate beyond the functional 
level and exacerbate an already “demonic disposition” (Kotkin 2017, p. 303). The 
conspiratorial nature of Stalin’s rise within the Party, together with “Lenin’s purported 
[last] testament calling for his removal” (Kotkin 2017, p. 299), can only have supported a 
propensity to assume that others may be plotting against him. As the decade wore on 
Stalin became fixated on his former opponents, especially the exiled Trotsky (who was 
murdered in 1940 in Mexico), and the level of repression escalated to dizzying heights. 
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The previous peak in Soviet executions had been 20,201 in 1930; in 1937 and 1938 
combined there would be 681,692 (closer to 830,000 if other causes of death during 
detention are taken into account) out of a working age population of about 100 million 
(Kotkin 2017). This Great Terror was carried out in an environment of little real 
domestic political threat. The Terror spread to the officer corps, with the greatest impact 
at the most senior level. Nine out ten of the most senior commanders were executed, 
“among the highest rungs of 186 commanders of divisions, the carnage took 154, as well 
as 8 out of 9 admirals, 13 of the army’s 15 full generals, and 3 out of 5 marshals” (Kotkin 
2017, p. 378). A toll that both greatly reduced the military leadership quality and greatly 
reduced the possibility of candid feedback to Stalin, setting up the disaster of the first 
months of the German invasion. The state bureaucracy, military intelligence and 
industrial management were also seriously diminished. Just as with Mao and the Cultural 
Revolution, Stalin would come to recognize the need to rein in what he had started before 
it destroyed what he had created. If it was only the weaker members of the leadership of 
the Party that were not seen as threats and therefore survived, such as Khrushchev (see 
below), what was the impact upon the quality of Soviet decision making longer-term? 
Given the leadership tenure of this generation until the mid-1980s that quality may have 
been significantly diminished both by the negative-fitness survivor selection effects of 
the purges, and the psychological effects upon those survivors. In the Cultural Revolution 
Mao tended to banish those out of favor, but not eliminate them, allowing for the 
reconstitution of a functional elite after the worst years of the Cultural Revolution. 
 Only painstakingly slowly did Stalin recognize the menace of a rearmed Nazi 
Germany led by a Hitler who railed against the “Judeo-Bolshevik” menace. The 1936 
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Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, joined by Italy in 1937, threatened the 
Soviet Union with attack from both the East and the West. The German annexation of 
Austria and the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, and the victory of the German-backed 
Franco in Spain underlined the threat. Stalin also exacerbated the historic enmity of the 
Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Romania toward the Soviet Union, and there had been 
repeated discussions between Germany and Poland about the latter joining the Anti-
Comintern Pact; which would threaten a joint German-Polish invasion. After the British 
and French guarantees were given to Poland, the two nations opened talks with the Soviet 
Union, but the British firstly obfuscated with respect to the formal alliance proposed by 
the Soviets and then informed Germany that they would not enter into such an alliance 
with the Soviets (Kotkin 2017, p. 621 & 629). With a German invasion of Poland 
imminent, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23rd, 
1939, including shared protocols dividing up Poland and the Baltic States in the event of 
a German invasion. This resulted in the front line between the Germans and Soviets being 
moved many hundreds of miles farther away from Moscow than it would otherwise have 
been, while reclaiming lands taken by the Poles in the 1920 Polish-Soviet War and 
removing the threat of invasion from the Baltic States. Thoughts that Germany would 
become bogged down in the West after its invasion of the Low Countries and France in 
May 1940 were dashed by the rout of the British and French armies. Within a year 
German forces would be amassed on the Soviet border, with their attack on June 21st 
1941 aided by Stalin’s unwillingness to properly mobilize his forces in the face of 
widespread warnings of an imminent invasion. “Hitler’s plan to fool Stalin worked 
remarkably well, permitting near-total surprise … Though Barton Whaley lists eighty-
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four different warnings that should have alerted Moscow, Stalin refused to believe or act 
on any of them, in part because he did not want to take any action that might provoke 
Hitler” (Gompert, Binnendijk & Lin 2014, p. 85). 
 The Soviet victory over the Axis powers would cost over 20 million dead together 
with widespread devastation and capped three decades during which the USSR had faced 
two invasions by Germany, a brutal civil war that included the intervention of numerous 
Western nations, a major famine, and The Terror. After all of this, the Soviet Union was 
faced with an overwhelming superior and antagonistic US and its allies. The alliance to 
beat the Axis Powers quickly turned into a continuation of the Cold War that had been 
broken by the Roosevelt administration, with a President Truman (who succeeded 
Roosevelt in 1945) that had stated in the New York Times after hearing that Germany 
had invaded the USSR in 1941 “if we see that Germany is winning we ought to help 
Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as 
many as possible … Neither of them think anything of their pledged word” (quoted in 
Butler 2008, p. 324).  
 
the price of defeat in World War 1 was the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
which was designed to turn Eastern Europe and the westernmost parts of Russia 
into a German preserve through a system of satellite states and economic 
exploitation … the civil war that followed the October Revolution drew in foreign 
powers including Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States … in 1941 
invading Axis forces advanced six hundred miles into Soviet territory in four 
months on their whole front and were only checked after twelve months, by when 
their southern armies had advanced a thousand miles into the Soviet Union … in 
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1959 the U. S. Strategic Air Command had 1,750 bomber capable of nuclear 
strikes on the Soviet Union, which lacked an effective means of attacking the 
United States. (MccGwire 1991, p. 8) 
 
 This imbalance led to a massive redirection of economic resources toward the 
military, and away from the reconstruction and development of the civilian economy, in 
an attempt to address the disparity with the US and NATO. The 1949 consolidation of the 
French, English and US zones of occupation into a rejuvenating West Germany, that 
became a member of NATO in 1955, can have only added to Soviet concerns. The rift 
with China in the late 1950s also created a rival on the Soviet’s eastern border. Given the 
Marxist-Leninist assumption of existential conflict between communist and capitalist 
systems, supported by US behavior and statements that called for the destruction of the 
Soviet system, Soviet defense policy was directed toward not losing a war; losing meant 
the destruction of the communist system within the USSR.  
 The resulting defensive posture was reflected in the maintenance of the Eastern 
European buffer (including the previously belligerent Poland, Baltic states, and Western 
Ukraine), the focus on a Communism In One Country that seriously limited the Western 
European left wing, and acquiescence to the Western dominance in Italy and Greece 
(Kolko 1990); which in the latter case included the use of Allied troops to defeat a 
communist insurgency. This defensive posture also drove Soviet military doctrine, with 
the USSR in a constant state of catch up with the West. 
 
 As fast as they caught up or developed a counter in one area of military 
 technology, the United States would introduce a new weapons system that 
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 outflanked them … In the 1950s it was the United States that enunciated the 
 policy of devastating strikes upon the Soviet Union known as massive 
 retaliation; it was NATO … that declared that it had integrated its arsenals 
 and would use conventional or atomic weapons as appropriate. Soviet war 
 planners had to accept these and other constraints, and … they were strategy 
 takers, unlike the Germans in World War II who were strategy setters. 
 (MccGwire 1991, p. 16) 
 
 On March 5th 1953, Stalin died and with the aid of General Zhukov (the military 
hero of WW2) Khrushchev established his leadership; including the execution of Stalin’s 
head of state security, Beria. Three years later, Khrushchev delivered the Secret Speech 
(which was relatively widely circulated within the Party and Eastern Europe) that was a 
“devastating attack on Stalin” who was “guilty of ‘a grave abuse of power’” (Taubman 
2012, p. 271) while glossing over his own extensive involvement in The Terror and 
wartime mistakes. A process of de-Stalinization was carried out, that included the 
rehabilitation of about twenty million victims of Stalin’s terror (both alive and deceased), 
and the release of those still imprisoned. This process undermined the Polish and 
Hungarian regimes, leading to increasing unrest. In the former this was successfully met 
with reforms, but in the latter the Soviet leadership “were in over their heads” (Taubman 
2012, p. 300) and the crisis led to direct military intervention to crush the uprising. In 
July 1957 Khrushchev very narrowly survived an attempted putsch. During the 
Khrushchev era (1953-1964) there was a limited amount of economic liberalization, some 
of which was reversed during his tenure, together with some political decentralization.  
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 Khrushchev had attempted to ease Cold War tensions through many unilateral 
actions, such as “deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces … [pulling] troops out of 
Austria and Finland [and encouraging] reform in Eastern Europe” (Taubman 2012, p. 
399). Mirroring its response to the unilateral overtures provided by Gorbachev three 
decades later, the US “refused these overtures … made their acceptance subject to 
conditions he as a Communist considers impossible. We are in the process of rearming 
Germany and strengthening our bases surrounding Soviet territory … He has offered a 
European settlement based on the status quo while we engage in economic competition” 
(US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson quoted in Taubman 2012, p. 399). The 1960 
shooting down of a US U2 spy plane which had flown deep into Soviet air space served 
to poison the relationship between the two nations, and the failed 1961 US Bay of Pigs 
invasion of Cuba together with the start of the construction of the Berlin Wall (to stop the 
exodus of East Germans through West Berlin) increased the tensions. In response to the 
US attempted invasion, and the stationing of US nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, the 
Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba. The resulting 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
came close to triggering a nuclear war, with this visceral threat of mutual annihilation 
creating a somewhat less antagonistic relationship between the US and the USSR that 
facilitated the later détente at the end of the 1960s. The Brezhnev years (1964 to 1982) 
were ones of stability, rather than change, but with a greater focus on military spending 
and advanced technology and less on the production of consumer goods. 
 His leadership had started propitiously, with the “Brezhnev Thaw” that included a 
continuation of the loosening of media control that had occurred under Khrushchev, but 
with a less celebratory and more reflective tone; the media acting as a critical lens to 
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identify such things as entrenched bureaucracy and corruption. Such an official mandate 
did not sit well when it was directed at those within the power structure, and the latter’s 
sense of being under attack was exacerbated “particularly after the 1963 decision to end 
jamming of foreign radio stations” (Huxtable 2016, p. 32) and from the dissident 
samizdat publications. With political unrest in Eastern Europe – especially in, but not 
limited to, Czechoslovakia, the tension between the revolutionary possibilities of press 
freedom and the need for political stability came more to the fore. The thaw started to 
turn into a freeze from 1965 onwards “Gradually, deviation from established truths were 
considered dangerous; ‘liberal’ became a term of abuse” (Huxtable 2016, p. 34). By 1968 
Kosygin’s (the reformist Premier) general reformist path, which included a small 
liberalization of economic planning and management, had been defeated. An early very 
limited attempt at the later Perestroika and Glaznost had been snuffed out, with a repeat 
of the 1956 press crackdown that stemmed from many of the same concerns (which 
included the unrest in Hungary). 
 
 By 1974, the country had seen trials of prominent intellectuals, a crackdown 
 on suspect thought within the social sciences, and by September an 
 exhibition of ‘non-conformist’ artists in Izmailovskii Park, Moscow, was 
 literally crushed by the authorities, which gave it the name by which it is now 
 known: the “Bulldozer exhibition”. (Huxtable 2016, p. 21) 
 
  The Brezhnev era became “associated with conformity, pessimism, and stability” 
(Ibid.). At first to “grease” the central planning wheels and to meet some of the unmet 
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consumer needs, an illicit economy had developed during the Stalin years. This grew 
during the Khrushchev period, and accelerated under Brezhnev into a full-blown parallel 
economy that involved the widespread corruption of state and party officials, reaching to 
the very top (Keeran & Kenny 2010, ch. 3); “the top operators in the shadow economy 
were an indispensable part of Brezhnev’s power base – and some indeed were close 
family friends” (Crump 2014, p. 209) 
 Between 1928 and 1970, the USSR was the third fastest growing economy in the 
world. At the peak of the Soviet economy in 1975, the GDP per capita was higher than 
Mexico, Latin America, South Korea, Taiwan (Ricon 2016), and of course, a China that 
was as poor as Africa. Russian GDP per capita was also just below 40% that of the US, 
35% as late as the early 1980s, and did not start to fall rapidly with respect to the US until 
very late in that decade and after the start of the Gorbachev reforms (Ricon 2016). The 
USSR was self-sufficient in oil throughout the communist era. Prior to World War 2, the 
Baku region had been the center of the Russian oil industry. In the post-war period, the 
Ural and Volga regions, “proved to be a bonanza” (Yergin 2011, p. 496), with Soviet oil 
production doubling between 1955 and 1960. Baku production never met its pre-war 
levels, and the Ural and Volga regions peaked in 1975. The discovery of massive oil 
deposits in Siberia more than offset these declines, with oil production reaching a ten-
year plateau in 1980 at five times what it had been in 1960. With an increasing share of 
oil production being exported in the post-war period, the result was a substantial increase 
in Soviet foreign exchange revenues. This effect was accelerated by the sustained jump in 
oil prices after the first oil shock at the beginning of the 1970s, together with increases in 
natural gas exports. 
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 These foreign exchange revenues were used to purchase the goods that the Soviet 
economy did not provide – such as new technologies, consumer durables and food. The 
oil rent funded imports that filled the gaps in the heavy industry, and military industrial 
complex, focused Russian economy. “The unbelievably strong (and increasing since the 
1970s) dependence of the Soviet Union on, first of all, imports of wheat and a number of 
other categories of consumer and industrial goods, especially high-tech ones, became one 
of the plates in its armor” (Ermolaev 2017). The 1970s increase in oil prices only added 
to this “When oil prices increased (and they continuously increased between 1974 and 
1980), there was a temptation to boost imports even more” (Ermolaev 2017). The large 
increases in both oil and natural gas production also fuelled a domestic economy that was 
highly energy intensive, including personal fossil fuel consumption that was heavily 
subsidized (compared to international prices) by the state. In contrast to many Western 
nations, the USSR did not increase energy efficiency in response to the oil price jumps of 
the 1970s.  
 The collapse in oil prices in the 1980s hit a Soviet economy highly dependent 
upon fossil fuel foreign exchange earnings for meeting basic consumer needs. This can be 
seen as at least a contributing factor to the sense of crisis that led to Gorbachev’s attempts 
at reform and the later dissolution of the Soviet Union. The state had been able to delay 
necessary reforms due to the previously surging amounts of foreign exchange earnings, 
allowing the underlying problems to compound further. 
 
It seemed a cure for all problems . . . Do [we] really need to solve the food 
problem radically and quickly, when it’s so easy to buy tens of millions tons of 
grain, followed by huge amounts of meat, and other food products from America, 
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Canada and Western European nations? Do we really need to pull our 
construction industry out of the horrible underdevelopment, if we can just utilize 
Finnish, Yugoslavian or Swedish construction specialists to build or reconstruct 
important objects and import the scarcest materials and plumbing equipment from 
West Germany, and shoes and furniture from other places? Many of my 
colleagues and I, in the end of the 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s, were 
thinking that the West Siberian oil saved the  economy . . . then we started to come 
to the conclusion that this wealth had at the same time seriously undermined our 
economy; the due and overdue reforms were continuously postponed. (Arbatov 
quoted in Ermolaev 2017) 
 
 The Soviet Union was not well positioned for the changes required to remedy its 
lagging performance in economic growth and commercial technology (as against military 
and space technology) and its inability to provide for increasingly complex and 
heterogeneous consumer needs. This was made worse by the intensification of the 
corruption of the state and society, 
 
during the last three decades of the Soviet era, illegal economic activity 
penetrated into every sector and chink of the economy; assumed every 
conceivable shape and form; and operated on a scale ranging from minimal or 
modest for the mass to the substantial for the many, to the lavish and gigantic, as 
well as elaborately organized, for some … the shadow economy spread out, grew, 
and prospered – under Brezhnev (1964-82) thanks to benign neglect if not tacit 
encouragement. (Grossman 1998a, p. 31) 
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 Much of this activity involved stealing time and materials from the state; a 
precursor to the wholesale looting that took place from the late 1980s onwards. The rapid 
phase of Soviet growth, from the 1950s to the early 1970s had been based on an 
“extensive” growth model, utilizing greater and greater amounts of labor (freed from 
intensified agriculture), land and raw materials. With the end of the labor surplus 
provided by the intensification of agriculture, raw material depletion that required the 
development of the higher cost Siberian deposits that “swallowed up a large fraction of 
the investment budget for little increase in GDP” (Allen 2001, p. 876), and a heavy 
redirection of R&D activities from commercial to military uses, the growth rate fell from 
the early 1970s onwards. Allen (2001) also points to a redirection of investment from the 
building of more modern plants to the maintenance and upgrade of current plants, as 
further reducing the growth rate. The ecological degradation caused by the intensive 
utilization of marginal lands, exemplified by the depletion of the Aral Sea to grow cotton, 
may also have constrained agricultural productivity. As noted above, the availability of 
the large amounts of foreign exchange provided by the rapid rise in oil prices in the 1970s 
also provided policy options that did not require the underlying economic problems to be 
addressed.  
 The two premiers following a Brezhnev who suffered a serious decline in health 
in his last decade (dependent on tranquilizers and having suffered two strokes), an 
Andropov who suffered total kidney failure in early 1983 (1982-1984) and the terminally 
ill Chernenko (1984-1985), were not alive long enough to have any real reformist impact. 
With Brezhnev having greatly reduced the turnover of the nomenklatura the 
administration had become significantly geriatric, stifling the ability to develop new 
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talent and be open to new ideas. Even as late as 1984, the leadership considered that only 
incremental reform was required. 
 
 the Soviet leadership still believed that [a strong Soviet economy] could be 
 achieved by shaking off the stagnation of the late Brezhnev years and 
 following through on fairly simple reforms [which] would include speeding 
 up the shift from extensive to intensive development; improving the planning 
 of production, the allocation of resources, and the distribution of goods; 
 eliminating waste; and increasing the efficiency of managers and the 
 discipline of the workforce. (MccGwire 1991, p. 158) 
 
 At this point, the Soviet economy may have been capable of slow growth for a 
significant period and the ensuing collapse was not an inevitably. 
 
even though Soviet socialism had clearly lost the competition with the West, it 
was lethargically stable, and could have continued muddling on for quite some 
time. Or it might have tried a Realpolitik retrenchment, cutting back on 
superpower ambitions, legalizing and then institutionalizing market economics to 
revive its fortunes, and holding tightly to central power by using political 
repression. (Kotkin 2001, Intro., para. 2) 
 
 
 In 1985 Gorbachev became premier, with a mostly unreformed state planning 
system that had been significantly corrupted, and a growth model that could only produce 
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extremely slow levels of economic growth. In the first two years of the Gorbachev 
leadership (1985-87), a generally reformist stance was taken in an attempt to reduce 
corruption and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the communist system. Even a 
reformist stance threatened many in the nomenklatura and their lifestyles. In many ways 
the nomenklatura could be likened to a non-capitalist oligarchy, but with their lifestyles 
and ability to push forward their offspring wholly dependent upon the continuation of 
their positions within the Party; with the exception of the illegal wealth obtained through 
the extensive corruption. This is very different to a capitalist oligarchy that owns the 
wealth that supports their lifestyles and can pass that wealth from one generation to 
another. There were three main interest groups, each representing a “combination of 
monopolies, their suppliers and customers who greatly depended on their success, and 
their representatives in the top political cadres … the defense-industrial complex (OPK), 
agro-industrial complex (APK) and fuel-energy complex (TEK)” (Guriev 2019, p. 125). 
The ossification of the Soviet state and Party, and the human composition of the interest 
groups within it, was very different to the experience of China, where collectivization and 
central planning had only been in place since the late 1950s and the upheavals of the 
Cultural Revolution and its aftermath had produced instability, rather than stability, in the 




5.1.5. Accelerating Collapse (1988 to 1998) 
 
 
 From 1988 onwards Gorbachev followed much more radical and disruptive 
policies, which constituted a fundamental restructuring away from communism and 
toward private property and market-based solutions; it was from this period onwards that 
GDP peaked before starting an accelerating absolute decline. This can be seen as an 
attempt to outmaneuver the inertial elements within the Party, but unfortunately many 
members of the nomenklatura that resisted reform were also best placed to take 
advantage of a dismantling that provided them the opportunity to transform their 
positions within the hierarchy into private wealth.  
 No substantive attempt was made to purge the nomeklatura to reduce the power 
of vested interests, nor was there any attempt to drive through necessary but painful 
reforms such as limited price liberalization backed up with repression (as Deng ordered 
in 1989). The possibility of a coup in response to such actions, as had happened to 
Khrushchev, was always a possibility: 
 
These [defense, industry and energy] lobbies were interested in preserving the 
status quo. Even an omnipotent General Secretary of the Communist Party could 
not have crushed them. Miller … cites a conversation between Gorbachev and 
Gosplan’s head … showing their understanding that curbing the military budget 
would result in their “dismissal”. (Guriev 2019, p. 129) 
 
 In the face of reduced revenues due to lower oil prices and alcohol prohibition, 
the state utilized international borrowing to support social expenditures, increased 
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military expenditures and industrial subsidies. At the same time consumer prices were 
kept low in “order to pacify the general public” (Guriev 2019, p. 126). The state became 
severely weakened through increased indebtedness, with the monetization of those debts 
when combined with price controls creating a repressed inflation waiting for any freeing 
of prices. 
 The 1988 laws on cooperatives and leases allowed for the de facto creation of 
private enterprises able to hold private property; possibilities that the more powerful 
shadow economy elements were best placed to take advantage of. The liberalization of 
trade also facilitated easy profits for those with the right connections, as goods could be 
bought at the low domestic prices (or stripped from state enterprises) and sold at much 
higher international prices for hard currency. Gorbachev’s decision to keep domestic 
prices low aided the process of looting, as black markets flourished and created shortages 
at the official prices. The result was an increasingly powerful and diverse group, 
including many state actors, that had become wealthy through simple arbitrage and asset 
stripping (and significant violence) rather than through the creation of real wealth.  
 Caught between a rapidly diminishing and indebted state apparatus, and a 
“private” sector heavily focused on extracting rather than creating wealth, the economy 
faltered and the black-market inflation accelerated. At the same time, the opening of the 
media to direct criticisms of the state and Party, Glasnost, helped undermine the 
legitimacy of both (Remnick 1993); especially from 1987 onwards as the press became 
increasingly pro-market and anti-communist (Keeran & Kenny 2010). This further 
reduced the capacity of an already heavily disillusioned and corrupt state apparatus to 
enforce rules and commit to future plans – helping to stymie any possibility of any social 
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bargain based on the redistribution of the future benefits of reforms. The period from 
1989 to 1991 represented a period of accelerating collapse, with the dysfunction of the 
weakened, delegitimized and increasingly corrupt state sector added to by the profiteering 
of many in the legal and illegal private sector. The economy was neither capitalist nor 
communist, but a highly dysfunctional and corrupt combination of the two.  
 Adding to this were political changes that disrupted economic policymaking and 
coordination; such as the wholesale constitutional changes, increasing nationalism 
(especially in the Yelstin-led Russian Republic) and the independence of an increasing 
number of Eastern European communist-bloc nations; facilitated by Gorbachev’s stated 
policy of non-intervention and accelerated by the cessation of subsidized imports from 
the USSR. The removal of the previous Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet military intervention 
to defeat any challenge to Eastern European communist regimes may have been a gambit 
to galvanize such regimes into reformist efforts, but it backfired spectacularly as it 
facilitated the collapse of those regimes. The resulting disintegration of the Soviet Bloc 
then helped legitimize the possibility of the disintegration of the multinational Soviet 
Union while demoralizing the Soviet leadership – especially the unification of Germany 
on Western terms. As Gorbachev would later write, “I would be less than sincere if I said 
that I had foreseen the course of events and the problems that the German question would 
eventually create.” (Gorbachev quoted in Kotkin 2009, p. 218). Events and problems very 
personally experienced by a Vladimir Putin stationed in East Germany. Gorbachev lost 
control of the process that he had begun, and his own popularity among the Russian 
populace plummeted. The coup de grace was delivered by the failed communist counter-
revolutionary coup (the August Coup of 1991), and the resulting dissolution of the Soviet 
 296 
Union that resulted from the power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The 
suddenness of the dissolution severed complex supply chains and payment processes that 
straddled newly independent states and produced an unprepared Russian state that at its 
inception lacked such basic functions as tax collection and effective control over local 
power structures. Kennan’s warning over four decades earlier was shown to be prescient: 
 
If … anything is ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a 
political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the 
strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies. (“Mr. X” 
[George Kennan] 1947, quoted in Grossman 1998, p. 24) 
 
 Communism was only victorious in China in 1949, prior to which the economy 
has been predominantly market and private property based. With market relations still 
being tolerated by the CCP until the mid 1950’s, the period of non-market relations lasted 
for only two and a half decades before Deng’s reforms. In addition, China benefitted 
from capitalist enclaves such as Hong Kong, linkages with the capitalist Taiwan and a 
large entrepreneurial Chinese diaspora. It also had a substantially simpler political 
economy due to its significantly lower level of economic development, and under Deng 
the CCP had a highly competent and legitimate state bureaucracy with enforced staff 
rotations to reduce stasis and undermine the creation of interest groups. The East 
European Soviet-bloc nations had been mixed capitalist economies prior to their 
incorporation into the Soviet sphere of influence, with full collectivization not being 
implemented for many until the 1950’s. The economy of Hungary, the richest of the East 
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European nations, had never been fully collectivized or centrally planned and the state 
had “been experimenting with marketization since 1968” and “had already taken 
substantial steps down the path to capitalism” (Klaudt 1995). In addition, a significant 
Hungarian diaspora existed. East Germany was integrated directly into West Germany, 
with massive amounts of federal financial transfers to aid the transition period. 
Czechoslovakia had also started a process of limited liberalization in the mid 1960’s, 
prior to the Soviet invasion and the reinstatement of the Soviet economic model; this 
liberalization was restarted in the 1980’s. 
 From an Institutionalist perspective, of all the communist nations, Russia was 
perhaps one of the least prepared for a move to market relations, private property and 
democracy. This position was made worse by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as 
the production and financial linkages of the previous central planning system that crossed 
republican borders fell apart resulting in a collapse in trade between the newly 
independent nations. The new Russian state was extremely weak as at inception it 
“lacked many of the attributes conventionally associated with statehood. It had neither its 
own currency nor its own armed forces, it did not control its borders, and it was unable to 
perform such basic functions as tax collection” (Tompson 2002, p. 15). 
 Given the massive economic and social destabilization of the 1988-1991 period, 
exacerbated by the breakup of the Soviet Union and centrifugal forces within Russia 
itself, a period of consolidation and stabilization may have been sought. Instead of 
following the gradualist approach followed by China, and to some extent Hungary (Hall 
& Elliott 1999) a “shock therapy” of rapid change was prescribed by Western elites and 
advisors and adopted by the Russian state. It may have been the case that things had 
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deteriorated to such an extent that only a final move to capitalism was possible. A 
continuance of the status quo of a dysfunctional and deteriorating mix of a failing and 
corrupt state sector and a heavily crony and exploitative private sector was itself a recipe 
for ongoing collapse. What is without doubt is that the shock therapy accelerated the 
collapse. 
 The first case of shock therapy in Chile had been carried out by a strong effective 
state within a mixed capitalist economy – and even that had to be substantially reversed 
within less than a decade. The result of rapid deregulation, marketization, and 
privatization within a country with no history of predominant market relations and 
institutionalized private property rights, a heavy dependency upon a weakened and 
corrupted central planning system, and a crony and extractive capitalist sector, should 
have been predictable, “initial conditions matter much more than economists in Russia 
and the West who urged rapid reform believed” (Millar 1997, p. 360) and “market 
elements and private sector were far too poorly developed when economic reforms were 
introduced in contrast to Poland or Hungary, which have made the economic transition 
much more difficult and painful” (Gidadhubli 1994, p. 1179). Many of the changes were 
carried out virtually overnight. 
 
The January 1992 reforms freed 90% of retail prices overnight; most remaining 
prices followed in the ensuing months. Directives and legislation rapidly 
liberalized trade and exchange rates, cut the state budget (reducing  defense 
expenditures by 68%), curtailed subsidies, and established provisions for 
enterprise bankruptcy. (Gerber & Hout 1998, p. 4)  
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 The results were made worse by the previously suppressed inflation and loose 
monetary policy that helped turn inflation into hyperinflation, together with a lack of 
financial support from other nations. Russia was very significantly deindustrialized, mass 
unemployment and impoverishment was produced, and through extensive illicit primitive 
accumulation the major productive assets were concentrated within a few “oligarchic” 
hands, many of which were the previous “ruling elite in pursuit of its own perceived 
interests” (Kotz & Weir 1997). This was “insider privatization” that allowed the “large-
scale conversion of state property into private property by …  the former managers of 
state enterprises in connivance with the higher echelons of the bureaucrats and former 
party apparatchiks known as the 'nomenklatura’” (Gidadhubli & Mohanty 2002, p. 5000). 
Cohen (2001, p. 101) supports this view, noting “when ‘privatization’ of large-scale 
property began in 1993-1994, members of the former Soviet elite, the nomenklatura, 
were its main beneficiaries”. This process was greatly aided by ill-defined property rights 
that facilitated insider looting and the extremely rapid privatization of large swathes of 
the economy to the benefit of those with the right connections and financial resources.  
 
The plan to transfer ownership and governance of economic enterprises from the 
state into private hands was designed in 1992 and mostly implemented by June 
1994. By that time over 75% of small-scale enterprises were privatized through 
direct competitive bidding or lease buyouts. Another 49,000 medium- and large-
scale enterprises, forming 60% of industrial assets, had completed or were 
undergoing ‘mass’ privatization. (Ibid., p. 5).  
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 The process “was completed by the scandalous loans-for-shares deals of the mid-
1990s” (Tompson 2002, p. 18). This was very different to the Chinese approach where 
rather “than undertaking the massive, centralized privatization of State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the Chinese government permitted a variety of ownership forms, including firms 
collectively owned by local governments, foreign-invested firms and new private start-
ups” (Buck et. al. 2000, p. 381) and kept ownership of the SOEs that it considered to be 
in strategic economic sectors such as energy and weapons production, together with the 
banking system. 
 Russian GDP collapsed by 18% in 1992, followed by 12% and 15% in the next 
two years, plus another 4% in 1995 (Ibid.). As Millar noted in 1997 (p. 360): 
 
The main annual macroeconomic indicators, including GDP, industrial 
production, agricultural production and capital investment have been falling in 
Russia since 1989, and the best forecasts suggest that they will continue to fall at 
least through 1997, although perhaps at a slower rate. Inflation continues too, 
although at lower rates recently …  The main sectors of the  economy are mired in 
debt: the enterprises to each other, their employees and the budget, and the 
government owes enterprises and their employees substantial sums too. Some 
33.6 million persons are living below the official poverty line, many more than in 
1989. Plus those living on the verge of poverty, the total may consist of one-half 
of the total population at a minimum. Life expectancy at birth has declined from 
62 years for men and 74 for women in 1992 to 58 and 72, respectively, in 1996. 
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 The halving of international oil prices between 1996 and 1998 further worsened 
the economic position, and the state defaulted on its foreign debts in August of the latter 
year.  
 In 1993, Russia’s fledgling democracy had been “dealt a wounding, possibly fatal, 
blow” as President Yeltsin carried out a military-backed coup that terminated “Parliament 
and all other elements of rule-of-law government in Moscow” (Cohen 2001, p. 125); 
actions approved of by the US President, who stated “approvingly that ‘if such a thing 
happened in the United States’ he too would have taken ‘tough actions’” (Ibid.). The 
increasingly heavy influence of the oligarchs over the Russian state apparatus added to 
the diminution of democracy. It was further subverted in 1996, with Yeltsin only just 
beating the Communist Party for the Presidency through the extensive intervention of the 
oligarchs, a US-supplied political strategy team (Jones 2017) and a suspiciously timely 
IMF loan that “will help Mr. Yeltsin carry through on commitments to increase social 
spending and to pay back wages, both of which will be helpful to him in winning votes” 
as the New York Times (1996) noted at the time. The above was wholeheartedly 
supported by the US President, as he “and his top aides [went] far beyond the norm of 
international relations, becoming the cheerleader, accomplice, and spin doctor, and thus 
implicating America [sic] in some of [Yeltsin’s] most ill-advised and even wicked deeds” 
(Cohen 2001, p. 139). The US election meddling was very overt: 
 
 The Clinton administration went out of its way, certainly well beyond 
 propriety, to help Yeltsin win. It arranged a booster-summit meeting in 
 Moscow and a $10 billion IMF loan shortly before the election, justified the 
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 ongoing Chechen war by comparing it to the American [sic] Civil War and 
 Yeltsin to Lincoln, and sent U.S. campaign experts to serve as his advisors. 
 The American [sic] ambassador in Moscow … even tried to pressure Grigory 
 Yavlinsky [Yeltsin’s main rival for the Presidency] to withdraw from the first 
 round in favor of Yelstin. (Ibid., p. 150) 
 
 This period was a social and economic catastrophe greater than that visited upon 
the United States in the depths of the 1930’s depression. “Russia would need decades to 
regain what it has lost in the nineties, and nothing can retrieve the millions of lives 
already cut short by the ‘transition’” (Cohen 2001, p. 169). The level of personal 
destruction was pointed to by the fact that in 2001 “real wages were 48 percent of their 
1991 value” (Ibid., p. 194) and that “According to official statistics [in 2001], about 40 
percent of the people live in poverty, but the actual figure is at least 50 percent, and 
several reliable Moscow newspapers report that it could be 85 to 90 percent … In a 
national survey, only 14 percent … said they could afford necessary medical treatment” 
(Ibid., pp. 194-195); in the Soviet Union healthcare had been free and real poverty only 
afflicted a small percentage of the population. The legacy of Stalin’s industrialization had 
also been destroyed, with a smaller Russia being returned to the backwardness the Tsars 
that the communists had tried to overcome. 
 
The result [of Boris Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” program] was the worst economic 
and social catastrophe ever suffered by a major nation in peacetime. Russia sank 
into a corrosive economic depression greater than that of the American 1930s. 
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Investment plunged by 60%, GDP by almost 50%; some two thirds of Russians 
were impoverished; the life expectancy of men fell below 59 years; and the 
population began to decline annually by almost a million people. In 1998, with 
nothing left to sustain it, the Russian financial system collapsed. State and private 
banks defaulted on their domestic and foreign obligations, causing still more 
poverty and widespread misery. (Cohen 2011, p. 26)  
 
Perhaps the most lasting industrial catastrophe of the Russian crisis … is the 
demise of advanced electronics manufacturing. (Castells 1998, p. 70) 
 
 The effects of the memories of this period upon the general Russian population, 
and state policy makers, should not be underestimated. The impoverishment of the highly 
educated middle class that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, including the 
destruction of their savings through inflation twice in one decade, represents a significant 
restraint upon economic and technological development. Strong leadership, social and 
economic stability, and a resurrection of national pride should all have a heightened 
attraction to a population that endured this catastrophic period. The generations that came 
of age and grew up during this period could be likened to the US Greatest and Silent 
generations that were the most active generations of the immediate US post-WW2 period, 
but having endured a more searing experience. For these Russian generations, and the 
older ones whose savings and pensions were destroyed during the collapse, it could be 
very easy to see Putin as a savior who rescued their nation and their own personal 
situations. The perceived complicity of the Western powers in the looting and collapse of 
the Soviet Union and then Russia adds to the historical memories of the Cold War and the 
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repeated Western military invasions; Napoleon in 1812, Britain and France in 1852, 
Germany in WW1 and WW2, and the European and US involvement in the Civil War of 
1918-22 (Foglesong 1995).  
5.1.6. Recovery and Stagnation (1999 to the present) 
 
 
 The economy that resulted from this chaotic period of crisis was a highly corrupt 
one, substantially controlled by a small group of oligarchs and caught in the Staples Trap 
(Haley 2011; Carter 2018); significantly more dependent upon the exports of raw 
materials and minerals than the USSR. Russia was significantly smaller in population 
than the Soviet Union, but retained the vast majority of the previous state’s oil and gas 
production within its borders. During the period that started with the first Putin 
presidency, Russia has been unable to generate a significant manufacturing export sector. 
In 2017 45% of exports were oil and oil products, 6% natural gas, 5% coal and 6% 
petrochemicals; 63% fossil fuels. Another 26% of exports were metals, precious metals, 
wood products and food. Only 6% of exports were made up of instruments, machines and 
transportation products while nearly half of imports consisted of goods in those 
categories (OEC 2019). As Sherstnev (2014, p. 82) states: 
 
 The Russian economy has become much less diversified, and its structure is 
 dominated by the primary sector industries … the predominant source of 
 commodity supply and the aforementioned growth of personal consumption 
 is imports. All the talk, especially popular during the perestroika years, about 
 restructuring and converting military production by using its technological 
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 capabilities for civil production basically remained talk. A significant part of 
 the industry was simply lost during the reforms that were actually implemented. 
 
 Oil and gas activities also provided 25% of state revenues in 2017 on a direct 
basis (World Bank Group, 2018), and significantly more when indirect effects are taken 
into account. Movchan (2017) notes the extreme sensitivity of the Russian state budget to 
oil prices: 
 
If oil prices start rising again, every $10 price increase will add $20–$40 billion to 
the budget. In other words, oil prices of $65–$70 a barrel will virtually eliminate 
the budget deficit for the time being. Likewise, an oil price of $30–$35 a barrel 
would seriously exacerbate the deficit problem and could trigger a serious budget 
crisis as early as 2019–2020. 
 
 The first decade of the twenty-first century repeated the Soviet experience of the 
1970s, with a continuous increase in oil prices ending in a high plateau that lasted from 
2006 to 2014 (excluding the temporary peak and fall around the Global Financial Crisis 
in 2009). As with the 1970s Soviet case, additional foreign exchange earnings also came 
from significant increases in natural gas exports. During this period, the Russian 
economy grew rapidly. The Russian economy hit bottom with the financial collapse of 
1998, with the economy contracting by 5.3%. In the next decade, the economy grew at an 
average annual rate of 7%, nearly doubling its size. After the contraction of 7.8% year of 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2009, the Russian economy grew an average of over 4% 
for three years (World Bank 2019). With the steep drop in oil prices in 2014, together 
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with the added impact of Ukraine-related sanctions, the Russian economy slowed, then 
contracted (2.3% in 2016 [Ibid.]) and then stabilized at the low growth rates reminiscent 
of the Soviet period of stagnation.  
 The GDP per capita of the USSR in 1988 was approximately one third of the US 
level (Ricon 2016) of US$21,417 (Worldbank 2019a) – about US$7,000. This was for all 
of the USSR and the territory that now constitutes Russia would be expected to have a 
significantly higher GDP per capita. Russian GDP per capita in 2018 was US$11,288 
(Worldbank 2019b). Accepting the problem of measuring Russian GDP per capita in US$ 
(instead of PPP), and the difficulty of measuring GDP in centrally planned economies, 
this comparison still shows how little real progress has been made in three decades. If the 
1980s were the “lost decade” for Latin America, Russia may be seen as having three lost 
decades. In that period the growth of the US, European, Chinese and other South East 
Asian economies have left Russia far behind. This very significant per capita relative 
decline, together with a Russian population that is only half that of the previous USSR, 
shows how much less powerful Russia is within the international system than was the 
USSR. The lack of a “Soviet Bloc” only adds to the relative decline with respect to the 
USSR. If the Cold War US administrations can be seen as having greatly exaggerated the 
threat that the Soviet Bloc constituted, the current hysterical US claims of the Russian 
threat make those previous administrations’ claims seem relatively attached to reality. 
 The recent stabilization of the Russian economy was aided by a significant fall in 
the ruble exchange rate. Such a flexible exchange rate is only part of the required policies 
to overcome the volatility of fossil fuel rents: 
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oil and natural resources are important assets that can contribute to the prosperity 
of the country and its citizens if managed well. That requires sticking to a policy 
of letting the exchange rate adjust to changes in oil prices to manage short run 
macro issues and long-term structural reforms that would allow Russia to become 
a modern market economy where intangible  wealth is an order of magnitude 
larger than its subsoil wealth. (Becker 2016) 
 
 Fossil fuel interests that maintain significant control over state policies, from both 
within and without, constitute a significant barrier to the required long-term structural 
reforms needed to accelerate growth outside the primary sector. A case in point is the 
removal of individual company emission quotas and a carbon trading system from 
proposed Russian climate change legislation in 2019, under pressure from the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) and the fossil fuel industry-friendly 
ministries of Energy and Industry & Trade, in favor of voluntary actions (Butrin & 
Shapovalov 2019).  
 
the model on which the Russian economy has been based for the past 20 years is 
dying. Everybody needs to find a way to move money into low-carbon areas of 
the economy. Under the leadership of Rosneft and Gazprom, this cannot be done. 
(Yulkin quoted in The Moscow Times 2019) 
 
 The result is that Russia’s economic growth has remained tightly correlated with 
fossil fuel rents (Becker 2016). The dependency upon fossil fuel revenues places Russia 
in an extremely disadvantaged position with respect to an energy transition to alternative 
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energy sources, especially when it does not possess a competitive manufacturing and 
services sector that could replace lost oil revenues and take advantage of green 
technology opportunities. Russia has some advantage in the arms manufacturing and 
nuclear power sectors, but even these advantages are at risk in the medium term from 
large customers such as China and India developing their own capabilities. As Movchan 
(2017) states: 
 
 Essentially, Russia needs to develop new export industries, but that 
 ambition requires a financially efficient production capacity on its own 
 territory and a reasonably high quality of product. Unfortunately, Russia is 
 incapable of delivering on either of these goals. 
 
 The Putin state has reasserted its control to a significant degree, but power is still 
negotiated between the state and the oligarchs. Those oligarchs that accepted the 
rebalancing of power between themselves and the state have remained, while those that 
have not, have been imprisoned or have fled. After a period of privatization of fossil fuel 
assets in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian state has worked 
to reassert control over these assets, with state backing becoming “a vital factor 
determining the success of [fossil fuel] players in Russia’s state managed capitalism” 
(Kretzschmar, Simpson & Hack 2013, p. 778). The result has been state management but 
not necessarily nationalization, “even state behemoths such as Rosneft and Gazprom are 
organized like private companies, geared primarily to pay dividends to shareholders – of 
which the state is simply the largest” (Wood 2018, p. 24). The need to keep fossil fuel 
revenues flowing to the state and a “predatory, authoritarian elite” (Ibid., p. 171), together 
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with an institutional inability to increase domestic energy efficiency and low-carbon 
sources, is evidenced in Russia’s extremely weak Paris commitment of 25-30% below 
1990 levels (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). Due to the decimation of heavy industry in 
the decade following the Soviet collapse this target allows for the country’s GHG 
emissions to grow “6-24% above 2016 levels by 2020 and 15-22% by 2030” (Ibid.). To 
all intents and purposes Russian fossil fuel centric GDP growth is not constrained by its 
Paris commitment. 
 The reorientation of the relationship with the US and the West became apparent 
with the arrest of the oligarch Khodorkovsky in 2003 and the Georgia crisis of 2008, and 
then gained speed with the NATO regime change intervention in Libya in 2011 and the 
start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 (see chapter 2.2.3. for more details); this reorientation 
has fundamentally changed the geopolitical environment for Russia and its ability to 
exploit its energy resources. Sanctions that included restrictions on the provision of 
technologies for fossil fuel exploration, together with credits and financial transactions 
for state banks and oil companies, have had serious impacts. These sanctions have also 
restricted the possibilities for the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows into Russia that 
could facilitate a general technology upgrading of Russian economic capabilities (Becker 
2009), restricting a development path heavily utilized by China. The US has made it clear 
that it does not accept a Russia with an independent foreign policy, a local sphere of 
influence, or a nationalistic elite not fully open to US elite ownership of strategic 
domestic assets. Escalating Cold War rhetoric from both US state actors and the 
mainstream media continue to support this position (Cohen 2019). 
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 The Ukrainian crisis directly impacted the ability of Russia to control its natural 
gas exports to Europe, as major gas pipelines transited through that country. Ukraine 
failed to pay for delivered supplies, and later defaulted upon the accumulated debt 
(supported by the IMF against its own rules). Russia had shut off natural gas supplies to 
the Ukraine to pressure it to pay its debts, but Ukraine simply diverted supplies meant for 
other European customers. As an alternative Russia has attempted to construct alternative 
pipeline routes. The South Stream route through Bulgaria was stopped due to pressure 
from the EU (which wanted to diversify its gas supplies) and the US (Stratfor 2015). The 
Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey (16 bcm/yr) and the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany 
(55 bcm/yr) were successfully constructed prior to the Ukrainian crisis. The TurkStream 
pipeline to Turkey (31.5 bcm/yr) was constructed after the failure of South Stream, and 
there are plans to extend Turkstream to supply gas to Greece, Italy and the Balkans. After 
much resistance from other EU members and the US, in late 2019 Denmark approved the 
final section of the Nordstream II pipeline to Germany (55 bcm/yr), although US 
sanctions affecting the pipe laying corporations will further delay completion. The 
fracking revolution in the US has turned that country into an LNG exporter, placing it in 
direct economic, as well as geopolitical, competition with Russia for the European 
market.  
 Given falling German natural gas production, the planned 2022 termination of 
Dutch production, and a move from coal to gas in electricity generation, Europe may face 
a shortfall of between 100 and 300 Bcm/yr of natural gas, increasing its need for plentiful 
and cheap external supplies (Dohmen, Jung & Nelles 2019); “Beyond the political 
rhetoric, there is an energy pragmatism that recognizes that Europe needs to import a lot 
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more gas and a lot of that is going to come from Russia” (Weafer quoted in Simes 2019). 
Russia has also made fossil fuel and pipeline investments in Iraq, which together with its 
alignment with the Syrian state, provide an impediment to European attempts at supply 
diversification (Koduvayer & Everett 2019). 
 As noted in Chapter 2, Russia has typified the US and its allies as attempting to 
restrict the development of Russia and its attainment of a greater geopolitical role. As 
Western sanctions have escalated, and the problematic relationship with the EU became 
evident, Russia has established a deepening relationship with China. The latter provides 
the still fast growing and largest national economy (in PPP terms) as an alternative and 
increasing source of demand for fossil fuels and other exports, as well as possible 
financing for new projects. It is also increasingly becoming an alternative source of high 
technology products that the West may become unwilling to sell to Russia. In addition, 
on the basis of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” the two are natural military, geo-
economic and diplomatic allies against Western pressure. Russia is also looking at other 
Asian nations, such as the non-aligned India, as an outlet for its fossil fuel exports. 
 Unlike the post-WW2 period, Russia’s heavily diminished economic and 
geopolitical position has placed it in the position of junior partner to China. From being a 
global superpower in the mid-1980s, the position of Russia has been reduced to one close 
to that of the WW1 Brest-Litovsk treaty. A German-dominated European Union and a 
US-dominated NATO have integrated the Eastern European and Baltic states, with the 
ex-Soviet republics of Georgia and the Ukraine seen as “aspiring” members. The 
presence of Western-centric governments and NATO troops on its border in the Ukraine 
and the Baltic states underlines Russia’s diminished position. Putin may have played a 
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weak hand relatively well, but that does not change the generally weak and defensive 
position that he brings to the table. 
 Russia has a mixed economy with a large private sector, and a relatively small 
state that levies a 13% flat tax on income (a 15% tax on incomes above 5 million rubles 
has recently been proposed), has a budget of approximately 20% of GDP, and provides 
free healthcare and education, while targeting budget surpluses when the economy is not 
in recession. The central bank also runs a conservative monetary policy, partly to protect 
the Russian economy against the volatility of fossil fuel prices. In many ways, Russia 
could be said to be at least as neoliberal as the US, while both experience the dominant 
political and economic power of their respective oligarchies. Without the glaring 
ideological differences that communism created between the West and Russia, the 
underlying relationship is laid bare – a competition between powers with Russia viewed 
as part of the periphery that should be subjugated to the West. A compliant Russia that 
opens up its economy to Western capital and maintains a deferential foreign policy, as 
under Yeltsin, is acceptable. “If they'd say 'uncle'”1 (Ronald Reagan quoted by Cannon 
1985) to the US/West and accept the “benign” stewardship of the Global Policeman then 
the relationship would be deemed acceptable. A nationalist elite with an independent 
foreign policy, rather than a comprador elite, is not. 
 The extreme concentration of wealth and income that resulted from the period of 
primitive accumulation and looting has led to a very low median income, with half of 
Russian workers earning less than 35,000 rubles (US$550) per month (The Moscow 
Times 2019a), with an average of about 45,000 rubles (US$705) per month (The Moscow 
 
1 Used by Ronald Reagan in reference to the Nicaraguan government during the illegal Contra war against 
that country, with “uncle” used in the slang form, denoting acceptance of defeat. 
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Times 2019b). Monthly earnings have been falling slowly in real terms since the fall in 
oil prices in 2012 (Ibid.). Such low monthly earnings are mediated somewhat by the very 
high home ownership rate and lack of mortgage debt (the state gifted homes to those 
living in them), together with the free healthcare and education (including higher 
education), and an exchange rate that does not properly reflect lower Russian prices (i.e. 
it significantly underestimates Russian PPP). Russian GDP per capita PPP was 
US$30,820 in 2017, about the same level as Greece (IMF 2020) and about 50% higher 
than China. This includes non-wage incomes that are highly concentrated in the top one 
percent of households though; i.e. it is not representative of the incomes of the vast 
majority of Russians, as is also the case for the US and China.   
5.1.7. Current Domestic Energy Consumption 
 
 
 Russian domestic primary energy consumption is predominantly provided by 
natural gas and oil, with the balance provided by coal, nuclear and hydro. The new 
renewables share is negligible. Russia’s energy intensity increased by 1.9% in 2018; in 
contrast to a 10-year trend of 0.7% annual reductions (BP 2019), as increased energy 
usage was predominantly supplied by natural gas and coal. 
Table 5 1: Russian Primary Energy Consumption 
     Mtoe          2007-17              2018 
            Mill. Tons Oil Equiv. Growth   Growth     Share 
Primary Energy Consumption 721 0.3% 3.8% 100% 
- Natural Gas 391 0.1% 5.4% 54% 
- Oil 152 1.2% 0.5% 21% 
- Coal 88 -1.1% 4.9% 12% 
- Nuclear 46 2.4% 0.7% 6.4% 
- Hydro 43 0.5% 2.6% 6% 
- Wind, Solar, Biomass, Geo 0 9% 11% 0% 
Data from BP 2020 Statistical Review and IRENA Renewable Energy Statistics 2019 
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5.2. Current Strategic Culture & International Political Economy 
 
 
 The policy orientation of the Russian state can be seen as predominantly toward 
the raison d’etat, both from within the state apparatus and from a nationalist economic 
elite – with both heavily dependent upon the fossil fuel and general primary economic 
sectors of the economy. The heavy influence of fossil fuel and other extractive industry 
elites acts as a blockage upon the development of an energy transition, as well as other 
non-primary sector industry and export service sectors. The nationalistic orientation has 
been reinforced by Western actions, with sanctions even forcing a limited level of import 
substitution. Although having a massive geographical presence on the Eurasian continent, 
Russia is a relatively weak power with its strength drawing upon the military and energy 
inheritances from the Soviet Union. 
  As has historically been the case the geographically sprawling nation is seen as 
surrounded by possible aggressors and competitors. With the increasing alliance with 
China, these concerns are now predominantly focused on a West that is considered to 
have repeatedly through history (whatever the political economy of the country) shown 
its unwillingness to accept Russia as an equal and independent partner. These concerns 
are exacerbated by the multi-century antipathy of Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and a 
Western Ukraine which competes as the historical home of the Rus’, fought for its 
independence in the Civil War, fielded divisions for the Nazi army and fought a guerilla 
war against the Soviet Union in the immediate post-WW2 period. At the same time there 
are concerns about the radicalization of Russia’s Muslim population (approximately 10% 
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of the population), which partially explains the support of Russia for those fighting 
Muslim terrorists in the Middle East and its actions with respect to Chechnya. 
 In response, the Russian state can be seen as taking an extremely limited and 
defensive stance when faced with such events as the war with Georgia, the Libyan regime 
change, Ukrainian coup (which endangered Russia’s Black Sea naval base and the 
Russian diaspora), and the attempted destabilization of its ally (and the site of its only 
foreign naval base) Syria. Russia is operating from a position of weakness, not one of 
strength. In this respect, the increasing alliance with China provides a lifeline (and a 
classic balancing coalition strategy) while also providing the risk of becoming a 
subservient partner. Russia’s fostering of its relationships with other powers, such as 
India, can be seen as a way of protecting itself from such an outcome.   
 In 2003 Bobo Lo painted a picture of a generally Eurocentric Putin that was 
highly effective in balancing the different national coalitions to maintain stability and 
power, “He has come to dominate the political class through stealth and guile, in not 
dissimilar fashion to Stalin who in the 1920s was able to split his potential rivals by 
playing on their mutual suspicions, while initially at least, appearing inoffensive” (Lo 
2003, p. 20) and creating a stronger position for the state with respect to economic actors. 
This was written before the actions taken against the oligarch Khodorkovsky, and the 
alienation of Russia from the West. Even in 2003, Lo saw Putin as dominating the 
foreign policy agenda and controlling the state with the aid of a small coterie of trusted 
individuals, many of which he had worked with during his days in St. Petersburg.  
 Although Putin has significantly consolidated power in the past two decades, he is 
still not a “new Tsar” as some in the West have described him (Myers 2015) and must 
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still take care to manage the different factions within the elites, and the hundred or so 
billionaire oligarchs who could be likened to somewhat independent medieval barons. 
With the de-legitimization of communism from the time of Gorbachev onwards (e.g. see 
Remnick 1993), and an aversion to ideology in general, Putin’s legitimacy rests upon his 
ability to maintain stability after the chaos of the previous years and improve the standing 
of the Russian people and Russia as a whole. The rapid growth during the recovery of the 
economy from the collapse period, together with positive domestic policies and the 
reinstatement of Russian “pride” after the humiliations of the 1990s, did provide the Putin 
administration with a high degree of legitimacy. By effectively balancing the different 
coalitions Putin maintains stability and power, but is limited in his ability to push bold 
new policy positions that may threaten a given constituency; the gutting of his proposed 
climate change legislation being a good example of this. Putin may have somewhat 
lessened the Medici vicious circle where economic and political power reinforce each 
other (Zingales 2017) but it is still very much an inertial factor within present-day Russia. 
 With his long tenure and extensive previous security service experience, Putin can 
be seen as having the same orientation as the Chinese leaders, focused on the raison 
d’etat – but without the institutional power of a CCP behind him and having to carefully 
accommodate diverse interest groups and oligarchic private interests. Given this, and the 
weak geopolitical position of Russia, the long-time horizon and extreme care exhibited 
by his administration’s foreign policy is understandable. As with the Soviet Union, 
Western official discourse has tended to create the mirage of strength from weakness 
with respect to both Russia and Putin. A gifted player with a weak hand is still a player 
with a weak hand. 
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 The inability of Putin to institutionalize his power and remove coalitions that 
given the chance would partially or substantially remove what he sees as his 
achievements, can be seen in his need to remain in power. The retirement of a US 
President, or even of Xi Jinping may create significant policy changes but would not 
fundamentally change the ideological bases upon which policy is based (e.g. “liberal 
capitalism” and “socialist market economy”); that is not the case with Putin. In 
neoclassical realist terms, the most important domestic variable is Putin himself. The 
recent Russian constitutional amendments made it possible for him to rule until 2036 (if 
twice re-elected), increased his control of the state (e.g. in being able to remove judges), 
made international law subservient to national law, and placed residency and citizenship 
limitations upon state office holders. These point to a determination to embed the new 
political economy and foreign policy orientation of Russia. The residency and citizenship 
requirements follow on from the previous changes designed to severely limit and control 
the operation of foreign NGOs within the country.  
 With the recent inability to overcome economic stagnation, and as the memories 
of the 1990s fade into history, a more diverse basis for state legitimacy may be required. 
In recent years there has been an increased celebration of Russian culture, utilizing both 
the Russian Orthodox Church and pre-communist history. Putin’s more recent 
conceptualization of Russia as an anti-liberal conservative bulwark against an 
antagonistic liberal West does fall upon fruitful ground given both historical and recent 
events and serves to delegitimize the pro-Western and liberal elements that still exist 
within the elite. As Laruelle (2016, p. 278) notes, “Since at least the eighteenth century, 
Russian intellectuals and official circles have used a civilizational grammar to define 
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Russia’s identity and place in the world” using non-binary constructs; “a European 
country that follows the Western path of development … a European country that follows 
a non-Western path of development … a non-European country”. Putin’s 
reconceptualization falls within this civilizational, as against nationalist, grammar – 
seeing Russia as fitting within the second option, in contrast to the Yeltsin years that 
heavily tilted toward the first option (and which is still supported by the liberal opposition 
and represented by Medvedev within the elite). The recent removal of Medvedev, who 
had been a close ally of Putin (a rift was caused when he did not block the UNSC 
approval for action against Libya when serving as the President [Zygar 2016]), from the 
position of Prime Minister, may also be seen as a reinforcement of the second option. 
Putin’s language certainly lacks the xenophobia of a nationalistic tilt, especially with his 
view of an integrated Eurasia with a free flow of goods and people.  
5.3. The Drivers of Current Energy Policy 
 
5.3.1. Geopolitics and Energy Security 
 
 
 A global energy transition away from fossil fuels represents an existential crisis to 
the Russian state, as well as many of its oligarchic backers, a situation reflected in its 
interactions with the UN climate change apparatus. Instead of reducing fossil fuel 
domestic usage and exports, Russia is focused on increasing both in order to maintain 
some level of economic growth and increase foreign exchange earnings. Such a high 
fossil fuel dependency makes the future position of Russia in the international system 
somewhat of a derivative of the international prices for oil and natural gas, as with many 
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other fossil fuel export dependent nations; with the outcome as uncertain as the future 
forecasts of those prices. 
 Russia’s overwhelming dependence upon fossil fuel exports places it at great risk 
with respect to a possible export embargo (as has been imposed on Iran and Venezuela), a 
probability heightened with the continuing Western sanctions and conflicts with the US. 
Russia would be expected to move exports towards friendly nations, such as China, and 
reinforce its relationship with its European customers (e.g. through Nordstream II). 
Utilizing the “Relationship Between Energy Security And Geopolitics” framework in the 
table below, the following lays out the historical combinations for Russia.  
 Even at the height of the Cold War, the USSR’s energy exports were not the 
subject of geopolitically based actions from the West and in addition Russia never used 
Europe’s dependency upon its fossil fuel supplies as a weapon. The Cold War was also 
typified by “proxy” conflicts rather than direct military engagements. It was an 
environment of Cold War conflict, but one of high trust between the USSR and Europe 
with respect to fossil fuel imports and exports. During the most recent period of conflict, 
geo-economic weapons such as sanctions, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments 
system and attempts to block fossil fuel technology transfer have been much more 
prevalent. This moves Russia from the left to the right-hand side of the table below. The 
need to reorient its exports toward more friendly nations over secure supply routes 




























 Domestic policy considerations preclude any growth-restricting energy policies, 
especially given the negative economic impacts of Western sanctions. In addition, the 
dominance of the fossil fuel sector interests within the state will severely restrict any 
actions that would reduce fossil fuel production. The economic and political power of 
oligarchs that rely heavily upon energy and raw material production also limits any drive 
to develop a renewable energy sector that would threaten their profits.  
5.3.2. Industrial Policy 
 
5.3.2.1. Reorientation of Exports Toward Friendly Nations 
 
 
 Russia has started to reorient its energy exports towards a China that has 
extremely large and growing energy needs combined with a geopolitically driven drive to 
reduce seaborne energy imports and those from the US and its allies. Energy exports to 
China can be paid for in local currencies, bypassing the need for US dollars and the 
SWIFT payment system. Russia is also looking at exports to the growing Indian energy 
market, another relatively friendly nation with which payments can be made in local 
currencies (Mehrishi 2018). This builds on its successful sales of nuclear technology to 
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India (Miglani and De Clercq 2018). Although Putin has stated that Russia will continue 
to show “a responsible, businesslike approach in relations with our long-standing partners 
in Europe” he has also stated that if Europe continued to “keep energy hostage to political 
differences” then “Naturally, we receive new impetuses to develop cooperation with 
those that do not support this logic – the logic of dishonest competition … The demand 
for hydrocarbons is growing in Asia, more quickly than in Europe” (Putin quoted by 
Simes 2019). With the scheduled closure of the 2022 Groningen gas field in The 
Netherlands and the depletion of other European natural gas fields, Europe may have no 
option but to increase its Russian gas imports. Gazprom’s (Russia’s main natural gas 
corporation) share of the European gas market rose 2% to a new high of 36.7% in 2018 
(Soldatkin 2019). 
 The new Power of Siberia gas pipeline will have a full capacity of 38 bcm/yr in 
2022-23, delivering approximately 9.5% of Chinese consumption. (Liang, Abrue & Fan 
2019). Russia also wants to develop a pipeline from its Altai region to China that would 
carry 30 bcm/yr (Guo & Wu 2019) and a spur from its Sakhalin - Khabarovsk – 
Vladivostok line into China to deliver 10 bcm/yr, but no agreements have yet been 
reached (Soldatkin & Grabar 2019). The Russian natural gas company Novatek also 
plans to increase its LNG production capacity to approximately 95 bcm/yr natural gas 
equivalent (NGE) by 2030; it is already producing 22.5 bcm/yr NGE at its Siberian 
Yamal facility (Daiss 2019). Novatek plans to utilize a fleet of large icebreaker vessels, 
together with ice capable LNG tankers, to extend eastbound deliveries to China and Japan 
into the winter months (Chambers 2019). There are also an increasing number of Russian 
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natural gas supplied petrochemicals projects, partly financed by China, with output 
targeted at the Chinese market.  
 
Power of Siberia, the Amur plant and Chinese funding for liquid natural gas 
production plants in Russia’s Arctic have underlined the growing business  ties 
between Moscow and Beijing, which have largely seen Chinese cash exchanged 
for Russian energy assets (Foy 2019).  
 
 Russian oil exports to China have also been increasing, with a nearly 20% jump in 
2018 to 1.43 million barrels per day (Abbasova 2019), partly delivered by a spur to the 
Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline (600k barrels per day) 
5.3.2.2. New Renewables and Transport Electrification 
 
 
 As noted above, the power of fossil fuel interests both within the state and the 
private sector provide a significant restraint to the ability of Russia to develop both a low 
carbon energy infrastructure and even other alternatives to fossil fuel export and revenue 
dependency. Even with the very weak Paris commitments, President Putin had to bypass 
parliament after “months of opposition from industry lobbyists” (Sauer 2019) to endorse 
the Paris Accord in late 2019. The chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RSPP) has stated that: 
 
 We have to maximize our sales of gas, oil and coal as much as we can 
 without stopping while there is still a buyer for it, and use that money to 
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 stimulate innovations in new technologies so we can keep up with other 
 economies. (Gerschkovich 2019) 
 
 Planned legislation to accompany the ratification of the Paris Accord was 
radically revised after pressure from the RRSP, Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, with proposals for carbon quotas, a national carbon trading system 
and penalties for the biggest polluters removed (Burtin & Shapovalov 2019). 
 Overall, there has been minimal activity with respect to an industrial policy aimed 
at developing a green technology industrial sector or the implementation of significant 
amounts of new renewables. This places Russia at a severe risk with respect to a global 
energy transition that could massively reduce its export and government revenues, as well 
as impact a significant portion of its industrial sector. With much of the fossil fuel sector 
based in areas that will be heavily affected by climate change, especially through the 
impacts of Arctic Amplification on permafrost regions, Russia may be heavily impacted 




 From the above, it can be ascertained that Russian foreign policy is heavily 
affected by its need to be able to continue to exploit its fossil fuel reserves, both to power 
the domestic economy and to earn foreign currency revenues through exports. This is 
supported through the domestic dominance of fossil fuel interests, as well as the need to 
support the economic growth that helps maintain state legitimacy (Becker 2019) and 
funds the expenditures required to resist Western pressure. Russia’s Paris commitments 
allow for continued fossil fuel driven economic growth until at least 2030. Its alignment 
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with China, and other moves to consolidate and diversify its ability to exploit its fossil 
fuel reserves, helps negate much of the current Western attempts to weaken the Russian 
economy. These policies are what would be expected from the “Integration of (Supplier) 
Energy Security and Geopolitics” framework. 
 Caught in the Staples Trap, Russia is committed to an energy policy position that 
may shore up its geopolitical security in the short, and even possibly medium, term. This 
period may be extended as it increases exports of natural gas, a fossil fuel seen as 
“cleaner” than coal for electricity generation, and also hard to dislodge from its space 
heating and petrochemical uses. President Putin has publicly taken a softly skeptical 
position with respect to climate change, which would be expected given the fossil fuel 
orientation and deep dependence of the Russian state. An end to the US shale revolution, 
resulting in a fall in US oil and gas production and/or significant Middle East hostilities, 
would also be advantageous in the short term. A possible expansion of arms and nuclear 
exports, together with the geopolitical strategic sourcing of fossil fuel imports by China 
may also delay the inevitable. In the medium term there is the risk that the main 
customers for arms and nuclear exports such as China and India may develop their own 
capabilities, and the global demand for oil and gas begins to fall due to the adoption of 
electric vehicles and increasing usage of renewable energy production. As China 
electrifies its transportation sector, the importance of Russia as a trusted fossil fuel 
supplier during any energy embargo may also be reduced over time; changing the 
dynamics of the relationship in China’s favor. A dynamic that can only be reinforced if 
the Chinese economy continues to grow significantly faster than Russia, and China’s 
technological capabilities march far ahead of those of the Russian nation. 
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 Unlike the Chinese state-directed focus on the continual upgrading of the 
economy and its technological base, there is no concerted focus and effort from the 
Russian state to remedy the severe shortcomings in the advanced manufacturing and 
green technology sectors: 
 
There are still no clear political or economic decisions for addressing further 
development of domestic production or for scientific and technical  development 
of the country. The contemporary leadership and its economic advisers generally 
reject import substitution, the state industrial policy, and seek maximum 
economic openness … Russia is becoming less able to generate innovation a la 
Schumpeter, or even to maintain the high technology inherited from the Soviet 
Union … International monitoring of scientific research (for example, the 
Thomson Scientific survey) shows a consistent and sufficiently rapid drop in our 
country’s role in the scientific world, especially in the natural sciences and 
engineering. (Sherstnev 2014, p. 83). 
 
 Without the capabilities and elite orientation to develop manufacturing output and 
services to replace fossil fuel revenues, and with little if any capability in the green 
technology sector, Russia is unable to escape the staples trap when its main staples may 
become increasingly in less demand. It has an even greater dependence upon fossil fuel 
rents than the USSR, and much of its manufacturing sector was lost in the depression of 
the 1990s. Any further falls in global oil prices and/or export volumes will inevitably lead 
to domestic economic retrenchment. Hence, Russia is at great risk of longer-term decline 
as nations replace fossil fuels with alternatives, especially the electrification of transport 
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that will displace oil demand. The resulting policy may be to sell as much of its fossil 
fuels “while it can” and continued obstructionism in international climate change 
negotiations in an attempt to extend the period that its fossil fuels will be in demand 
through a retardation of any global actions to decarbonize.  
 In this respect, Russia fulfills Nyman’s (2018) thesis of a fossil-fuelled increase in 
short-term security leading to a longer-term decrease in security, but in a novel geo-
economic form. With Russia being the largest Arctic nation, and Arctic Amplification 
driving climate change in that region at multiples of the global pace, Russia may also 
fulfill Nyman’s main thesis at a quicker pace than others. That much of Russia’s fossil 
fuel infrastructure sits upon permafrost may only add irony to that thesis. 
 From a neoclassical realist perspective, the Russian state can be seen as generally 
focused on the interests of the Russian nation, the raison d’etat, as defined by Putin and 
his close allies, while limited in its policy orientation through the dominance of fossil fuel 
and other oligarchic interests. Its highly defensive and careful foreign policy actions 
show a quite accurate perception of its weak position within the international system; 
with the focus on protecting its position, building a balancing coalition, and attempting to 
reduce the alignment of others with the US foreign policy position toward itself. The skill 
and carefulness of this policy can be seen in the reactions to the Ukrainian coup - from a 
geostrategic viewpoint Russia had no option but to integrate the Crimea, but was very 
careful not to be seen to be invading the Eastern Ukrainian provinces. The same can be 
said with respect to its intervention in Syria (the site of its only foreign naval base), and 
the relationship with Turkey. Working from a position of weakness, Russia has 
performed with high competence with respect to foreign policy with surprising successes. 
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 With the recent constitutional changes, Putin hypothetically has another 16 years 
to alter the internal power balance more toward his favor and perhaps be in a position to 
drive a very different industrial and climate policy. As China’s GDP per capita in US$ 
(i.e. non PPP) surpasses Russia’s and widens the gap during the next decade, Russia may 
become an attractive and safe destination for Chinese FDI. This could be utilized by 
Putin to help build out an alternative industrial sector and impose some domestic 
competition upon the oligarchs. In this respect, one of the greatest beneficiaries of 
increased US hostility to China may be Russia. If Putin is unable to take advantage of the 
shrinking window of opportunity Russia may well revert in the long term to its historical 
backwardness, while clinging onto industries of a bygone era and the support of an 
increasingly dominant China. 
5.5. Framework Insights In The Russian Study 
The current dynamic of the international system (what Cox refers to as the world 
order), places Russia as a secondary power with significant military capabilities 
(including a nuclear arsenal only second to that of the US) inherited from its previous 
existence as part of the Soviet Union while being much weaker than the combined Soviet 
bloc. In its European sphere it is faced with a NATO and a European Union that are at 
odds with significant aspects of its national interests, and generally with a US which 
seems to see Russia’s subjugation, including possible regime change, as the only 
acceptable geopolitical outcome; evidenced by “the failure of the Euro-Atlantic 
community to create a security system that acknowledges Russia’s interests” (Milosevich 
2021). In response, Russia has increased the closeness of its alliance with China in the 
past few years, and become more assertive in protecting its national interests – shown 
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with the annexation of Crimea in response to the Ukrainian coup and its actions in Syria 
to forestall regime change in the nation hosting its only Mediterranean naval base. The 
Russian economy and the state are heavily dependent upon the export of fossil fuels, 
something that was not politicized during the Cold War, but which has now been 
weaponized by the US; with both sanctions designed to restrict the development of the 
fossil fuel sector and pressure brought to restrict new fossil fuel pipelines to Europe. The 
neoclassical realism of Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, adds an analysis of the internal 
dynamics of Russia – an authoritarian state with a leader (Putin) that balances the 
interests of a Russian capitalist oligarchical class heavily focused on resource extraction 
and rent seeking (approximately one hundred US$ billionaires), the siloviki (nationalist 
state security forces, of which Putin himself was a member) and his own circle largely 
populated with trusted colleagues from his days in St. Petersburg. Together with a state 
budget that is approximately the same as the US equivalent in terms of GDP, a 
government focused on balanced budgets, a significantly neoliberal economy, and 
extreme inequalities in wealth and income, Russia can be seen to significantly resemble 
the US. The problem with the Russia is not its ideology - with Communism going the 
way of the Soviet Union, nor its general workings, but that its elite and strategic culture is 
nationalistic and resists subjugation and exploitation by the US and the West in general. 
The balancing act carried out by Putin tends toward inertia, especially in domestic 
economic policy as moves to reverse the deindustrialization of the 1990s and foster new 
green technologies are stymied by the interests of the fossil fuel, and other extractive 
elites whose dominance would be threatened by a rebalancing of the economy and a 
move away from fossil fuels. Limited reindustrialization has been mostly carried out with 
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the oversight of the security services overseen by the siloviki, and a military industrial 
complex that maintained much of its capabilities during the 1990s through exports – as 
evidenced by the recent additions of advanced weapons to Russia’s arsenal and the 
nation’s position as second in weapons exports only to the US. Russia’s relative 
economic and geopolitical weakness, when added to the domestic political balancing act, 
leads to a relatively defensive and reactive position in the foreign policy space. The 
maintenance of this balancing act is heavily dependent upon Putin as an individual, and 
therefore a change in leader would create the possibility of significant domestic 
instability. Such an analytical picture does provide a relatively nuanced view of the 
present, and provides some insights into future state policy making, but does not provide 
a vision of the historical processes that created the current Russia, nor their possible 
impact going forward. It also takes the present as a given, without problematizing its 
elements; how and why the present came into being may have significant exculpatory 
value with respect to how the future may progress. 
Since the Middle Ages, Russia has been treated as the eastern Other by Europe, 
reflecting both memories of the Mongol hordes and the result of the Great Schism. It has 
also had centuries long conflicts with its neighbouring nations, such as Poland, the 
Ukraine and the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that colour the present 
after being subsumed during the period of the Soviet Union. With Russia becoming a 
great power after the defeat of Napoleon, Britain also turned from an ally into an enemy 
that demonized it as a despotic threat to civilized Europe. Consisting of a huge landmass 
that sits between Europe and Asia, Russia has occupied an indeterminate position that is 
neither European nor Asian. Peter the Great pointed Russia toward Europe, and its elite 
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remained Westernized (including conversing in French rather than Russian) until the fall 
of the monarchy in 1917 – even while being treated as the Oriental Other by the West. 
This Othering was extended during the time of the Soviet Union and then the Soviet bloc 
and has returned with the renewed nationalism of Putin. 
 Gorbachev and Yeltsin both strived for acceptance within the West, and the latter 
was heavily dependent upon Western support and technical advice. The West did not 
provide the financial aid required to blunt the effects of the Russian shock therapy of the 
1990s, contributing to the 50% collapse and extensive deindustrialization of the 
economy. In parallel, the West extended NATO and the EU toward Russia’s borders, 
abrogating the commitments made to Gorbachev when the unification of Germany was 
being discussed. At first, Putin followed an orientation toward the West and offered 
important support to US efforts in Afghanistan after 9/11, but this changed with his 
actions against the oligarchs from 2003 onwards that represented a rebalancing of state 
power with respect to the capitalist class. In addition, these actions may have forestalled 
the sale of a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel assets to US interests. In the same 
year, there was a wave of NATO enlargement with the inclusion of the Baltic States 
(Poland had become a NATO member in 1999 and joined the EU in 2004) and Western 
support for colour revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine. The response to Putin’s 
actions from the West was rapid with Putin being denigrated as an autocratic devil 
incarnate when earlier he had been seen as a friend (or assumed subordinate) of the West. 
Since this period, Russia has progressively moved toward the East as the West has taken 
increasingly aggressive steps such as the support for the Georgian invasion, the coup in 
the Ukraine, sanctions and US actions to stop the Nordstream 2 pipeline. The 
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unwillingness of the West to treat Russia as anything other than a supplicant, together 
with the escalating propaganda against Putin and Russia, has led to some rebalancing of 
forces within the Russian strategic culture. Putin has both moved to remove foreign 
interests, such as foreign NGO’s and state functionaries with foreign passports or 
residency, taken an increasingly oppositional stance to the West, and moved to facilitate 
the continuation of his own rule.  
The strategic culture, as well as that of the general population, is heavily affected 
by the lack of any bourgeois or democratic revolution in Tsarist Russia or the USSR. The 
state has always been an authoritarian one, notwithstanding the brief glimpses of 
democracy after the 1905 revolution (1905-1917, undermined by the absolutist-minded 
Tsar Nicholas) and after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991 to 1993 when President 
Yeltsin ordered the storming of the parliament building). The lived experience of many 
Russians of the chaotic move to a deeply corrupt and rentier capitalism in the 1990s, 
combined with economic collapse and widespread deindustrialization, may have darkly 
clouded their view of liberal capitalist democracy. This is reflected in the very low 
approval rates among the populace for multi-party systems and the market economy (Pew 
Research 2019). 
From the 1980s onwards the authoritarian state carried out a revolution from 
above, accelerating the move to a corrupted form of capitalism based upon primitive 
accumulation by those with power and connections, rent extraction, and financial 
speculation; including the dissolution of the Soviet Union against the wishes of the 
population expressed in a 1991 referendum on the subject. The nature of this move may 
have been significantly affected by the death of so many of the nation’s best leaders and 
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thinkers under Stalin, leaving only relative mediocrities that as a group stayed in office 
overseeing a fossilized bureaucracy until they died (with the exception of Khrushchev). 
This produced a corrupted and mediocre state with self-interested elite nomenklatura 
factions and fiefdoms that had been built up and reinforced over decades; covering up 
much of its failing with fossil fuel foreign currency revenues that also facilitated large-
scale embezzlement and misuse. Russia today somewhat resembles a weaker version of 
its Soviet predecessor, still very much dependent upon fossil fuel revenues to hide the 
weakness of the economy, with an autocratic state and powerful security forces, and 
many of the same nomenklatura in both the siloviki and as part of the new capitalist class. 
Although GDP per capita in 2018 was approximately 90% higher than at the high point 
of the Soviet Union (a level equalled only in 2003 after the economic collapse of the 
1990s), it has stagnated in the past decade (Jutta & van Zanden 2020), mirroring the oil 
price to a large degree, and the level of income and wealth inequality is much greater in 
the present than during Soviet times. This may mean that although Putin did bring 
stability and relative recovery after the chaos of the 1990s, the welfare of the majority of 
Russians may not be that much better than at the height of the USSR. This is very 
different to the experience of the average Chinese citizen, who has seen their standard of 
living grow enormously in the past three decades and looks forward to more gains. With 
memories of the recovery of the first decade of this century receding, the Russian state is 
at the risk of reduced legitimacy if it fails to reignite the growth in living standards. 
Putin himself has stated that he sees the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and what 
followed as a tragedy, to be added to the deprivations of the two world wars, the post-
revolutionary civil war, the invasion by Napoleon, the Crimean War, the Time of 
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Troubles, and the Mongol invasion; a sentiment that we can assume is shared by the 
siloviki. This positions the centralized autocratic state as a protector of stability and 
sovereignty; reinforced by the ability of Putin to reverse some of the chaos and 
destruction of the 1990s with the help of rising oil prices (although as noted above this 
basis of legitimacy may be declining). Russia can be seen to have been in conflict with 
the West for more than two centuries and with Poland and the Baltic states since the 
seventeenth century, making the sprawling nation’s concerns about being surrounded 
with possible enemies not a case of paranoia but a rational position based upon both 
history and more recent events. 
From an Amsterdam School perspective, the heterogeneous Russian elite have few 
connections with Western elites; especially in the case of the siloviki and St. Petersburg 
groups. The separation of the capitalist class from the West has been increased through 
Putin’s actions against specific oligarchs (e.g. Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky and 
Berezovsky), his close relationship with others (e.g. Deripaska) and the more recent 
Western sanctions – although a significant portion may be open to comprador status if it 
were a profitable bargain. This capitalist class is not fully autonomous, being balanced by 
Putin and his inner circle and a siloviki that has not been heavily coopted by the capitalist 
class nor developed relationship networks with Western security complexes. Together 
with the ongoing high levels of popularity of Putin, such an elite makes it extremely hard 
for the US and the West to co-opt a significant group with which to undermine Russia 
from within; while underlining the importance of Putin with respect to Russian foreign 
policy. The strict controls over foreign NGOs and the monitoring of US and other 
Western diplomats also reduces the possibility of any such co-option. Some Western 
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analyses have seen the siloviki as dominating an aggressive militarized state, but this 
seems to be greatly overstretching reality as the siloviki itself is not monolithic and “the 
correct inference to draw from extant data is that perhaps Russia’s top political 
leadership came to be dominated by siloviki during the Putin presidency but its elite as a 
whole definitely did not” (Rivera & Rivera 2018).  
The deepening alliance with China offers Putin some ability to overcome the 
inertia inherent in his domestic balancing act, as the Russian MIC benefits from 
increasing sales to China (at least in the short and medium term) and Chinese capital 
could be used to develop non-fossil fuel sectors of the Russian economy; strengthening 
the none resource-extractive elite sectors. In parallel though, the increasing Chinese 
needs for fossil fuel imports and energy security does lend support to the fossil fuel 
sector. The importance of fossil fuel revenues for both the Russian elite and state is a 
central long-term challenge to Russia given the probability of a low carbon energy 
transition that Russia will tend to forestall for as long as is possible. 
The increasing levels of interaction between the elites of the Chinese 
developmental state and Russian elites may also help reorient the latter, although Russian 
elites may also be careful to not become subordinated to their Chinese counterparts and 
there is a lack of the shared language (in the case of the UK and British settler colonies) 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 




 The framework used in this dissertation combines two distinct ontologies, that of 
the relatively ahistorical and state-centric neoclassical realism and that of a Coxian 
historical materialism that can operate at, and across, multiple levels of analysis – such as 
the system level and horizontally between state/society complexes. My usage of the 
Coxian conceptualization of the state/society complex removes the liberal notions of the 
independence of the state, the economy and civil society, and also removes the Western 
liberal lens through which much of the West views, and judges non-Western nations. In 
addition, the utilization of the concept of strategic culture allows for the agency and 
subjectivity of national strategy making elites that may have significant impacts with 
respect to other factors, even those of the longue durée. This complexity mirrors that of 
the actual social world being analyzed, which cannot be adequately represented by any 
single theory – as Van Der Pijl (2009, p. xii) states, “No single theory has produced such 
a watertight ‘coverage’ of the object of inquiry that a different approach would not serve 
to highlight blind spots or weaknesses. To paraphrase Hegel, there cannot exist a truth 
that is separate from the totality of thinking and being”. My usage of the term framework 
rather than that of model accepts the inability to perfectly represent the complex social 
structures involved and the indeterminacy of outcomes. Its use is a descriptive one to 
provide insight into general trends and possible outcomes, but not to predict specific 
outcomes.  
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 Unlike the neo-realists, liberal internationalists, or scientific Marxists, this work is 
not looking to create a “scientific” predictive model, but more a descriptive framework 
through which a better approximation of social reality can be gained. It accepts that the 
sheer complexity of that reality is not fully knowable, and that any attempt at “scientific” 
representation will always result in a deeply flawed and overly simplistic result. Such 
over-simplification is redolent in many areas of international relations, with outcomes 
said to be the result of a small number of unproblematized universally applicable 
assumptions backed up in some cases by highly questionable historical analyses. To put it 
bluntly, the international system is important, the longue durée is important, national 
elites are important, ideas and culture are important, individuals are important BUT 
their relative importance may vary greatly with respect to a given historical and 
geographic context AND may be annulled by the vicissitudes of contingency. This does 
not lend itself to universalist and concise theory making, but hopefully points the way to 
both increased insight and intellectual humility. This humility includes an acceptance that 
Eurocentric beliefs in such things as the superiority of liberal capitalism to other avenues 
to modernity, and the definition of the modern state arising from interpretations of the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), may be merely provincially specific worldviews. So how 
does the proposed framework perform with respect to the three example nations? 
 Both neoclassical realism and Coxian historical materialism go beyond any 
artificial separation of the intranational and the international, with the former accepting 
that the internal configuration of states may significantly differ and that those differences 
may affect foreign policy actions. Cox goes further than this, seeing social forces acting 
both within and across states, an insight that is highly applicable in the case of the US and 
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its relationship to other nations. The US can be seen as the vanguard of the Western 
civilizational project that started in Western Europe, claiming Greco-Roman origins, and 
spread across the globe through conquest and settler colonization. Its core members 
consist of Western Europe and the white settler colonies of Canada, the US, Australia and 
New Zealand; it is no coincidence that the latter four and the UK are the members of the 
“Five Eyes” intelligence sharing arrangement. The generally lighter-skinned elites of 
Central and Southern America also tend to identify with a European civilizational 
heritage, facilitating their comprador status as leaders of nations generally deferent to the 
West. Such deference is also seen in many of the post-colonial elites that have been 
socialized and schooled within Western institutions and social milieu, as well as nations 
such as Greece, Japan and the Philippines where Western state/society configurations 
were imposed by force. The resultant shared beliefs, together with cultural, friendship 
and familial ties, greatly aided the US in the development and maintenance of its post-
WW2 hegemonic position. 
 Cox states that “A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward 
expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class” 
(Cox 1983, p. 171) and sees Britain as the global hegemon from 1845-1875, a non-
hegemonic period between 1875 and 1945, then a period of US hegemony. As detailed in 
the relevant case study, the US became dominated by its national bourgeois white 
protestant elite with independence in 1776, and the resulting removal of British rule. This 
elite was greatly consolidated and strengthened through the results of the Civil War and 
the growth of large-scale businesses at the end of the nineteenth century. The multi-
century project of territorial expansion that had begun with the first colonizers was 
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completed early in the twentieth century and replaced with a project of a more indirect 
approach to domination. This approach came into its own in the post-WW2 years when 
the other competitors for global or regional hegemony had been economically destroyed. 
The US elite developed its ability to become “a class for itself” through such integrating 
structures as the Council for Foreign Relations established between the two World Wars; 
an organization central to the conceptualization and implementation of the post-WW2 
global Open-Door policy (Shoup & Minter 1977; Shoup 2015; Wertheim 2020). The US 
was able to use its immediate post-WW2 dominance to design the systems of global 
governance to its benefit and forge the Western European and Japanese social structures 
to allow them to act reliably within its hegemonic bloc. Hegemony at home was extended 
to hegemony within the West, with an “Atlantic ruling class, which continues to occupy 
the commanding heights of the global political economy” carrying out a strategy 
designed to “open up contender state/society complexes, dispossess the state classes, and 
replace them by a governing class submitting to liberal governance and ‘open for 
business’” (Van Der Pijl 2012, p. 504). 
 The flexibility of the framework is evident here, in that it does not require an 
either/or distinction. The hegemonic elites within the differing state/society complexes of 
the West are significantly integrated, but they are still dominated by a national US elite. 
This integration was aided by the establishment of such bodies as the Ditchley 
Foundation in 1958 (the “spiritual home” of the US-UK relationship), the Atlantic 
Council in 1961 (with a mission of “shaping the global future together” that galvanizes 
US leadership in the world), the German Marshall Fund in 1972 (to promote elite 
cooperation between North America and Western Europe), and the Trilateral 
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Commission in 1973 (to foster cooperation between North American, Western European 
and Japanese elites); reflecting the recovery of the Western European and Japanese 
economies, whereby “the plutocracy that dominates the system is centered in the United 
States, but has powerful allied branches in Western Europe and Japan” (Shoup 2015, 
preface, para. 2). This plutocracy may be somewhat transnational but it is still heavily 
grounded within the nation-state, with the US nation-state providing the prevalence of 
force to facilitate the protection and expansion of its hegemonic zone. 
 Such a position contrasts with those that see the existence of a truly transnational 
capitalist class, independent of national linkages, such as Robinson (2005, p. 11) 
“Globalization is not a ‘national’ project but a class project without a national strategy, or 
rather, with a strategy that seeks to utilize the existing political infrastructure of the 
nation-state system and simultaneously to craft TNS structures” (Robinson 2005, p. 11). 
Such a conceptualization is shown to be overly extreme by analyses that show the 
concentration of TNC ownership within US nationals (Starrs 2013), the dominance of 
global value chains by US-domiciled corporations (Phillips 2017), and the dominance of 
US citizens among the extremely wealthy (Credit Suisse 2019), together with the US 
dominance of NATO.  
 The Chinese Party-State can be seen as hegemonic, and as a “class for itself”, 
within China but on the international stage it lacks the shared history, culture and values 
that the US enjoys with its Western counterparts and comprador allies. In addition, it is 
faced with historical enmities and competing civilizational projects within the Asian 
region, together with the Orientalist Othering of the West. A tributary system, rather than 
a hegemonic order, based upon non-interference and the acceptance of social, political 
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and economic heterogeneity may much better fit China’s circumstances. With Putin 
acting as the skilled moderator between competing elite interests, with a sub-set that may 
be happy with comprador status, a hegemonic order and a dominant “class for itself” 
does not exist within Russia. Together with the historical enmities of many of its 
surrounding states, its Othering by the West, and the lack of the shared ideology of 
communism, it is unable to establish even a regional hegemony. One area of possibility 
for both China and Russia is Africa where there is a readiness to learn from the successes 
of the former and a memory of post-colonial aid from the latter, but a truly hegemonic 
position is highly unlikely for either. 
 The threat of China to the US is not one of competing hegemony, but rather one 
of the degradation of US and Western hegemony, even within the Western nations 
themselves. At an ideological level China provides “the threat of a good example” 
(Chomsky 1993, p. 22) as a country that has raised itself from sub-Saharan levels of 
destitution to become a huge middle-income nation, using its own form of modernity that 
is antithetical to much of liberalism and the “development” prescriptions of the Western-
dominated global institutions. The Chinese state/society complex is dominated by a 
Party-State, with “a state class [that] to varying degrees confiscates its society from 
above, relying on state initiative to accelerate and sustain the pace of social change and 
develop the economic and military assets necessary to hold its own against the West” 
(Van Der Pijl 2012, p. 504). The “commanding heights” of the economy, such as the 
financial system and fossil fuel sector, are directly controlled by the Party-State, and 
significant control is maintained over the rest of society. Concepts such as an independent 
bourgeois class (Starrs 2017) or civil society lose much of their meaning with the 
 341 
extensive Party-State integration and cooption of such possible independent sectors. This 
Party-State has resisted the movement toward liberal democratic capitalism, and has 
certainly not allowed the “Atlantic ruling class … to open up [its state/society complex], 
dispossess the state classes, and replace them by a governing class submitting to liberal 
global governance and ‘open for business’” (Van Der Pijl 2012, p. 504). In Coxian terms, 
this is competition between two very different state/society complexes with China 
providing the greatest challenge to the West to date – significantly greater than that of the 
Soviet Union. For a Chinese high-technology corporation such as Huawei to better its 
Western rivals, or for the BRI to facilitate others to follow China’s developmental lead 
while accepting state/society diversity, is heretical to liberal internationalism and the 
(neo)LIO, and therefore a direct threat to US and Western hegemony – both at home and 
abroad. 
 
 BRI represents a profound challenge to U.S. influence throughout large parts 
 of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and southern Europe. China’s geoeconomic 
 strategy is not a challenge susceptible to defense, deterrence or containment. 
 China is offering large-scale financing to dozens of countries, with few of the 
 conditions on which Western institutions normally insist” (Dobbins, Shatz & 
 Wyne 2018, p. 13). 
 
 In many respects, in contrast to the Cold War period, Russia does not offer a 
state/society complex that poses an ideological threat to liberal capitalism as currently 
practised in the US. The Russian state/society complex may be seen as a poorer and less 
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developed version of that in the US; not a parallel that US elites would like to publicly 
emphasize or even internally accept, but the case for such a parallel can be made. An 
economically and politically dominant elite with extreme inequality in both wealth and 
income, electoral and media systems that serve to severely constrain acceptable political 
discourse, and with religion as a significant part of the national mythology and current 
political milieu; which country does this describe? The differences have only shrunk in 
the past two decades as the US has become increasingly authoritarian and power 
centralized within the Presidential office – the Imperial Presidency that Schlesinger 
(1973) warned about and was consolidated under Bush and Obama. Much more than in 
previous times, the creation of difference through propaganda is unlinked from actual 
social and economic realities in the case of Russia. 
 Even in a hegemonic order, the policy making elite is specific to a given nation 
and will be reflective of that nation’s political, economic, and social past and present. The 
framework allows for the group identity and belief systems of those that constitute the 
policy making elite of the state/society complex, through the usage of the strategic culture 
concept, pushing aside the rational and deterministic instrumentality assumed in much of 
mainstream IR and political-economy conceptualizations (e.g. rational choice theory). 
Chomsky makes the point well, specifically with reference to the intellectual elite, but his 
point can be extended to the rest of the elite given their shared group socialization 
processes and elite schooling: 
 
my guess is that you will find that the intellectual elite is the most heavily 
indoctrinated sector, for good reasons. It’s their role as a secular priesthood to 
 343 
really believe the nonsense that they put forth … for the intellectual elite 
themselves, it’s crucial that they believe it because, after all, they are the 
guardians of the faith. Except for a very rare person who’s just an outright  liar, 
it’s hard to be a convincing exponent of the faith unless you’ve internalized it and 
come to believe it. (Chomsky 1987, p. 35) 
 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the US policy elite in maintaining a given set 
of beliefs and cultural values over time, even when integrating “non-traditional” members 
is documented by Layne (2017). Chomsky also notes the seeming inability of US elite 
members to comprehend the points that he makes which contradict their indoctrination, 
when a more general audience does not seem to have “much difficulty” (Chomsky 1987, 
p. 35). The core of the US elite belief system is what used to be known as the White 
(protestant) Man’s Burden to spread Western-civilization from the “Lockean heartland” 
(Van Der Pijl 2012, p. 504) to the rest of the globe; more recently cast in more politically 
correct cultural terms such as “liberal capitalist democracy”, “human rights”, and “liberal 
internationalism”. With the US as the Shining City On A Hill, the freest and most just 
society in the world that is full of Horatio Alger-like upward mobility, and The Global 
Policeman that strives for power only so that it can act as the compassionate tutor to the 
less civilized. Within such a belief system those that do not accept such tutoring can be 
Othered as a dangerous force that must be removed or contained; whether it be 
Amerindians, “gooks”, “godless-communists”, “Moslem-terrorists” or “autocracies”; 
resurfacing the Terror Dream of the colonial era. The underlying racist and religious 
underpinnings may manifest themselves in such things as the conceptualization of a 
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Democratic Peace Theory that is blind to the overthrow of non-white democracies (e.g. 
Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Chile 1973) by white democracies and the racial undertones 
of the reaction to the economic rise of first Japan and then China. This US and Western 
elite self-righteousness and conceptual blindness may create significant policy errors and 
create a greater level of international risk than would otherwise be the case: 
 
Morgenthau’s warning against the tendency to take the interests of our own group 
and make them into the moral law of the universe has never been more timely in 
an age in which liberal states earnestly debate the degree to which they should 
tolerate the polities founded on another basis. (Thompson & Clinton 2006, p. 
xxiii) 
 
It is only within such a belief system that China could be expected to “naturally” 
progress toward liberal capitalist democracy or otherwise fail (a good recent example 
being Kroenig 2020) and that Russia could be seen as an aggressor in the face of an 
expanding and encircling West. The elites “really believe the nonsense that they put 
forth” (Chomsky 1987, p.35). 
 The Chinese elite is also effective in maintaining shared beliefs and cultural 
values, but has also shown a flexibility and openness to other world views and an 
acceptance of civilizational heterogeneity that contrasts with US and Western elites that 
tend to believe in the universal nature of liberal capitalism and its place as the highest 
form of civilization. The words of Xi Jinping in 2015 are instructive when compared to 
the arrogant assertions of Western elites: 
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our commitment to upholding the basic components and methodology of Marxist 
political economy does not imply a rejection of the economic theories of other 
countries … At the same time, however, we must cast a discerning eye on the 
economic theories of other countries, particularly those of the West, making sure 
that we separate the wheat from the chaff … economics … does not exist in a 
vacuum, and therefore cannot be separated from social and political issues … For 
Marxist political economy to remain vital, it must evolve with the times. Practice 
is the source of theory. (Xi 2015) 
  
 For Chinese and Russian elites the “multiplex world … a world without a 
hegemon, culturally and politically diverse yet economically interconnected” envisaged 
by Acharya (2018, p. 6) holds no ontological challenges, but it may fundamentally 
destabilize the Ontological Security of Western elites as they are forced to come to terms 
with a liberal capitalism that is only provincial rather than universal. For a non-Western 
nation such as China to approach the income per capita levels of the core Western 
nations, overcoming the middle-income trap, creates not just a geopolitical competitor 
but also a competitor in racial, cultural and ideational terms in the minds of the Western 
elites who have assumed their natural superiority for centuries.  
 For the neorealist, US-China competition is simply that of a rising power with 
respect to the currently dominant power, with the US elite responding “rationally” to that 
challenge. For the liberal internationalist, the conundrum becomes the lack of alignment 
with “Western values” as the Chinese economy has become integrated into the global 
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economy and the growing hostility between such highly integrated economies. The 
nuances that arise from the use of the analytical tools of strategic culture and Cox’s 
state/society complex are lost and the more comprehensive nature of the challenge of  
China’s Party-State to the US Plutocracy-State and the Western elite grouping that the 
latter dominates, remains unobserved. 
 The usage of strategic culture also allows for the impacts of the lived experiences 
of policy making elites. The CCP elite share the visceral personal childhood impacts of 
the Cultural Revolution and the teachings of a Chinese history replete with societal 
collapses and external domination coalescing into a belief in the strong Party-State as the 
guarantor of national unity and sovereignty. China’s Century of Humiliation, during 
which the Middle Kingdom was reduced to the status of a supplicant, also provides 
collective memories of societal mistreatment, suspicion of the West, and the rightness of 
China’s reestablishment as a great power or even the greatest power. The long history of 
an activist state as the protector of the Chinese people and its culture also provides a level 
of state legitimacy and an acceptance of widespread state intervention among the general 
populace that is inimical to Western liberal traditions. The combination of Legalism and 
Confucianism not only provides for an effective and strong state, but also one that rules 
in a way that maintains its legitimacy and its Mandate of Heaven, 
 Bell (2015, p. 179) typifies the unique Chinese political structure as “democracy 
at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top”, with the long 
service and slow climb required of the senior members providing for a high level of 
cohesion and a long-term (i.e. decadal) policy orientation. In such a structure, “a person 
with Barack Obama’s presidential professional experience would not even be the 
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manager of a small county in China’s system” (Li, quoted in Bell 2015, p. 187). Of 
course, such a system is open to the personal favoritisms, cliques, and corruption of any 
such authoritarian bureaucracy – as has been evident with respect to the Party-State. 
Notwithstanding this, the bureaucracy has displayed a high degree of competence and 
raison d’etat (with the continued success of the Party seen as a crucial element of the 
raison d’etat) and has been seen to carry out policies to ameliorate such tendencies. The 
recent actions taken against Jack Ma and the Ant Group (Neate 2020; Zhong 2020) may 
be seen as designed to reign in possibly dangerous financial activities (both to the 
Chinese financial system and to individual borrowers) as well as rentier and monopolistic 
tendencies that could damage the legitimacy of the Party-State. As Hudson (2015) has 
noted, a highly innovative financial sector may be beneficial to the elites but not to the 
general populace. The actions taken against Jack Ma and the Ant Group also remind the 
economic elites that the Party-State is preeminent and that private sector firms operate 
under its oversight. 
 The Russian policy making elites, as well as the general populace, share the 
visceral personal impacts of chaos and collapse with their Chinese counterparts. In the 
Russian case from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos of the 1990s - during 
which Russia became a mere shadow of its previous glory and the West was seen to 
support a kleptocratic authoritarian state to further its own interests. The Western 
movement toward Russia’s borders and its extensive propagandist Othering of the nation 
can only have increased the suspicion of a West that refuses to deal with Russia as an 
equal. Combined with a history replete with Western interventions, a tendency toward 
stability, protection of sovereignty (for example in the tight control of foreign NGOs) and 
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careful statecraft, can be seen as stemming from both the internal strategic culture and 
Russia’s geopolitical position. The lack of a cohesive elite also reinforces conservative 
tendencies as a careful balance must be maintained between competing interests. 
 The US policy making elites overlap substantially with the economic elites and 
their corporate and think-tank networks, providing shared educational, corporate, 
consulting and social experiences. Their history is one of centuries of Western 
dominance, seventy years of US global dominance, and a homeland that last experienced 
warfare nearly a century and a half in the past. The increasingly rentier and extractive 
orientation of these elites over the four decade plus period of neoliberalism and 
globalization has somewhat separated them from the raison d’etat, as short-term 
financially driven profit making has taken precedence over nation building. In addition, 
the belief in the universal pre-eminence of liberal capitalism, buttressed by the collapse of 
the communist Soviet Union, may have provided a hubris that blinded policy makers to 
the rise of possible competitors. This understanding of US strategic culture, not available 
to neorealist (as opposed to classical realist) and liberal internationalist ontologies, 
provides the insights necessary to understand the weakness of the West in directly 
fostering Chinese growth – blinded by the elite’s belief in its own ideology, together with 
a certain amount of racist arrogance (e.g. that Orientals can only copy and not create high 
technology), and the huge profit-making opportunities available. The former factors may 
now have been somewhat reduced, but the latter when combined with the costs associated 
with reshoring or onshoring production activities is still significant. The historical 
Othering of Russia, the residual impacts of a Cold War that was reignited in the 1980’s 
by Reagan, and anger at the “loss” of Russia during Putin’s reign may also help account 
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for why the US has not been willing to heed the neorealist position that it should split 
Russia from China, to deal with one geopolitical opponent at a time, as it did successfully 
in the 1970s. Instead its foreign policies have served to greatly deepen the alliance 
between the two nations. This is in contrast to the US policies toward China during the 
1970s that were directed at taking advantage of the split between it and the USSR (with 
China the much weaker of the two) in order to bring China closer to the US (neo)LIO and 
exacerbate that split. Instead, the US seems to have gone out of its way to vilify Russia 
(now very much the lesser of it and China) and reinforce the nationalist forces within that 
country. A Russia within the Western camp would both threaten the Chinese northern 
border and the fossil fuel supplies from Russia and Central Asia that are critical elements 
of current Chinese energy security. The vast anti-Russia propaganda effort during the 
Trump administration can only have served to make such a possibility even more remote. 
The utilization of the strategic culture concept may be lacking though, as recent 
Chinese history has been deeply affected by the impacts of specific individuals; firstly 
Mao (who at times could be likened to an Emperor), and then Deng. Unlike truly despotic 
nations though, the CCP has shown its ability to somewhat self-correct even in the face of 
a leader as dominant as Mao; for example, in the demotion of Mao after the failures of 
the Great Leap Forward. Deng’s reforms and the ongoing development of China have 
also greatly strengthened the Party-State with respect to any individual leader. Xi may be 
considered by some to be gaining the same personal power as Deng, but even Deng had 
to be mindful of what was possible within the constraints of the Party apparatus. Also, 
Deng’s passing did not fundamentally change the ideology and structure of the Party-
State.  
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In Russia, the individual Tsars, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin 
and now Putin did not fully establish the effective bureaucratic and administrative 
structures of either modern Western liberalism or the current Chinese Party-State. While 
the Mao-dominated China gave way to the institutional rebuilding of Deng, Jiang and Hu, 
the bureaucratic structures of the USSR were destroyed and replaced with a Russia 
dominated by individuals and cliques. In the US, regular elections, presidential term 
limits, political parties, and governmental structures limit the impact of any one 
individual. In China, the Party-State acts as a barrier to a Mao-like figure, as does the 
memory of Mao’s rule. In Russia, there are no such barriers, resulting in the greater 
importance of individuals - especially Putin. A central question for the future of Russia is 
the state of one man’s health and his ability to continue his rule through a chosen 
successor – as he himself was chosen by his predecessor and the oligarchs. The centrality 
of such an individual requires incorporation into the model as a possible contingency, as 
the rise and nature of such an individual is not fully knowable in advance. 
Bolstered by the rise in oil prices in the first decade of the new century, and his 
ability to mediate between and balance competing interests, Putin has been able to 
provide a relative stability and has been rewarded for this with legitimacy from the 
Russian citizenry. Putin has striven in recent years to institutionally and culturally embed 
the base of his power and his future legacy. To build a new nationalism, Putin has 
reached back to the Tsarist period and the founding myths of Russia. The tight alignment 
with the Russian Orthodox Church celebrates the Russian image of itself as the protector 
of Orthodox Christianity and conservative values. The “Great Patriotic War” has also 
been raised to the status of a founding myth, on par with the defeat of the Mongols, the 
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expulsion of the foreign powers after the Time of Troubles, the Battle of Poltava, and the 
Battle of Borodino against Napolean’s Grand Armée (Walker 2018). There was much 
public appetite for the nationalistic myths upon which national pride could be rebuilt after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demotion of Russia in the international ranks, as 
shown by the growing demand for media that celebrated the pre-Soviet era (Norris 2012). 
As Walker (2018, p. 253) pointedly states, “Russia’s glorious past has become a national 
obsession, but a prosperous future still seems a long way off”. Such a yearning for past 
national greatness in the face of a much lesser present heavily parallels the mood of my 
native Britain which continues its shrinkage from the time when the “sun never set” on its 
Empire while its media continues to celebrate its past much more than its present.  
Notwithstanding Putin’s efforts, Russia is still predominantly the kleptocratic and 
oligarchic nation that he inherited from his predecessor, with a significant liberal-western 
oriented constituency and a state/society complex that has not fully institutionalized his 
nationalist orientation. Putin may be personally committed to the raison d’etat but there 
are domestic forces that may still yearn for a comprador rapprochement with the West 
and be able to place their personal interests above what is good for the nation. 
The use of a historical materialist lens removes a major shortcoming of much IR 
scholarship in seeing the present as a creation of the past, and the future emanating in a 
somewhat path-dependent way from the present. A process so well captured by Marx: 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations 
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weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be 
occupied revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not 
exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously 
conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, 
battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new sense in world history in 
time-honored disguise and borrowed language. (Marx 1885) 
 
Its dialectical nature also accepts the nature of historical change as a process of 
continuing struggle between competing interests and worldviews rather than as a path to 
societal perfection.  
The ahistorical, Eurocentric and universalist shortcomings of neorealism with 
respect to a rising power such as China are evident in analyses such as Allison’s (2017), 
that rely upon the assumption that the small-scale Peloponnesian wars of more than two 
millennia ago are applicable to the modern world of superpowers and weapons of mass 
destruction, with the internal dynamics of each nation deemed to relative irrelevance. 
Furthermore, both classical realist and neorealist scholars may utilize simplistic readings 
of Thucydides, an author that may in fact be a highly unreliable narrator (Podoksik 2005). 
There is a great deal of disagreement among historians about who actually started the 
Peloponnesian wars; it could have been Athens, Sparta, Corinth or even a combination 
(Dickins 1911; Tannenbaum 1975; Kagan 2013), and therefore the main lesson to be 
learnt is the complexity of the real world, even the ancient one. In addition, as Bagby 
notes (1994, p. 133), “Thucydides thinks that an understanding of the political and 
cultural differences among city-states before and during the Peloponnesian War is crucial 
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for understanding their behavior”; Sparta and Athens could easily be seen as greater 
ideological competitors than the Cold War US and Soviet Union. This is directly at odds 
with the ontology of neorealism, but compatible with both Cox’s historical materialism 
and neoclassical realism as well as the conceptualization of strategic culture used in this 
dissertation. As noted in the chapter on China, learnings from the much larger conflicts 
that happened in that country during the same time period as the Peloponnesian War may 
be more applicable to the present.  
The dialectical nature of change is most evident in the US, with the extreme 
economic cleavages created by four decades of neoliberalism interconnecting with a 
history of racist Othering that has not been properly surfaced and addressed by economic, 
political and cultural elites. As Martin Luther King so eloquently stated: 
 
History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give 
up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily 
give up their unjust posture, but as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups are 
more immoral than individuals … few members of a race that have oppressed 
another race can understand or appreciate the deep groans and passionate 
yearnings of those that have been oppressed. (King 1963) 
 
The intensification of these fault lines during the COVID crisis, and the inability 
of even “progressive” elites to adequately conceptualize and address them, points to the 
possibility of an intensifying internal strife which may significantly affect foreign policy 
decision-making and the ability of elites to command societal resources when necessary. 
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In such circumstances, the identification and scapegoating of threatening Others may 
serve both to distract and discipline the general populace. As shown with the US entry 
into World War 1 and the more recent Iraq wars, and noted by Goering, the 
Reischmarschall of Nazi Germany, in an interview given at the Nuremberg Trials in 
1946: 
 
Naturally, the common people don’t want war, neither in Russia nor in England 
nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood, But the 
people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you 
have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack 
of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any 
country. (Goering 1946) 
 
 Cox’s historical materialism also allows for the inclusion and treatment of non-
systemic, but system changing, variables such as the still ongoing process of global 
industrialization and the probable future transition of the global energy system to low 
carbon sources. The latter will have consequences far beyond those of simple 
technocratic changes, with highly divergent impacts between nations. The three case 
studies chosen include both the possible greatest gainer (China) and one of the possible 
greatest losers (Russia) from such a transition. The relative positions of China and the US 
with respect to gains from such a transition, together with the differing balances of power 
within their state/society complexes, may provide China with geopolitical advantage. 
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Within the US, the tension between fossil fuel interests and other elite groupings may 
intensify over time as the need for such a transition becomes more urgent. 
 From the above, it can be seen that the framework utilized in this dissertation 
captures much of the complexity of international relations that mainstream IR 
frameworks miss. Its hybridity serves to better match the complexity of the world, and 
the rejection of the universality of Eurocentric and liberal tenets allows for the analysis of 
heterogeneous nations on a basis less coloured by a single ideological lens. What are the 
areas of further research that may be the most fruitful ones? 
 A first area of research would be to utilize the framework to analyze the position 
of other nations. Germany, as the now dominant power within the EU, would provide 
useful insights. India, as both a regional power and one that seems to be in a transition 
phase from secular socialism to oligarchical neoliberal Hindu-nationalism, may prove to 
be another fruitful research topic. Japan, as another regional power and historical 
competitor to China, may also be a good candidate. It is important to remember that the 
framework may be limited in its applicability to nations that possess limited sovereignty 
– which is the case with many nations, especially in Africa and the Americas. For 
example, the concept of state/society complex would require some changes to integrate 
things such as comprador elites and the deep penetration of supranational authorities (e.g. 
the World Bank, IMF, United Nations Development Program, European Central Bank, 
European Commission), foreign agencies (e.g. USAID and the National Endowment for 
Democracy), and international non-governmental organizations (e.g. “philanthropic” 
foundations such as the Rockefeller, Ford, Open Society and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
foundations) and transnational corporations into the internal workings of many nations. 
 356 
 Another important area for possible research is the detailed geopolitical and 
energy security dynamics of a transition away from fossil fuels, an area that has been 
little covered by the academy. Such research would include the dynamics of a highly 
inelastic global oil and gas market place, the extreme dependence of some elites upon oil 
and gas rents for their continued rule and even personal survival, highly varied extraction 
and social costs, the possibility of supplier favoritism with respect to domestic and allied 
production, and the possible urgency to bring forward production of a wasting resource 
that at some point will ultimately become worthless. The possibility for a highly volatile 
period with non-linear demand responses and significant conflict needs to be fully 
conceptualized and understood with respect to possible outcomes and most applicable 
policy options. 
 Another area of research could be into the construction of possible coalitions that 
could enforce a low carbon energy transition through economic incentives and 
disincentives, and military means if necessary, together with the financial steps required 
to remove the threat posed by fossil fuel and growth-related assets to the global financial 
system. For example, could a nationalization of fossil fuel assets, with the losses on those 
assets becoming significantly socialized, facilitate a transition by removing much of the 




6.2. Overall Framework Insights  
The analysis facilitated by the framework provides explanatory value with respect 
to recent events that both neorealism and liberal internationalism cannot adequately 
explain – the increase rather than a reduction in US and Western overt and covert 
aggression after the fall of the Soviet Union, the nature of the Russian state/society 
system following the Soviet collapse, and the rise of China. By understanding both the 
historical nature of the related state/society systems and the culture of the decision-
making elites, these outcomes can be accounted for. 
With respect to the US, the collapse of the Soviet-bloc can be seen not as the 
collapse of the preeminent security threat that will allow for a more peaceful world and a 
reassignment of resources away from the security state, but rather as the opportunity to 
fulfil a multi-century elite mission of US, and Western, global dominance and the 
opening of all nations to US, and Western, exploitation and profit making. Within this 
context, the expansion of NATO (and the EU) in the wake of the collapse of the very 
threat that NATO was supposedly constructed to address, becomes comprehensible. The 
unwillingness to include a Russia with any semblance of sovereignty within the Western 
alliance, together with the aggressive regime change operations within its bordering 
nations, also becomes understandable. 
 The removal of the Soviet bloc removed a blockage to the dominance of the US 
capitalist class, and its lesser allies, allowing for a more aggressive geopolitical stance 
designed to subjugate all other nations; the more permissive international environment 
facilitating a full expression of the interests of the US elite within its foreign policy. After 
sensing victory in this drive for global dominance, the rejuvenation of Russia and the 
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emergence of China now threaten a less permissive international environment of a 
multipolar world that will constrain US, and Western, expression of their capitalist class 
interests within their foreign policy; especially with a China that it is dominated by a 
Party-state class that has remained in place during China’s decades of rapid growth, 
rather than a liberal capitalist one. Over a period of hundreds of years, material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions have reinforced each other in the production of a 
Western common sense that sees liberal capitalist democracy as the only acceptable 
“modern” civilizational model, supported by a degree of inherent racial and religious 
arrogance – with the US as the epitome.  
A parallel can be drawn between the current position of the West, one of 
civilizational arrogance and ideological dogmatism, and that of China prior to its Century 
of Humiliation. A China that considered itself as the peak of civilization, with a 
state/society complex operating with the ideational and institutional arrangements 
established during the Tang dynasty a millennium before, was unable conceptualize the 
West as a threat, and to reinvigorate itself when that threat was realized. The Century of 
Humiliation was one of a reconceptualization of Chinese society, a much slower one than 
the successful Japanese example of the Meiji Restoration, completed by Mao and then 
Deng. A reconceptualization that benefited from the readiness to take lessons from many 
philosophical traditions, both from within and without China, while remaining generally 
faithful to the service of the welfare of the Chinese people (the Mandate of Heaven now 
transformed into a Performance Legitimacy that replaced the ideological support of 
communism). After the path of radical economic and political liberalization was rejected 
at the end of the 1980s, the pre-eminence of the Party-state was reinforced and a hybrid 
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Chinese path to development and modernity – rejecting the Western liberal path – 
became the new common sense. A path that resulted in the growth miracle of the 
following three decades, one that greatly surpassed that experienced by the US during its 
period of rapid growth in the nineteenth century. In this context, the actions of Xi should 
not be surprising as they represent a redirection back toward the centrality of a less 
corrupt and more benevolent Party-state after the unequal and corrupting rapid growth of 
the first decade of this century. The actions to restrict rentier financial activities (e.g. 
subprime lending) and tighten controls and regulation over the creation of credit, together 
with the commodification of the social sphere (a primitive accumulation of the social 
commons and human psychological preferences) inherent in the business models of 
social media companies, serve to both protect the Chinese citizenry against exploitation 
and remove threats to the stability of the Chinese development model and the authority of 
the Party-state; quite the opposite of the position taken by the US state. The continued 
high competence and responsiveness of this Party-state is evidenced by its responses to 
domestic pollution concerns, the challenge of the COVID pandemic, the extensive 
infrastructural, economic and military upgrading of the past decade, and the creation of 
world-beating technological organizations such as Huawei. 
The West finds itself unable to conceptualize China as a civilizational equal that it 
can learn significant lessons from; lessons that may threaten both the current wealth and 
position of the capitalist class and challenge the basic self-serving ontology through 
which it views the world. From Cox’s conceptualization the co-creational relationship 
between material capabilities, ideas and institutions is evident; the prospect for significant 
ideational change is constrained by material capabilities and institutions, and any such 
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change will result in concomitant changes in those other forces. The work of de Graaff 
and van Apeldoorn, as well as that of Layne, point to the workings of these inertial 
constraints within the US strategic culture. The possibilities for a rethinking of US 
foreign policy are constrained both by the material and institutional realities within which 
the strategic culture operates (e.g. sources of funding and future career paths), and the 
selection and socialization processes that work effectively to discipline and/or winnow 
out non-compliant individuals. The inability to conceive of an alternative to liberal 
capitalism or to accept a more pluralistic world order is evidenced by the repeated refrain 
to “Western values” in the criticism of China, with the civilizational Other still being 
expected to comply to Western civilizational ideals and the rules of a (neo)LIO that the 
West both constructed and places itself in the position of judge and jury over such 
compliance. At the same time, Western elites repeatedly point to the “inevitable” collapse 
of China, and its presumed inability to advance beyond the middle-income trap, due to its 
illiberalism. Tooze (2021) reflects this level of civilizational arrogance and rejection of 
unfortunate facts within the US military establishment when he states: 
 
Now, the ultimate goal of the Pentagon planners is to loosen that link between 
economic performance and military force. They aim to secure US military 
dominance even as the centrifugal effect of global economic growth reduces 
America’s relative weight in the world economy. Ultra-advanced technology, not 
GDP, will be the decisive factor. As Washington torques the sinews of power, the 
entire world will feel the effect. 
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No acknowledgement of the development of advanced military technologies by 
Russia and China (e.g. hypersonic surface to surface and air to surface missiles), the 
repeated failure of so many high technology military projects – from the “Star Wars 
program” of the Reagan era to the current F35, and the repeated US losses against China 
in war games situated in the South China Sea (Copp 2021). The utilization of the Coxian 
insight of the fundamental co-creation of material capabilities, ideas and institutions 
within this work helps identify the linkage between US economic and military dominance 
in the creation of the institutions of the LIO in the immediate post-WW2 period and the 
(neo)LIO in the post-Soviet period. As relative material capabilities of liberal and 
illiberal powers change in the latter’s favour it should be expected that the institutions of 
the world order will also change, with the (neo)LIO being less resistant than some of the 
more sanguine US academics (Deudney & Ikenberry 2018; Ikenberry 2018) from being 
transformed into a multipolar order with institutions reflecting compromises between 
heterogeneous worldviews – including illiberal ones. The belief that “Both projects - the 
Westphalian and liberal internationalist—were founded on ideas that were implicitly 
universal in their normative and legal-political scope” (Ikenberry 2018, p. 24) is bereft of 
the Coxian insight while exhibiting the blinkers of Eurocentrism. The assertion that “The 
liberal order and its democracies will prevail because the stately ships of illiberalism 
readily run aground in turbulent times, while the resilient raft of liberalism lumbers 
along” (Deudney & Ikenberry 2018, p. 24) requires significant self-reflection with 
respect to the differing experiences of China and the West in the post Global Financial 
Crisis world (with the current COVID crisis offering another chance for such self-
reflection). 
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An unsettling parallel for US elites is that of the Soviet Union and the US during 
the 1980s, with a Russia handicapped by a slow growing economy and an increasingly 
corrupted and dysfunctional Party-state bureaucracy that was not able to keep pace with 
the US and the West; with an increasingly radical revolution from above producing 
collapse rather than rejuvenation. In the present, the US now sits in the slowly growing, 
corrupted and dysfunctional role, with a faster growing China seeming to possess a much 
more competent and focused elite class, and the US directing a much greater share of 
GDP toward military and security activities, together with rentier profits, while its 
domestic infrastructure, institutions, the social welfare of the majority, and the legitimacy 
of the capitalist elite and state decay. As Tooze (2021) notes “Defining militarised 
spending more generally to include Homeland Security, the share [of US state 
discretionary spending] rises to two thirds or more”. The use of approximately US$8 
trillion of resources for US military aggression, with little to show for it except within the 
pockets of corporate executives and shareholders, is a prime example of the unlinking of 
US state policy from basic competence and the raison d’état. The inability of the 
strategic culture to address the scale of this failure and to accept the need for a 
fundamental process of renewal reflects its locked in nature. In such a context the 
extreme reactions to the retreat from Afghanistan, after twenty years of expensive failure, 
becomes comprehensible; a rejection of the inconvenient facts and shooting of the 
messenger required to forestall the acceptance of the need for a fundamental rethink of 
US foreign policy and the nature of its state/society complex.  
The internal dynamics and historical trajectory of Russia place it as a weak 
secondary power requiring an alliance with a major power. The material, institutional and 
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ideational history does not provide the basis for the kind of developmental state that 
China possesses. For a few decades, mostly under Stalin, successful industrialization was 
carried out, but the state was unable to move from an extensive mode of development into 
an intensive one. In the decades following Stalin the state ossified and became 
increasingly corrupted, which then became the basis of the corrupted and rentier 
capitalist elite created during the 1990s. Putin has brought some stability and state 
oversight, greatly aided by the increase in oil prices in the new century, but is greatly 
restricted in his ability to carry out the required transformation required for Russia’s 
development beyond the status of a resource exporter with a relatively advanced military 
industrial sector. Attempts to gain the support of the West in such a transformation were 
rebuffed, and now Russia is heavily dependent upon its alliance with China; an alliance 
where it has come to accept its secondary role. Given the inability to endogenously 
upgrade its economy, Russia may be increasingly faced with the role of Mexico with 
respect the US, that of a resource exporter and location of Chinese offshored production 
sites. With Chinese GDP per capita at market exchange rates close to surpassing that of 
Russia, and growing at a much faster rate, this may become a distinct possibility during 
the current decade; especially if the Chinese currency appreciates and the transition to 
low carbon energy systems accelerates. As the Chinese equal and overtake average 
Russian incomes on a PPP basis over the next ten years, and Chinese technological 
achievements outstrip those of Russia, the legitimacy of the Russian state and elite may 
become more challenged while at the same time a window for more fundamental change 
may be opened. The management of the changing relationship between the two powers 
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will be a crucial one for China, with the maintenance of Russian national prestige and 
state legitimacy a significant determinant. 
The Chinese state/society complex has been “winning” for over four decades, 
aided in its early days by a highly supportive West that assumed that it would inevitably 
become more liberal and open to Western leadership and more recently by the West’s 
error in pushing Russia (and also Iran, Pakistan and most recently Afghanistan) toward an 
increasingly close alliance with China. The general geopolitical strategy of “winning 
without fighting” (Boyd & Ufimsteva 2021), backed up with a strong defensive military 
position, is highly effective for a development state with high levels of domestic 
legitimacy and capable of driving still fast economic growth and industrial upgrading. 
The analysis facilitated by the framework identifies no need for any fundamental change 
in this strategy unless triggered by a militarily aggressive US, especially with a foreign 
policy and economic stance that has helped keep ASEAN out of any anti-China alliance. 
In contrast, the US is challenged with the need for a significant ideational, institutional 
and material renewal that will require a rebalancing of internal power relationships and 
quite possibly income and wealth distribution; together with a significant adjustment in 
its attitude toward the sovereignty of other nations. Without such a renewal, the US may 
face an accelerating decline in position with respect to China as it continues to fight using 
the assumptions of its “unipolar moment” and the first Cold War, in the face of an 
opponent with very different strengths, strategies and tactics and a significantly changed 
world system. Russia faces the same challenges, although allied with China, in striving to 
not become increasingly a natural resource supplier and provider of cheap production 
facilities – a Mexicanization. 
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The possible impacts of the above for the possibility of a move to a low carbon 
energy system are covered in the next chapter. 
6.3. Lessons for the Combined Transition 
 
“Our Gross National Product … counts air pollution and cigarette advertising … special 
locks for our doors and jails for the people who break them … the destruction of the 
redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl … napalm … and nuclear 
warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in our cities … Yet [it] does 
not allow for the health of our children, the quality of our education or the joy of their 
play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the 
intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials … And it can tell 
us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans.” 




 More than five decades ago, Robert F. Kennedy detailed the severe shortcomings 
in the measurement of Gross National Product (GNP) and its disconnection from many of 
the things that create and maintain the happiness of the citizenry. Such insights have still 
not been accepted into mainstream policy making discourses. Instead, growth in 
GNP/GDP has become increasingly fetishized as the official measure of the success of a 
given nation and the competency of its policy making elites. Ecomodernist theories have 
been used to reconcile such growth with the need to limit humanity’s impact upon the 
Earth systems that are critical to the continued existence of complex human civilization. 
In an earlier chapter I addressed the improbability of the ecomodernist assertion of a hard 
delinking between economic growth and material consumption facilitating such a 
reconciliation. The geopolitical transition that is currently taking place reinforces this 
growth imperative, as competing nations strive to maintain or increase their relative 
economic power. In addition, the possibility of the extensive international cooperation 
required to address climate change, and other issues stemming from large scale human 
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interference with Earth systems, is reduced as the level of international conflict increases. 
This brings us to a modified form of the paradox proposed by Nyman (2018): the attempt 
to maximize relative geopolitical position by individual nations removes the possibility of 
significant reductions in fossil fuel usage in timeframes relevant to limiting climate 
change within a safe temperature range – increasing the risk of large-scale discontinuous 
changes in the climate that may be produce an existential risk to modern advanced 
civilization. 
 With a United States that has been expanding for over four centuries, representing 
the vanguard of a “liberal”, Christian and white West that had been expanding for two 
centuries prior to that, the US-led bloc can be seen as the historically unstoppable force – 
one that considers itself as the natural successor to Greco-Roman civilization. This was 
especially the case during the 1990s, the global apogee of Western universalism, but it is 
now being challenged by the immovable object of a China allied with Russia that cannot 
be contained in the way that the USSR was. The leaders of both China and Russia have 
expressed their resistance to the Western assumptions of exceptionalism and pre-
eminence: 
 
I would rather disagree with a case he [Obama] made on American 
exceptionalism, … It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see 
themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation. … We are all different, but 
when we ask for the Lord’s blessings, we must not forget that God created us 
equal. (Putin 2013) 
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No country has the right to dominate global affairs, control the destiny of others 
or keep advantages in development all to itself. Even less should one be allowed 
to do whatever it likes and be the hegemon, bully or boss of the world … There 
must be no practice of exceptionalism or double standards. Nor should 
international law be distorted and used as a pretext to undermine other countries' 
legitimate rights and interests or world peace and stability (Xi 2020) 
 
That immovable object also threatens to soon take over the role of the 
unstoppable force, at least regionally – although perhaps with a lesser level of forced 
ideological and socio-economic assimilation. The best that can be hoped for in such a 
confrontation is a relatively peaceful period of conflict before a new geopolitical balance 
is reached, especially with the highly divergent state/society complexes, national histories 
and cultures of the West and China. Especially with rhetoric such as this in an editorial of 
the official Chinese media:  
 
If China, as a major power, wants to realize its great rejuvenation, it must 
overcome the US’ strategic malice and madness. A peaceful coexistence between 
China and the US cannot be achieved by China’s obedience and tolerance. We 
must be an invincible force, and then the US may finally accept peaceful 
competition with China in accordance with rules. In other words, benign 
cooperation between the two countries can be stabilized only when the US finds 
that peaceful coexistence with China is its best choice, or the least-worst one. 
(Global Times 2020) 
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 Very much “speak not so softly and carry a big stick” to misquote Theodore 
Roosevelt. The possibility of a “hot” war cannot be written off just because the nations 
involved are highly economically integrated and such a war may seem a little crazy. 
Many made the same mistake about a WW1 fought predominantly between relatively 
homogeneous Christian nations with inter-married aristocratic elites and substantial inter-
country trade flows. The German fear of a closing window in which it would be able to 
defeat the industrializing colossus of Tsarist Russia is also mirrored in US elite concerns 
about time not being in their favor with respect to challenging a rising China. All three 
nations also possess the required level of elite media and social control to change the 
national populace’s perception of another nation to facilitate and legitimize war if 
required; as displayed by Russia with respect to its actions in Chechnya and the Crimea, 
and the US with respect to its actions in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Libya, and its 
entry into WW1. This is not to say that conflict is inevitable, especially if China 
continues to move ahead economically and diplomatically while focusing on defense 
rather than offense and Western elites can come to terms with their worldview becoming 
provincial rather than universal. Without such an acceptance, the West will continue to 
condemn China as not being acceptably “modern” through the lens of its assumed 
universalistic assumptions of what “modernity” is, even within the walls of the academy: 
 
With its resort to Western standards, current scholarship is full of unilateral 
critiques and “accusations” about the wrongdoing of the Chinese government 
without any serious exploration into the underlying operative logic of the Chinese 
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government embedded in a complex economic, social, and historical context. 
Without any sound reasoning and evidence, an implicit working assumption 
behind much of this scholarship is that China will or ought to adopt the model set 
up by Western doctrines. (Zhou 2019, p. 424) 
 
 When the required energy transition is placed within its geopolitical and political-
economic context, instead of viewed as simply a technocratic exercise, the importance of 
the relationship of the major powers with respect to such a transition becomes apparent. 
The three powers analyzed in this work hold very different positions with respect to that 
transition. China has the most advantaged position, as it is a major fossil fuel importer 
and its industrial policy has placed it in a leading position in the fields of green 
technology intellectual property, production and implementation. In addition, its surface 
transportation is already much less dependent upon internal combustion engines than 
those of both the US and Russia. This is not to say that China will quickly move to a low-
carbon economy, given its economic-growth driven need for increasing and secure 
energy supplies that are still heavily dependent upon the usage of domestic coal 
consumption. Rather, that it stands to gain the most from any such transition, whatever 
the pace of that transition, relative to Russia and the US. Russia has the most 
disadvantaged position, with a high dependency of state revenues and corporate profits 
on fossil fuel exports, and minimal capabilities in green technologies. The US is a mixed 
picture, with both a significant fossil fuel sector and a growing green technology sector, 
although the latter is significantly behind that of China. In both Russia and the US, fossil 
fuel elites act as a significant negative with respect to the ability to improve relative 
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positions; as does the lack of the kind of focused state industrial policy practiced in 
China.  
Some may question the effectiveness of such state-driven industrial policy, but the 
rapid upgrading of Chinese technological capabilities in the past decade tends to support 
its effectiveness when managed by highly competent and trustworthy bureaucracies; as 
seen with the highly successful state-driven development of the “Four Little Dragons” 
and Japan (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Vogel 1991; Wade 2004; Chang 2006), China 
and Vietnam (Hansen, Bekkevold & Nordhaug 2020). The collapse of the Soviet Union 
greatly delegitimized state-driven industrial policy, but the inference that the collapse of 
the USSR proved that industrial policy was not efficacious utilizes false-logic. It is akin 
to refusing to take a drug prescribed by a doctor because some people overdosed on that 
drug. The other false parallel used to critique industrial policy is that of South American 
import substitution, but this is comparing Asian apples to South American oranges. The 
South American nations were handicapped by such things as corrupt bureaucracies, 
societal institutions oriented toward negative rent-seeking and clientelist behaviours, and 
an import substitution orientation that facilitated the protection of inefficient and 
uncompetitive “favorites”. Even with all of these shortcomings, South American state-
driven development was not the disaster that the Western consensus proposes (Hira 
2007). The negative Western consensus view (a “cognitive and normative monoculture of 
basic beliefs about how the world does work and how it should work” [Wade 2014, para. 
4]) toward state-driven development is highly resistant to the lessons of the Asian 
examples, and forgetful of successes in its own history, such as nineteenth-century 
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Germany and the US (Hudson 2010), and too negative with respect to the South 
American experience.  
The reality is that “In a world of constructed comparative advantage, social and 
political institutions – the state among them – shape international specialization. State 
involvement may be taken as one of the sociopolitical determinants of what niche a 
country ends up occupying in the international division of labour” (Evans 1995, p. 9-10). 
Simplistic, and quite possibly self-serving (Chang 2010), notions of Ricardian fixed 
comparative advantage (and capital bottled up within each nation) and the “natural” 
shortcomings of state intervention with respect to ”free” markets may be as relevant to 
the present day as a buggy whip is to a modern car (Chang & Grabel 2014). 
 The above points to the possibility of an accelerated move of China toward an 
energy transition, taking advantage of its leading green technology position to claim an 
increasing technological lead over the US. At the same time, such a move would serve to 
decrease its fossil fuel imports, which will provide an improvement in both its terms of 
trade and its energy security – especially with respect to a US-led energy blockade. One 
major retardant of such a move is the inertia and friction that exists within societies, 
friction that is not reflected in the technocratic ecomodernist models of energy transition. 
These include the question of the large losses that would be actualized in non-depreciated 
economic assets, such as fossil fuel powered electricity generation and fossil fuel 
extraction, together with the structural unemployment and retraining needs produced by 
such a transition. In addition, there would be the physical and financial limitations on the 
speed of production ramp-ups in areas such as electric vehicle production, solar panel and 
wind turbine production and implementation, raw material extraction, electric grid 
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expansion and battery production (Yergin 2020). Added to that would be the possible 
impacts on important constituencies within the CCP, such as the national oil companies 
and the electricity generation sector. This is nowhere near an exhaustive list of the 
physical, political and economic retardants upon a low carbon energy transition. An 
overall concern for a CCP that is very cognizant of the need for social stability would 
also be the possibly highly disruptive effects of a rapid transition, including risks to the 
economic growth that supports CCP legitimacy in a myriad of ways. Much better to have 
a measured transition that still takes advantage of China’s leading position but does not 
risk instability within the Party and society as a whole, and also does not risk the stability 
of China’s fossil fuel dependent northern ally. Such a “steady as she goes” approach may 
also serve not to awaken the alarm of US elites in the way that the “China 2025” 
initiative did. The recent Chinese proclamations of being carbon-neutral by 2060 supports 
this, “steady as she goes” hypothesis.   
 The need for continued economic growth, for domestic legitimacy, financial 
stability, and geopolitical reasons, will continue to limit any decreases in GHG emissions 
if only a relative decoupling is assumed. If Chinese GDP growth is to average 5% over 
the next decade, a realistic assumption given the recent GDP growth deceleration, even 
the combined effects of a relative decoupling of energy usage and increased renewables 
usage may not produce more than a minor reduction in GHG emissions. Any reduction in 
the acceptable GDP growth rate would both reduce the relative size of Chinese GDP with 
respect to the US and its Western allies in the future, and limit increases in the welfare of 
the Chinese population. In this context, the Chinese promise of a peak in national GHG 
emissions “by 2030 at the latest” makes a great deal of geopolitical and domestic political 
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sense, and is aligned with the recent target of doubling Chinese GDP per capital by the 
mid 2030’s; no hints of reducing GDP growth to accelerate a reduction in GHG 
emissions. By that date Chinese GDP would be approximately double that of the US in 
PPP terms and China’s economic mix would be at a stage when increasing amounts of 
energy (and emissions) will be embedded in imports (transferring GHG emissions to the 
national accounts of other nations). At the global level, such a peaking of Chinese GHG 
emissions, counted on a national production basis, may have little if any positive impact 
upon climate change given the height of the peak and the possibility for a significant 
increase in externalized emissions through imports of embedded energy. 
 The Anthropocene Geopolitics that Dalby (2020) calls for to facilitate ecological 
sustainability may therefore not be possible until at least the point at which the above 
processes have completed, meaning a delay of at least a decade or more before even the 
most limited of geopolitical prerequisites would be in place for such a global “coming 
together”– even ignoring the internal political dynamics in many nations that may retard 
any move away from fossil fuels. The definition of the required destination is not the 
bigger problem, it is the question of how we get “there” from “here”; with the latter 
moving farther away from the former by the day. 
 Does ecomodernism have any new rabbits that can be pulled from the proverbial 
hat to resolve, or at least delay the consequences of, the paradox? Perhaps yes, at least in 
a discoursal sense, through the intensification of human attempts to control nature; 
technocratic “solutions”, that allow for continued growth, and don’t challenge the status-
quo state/society complexes. These are the geo-engineering technologies that promise to 
either provide an anthropogenic global thermostat by reducing the albedo of the Earth, or 
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capture and store the climate-warming waste gases of human consumption – in some 
cases even fulfilling the ecomodernist dream of a ‘circular’ economy where those wastes 
are recycled into new production processes. Even if such proposed technologies are 
highly speculative, they may provide the socio-economic and ideational path of least 
resistance within nations unready or unable to face the deep and threatening changes 
required to significantly reduce global fossil fuel use. Discourses on such technologies 
have already infested the UN IPCC documents (Anderson 2015), as climate change 
progress has increasingly lagged behind the required path; with assumptions of colossal 
human projects aimed at sequestering gargantuan amounts of carbon dioxide – always in 
the future (Larkin, Kuriakose, Sharmina & Anderson 2017; Hilaire et al, 2019). 
 To allow for a continuing belief in the ability of human ingenuity to overcome 
ecological limits, Solar Radiation Management (SRM) technologies, some of which 
appear to be relatively cheap to implement and can be localized to a geographic locality 
(i.e. managed nationally) may just fit the bill; especially if an emergency response is 
required to combat non-linear reactions of the Earth System. As with other geo-
engineering technologies though, the possible side effects are not fully understood, and 
different technologies may be required for specific areas such as the Polar Regions. The 
next UN IPCC report, slated for 2022, will be indicative of whether SRM technologies 
are gaining acceptance within technocratic circles. A report on solar geoengineering 
released in early 2021, by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine, calls for the US government to fund a 5-year $200 million national research 
program (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 20021). 
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 That the implementation of such colossal and fundamentally untestable 
technologies may be more believable than a reconciliation and cooperation of nations and 
humanity along the lines proposed by Dalby (2020) is indicative of the depth of the 
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